Forthcoming African Elections

Botswana: Parliamentary
Date of last election: October 1999
Date of next election: October 2004
Parties contesting last election: 8
Results of last election: Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) (54.2%); Botswana National Front (BNF) (26.6%); Botswana Congress Party (BCP) (11.3); Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) (5%); Botswana People’s Party (BPP) (0%)
Parliamentary seats (40): BDP (33); BNF (6); BCP (1); BAM (0); BPP (0)
Multi-party elections since independence: 7
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? No
Are presidential terms restricted? Yes, 2 consecutive 5-year terms
Has this been amended? 1960 constitution amended in August 1997 restricting presidential terms.

Burundi: Presidential and Parliamentary
Date of last election: 29 June 1993
Date of next election: 1 November 2004
Parties contesting last election: 2 dominant parties got 95% of the vote
Results of last election: Hutu-dominated Front for the Democracy of Burundi (FRODEBU) 73%; Tutsi-dominated Union of National Progress (UPRONA) 22%
Parliamentary seats (121): FRODEBU (65); UPRONA (16); Civilians (27); Other (13)
Multi-party elections since independence: 1
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? No
Are presidential terms restricted? Constitution not yet in place.
Note: Election to replace transitional government being held in terms of Arusha Peace Accord.

Cameroon: Presidential
Date of last election: October 1997
Date of next election: October 2004
Parties contesting last election: 4
Results of last presidential election: Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) (92.6%); Cameroon People’s Union

Of politicians, power and parliaments

In SA’s third democratic elections the ruling ANC returned to power with an overwhelming majority. Such a majority makes even more important a proper separation of powers between the legislature and the executive and greater scrutiny of legislation and government policies by MPs, irrespective of their party affiliation.

Africa has never had a shortage of parliaments – only a dearth of independent ones. ‘Rubberstamp’ parliaments have also been used to provide legitimacy to a sometimes increasingly autocratic executive or president.

Electoral dominance has often been misconstrued as the right to ignore other opinions, because the majority clearly agrees with the policies of the party. But party dominance should not result in a narrower space for political debate. In fact encouraging debate about policy alternatives becomes imperative. As Raila Odinga, Kenyan minister of housing and public works, said at a workshop on parliaments in Africa recently, the opposition ‘must keep the ruling party in check, guarding against weaknesses and excesses… but should not oppose for the sake of opposing, but [seek to] provide alternatives’. This requires vigilant MPs and an electorate that takes an active interest in politics. Both are vital for democratic consolidation.

Across the continent there is a small, yet growing, trend of parliaments trying to assert themselves. In Malawi, parliament thwarted many attempts by President Muluzi to make it a more pliant institution. In Zambia an amendment allowing a third presidential term for Chiluba failed because of the emergence of a common front between MPs and civil society. In Kenya the Public Accounts Committee chair is drawn from an opposition party and in the post-Moi era there are heated debates about moulding a more effective parliament.

What constitutes effective MPs and opposition parties? A record of independent inquiry on bills before parliament; an assertive stance on any attempts by the executive to limit accountability or transparency to parliament; the exercise of parliament’s powers of oversight in terms of the constitution; and attention to constituency work. For opposition parties, it includes providing policy alternatives.

Clearly, lack of parliamentary resources and a culture of debate are key constraints, especially where for too long capturing state power meant access to economic and political patronage. However, Kenya’s recent history of coalition government may be instructive about minimising these extremes. Although not without its pitfalls, the necessity of compromise compels the coalition partners to abandon fixed policy positions, thus creating an opportunity for reaching consensus on the required policies — a familiar development in many European countries.

If parliaments are to recapture their rightful role in the state, they must not flinch from exercising their powers responsibly. This also requires greater understanding by MPs of the role they have to play — representing the interests of their constituencies; making good legislation in the interests of citizens; and keeping the executive in check. (In the Netherlands, for example, new MPs undergo 4-8 weeks of training on how parliament works and what it takes to be a good parliamentarian.)

These cannot be implemented overnight. It requires breaking away from the politics of patronage and the mindset that MPs (especially of the ruling party) must be ‘agents’ of the executive.

