Mine Action in Southern Africa: Instrument of development?

Edited by
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Funded by the
Finnish Government

2003

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs
Jan Smuts House, University of the Witwatersrand, Braamfontein, Johannesburg.

ISBN: 1-919969-11-X

Please note that $ refers to US$ unless otherwise indicated.

Cover designed by Heather Botha

Tyrus Text and Design

Printed by Intrepid
Commercial Printers (Pty) Limited 4862

www.wits.ac.za/saiia

Editor's Note

This book is the product of the valuable contributions of many individuals in the front line of mine action, who have given me both of their time and access to their indispensable knowledge over the last two years. In particular I would like to thank the four contributors to this book, Dr Ananda Millard, Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Dr Paul Wilkinson and Brigitte Masella. Ananda Millard in particular has been an invaluable sounding-board who has helped me to better understand the complexities and challenges facing mine action in Southern Africa.

Thanks must also go to numerous role-players in regional mine action, especially Noel Stott of Mine Action Southern Africa (MASA) for his comments on the final manuscript. My appreciation also to João Ndlovu of the SADC Mine Action Programme, Mark Reynhardt, Rob Wensley, Tom Markram, Bennie Lombard and Nontombi Makupela of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, and the staff members of the National De-mining Institute of Mozambique and the national mine action programmes in other SADC countries. David Horton, Mike Wilson and Alberto Alfaco of the Canadian International De-mining Corps (CIDC), Alberto da Silvo of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in Mozambique and Jackie D'Almeida of the Accelerated De-mining Programme (ADP) are among the many individuals involved in mine action in Mozambique and elsewhere who shared their experiences with me. In addition, I would like to thank the numerous persons I had contact with at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD). A particular word of appreciation goes to Kerry Brinkert, the manager of the Implementation Support Unit of the GICHD, whose valuable presentation on victim assistance under the Ottawa Convention has been included as an annexure to this book.

This project would not have been possible without the generous financial assistance and support of the Finnish government. A special word of thanks is owed to Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen and Heidi Schröderus-Fox of the Finnish Embassy in South Africa, Lars Backström, director of Humanitarian Assistance, and Olli Sotamaa of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for

their kind assistance. I also would like to thank Juhani Toivonen, previously the Finnish Charge D'Affaires in Mozambique, for the insights that he provided during his discussions with me.

Lastly I would like to thank all the staff of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) who assisted in bringing this research project to fruition. Annelize Schroeder, the director of Operations, and Katy de Villiers, programme assistant, helped with the arrangement of the regional landmines conference, 'Development and De-mining: The Missing link? Defining holistic, sustainable and cost-effective mine action solutions for Southern Africa', from 10–11 October 2002. Anne Katz assisted with the layout of the *Demining Debate* issues that were published during the duration of the project.

A special word of thanks goes to Dr Greg Mills for his kind support and to Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, whose oversight of the project was extensive, invaluable and brought out the best in me. My appreciation goes also to the editing team whose diligence ensured that this book was finally published, namely Peter Farlam (SAIIA publications manager), Anne Katz (research secretary) and Tracy Seider (freelance editor and typesetter). My special gratitude also to Pippa Lange, SAIIA's external editor, who tenaciously clung to every word written and then ... promptly changed it. This is her third seminal editing work on de-mining for SAIIA. Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their motivation and steadfast support during the preparation of this book.

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About the authors

Neuma Grobbelaar has worked as the SAIIA landmines researcher since February 2001. She is also the deputy director of studies of SAIIA. She was the editor of the SAIIA electronic and hard copy publication, the *Demining Debate: Landmines in Southern Africa*. During the project four issues of the *Demining Debate* appeared, namely *SADC and Mine Action: The way forward*, June 2001; *Impact Survey in Mozambique: An essential development tool*, October 2001; *South Africa and the Mine Ban Convention: Developing enabling legislation*, April 2002; and *SADC Demining Operators Meeting: Grasping the nettle of regional mine action at last?*, July/August 2002. The SAIIA regional mine action conference entitled 'Development and De-mining: The Missing Link? Defining holistic, sustainable and cost-effective mine action solutions for Southern Africa' from 10–11 October 2002 was organised by her.

Dr Ananda Millard is the training co-ordinator for IMSMA at the GICHD. Prior to joining the GICHD in October 2002, she was a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, where she was a member of the Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities project. In addition to her research on humanitarian mine action, she was closely involved in the development of research methodologies for work in conflict and post-conflict situations, including the development and implementation of approaches to local capacity-building. She holds a doctorate from the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.

Aksel Steen-Nilsen has been the programme manager of the NPA mine action programme in Angola since August 2001. He joined the NPA after serving in the Norwegian defence force for 12 years, leaving the service with the rank of major. The NPA mine action programme operates from Luanda, and is currently active in the provinces of Malanje, Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Moxico and Huila, with regional offices in Malanje, Luena and Lubango. The programme employs 460 local and six international staff. It is the largest international NGO-driven mine action programme in Angola, and is one of the few programmes that have remained operational in Angola since its entry in 1995, despite the return to civil conflict during the late 1990s.

Dr Paul Wilkinson is the president of Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates Inc. and **Brigitte Masella** is a senior researcher in the same organisation. The Landmine Impact Survey in Mozambique was carried out by Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates Inc. and the CIDC on behalf of the mine-action authorities of the government of Mozambique between January 1999 and August 2001. Paul Wilkinson holds a doctorate in Archaeology and Anthropology from Cambridge University. He is based in Montreal and has practised as a consultant in environmental and social sciences for the past 30 years. He has been responsible for a wide range of studies in Canada, Alaska, Africa and Asia. Brigitte Masella holds a Master's degree in Environmental Planning from York University, Canada. She has undertaken numerous commissions in the environmental and social sciences, both in Canada and internationally, over the past 10 years.

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Foreword

The deadly threat of anti-personnel mines (APMs) has caused incalculable suffering in Africa, and particularly in Southern Africa. The presence of these mines, and other explosive remnants of war, impede the realisation of our common vision to eradicate poverty and to place our continent on the path of sustainable growth and development. Our generation carries the responsibility to act collectively, and with unity of purpose, to eradicate these atrocious weapons forever, thereby making an effective contribution to establishing the conditions for a better life for succeeding generations. The adoption and entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction is a testament to our collective endeavours. The international norm against APMs, established by the Convention, sets the timeframes and methodologies for assisting the victims of APMs and for returning the land back to productive use.

The long-term challenge faced by those severely affected by the legacy of APM use, and by the threats posed by other explosive remnants of war, requires a significant and co-ordinated response, which includes the allocation of adequate resources and expertise, at the national, regional and global levels. Those who have managed to build a national capacity to address this challenge can offer valuable lessons, not only for the region, but also globally.

The success of the 'Ottawa process' leading to the adoption and subsequent implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was founded on the spirit of inclusivity and engagement by all the actors involved in mine action. In following this approach, the project on Landmines in Southern Africa, undertaken by SAIIA, has highlighted some of the challenges and valuable lessons learned in a very useful and thought-provoking manner.

This book is a culmination of some of the research generated by the project in 2001 and 2002. It takes a closer look at the significant progress achieved over the past ten years and it looks at how the governments and communities of Southern Africa have responded to the challenge facing them. Moreover, it offers insights and provides examples of how mine-affected countries can integrate humanitarian mine action into national developmental strategies.

I believe that this book will stimulate a debate in the mine action community on how opportunities can be optimised and how we can ensure that the core humanitarian objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty are realised. This book offers a glimpse into the rich legacy and innovation that Southern Africa and other mine-affected regions and countries that have confronted similar constraints have to offer in achieving our common objective of a world free of APMs.

Jackie Selebi
Commissioner of Police and
former chief South African negotiator of the Ottawa Convention

Introduction

Neuma Grobbelaar

The Landmines in Southern Africa research project (February 2001–February 2003) of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has adopted as its focus mine action at the policy level, with an emphasis on mine-affected countries in Southern Africa. The project has attempted to formulate a series of policy recommendations to strengthen national and regional capacities in mine action in the region. Sponsored by the Government of Finland (which has supported it over four years), the project has been investigating the link between development, de-mining and mine action.

The project has also tracked the response of SADC countries to the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (otherwise known as the Ottawa Convention). In the period under review, Angola and the DRC ratified the Ottawa Convention. All 14 members states of SADC are now State Parties to the Convention, in effect underwriting the creation of a zone free of anti-personnel mines in Southern Africa.

Background and purpose of the publication

Mine-affected countries in Southern Africa have been hampered in their attempts at development and rehabilitation by the presence of anti-personnel mines (APMs), landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs) in the region. (In this book APMs, UXOs and landmines are used interchangeably, and the word *landmines* is employed as the common signifier of the presence of all three categories of explosives.) The numerous anti-colonial struggles and civil wars in the region may have been laid to rest in most cases, but they have left a deadly legacy for current governments and the citizens they serve. The purpose of this book is to discuss some of the national responses that governments have adopted to the landmines problem. This should illuminate how governments, donors and mine action agencies can strengthen mine action in the region. The book also derives some comparative lessons from other mine-affected states which may be appropriate to the situation in SADC. Lastly, the book suggests how mine-

affected SADC countries can augment their national responses, especially as they relate to national capacity-building and development.

The Mozambique national mine action programme receives the greatest amount of coverage in this book. The reason is that Mozambique is not only one of the most heavily mine-affected countries in Southern Africa, but it also has one of the largest and most mature mine action programmes. Brief overviews of the national mine action programmes of the other seven mine-affected countries in the region are also given. (Readers who are interested in a more detailed discussion of the individual mine action programmes in SADC can consult the *Landmine Monitor Report* series of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines [ICBL]. Their website address is *www.icbl.org*).

The book is subdivided into two sections. The first deals with the improvement of mine action in Southern Africa, drawing on comparative examples from inside and outside the region; whereas the second focuses on the particular experiences of persons working on the various aspects of mine action in Southern Africa at an operational level. The first section (chapters 1–5) is the work of the SAIIA landmines researcher, Neuma Grobbelaar.

The first chapter includes an overview of the extent to which SADC countries are contaminated by landmines, and provides a summary of the status of the mine action programmes in the eight mine-affected countries in SADC.

Chapter two takes a closer look at the role of SADC (more specifically, the role of the SADC mine action programme) in initiating and supporting a regional response to the landmines threat in Southern Africa. This chapter introduces the various projects that were launched under the SADC mine action programme. It also evaluates the successes and failures of the regional programme, and presents a series of policy recommendations to SADC governments on how the response of the Secretariat can be enhanced and supported.

Chapter three extracts lessons for mine-affected countries in SADC on how to improve the integration of mine action into their national development frameworks. This chapter explores the following issues: whether mine action is considered a development activity; the extent to which mine action is currently integrated into the national development policies of mine-affected countries; how resource mobilisation can ensure that mine action is more fully incorporated into national development agendas; and lastly, how the socio-economic impact surveys can illustrate the linkages between mine action and development activities.

Chapter four assesses the policies of donors involved in mine action in the SADC region. This chapter attempts to evaluate their commitment to continue supporting mine action; to determine the extent to which donors

are integrating their mine action activities with the recipient states' development programmes; and asks whether mine action can act as a catalyst for improved development strategies.

Chapter five makes a series of recommendations to mine-affected governments in SADC and donors active in the region on how to integrate mine action into the overall national development strategies of affected states more successfully. It identifies 12 recommendations that are key to the management of a successful national mine action programme. These are open and continuous communication with all partners in mine action; political commitment by national governments to mine action; an emphasis on national capacity-building; effective management and cultivation of good donor relations; an ongoing evaluation of goals and objectives; the building by donors and governments of partnerships with all stakeholders in mine action; the better allocation of funding to ensure the improved integration of mine action into overall development initiatives by both governments and donors; the introduction of more flexibility and certainty in funding procedures; an approach to mine action that is regarded as less a purely technical activity and more an effective development intervention; an emphasis on tapping into local expertise and capacity; the development of proper exit strategies by donors; and lastly, the establishment of an appropriate platform to launch an effective regional response.

Chapter six (the first of the second section) is written by Aksel Steen-Nilson, the programme director of the Norwegian Peoples' Aid in Angola. This chapter focuses on the need for the Angolan authorities responsible for de-mining to rebuild their credibility and win international trust as the only way to ensure continued support from donors for mine action in that country. He highlights some of the obstacles the mine action community in Angola faces which hamper effective mine action. He also makes a series of recommendations to the government that, if implemented, will promote more efficient mine action in Angola.

Chapter seven, written by Dr Paul Wilkinson and Brigitte Masella of Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates Inc., looks at the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey (MLIS) completed in 2001. The authors discuss the value that the MLIS adds to mine action planning and implementation in Mozambique. They also identify some of the areas where the MLIS had an impact beyond the narrow confines of mine action, thus adding further value to the development and rehabilitation of that country.

Chapter eight is written by Dr Ananda Millard, the training co-ordinator for the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD). This chapter focuses on communities in Southern Africa that are affected by

landmines. The author explains how mine action can become more successful if a better understanding of the communities in which de-mining agencies operate is cultivated, and the inherent capacities that communities retain to deal with the landmine threat are acknowledged. She proposes that operating organisations should take a much more proactive role in ensuring the success of mine clearance beyond the technical issues of concern. This can be achieved through training, learning, institutional change and the establishment of more co-operative relationships between operators and mine-affected communities.