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

INSIDE
EU expansion and Africa ............... 3
Kenya in Sudan and Somalia ........ 4
African elections continued on p.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of Election</th>
<th>Date of Last Election</th>
<th>Date of Next Election</th>
<th>Parties contesting last election</th>
<th>Results of Last Election</th>
<th>Multi-party elections since independence</th>
<th>Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years?</th>
<th>Are presidential terms restricted?</th>
<th>Has this been amended?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>15 June 1999</td>
<td>18 May 2004</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>United Democratic Front (UDF) 52.4%, Malawi Congress Party (MCP) / Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) 45.2%, Malawi Democratic Party 1.43%</td>
<td>Yes, two consecutive 5-year terms</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Frelimo (52.3%), Renamo (47.7%), Liberal Democratic Party of Mozambique (0%), Social-Liberal and Democratic Party (0%), Mozambican Opposition Union (0%), Democratic Union (0%)</td>
<td>Yes, two consecutive 5-year terms</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>15-16 November 1999</td>
<td>30 November 2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) (76.8%); Congress of Democrats (COD) (9.9%); Tumhalle Alliance of Namibia (DTA) (9.5%); United Democratic Front (UDF) (2.9%); Monitor Action Group (MAG) (0.7%)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>19 September 1999</td>
<td>Dec 2004-Jan 2005</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of the People of the CAR (MLPC) (51.6%); Central African Democratic Assembly (RDC) (19.4%); Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) (11.2%); (Patriotic Front for Progress (FFP) (6.1%); Social Democratic Party (PSD) (5%); Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP) (4%); National Unity Party (PUN) (3%); Democratic Forum for Modernity (FODEM) (2%); Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) (2%); People’s Union for the Republic (UPR) (1%); Civic Forum (FC) (1%); Independents 6%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>7 parties, 2 coalitions</td>
<td>Militant Socialist Movement, Mauritian Militant Movement, Republic Movement, Mauritian, Mauritian Social-Democratic Party = MMM/MSM (52.3%); Mauritian Labour Party, Mauritian Party of Xavier-Luc Duval = PTr/PMXD (36.9%); Rodrigues People’s Organisation (10.8%)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Frelimo (52.3%), Renamo (47.7%), Liberal Democratic Party of Mozambique (0%), Social-Liberal and Democratic Party (0%), Mozambican Opposition Union (0%), Democratic Union (0%)</td>
<td>Yes, two consecutive 5-year terms</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>19 November 1999</td>
<td>20 November 2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) (76.8%); Congress of Democrats (COD) (9.9%); Tumhalle Alliance of Namibia (DTA) (9.5%); United Democratic Front (UDF) (2.9%); Monitor Action Group (MAG) (0.7%)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>National Movement for the Development Society (MNSD) (33.2%); Party for Democracy and Socialism (PDNS) (22.7%); Democratic and Social Convention (CDS) (22.5%); Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) (10.9%); Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP) (7.7%)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Presidential and Parliamentary</td>
<td>13-23 December 2000</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Umar Hasan Ahmad a-Bashir (Al Mattamar al Watani) (86.5%); Ga’afar Nemeiri (Working People’s Force Alliance) (9.6%); Malik Hussain (1.6%); Al-Samawi Husayn Uthman Mansur (Independent Democrats) (1.0%); Mahmoud Ahmed Juna (1.0%)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central African Republic: Presidential

Date of last election: 19 September 1999
Date of next election: Dec 2004-Jan 2005
Parties contesting last election: 9
Results of last election: Movement for the Liberation of the People of the CAR (MLPC) (51.6%); Central African Democratic Assembly (RDC) (19.4%); Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) (11.2%); (Patriotic Front for Progress (FFP) (6.1%); Social Democratic Party (PSD) (5%); Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP) (4%); National Unity Party (PUN) (3%); Democratic Forum for Modernity (FODEM) (2%); Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) (2%); People’s Union for the Republic (UPR) (1%); Civic Forum (FC) (1%); Independents 6%
Parliamentary seats (109): MPLIC (47); RDC (20); MDD (8); FFP (7); PSD (6); ADP (5); PUN (3); FODEM (2); PLD (2); UPR (1); FC (1); Independents 7
Multi-party elections since independence: 2
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? Yes, in 1993 the MLPC, a formerly banned opposition party, won the elections.
Are presidential terms restricted? The constitution has been suspended.