Chapter nine is written by Neuma Grobbelaar, the SAIIA landmines researcher. It examines the development of ground-breaking enabling legislation in South Africa which incorporates the requirements of the Ottawa Convention into the national legal framework. This chapter focuses on the unique approach adopted by the South African government, in consultation with civil society, to develop the draft legislation, and on the innovations proposed by the drafters of the legislation that are intended to strengthen the application of the Convention on South African soil.

The annexures to this book include the complete five-year National Mine Action Plan of Mozambique. The presentation made by Kerry Brinkert, manager of the Implementation Support Unit of the GICHD, at the SAIIA regional landmines conference on 10–11 October 2002, on how the Convention can provide support to landmine victims has also been included, in view of the weak capacity of governments in the region to deal with this issue. The annexures also include a comprehensive contact list of mine action organisations (both local and international) that are involved in the region, and a list of useful website addresses on mine action for those readers who want to learn more about mine action in Southern Africa and elsewhere.

The aim of this book is to stimulate discussion in the mine action community on how mine action could be better integrated into the national development frameworks of mine-affected countries. It calls on donors, governments and agencies in the operational field to reassess their policies and approaches with a view to extending the impact of mine action policies. It also offers recommendations to mine-affected countries with an endemic and long-term problem on how to ensure continued donor support, and how to integrate mine action into their national development frameworks in a sustainable manner. It is hoped that this book will galvanise governments of mine-affected countries in the region into taking more positive steps to address the landmine problem and to learn more effectively from the experiences of other countries in a similar situation.

Section One

Improving mine action in Southern Africa

CHAPTER 1

Overview of the mine situation in Southern Africa

Neuma Grobbelaar

SADC is the first region in the world that has endorsed an anti-personnel mine free zone. All its member states have ratified the Ottawa Convention.

Introduction

Southern Africa has a strong mine action tradition. However, this history of involvement comes at a price. The many mine action interventions in the region over the past 10 years would not have been necessary had it not been for the extensive landmine, anti-personnel mine (APM) and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in these parts.[1] Africa is widely acknowledged as the most mine-affected continent in the world: more than 30 states have a landmine problem.[2] Two of the most severely mine-affected countries, Angola and Mozambique, are located in Southern Africa.

Eight of the SADC 14 member states are affected by landmines, APMs and UXOs. (See Table 1.) However, there has been some progress. The DRC is the only country in SADC still in the midst of sporadic outbursts of civil and inter-regional conflict. The Angolan civil war ended on 4 April 2002 with the signature of a ceasefire agreement between the Angolan government (representing the MPLA) and UNITA. The end of the long drawn-out conflict in Angola[3] has also had a positive effect on Namibia and Zambia. The recent

Table 1: Mine-affected SADC states

Country	*Mine-affected*	*Country*	*Mine-affected*
Angola	Yes	Namibia	Yes
Botswana	No	Seychelles	No
DRC	Yes	South Africa	No
Lesotho	No	Swaziland	Yes
Malawi	Yes	Tanzania	No
Mauritius	No	Zambia	Yes
Mozambique	Yes	Zimbabwe	Yes

Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2002, International Campaign to Ban Landmines

increase in mine incidents in both countries have been linked to the substantial Angolan refugee populations living in them since 1975, and cross-border military incursions by the two Angolan parties into their territories. Malawi's and Swaziland's mine problems stem from the extensive mining of Mozambique's northern and southern borders during its 17-year civil conflict. Zimbabwe's is a remnant of its own liberation war during the 1970s.

The severity of the mine and UXO problem varies from country to country. Of all the countries in SADC, the mine situation in Angola is considered the most severe, followed by those of Mozambique, the DRC and Zimbabwe.

Map of Africa showing the Southern African Development Community

SADC and the Ottawa Convention

The responses of SADC members to the mines problem have varied, but in one respect they have adopted a common approach. All SADC member states have ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (hereafter called the Ottawa Convention or the Convention) and are State Parties to it. SADC is the first regional organisation worldwide to achieve this goal. This offers tangible proof both of the severity of the problem as perceived by the governments of the member states, plus of their political commitment to addressing it. (See Table 2.)

Table 2: SADC membership of the Ottawa Convention

Country	*Signature*	*Deposit*
Angola	4 December 1997	5 July 2002
Botswana	3 December 1997	1 March 2000
DRC	Not available	2 May 2002
Lesotho	4 December 1997	2 December 1998
Malawi	4 December 1997	13 August 1998
Mauritius	3 December 1997	3 December 1997
Mozambique	3 December 1997	25 August 1998
Namibia	3 December 1997	21 December 1998
Seychelles	4 December 1997	2 June 2000
South Africa	3 December 1997	26 June 1998
Swaziland	4 December 1997	22 December 1998
Tanzania	3 December 1997	13 November 2000
Zambia	12 December 1997	23 February 2001
Zimbabwe	3 December 1997	18 June 1998

Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2002, International Campaign to Ban Landmines

Mozambique held the first State Party Meeting of the Convention in May 1999. The DRC and Angola were the last two countries to ratify the Convention in 2002.

National capacities in SADC

All of the mine-affected countries in SADC have some form of national mine action capacity. Six member states have launched fully-fledged mine action co-ordination programmes.

In Angola, the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROEE) is responsible for the operational implementation of mine action, whereas a new body, the Inter-Sectoral Commission on De-mining

and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) has a co-ordination function. Both bodies operate under the Department of Social Reintegration and Assistance.

In the DRC mine action is conducted under the auspices of the UN Mission in the DRC, MONUC.

In Mozambique the National De-mining Institute (IND), which is responsible for mine action co-ordination, is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In Namibia, mine action is conducted and co-ordinated by the Namibian Defence Force. A similar pattern occurs in Zambia, where de-mining is co-ordinated by the Zambian Mine Action Centre, which answers to the Zambian Defence Force.

In Zimbabwe, a National Mine Action Authority has been established, chaired by the deputy secretary of the Ministry of Defence. The Zimbabwean Mine Action Centre, the National De-mining Office (NDO), is part of the National Defence Force. (See Table 3.)

Several successes have been achieved under the national programmes.

Table 3: Mine action co-ordination in SADC

Country	*Co-ordinating Agency*
Angola	Inter-Sectoral Commission on De-mining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) The National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROEE)
DRC	UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC)
Mozambique	National De-mining Institute (IND)
Namibia	National Defence Force (NDF)
Zambia	Zambian Mine Action Centre (MAC)
Zimbabwe	National De-mining Office (NDO)

Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2002, International Campaign to Ban Landmines

Stockpile destruction and technological innovation in de-mining

Under Article 4 of the Ottawa Convention, all State Parties are expected to destroy their stockpiles of mines as soon as possible, but within a maximum period of four years after the Convention enters into force for that State Party. Eight SADC states have already met this obligation. It must be noted, however, that four of the eight countries had no stockpiles.) (See Table 4.)

South Africa was the only country in the region that manufactured APMs on a significant scale,[4] but the South African production lines were stripped and dismantled in 1995, well before the Convention was signed.

Table 4: Status of stockpile destruction in SADC

Country	*Status*	*Country*	*Status*
Angola	Symbolic (first destruction in June 2002)	Namibia	Destruction complete
Botswana	Small quantity/ retained for training	Seychelles	No stockpile
DRC	Symbolic beginning	South Africa	Destruction complete (<5,000 retained for training)
Lesotho	No stockpile	Swaziland	No stockpile
Malawi	No stockpile	Tanzania	Not begun
Mauritius	Destruction not planned yet	Zambia	Decision to keep entire stockpile (6,691 mines)
Mozambique	Destruction complete	Zimbabwe	Destruction complete

Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2002, International Campaign to Ban Landmines; Article 7 Reports

Many of the world's latest technological innovations in mine action have either evolved or been tested in the region. The diverse terrain, 'the proximity to the problem' and the mushrooming of mine clearance organisations (commercial, non-governmental, local and international) have led to a thriving, if highly competitive (some would argue cut-throat) industry.

South Africa has played a leading role in developing the mine-resistant vehicles that are used in humanitarian de-mining operations. Many mine clearance organisations in the region are involved in trials of mechanically-assisted mine clearance projects; mine detection dog training; protective clothing; the chemical detection of APMs and landmines; and mine-detection equipment. (The technological advantages of the de-mining methodologies that have been developed in the region fall outside the scope of this publication, but Annexure C provides a contact list of mine clearance organisations in the region if further information is required.)

Status of mine clearance

The region has made good progress in meeting its mine clearance obligations under the Convention. (Article 5 requires all State Parties to have mapped and cleared all mine-fields and destroyed all mines on their territory within 10 years after entry into force of the Convention for that State Party.) However, some problem areas remain.

In the case of Swaziland, mine clearance training has been conducted with the assistance of the US Defence Force. A stand-alone de-mining unit has not

been set up. The Swaziland government has failed to respond adequately to its obligations, but it is now trying to find the resources to establish a de-mining unit.

Whereas the minefields in Zimbabwe are located in areas that are fairly contained, well known and marked (although fences are often vandalised), most de-mining activities were halted in December 2000 due to a lack of funding and in particular the withdrawal of donor support following the political crisis in that country. However, in the preceding period 197,919 mines were removed from Zimbabwean minefields and destroyed.[5] Zimbabwe still has an estimated 1,166,280 mines deployed in seven identified minefields.

Table 5: Location of Zimbabwean mine-fields (Area, Number & Deployment)

Location	*Area (km²)*	*Estimated number (AP mines)*	*Date of deployment*
Mzengezi to Nyamapanda South (Ruenya)	355	630,500	1976–1979
Stapleford Forest to Mutare	50	254,500	1976–1979
Burma Valley	3	60	1976–1979
Junction Gate to Jersey Tea	75	12,960	1976–1979
Malvernia (Sango) to Crooks Corner	50	247,660	1976–1979
Victoria Falls to Mlibizi	143	17,600	1976–1979
Kariba Power Station		3,000	1963

Source: Zimbabwean, Article 7 Report, 13 February 2003

In Mozambique great progress has been made since 1993. After the completion of its national landmine impact survey in 2001, the Mozambican authorities were confident that they would be able to address the high- and medium-impact areas in Mozambique before the ten-year deadline expired. The survey determined that more than 10% (1.7 million) of the population were facing threats to their lives and livelihoods owing to the presence of mines. Other findings included the following:

- Landmines and UXOs are found in all 10 provinces (123/128 districts).
- At least 558 km² are suspected of having some degree of contamination.
- There have been 172 known accidents in the past two years.
- The most frequently reported blockages of access to resources related to:
  – agricultural land (464 communities, 950,000 persons, 369 km²);
  – roads (231 communities, 369,000 persons);
  – non-agricultural land used for hunting, gathering firewood, and other economic and cultural purposes (180 communities, 291,000 persons, 137 km²); and

– sources of drinking water (less frequent affecting 55 communities, 87,000 persons).[6]

Mozambique's Five-Year National Mine Action Plan (2002–2006) — MNAP — has identified the following goals:

- to clear all high- and medium-impact sites;
- to destroy all UXOs;
- to destroy all existing stockpiles (Mozambique has already got rid of its formal stockpile);
- to survey and mark all remaining low-impact areas;
- to maintain a national mine risk education/marking programme; and
- to establish a long-term survivor and victim assistance programme.[7]

These targets are achievable if the current level of funding and donor support to mine action in Mozambique is sustained. (Please consult Annexure A for the MNAP.)

Namibia's mine problem has been largely addressed. Most mine action interventions now focus on mopping-up operations and the removal of UXOs. These activities are conducted by the Namibian Defence Force and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units of the Namibian Police. Military activity on Namibia's northern border between UNITA and the MPLA, particularly between the mid 1990s and April 2002, was the major reason for the (relatively contained) upsurge in the use of mines and consequently of mine accident victims in its border areas.

Malawi has been slow to respond to the mines threat, although it has identified itself as mine-affected and has been involved in regional activities aimed at addressing the landmines problem. The area believed to be landmine contaminated is predominantly on Malawi's southern border with Mozambique. The government is in the process of establishing a mine action centre to co-ordinate mine action activities. However, a lack of funding stands in the way of effective mine action implementation.

The Zambian Mine Action Programme is fairly new. Locating the minefields is made difficult by the fact that during the last 40 years liberation armies from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola planted landmines randomly across its territory. There are therefore no conventional minefields in Zambia.

The areas most affected by landmines include its border with the DRC, from Mwinilunga along the western border to Lundazi in the Eastern Province, representing a broad swath of land encompassing the North-Western Province, the Western, Southern, Lusaka, Central and Eastern Provinces.[8] Zambia hopes to complete its de-mining activities by 2007. It is currently conducting a national impact survey to facilitate the process. A core group of humanitarian de-miners were trained with the assistance of

the US in 2001 and 2002, but Zambian mine action remains constrained by a lack of adequate funding.

In Angola and the DRC the picture is less rosy.