Ghana: Presidential and Parliamentary

Date of last election: December 2004
Date of next election: 7 December 2000 (1st round); 28 December 2000 (2nd round)
Parties contesting last election: 7
Results of last election (from second round): New Patriotic Party (NPP) (56.9%); National Democratic Congress (NDC) (43.1%); People’s National Convention (PNC); Convention People’s Party (CPP); National Reform Party (NRP); Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP) and United Ghana Movement (UGM) were all eliminated in the second round of elections.
Parliamentary seats (200): NPP (100); NPC (92); PNC (3); CPP (1); Non-partisans (4)
Multi-party elections since independence: 3
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? Yes, the NPP defeated the NDC in 2000.
Are presidential terms restricted? Yes, two consecutive 4-year terms
Has this been amended? No

Mali: Presidential and Parliamentary

Date of last election: 15 June 1999
Date of next election: 18 May 2004
Parties contesting last election: 11
Results of last election: United Democratic Front (UDF) 52.4%, Malawi Congress Party (MCP) / Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) 45.2%, Malawi Democratic Party 1.43%
Parliamentary seats (193): UDF (93), MCP (61), AFORD (30), Independents (6)
Multi-party elections since independence: 2
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? Yes, two consecutive 5-year terms
Has this been amended? No

Mauritius: Parliamentary

Date of last election: September 2000
Date of next election: September 2004
Parties contesting last election: 7 parties, 2 coalitions
Results of last election: Militant Socialist Movement, Mauritian Militant Movement, Republic Movement, Mauritian, Mauritian Social-Democratic Party = MMM/MSM (52.3%); Mauritian Labour Party. Mauritian Party of Xavier-Luc Duval = PTr/PMXD (36.9%); Rodrigues People’s Organisation (10.8%)
Parliamentary seats (66): MMM/MSM (55); PTr/PMXD (6); OPP (3)
Multi-party elections since independence: 8
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? Yes, in 1995 and 2000
Are presidential terms restricted? n/a
Has this been amended? n/a

Namibia: Presidential and Parliamentary

Date of last election: 15-16 November 1999
Date of next election: 30 November - 1 December 2004
Parties contesting last election: 4
Results of last election: South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) (76.8%); Congress of Democrats (COD) (9.9%); Tumhalle Alliance of Namibia (DTA) (9.5%); United Democratic Front (UDF) (2.9%); Monitor Action Group (MAG) (0.7%)
Parliamentary seats (78): SWAPO (55); COD (7); DTA (7); UDF (2); MAG (1); Appointed members (6)
Multi-party elections since independence: 3
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? No
Are presidential terms restricted? Yes, two consecutive 5-year terms
Has this been amended? Yes (in 1998 the constitution was amended to allow President Nujoma to stand for a third term).

Niger: Presidential

Date of last election: October 1999
Date of next election: October 2004
Parties contesting last election: 5
Results of last election: National Movement for the Development Society (MNSD) (33.2%); Party for Democracy and Socialism (PDNS) (22.7%); Democratic and Social Convention (CDS) (22.5%); Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) (10.9%); Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP) (7.7%)
Parliamentary seats (83): MNSD (30); PDNS (16); CDS (17); RDP (8); ANDP (4)
Multi-party elections since independence: 4
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? No
Are presidential terms restricted? n/a
Has this been amended? n/a

Sudan: Presidential and Parliamentary

Date of last election: 13-23 December 2000
Date of next election: December 2004
Parties contesting last election: 4
Results of last election: Umar Hasan Ahmad a-Bashir (Al Mattamar al Watani) (86.5%); Ga’afar Nemeiri (Working People’s Force Alliance) (9.6%); Malik Hussain (1.6%); Al-Samawi Husayn Uthman Mansur (Independent Democrats) (1.0%); Mahmoud Ahmed Juna (1.0%)
Parliamentary seats (360): Al Mattamar al Watani (National Congress) (355); Non-partisans (5)
Multi-party elections since independence: 2
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? No
Are presidential terms restricted? n/a
Has this been amended? n/a
European Union expansion: Implications for Africa?