The DRC government has identified several areas suspected of containing mines. These affect 165 villages in the provinces of Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Equateur, Kasai-Occidental, Kasai-Orientale, Katanga, Kinshasa, Maniema, Nord-Kivu, Province Orientale and Sud-Kivu. Limited clearance activities in the DRC have been possible owing to the ongoing conflict in the country. However, a Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC) has been established under the auspices of MONUC, and the government has established a Mine Action Commission to support it. The MACC began with the symbolic destruction of about 15,000 mines to provide impetus to mine action efforts in the DRC. However, progress will be slow while the sporadic hostilities continue between the different factions in the DRC.

Angola faces an enormous task, but the onset of peace provides the Angolan government and its mine action partners with an opportunity to address the country's mine problem. The first hurdle to overcome is creating confidence in international donors that the government has sufficient political will to deal with the problem effectively. According to Angolan estimates, 75% of the population is considered to be at risk owing to the presence of APMs, landmines and UXOs.

The Angolan government has begun to take some positive steps. It is currently in discussion with the Survey Action Centre (SAC) in Washington to implement a national landmine impact survey, the data for which will be collected in the field during 2004. This will enable the government to make a realistic assessment of the scale of the problem, and allow it to design a focused national mine action strategy in collaboration with its partners.

In the interim the Angolan government is focusing on a contingency assessment of areas suitable for the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). During 2002, international mine action NGOs based in Angola assessed between 300–500 potential areas for this purpose. This process continued during 2003, in consultation with the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Provincial authorities will be drawn into the exercise, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to establish priorities and prepare transition plans. However, the process has not been without its problems. The closure of the UNITA demobilisation camps by the Angolan government in February 2003 led to a chaotic resettlement of UNITA's ex-soldiers and their families. Many NGOs reported that this allocation of land (also to IDPs and refugees that returned spontaneously) happened without verification that the areas used for the purpose had been properly cleared or certified as mine-free.

The mine action capacity of the Angolan government and its partners is currently under review. The intention is to devise a national mine action plan that will cover the whole of Angola and all the resettled populations by 2004.

Table 6: SADC timelines for clearance obligations

Country	*Due date*	*Country*	*Due date*
Angola	January 2013	Namibia	March 2009
DRC	November 2012	Swaziland	March 2009
Malawi	March 2009	Zambia	August 2011
Mozambique	March 2009	Zimbabwe	March 2009

Source: Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 14 May 2003

Mine risk education, victim assistance and enabling legislation

Most of the mine-affected states in the region have established strategies to conduct mine risk education and are assisted by a variety of international and local NGOs. However, a serious weakness within the region has been the relative neglect of rehabilitation, long-term support and the reintegration of mine victims into society. SADC countries simply do not have the capacity to provide such support in view of the fragile state of their economies and the lack of, or limited scope of, their social welfare networks. It is the one area of mine action in the region that is almost entirely donor dependent and where national capacity is very weak. It is very difficult for these states to give landmine victims preferential treatment above victims of other disabilities in such a resource-scarce environment. Most mine victims have to rely on the generosity of their family members or their communities, whose ability to support them is stretched to the limit. This aspect requires urgent attention from SADC governments, which need to give more thought to long-term resource mobilisation, social reintegration programmes, vocational training and prosthesis support. (Please note that Annexure B contains an overview of how mine-affected states can call on the Convention to support mine accidents victims.)

The reduction in mine casualties in the Southern African region reflects the extent to which SADC governments have managed to develop effective mine action strategies. The numbers have come down significantly in countries such as Mozambique, with its mature and multi-tiered mine action strategy. Although mine accidents in Angola have been judged to have

stabilised since 2000 at just over 800 per year, this figure does not reflect the true picture owing to the under-reporting of incidents and the lack of communication with certain areas that are considered to be mine-affected. The opening up of the latter could lead to better access to statistics, and ironically, an increase in the number of reported accidents.

An unfortunate development in the region has been the increase of victims in the DRC. The 2001 figures indicate that the number of mine accident victims was higher than that of Mozambique.

Landmine casualties: 2001



Source: UN Mine Action Service Database

Some SADC states have passed specific legislation enabling them to implement the Ottawa Convention. The Regional Office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), based in Pretoria, has assisted in this process. (See chapter 9 for further information.)

Conclusion

SADC states have managed to build an impressive amount of national capacity to deal with the mine problem in their part of the world. Of all the current programmes, Mozambique's is the most substantial. This is attributable to the political priority given to mine action by the Mozambican government, combined with the significant donor and NGO support that the country has received over the past 10 years.

Another positive example is supplied by Namibia, which has managed to address its mine problem to a large extent, and now has the capacity to deal with incidents as they arise. However, the starting point of mine action in Namibia differed dramatically from that of Mozambique as far as the level and spread of contamination was concerned. The scale of the mine problem

in Namibia was far smaller than that in other mine-affected countries in the region.

Other SADC states have achieved mixed results. Mine action in Zimbabwe has suffered both because of the political and economic crisis in the country and the withdrawal of donor support. In other countries, such as Zambia and Malawi, the national mine action institutions are fairly new, or still in the process of being established.

Generally, the dependency of most national mine action programmes in Southern Africa on external material and financial support is a key constraint. Donor involvement will remain an important determinant of mine action in the region in the foreseeable future.

The following chapters will explore some of the positive aspects of mine action in the region, to extract from them the lessons that can be learnt. They will also investigate some of the obstacles to success.

Endnotes

1 Estimates on the number of landmines in SADC states vary considerably. An initial estimate of 15 million mines in Angola was revised in 1998 to a possible six million mines. The omission of proper mapping and recording by most parties involved in past and present conflicts in the region has meant that most mine estimates have been 'guess-timates'. Therefore, a crucial factor in deciding where mine action is appropriate has to be the impact of mines on communities and their socio-economic wellbeing. Mine action organisations generally use the number of reported landmine victims as an important indicator of mine-affectedness. In Angola it is estimated that one in every 415 Angolans has a mine-related injury. See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*. New York: Landmine Monitor Core Group, 2000.

2 Ibid., p. 41.

3 Angola had been at war since independence from Portugal in 1975.

4 Zimbabwe produced APMs on a much smaller scale and dismantled their production capability in 1997. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report, 1999*. New York: Landmine Monitor Core Group, 1999, pp.97-99.

5 Article 7 Report, Zimbabwe, See *www.mineaction.org/africa_region.cfm*.

6 See Mozambique Five-Year NMAP (2002-2006), on *www.ind.gov.mz*.

7 Ibid.

8 The areas most affected by landmines and UXOs, as identified by the Zambian government, include: (a) Bottom Road in Gwembe Valley, Southern Province; (b) Lower Zambezi, Southern Province; (c) Sinjembela area (Sioma-Sinjembela and Lusu-Imusho roads), Western Province; (d) Nyimba and Petauke disctricts, Eastern Province; (e) Zambia border areas with Mozambique and Angola (Eastern, Western

and North-Western Provinces); (f) Former bases for freedom fighters; (g) Chikumbi, Central Province; (h) Central Province: Serenje, Mkushi And Mboroma; (i) Mangango, Western Province; (j) Chongwe, Lusaka Province; (k) Lyangati, Western Province; (l) Kavalamanja in Luangwa, Lusaka Province and (m) Siampondo in Kalomo, Southern Province. See Zambian Occasional Paper submitted to the Intersessional Work Programme of the Ottawa Convention, *Zambia Landmine Problem*, 25 July 2002.

CHAPTER 2

The role of the Southern African Development Community in regional mine action

Neuma Grobbelaar

> The challenge, as Africa itself, may be described as simply 'Big '… The size and the scope of the space and the people that are Africa do not lend themselves to a 'one-size-fits-all' landmine remediation scheme.
>
> *Dennis Barlow, Journal of Mine Action, 2002*[1]

Introduction

For mine action to be effective, policies that are mutually reinforcing at national, regional and international levels need to be developed. Mine action is rarely successful if it happens in isolation. There are good reasons to look critically at current practice and to ask whether there are common solutions to the mine problems in Africa, Asia or Latin America. However, this approach presents the danger of over-simplification and the expectation that mine action solutions can be imported or transferred, with very little regard for the practical barriers that factors such as geography, lack of infrastructure, personnel and facilities for repairing equipment, represent.

Outsiders tend to view Africa as one large country, instead of recognising it as a continent. The focus area of this chapter, SADC,[2] represents a geographical area as large as the US. The physical expanse of its largest member state, the DRC, makes Western Europe look positively puny.

Whereas several laudable arguments support a mine action approach embracing the entire continent, a sub-regional one seems more appropriate, for the following reasons:

- the wide disparities in the mine-affectedness of African countries;
- the geographic expanse and diversity of the different states on the continent present diverse logistical challenges;
- the language barriers;
- the institutional weaknesses in many countries; and
- the selectiveness of donor involvement, which is often linked to former colonial ties.

For all the same reasons mentioned above, even a sub-regional approach encounters some problems, as the geographic, linguistic, historical and political diversity of the continent is also reflected on this level. However, this has not stopped the 14 member states of SADC from developing and

pursuing mine action policies on a regional basis. This chapter will look at the initiatives that have been undertaken within the framework of SADC–EU co-operation on mine action.[3]

The imperatives for regional co-operation in SADC

Setting aside the EU's willingness to support SADC's mine action programme, any analyst examining mine action in the region is likely to ask: 'Why has Southern Africa opted for a regional approach?' There are several reasons. Two of the most seriously mine-affected countries in Southern Africa, Mozambique and Angola, are members of SADC. Both states would therefore have a strategic interest in seeing SADC engage with the landmine issue. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a further six of SADC's member states are also mine-affected. Mine contamination in the region is therefore a problem that affects the majority of SADC's members.

Regional co-operation on mine action is also motivated by border and cross-border mine contamination. In Zimbabwe, for example, known mine contamination along its northern and eastern borders with Zambia and Mozambique, dating from pre-independence days, is well documented. Another instance is the development of regional peace parks, which will link areas in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa, and other SADC states in future, to form large transnational nature reserves. An integrated de-mining effort is required in this designated land to ensure the safety of tourists and the successful relocation of animal herds.

But there are more significant reasons why a regional approach is important. Landmines have a particular impact where the displacement of refugee populations across national borders brings them into contact with landmine-contaminated areas, and where internal conflict leads to the laying of landmines in border regions. The ongoing civil war in the DRC has a spillover effect on Zambia and its other neighbours, while the conflict between Unita and the MPLA in Angola between 1975–2002 led to military incursions by both parties into Namibia and the planting of new mines in the border region. A sub-regional effort therefore seems a logical approach. Co-ordination could be of particular value in cases where mine risk education can be advanced amongst populations that often share a common cultural heritage and language across a border and particularly when refugees are relocated back to their countries of origin.

Generally, SADC could also play a crucial mine-co-ordinating role in the following areas:

- Preparing contingency plans to mobilise funding for mine action when IDPs and refugee flows are expected.

- Ensuring that international humanitarian NGOs engaged in cross-border assistance programmes are supported by governments.
- Supporting and enhancing the capacity of member states to address the needs of landmine victims.
- Acting as a clearing house for mine action operators, to ensure that best practice is adopted throughout the region.
- Encouraging and mobilising financial support for the development of local research and development (R&D) in mine action technology.
- Ensuring that mine action is integrated into the regional development goals of SADC, such as infrastructure improvement.
- Addressing the region's landmines problem on a political level, to halt the use of landmines by rebel groups and government forces.
- Tapping into the existing international goodwill for mine action, and ensuring that the African continent places mine action on its agenda as a priority.
- Encouraging all SADC members to implement the obligations they have undertaken as State Parties of the Ottawa Convention.

The SADC Mine Action Programme: A brief history

The SADC Mine Action Programme is the result of a joint SADC–EU programme, known as the Berlin Initiative. It was launched in 1994, with a view to promoting greater regional co-operation on a range of issues — including mine action. A pilot project, supported by a targeted financing agreement, was launched in December 1997 to develop an integrated approach to mine action in Southern Africa. Its budget of 2.07 million euros, to be applied over two phases, represented 1.15% of the total EU contribution to mine action worldwide in the period 1992–98.[4]

Several areas of joint co-operation were identified as necessary to a regional mine action programme. All required preliminary investigation. Research was to be made into:

- specialist training requirements;
- the region's technological skills and innovation (inventory);
- regional capabilities for the treatment and rehabilitation of landmine victims;
- the development of a SADC database that could provide mine action information on a regional basis;
- mine awareness/mine risk training; and
- the need for technical assistance.

The first phase of the project assessed both the overall magnitude of the landmine problem in mine-affected SADC states according to jointly defined

criteria, and the capacity of the different national governments to address it. SADC's role in assisting mine-affected member states was also investigated during this phase. Four research studies were completed on:

- the feasibility of establishing a SADC landmines database;
- an assessment of skills training needs in de-mining;
- the necessity for a regional inventory of mine action technology; and lastly,
- ways in which the capacity of governments in mine-affected countries to conduct mine-awareness training could be improved; and ways in which regional rehabilitation/treatment centres could be augmented.

The SADC Council of Ministers approved the recommendations of the first phase in August 1999. The second phase included the implementation of the recommendations and the completion of a series of pilot studies by April 2001. However, although most of the pilot studies were completed by that date, at the time of writing some of the resultant project proposals had still not been taken up by the Secretariat.