The expansion of the EU on 1 May 2004 to include 10 new members has significant implications for Africa, not only in terms of trade between the region and the EU, but also concerning the lessons that the African Union can learn from the European experience.

On 1 May 2004, 'Fortress Europe' expands to include 10 new members, mostly from Central Eastern European (CEE) countries. The enlargement of the EU is illustrative of the appeal of the European model to these young democracies, and has also acted as a spur to consolidate democratic and free market systems there. This expansion is a final confirmation of the end of the Cold War division of Europe, but it also has implications for Africa.

Accession to the EU requires adherence to a set of strict criteria: politically, states require stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; economically, new members need to have a functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces; lastly, countries must incorporate the Union’s legislation into their domestic statutes. These conditions ensure convergence with EU standards.

Significantly, although the African Union is modelled on the EU, there are no such criteria for membership. When Nepad was first presented there were indications that only those who embraced its fundamental principles would be admitted into the ‘club’. The peer review process is voluntary, but the wide divergence in commitment to democracy and open economic systems in Africa can still present problems to this nascent process.

This is not to say that many of the challenges facing emerging African democracies are completely absent in Eastern Europe. Many of the ex-communist applicants are still young democracies with the concomitant institutional weakness of such polities. Furthermore, EU policies (such as those on global trade and the environment) reflect the interests of its current members, most of whom are wealthy developed states. The accession of new states implies an expansion of these policies to accommodate the interests of new members.

In particular, EU expansion also has broad implications for the South’s demand to reduce subsidies to farmers in the Union. Many of the new entrants have sizeable farming communities. In particular, new member states only represent 6% of the EU’s GDP. Of the new members, only Cyprus, with a GDP per capita of €15,080, exceeds those of the EU’s poorest members, Greece (€12,880) and Portugal (€12,513). Under the accession agreement, new members receive only a quarter of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies that existing members receive, as the CAP budget has been set until 2013. Farm subsidies for these countries will also be introduced gradually over 10 years. Enlargement will certainly place a burden on the CAP by tripling its budget by 2006. Certain countries, mainly net contributors to the EU budget such as Germany, support the reform of CAP subsidies to reduce their own contributions. However, reform of the CAP has met with much opposition from states such as France, Spain, Italy and Ireland, whose agricultural sectors are highly dependent on the subsidies.

The matter of Europe’s CAP subsidies resonates deeply with Africa, whose economies are heavily dependent on trade in agricultural products. Farming employs some 70% of sub-Saharan Africa’s workforce and generates on average 30% of the region’s GDP. The EU’s CAP subsidies undermine the markets and opportunities for farmers and agricultural labourers in most African countries. The expansion also brings with it a new set of problems. Africa, as a trade and investment destination, may be dwarfed by the advantages of EU members investing in their own backyard. In addition, new CEE members offer attractive benefits to old EU members, such as the proximity of markets, an educated labour force, cheaper wages, and reduced export costs.

For South Africa, EU expansion presents some of these same challenges but also opportunities. Expansion opens up these markets to SA products in terms of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). The EU is SA’s main trading and investment partner and the FTA provides SA with a competitive advantage, given the relatively greater sophistication of its economy compared to other African states. The reduction on tariffs and trade restrictions allows SA to penetrate the markets of the new EU members. It may also increase the pressure within the EU for a slow-down in further liberalisation, given that in the case of the TDCA and also of the Lomé/Cotonou agreements, access to European markets by the South is asymmetrical or non-reciprocal. This factor will also have implications for the negotiation of the economic partnership agreements with the ACP states, as part of the Cotonou agreement.

The new EU states face a number of challenges arising from their accession. South Africa and Africa also need to critically assess the opportunities and constraints presented by this expansion.

Laroushka Reddy
Playing Big Brother to Sudan and Somalia: Kenya and the US

Successful conflict resolution depends on the willingness of the combatants themselves to settle their differences. Yet, neighbours with clout and commitment can play a critical role in moving the negotiating process forward. Dysfunctional states breed regional instability and provide havens for terrorist operations. While South Africa has been actively involved in Burundi and the DRC, Kenya has been engaged in resolving two other conflicts forming part of this 'arc of instability': Somalia and Sudan.