Mine action and the SADC Secretariat

As pointed out by the SADC Mine Action Co-ordinator, João Ndlovu, there is a misperception that the SADC Mine Action Programme is 'big and should be involved in actual implementation of the programmes'.[5] In fact its focus is almost entirely at the level of policy development and facilitation. Therefore its effectiveness is directly related to the level of commitment that individual member countries show to mine action.

The SADC Mine Action Programme has its own technical committee. This consists of a mine action co-ordinator, who is a member of the Secretariat in Gaborone, and government representatives from each member state. The latter usually lead the mine action programmes in their respective countries. For example, Mozambique has traditionally been represented by the director or the deputy director of the IND; Angola by the director of the INAROEE; and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Malawi by the heads of the de-mining offices based in their respective ministries of defence. Although South Africa does not have a landmines problem, it has been a regular participant, being represented by the SADC national contact point (NCP) officer from the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Discussion within the SADC Mine Action Committee follows a structured format, and broadly focuses on the following areas:

- Implementation of those decisions which affect mine action taken at the bi-annual Ministers' Council meetings.
- Mine action in the individual member states.

- The status of the joint SADC–EU mine action programme.
- Implications for member states of their ratification of the Ottawa Convention.[6]

Although the SADC Mine Action Committee is supposed to meet bi-annually, in the past meetings have tended to take place on a largely ad hoc basis.[7] Mozambique was elected to serve as chair of the committee for a two-year period in November 1999. South Africa was elected as deputy chair on the same occasion, and was supposed to accede to the chair in November 2001. Instead, Angola was nominated as the incoming chair in June 2002, following its assumption of the SADC Summit chairmanship. Although expectations were high that the work of the SADC Mine Action Committee would be given new impetus by Angola's leadership (especially in view of Angola's status as the most mine-affected country in SADC), this has not happened. The SADC Mine Action Committee has not met since Angola took over the chairmanship of the committee. This could be partly explained by Angola's preoccupation with its own national mine action strategy, and other pressing issues on its national political agenda following the end of the war in April 2002.

However, there are other reasons why the SADC Mine Action Programme has not achieved its full potential. The restructuring of the SADC Secretariat has largely 'hijacked' the effective functioning of the SADC Mine Action Programme. Like SADC, the Secretariat has undergone a significant restructuring since its establishment in 1992. Initially SADC simply took over the 21 sectors of the Southern Africa Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC).[8] The sectoral responsibilities were parcelled out to the individual member states. For example, Mozambique was given responsibility for the transport sector, whereas Angola was alloted the energy sector. This 'division of labour' between member states did not take cognisance of the capacity of individual states to advance regional integration in these sectors.[9] The differences in capacity between member states and their pursuit of national agendas hindered regional integration, the overarching objective of SADC.

When South Africa joined SADC in 1994 a discussion of the need for a far-ranging reorganisation of the Secretariat and its objectives began. It was agreed that there should be a structural division between the socio-economic and the military, defence and political objectives of the organisation.[10] The 21 socio-economic sectors of SADC were reorganised into four clusters. The Mine Action Programme was incorporated into the fourth of these, as a special programme of the social and human development cluster.[11] Other programmes that required joint action under the same umbrella, related to small and light weapons, refugees and IDPs, and disaster management.

In August 1998, Zimbabwe sanctioned, ostensibly under the SADC banner,

the intervention of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops in the DRC in support of Laurent Kabila. SADC did not officially endorse the intervention.[12] However, this action by Mugabe prompted other SADC leaders to address the military, political and defence objectives of the organisation.

After 2002, the SADC Mine Action Programme was reassigned to the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee of the newly activated Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). The SADC Mine Action Co-ordinator explained this positioning as relating to 'the military nature of landmines and landmine clearance thereto (sic) put this activity under the OPDS'.[13] (Please note Figure 1.)

The slowness of the restructuring process over the last eight years has been exacerbated by severe funding restrictions and staff shortages. SADC is highly donor-dependent for its economic survival, and although the restructuring of SADC includes a more realistic costing of its financial operations and a greater focus on national contributions by members, its financial situation remains precarious. The mine action co-ordinator is expected not only to manage the mine action programme, but also to be responsible for other programmes, including small arms proliferation.

Overview of SADC's activities in mine action

Victim assistance

An initial review of the support offered to landmine victims in 1998–99 revealed that most national governments rely on NGOs to conduct the bulk of victim assistance. There is no specific national institution to deal with the treatment and rehabilitation of victims in any of the mine-affected states. Most member states do not have the resources to attend to all the needs of survivors, and have to be careful not to raise expectations that they cannot meet. SADC members subscribe to the position that people who are disabled owing to mine accidents should not be given preferential treatment above those with other disabilities.

A comprehensive approach should be adopted to ensure that mine victims are provided with access to the specialised care that they require. The SADC programme therefore intends to build on the capacity of existing landmine survivors' networks that have been set up by international and local NGOs that support landmine survivors. A SADC workshop on victim assistance in Luanda, Angola, on 29–30 September 2000 concluded that there was a clear need for a regional policy on landmine victim assistance. A project proposal was approved by the SADC Mine Action Committee following this workshop, which suggested that a Resource Mobilisation Seminar on Victim

Figure 1: New position of the SADC Mine Action Programme



Assistance should be held. The last SADC Mine Action Committee meeting in Angola in 2002 also reported to the Ministerial Council that the policy recommendations that evolved out of the Angola workshop on the comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims should be implemented in member states.

SADC mine action database

The SADC database, which was established in Mozambique in 2002, is intended to provide participating member states and donors with a comprehensive overview of existing programmes and priorities. The database will link the states most mine-affected and the SADC Secretariat. In this way mine action management and decisions related to improved resource allocation can be greatly improved. States will be able to consult the database through a network of bilateral access points. So far Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Malawi have expressed an interest in being linked with the regional database. Nineteen managers from the region have been trained over the past two years to manage the access points and database. When fully operational the system will also be accessible to de-mining operators via a central website linked to SADC. The database will be comprehensive and will provide specific information on which areas are mine-affected, current mine risk education programmes, de-mining operations and the number of landmine victims.

Appropriate and community-based technology and specialist training

The development of appropriate technology and the development of special mine management skills in the region were identified as areas where regional co-operation can make an important difference.

The 1998–99 survey concluded that the development of a SADC testing site in Gaborone would be desirable. However, the SADC Mine Action Committee recommended that it would be a far more cost-effective strategy to evaluate existing test sites in the region first. A group of technology consultants has been appointed to evaluate the testing sites in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia. Once their report has been received, the Mine Action Committee will consider whether a SADC-accredited testing site is needed.

SADC also tested R&D innovations developed locally for de-mining in the region. These included explosives for landmine disposal, personal protection equipment and landmine detection devices. Other trials included evaluating both a flip hammer that had been developed by a private company in

Zimbabwe to enable communities to become more involved in mine destruction, and an experimental project to breed and train indigenous mine-detection dogs.