The new Kenyan government, under the NARC alliance, has remained seized of these two processes, regarding them as critical for its own and the region's prosperity. The US, in turn views Kenya as pivotal in East Africa, given the region's importance in the war against terror.

Peace efforts in Sudan and Somalia are not new. Since 1994, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been trying to hammer out a Sudanese peace deal between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A in the south.

Kenya started its involvement in the Sudanese peace process when it was appointed to the chair of IGAD in 1997. In July 2002, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, a Kenyan and chief mediator in Sudan, presided over the first face-to-face meeting between the head of SPLM/A, John Garang and President al-Bashir, at the Kenyan town of Naivasha. The two rivals signed the Machakos Protocol, which declared the SPLM/A and Khartoum government's goals and principles and outlined methods to realise their joint commitment to a negotiated, comprehensive settlement based on the unity of Sudan. They agreed to discuss the unresolved issues of state and religion, self-determination for the people of south Sudan, power-sharing, wealth-sharing and human rights. A five-year interim period would be followed by a referendum on the desirability of an autonomous government in the south.

Somalian peace talks, under the aegis of IGAD were held in the Kenyan town of Eldoret in October 2002. Progress however has been slow. Talks have been postponed several times and the chairman of the regional talks, Kenyan Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka, has been involved in convincing many of the Somali parties to return to the negotiating table.

Since he took office in January 2003, Mwai Kibaki has played a direct role in the Sudanese peace process. He met President al-Bashir and John Garang in April 2003, after which the SPLM/A and the government signed an agreement allowing the integration of troops in some disputed areas.

The Kenyan government has been actively supported by the US. In October 2001, the US appointed former senator John Danforth as special envoy to Sudan, and Andrew Natsios, the administrator of USAID, as the special humanitarian co-ordinator for Sudan. In addition, the US launched various development initiatives in basic education and agricultural revitalisation. Significantly, Sudan has been removed from Washington's blacklist of countries harbouring terrorists, and sanctions have been lifted. While the US may be eyeing Sudan's strategic oil reserves in the context of the present troubles of the Middle East, it has helped to smooth the process for peace in Sudan. The proximity of the Horn of Africa to the Middle East is a constant source of concern for the US — hence conflict resolution in the Horn may help to minimise such vulnerability.

Sudan is due to hold a general election in December this year. Kenya will have to double its efforts to bring this about. But while there is hope that the north-south conflict is abating, there are fears of an even more serious east–west division. Continued fighting with a cruel ethnic dimension in Western Darfur between the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and government-backed rebels has fuelled these concerns. Many rebel groups have been excluded from the Kenyan peace talks, and the Darfur situation resulted in Chad hosting talks between the SLA and JEM. In Somalia, the final phase of talks to discuss the distribution of power and choose a parliament for a government of national unity for the proposed five-year interim period have been postponed. Many small rebel groups have complained that they have been excluded from the peace process.

In dealing with both Sudan and Somalia, Kenya and IGAD must look to other conflict resolution exercises to avoid the same pitfalls. Even the smallest rebel group must have a stake in the negotiations. For that to be achieved it is necessary for the parties to believe that they will get more from negotiations than from a continuation of the fighting. It is also important for the talks facilitators to be as inclusive as possible.

The tragic experience of the Rwandan genocide ten years ago has raised the stakes and pressure for regional players such as Kenya to forge a lasting deal in Sudan and Somalia soon.

Asanda Saule

African elections continued from p.2

Tunisia:

Presidential and Parliamentary

Date of last election: 18 October 1999
Date of next election: 24 October 2004
Parties contesting last election: 6
Results of last election:
Constitutional Democratic Rally (DCR) 98.01%, Unionist Democratic Union (UDU) 0.99%, Popular Unity Party (UPU) 0.98%, Movement for Renewal, Social Liberal Party
Parliamentary seats (182): DCR (148), PUP (7), UDU (7), MR (5), SLP (5)
Multi-party elections since independence: 1
Have opposition parties won in the last 10 years? No
Are presidential terms restricted? Yes
Has this been amended? Yes, in 1986 to permit the president to serve for three 5-year terms. In 2002 it was changed to allow the president to run for re-election one more time in 2004.

Rachel Bambo, Nuria Giralt and Nandile Ngubentombi

© Copyright SAIIA 2004