SADC selected 44 senior mine action managers from the region to participate in a middle management training course arranged by the Institute of Military Engineering Excellence of Southern Africa (IMEESA). This took place during October 2000 in Pretoria, South Africa. Participants underwent training in database management; GPS; GIS; and field and quality management. The project had the added advantage of creating a network of database managers and senior managers within the region, and improving indigenous middle and senior management capacity in mine-affected SADC states.

An important contribution to mine action in the region was made when SADC organised a De-mining Operators' Technology Workshop, which was held in Luanda, Angola in June 2002 after several delays. The workshop was the outcome of requests made to SADC by regional de-mining operators that it address pertinent issues related to mine clearance activities. These included how to control fly-by-night de-mining companies and how to enhance the competitiveness of regional practitioners. The operators also emphasised the importance of a code of conduct and the need for a regional monitoring body to ensure that the criteria for quality assurance, as established by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), are applied.

The workshop was significant because it did not focus only on technological issues. The regional operators and humanitarian agencies subdivided into three separate working groups to discuss:

- policy and legislative issues;
- technology and information; and
- landmine victim assistance and resource mobilisation.

Each working group submitted a series of recommendations to the conference plenary for discussion, and to the SADC Mine Action Committee to take further.[14]

(See Figure 2 for a complete overview of the submissions formulated by the three working groups.)

Two of the workshop's key proposals were the creation of a Regional De-mining Operators' Forum which would oversee regional standards and the establishment of a regional technical executive capability to support the SADC Mine Action Programme. Discussions are being held with the Secretariat in Gaborone over the terms of reference for funding and the focus areas of the latter body. The regional forum is envisaged as an offshoot of the national forums that are to be established in member states. However, progress in this area has been slow.

Figure 2: Policy Recommendations by the SADC mine action organisations (mine action NGOs, commercial companies, operators) at the Technology Workshop, Luanda, 26-28 June 2002

WORKGROUP I: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

1. All SADC countries should exchange information about the formal national government accreditation processes and policies for de-mining operators in their countries of origin.
2. A catalogue of the types of de-mining equipment that have been used in the region should be compiled under the auspices of the SADC Secretariat. This should include proper background and a full history of the type of projects for which they were used (terrain and purpose), as well as the type of problems or shortcomings experienced.
3. SADC should investigate the possibility of establishing regional safety standards and assist with quality assurance after clearance, either under a SADC umbrella or through national government policies.
4. SADC should investigate whether it is possible to supply mine clearance equipment on a regional basis (as an expression of South-South co-operation) above and beyond what national governments provide.
5. SADC should look at how national governments could be helped to provide more assistance to landmine victims. Minimal support has been extended to landmine victims in the past. The SADC Mine Action Committee (SMAC) should do more to sensitise national governments to the special requirements of landmine victims, which relate to vocational training, their reintegration into society and financial assistance.
6. SADC governments and the SMAC should liaise more effectively with international NGOs that assist landmine victims.
7. SADC should have a strong and clearly articulated policy on landmines that gives strategic direction, allows for the specificities of each country, and requires political attention from SADC leaders.
8. SADC should be more proactive and should observe how other regions are providing support to mine-affected countries at international and national level. Such assistance includes fundraising and capacity building.
9. SADC should insist on greater transparency and accountability in national de-mining programmes, and introduce better fund management, policies and controls.
10. SADC should investigate the possibility of providing training to financial managers who can assist in the financial regulation of de-mining programmes across the region. In this way specialised skills would be developed that would benefit the whole region.
11. The middle management training that was done for de-mining operators by IMEESA in 2000 should be followed by a future course, with an emphasis on training that is suited for the region and its circumstances.
12. SADC should look at ways in which funding for mine action could be generated locally. Landmine contamination is a long-term problem with no quick-fix solutions, and international donor funding is a finite resource. Therefore alternative sources of income should be sought.

WORKGROUP II: TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION

The technology and information workgroup approached their deliberations from the perspective of the need to build confidence in the technical capacities of the region, as well as that of gaining access to development aid funds. Business/commercial considerations and concerns over the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of their programmes were the primary topics that informed their work.

Accordingly, the working group made two proposals:

1. A self-regulating regional operators' forum or association should be formed to address some of the problems of standardisation and co-ordination that de-mining operators encounter in the region. The forum, which would serve as a single source of affiliation for operators, would undertake:
   - the establishment of a code of conduct;
   - responsibility for regional operators' meetings (for both testing and demonstration purposes);
   - the creation of a body of knowledge in the form of a regional newsletter;
   - oversight and co-ordination of training;
   - engagement in client education; and
   - peer reviews and the imposition of sanctions against wayward operators.

2. A SADC regional technical action group that would provide a support function to the SMAC and would work within the recognised structures of SADC, should be established. This action group would work to create a sustainable, technical executive capability for the region. It would adopt a three-pronged approach:
   - taking the lead in creating centres of excellence (and in discussing how to provide technical support to the region).
   - taking responsibility for the standardisation of humanitarian de-mining in the region on a par with UN standards; and
   - providing co-ordination and information-sharing on information technology, the activities of mine action centers, regional training, technology testing and R&D.

WORKGROUP III: LANDMINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND RESOURCE MOBILISATION

The third working group pointed out that co-ordination between all the governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in victim assistance is essential, and that there should be no discrimination between military and civilian victims. There should be one focal point and one co-ordinating body at a national level that supports a comprehensive and integrated approach. Fundraising should be well planned and consolidated, also at a regional level. Special training should be provided to/for medical staff (such as doctors and psychologists) who undertake the treatment of landmine victims, both on a national and regional level.

Evaluation

The recommendations made at the workshop in Luanda reflected the high hopes that operators, NGOs and academics had for regional co-operation, in contrast to their perception that past results in mine action co-operation has been disappointing. Both regional and international participants expressed their concern about the current lack of a regional focus and substantive initiatives. The most serious criticism of regional mine action made at the meeting was the time lag between the completion of the research surveys and the implementation of their recommendations. The delays in both the hosting of the technology workshop (more than two years) and the implementation of the recommendations of the victim assistance workshop are two very obvious examples.

Critically, a broader evaluation of SADC mine action also shows that there has been poor communication of regional decisions that affect mine action agencies in the field. The member states are represented at an official level at the SADC Mine Action Committee meetings, but the meetings themselves do not invite the wide-ranging NGO participation that is evident at similar gatherings related to mine action held at the international level. Most of the discussions and decisions taken by the SADC Mine Action Committee are subject to political approval and tend to involve government departments linked to a specific donor framework. However, this is not acceptable as a reason for denying wider participation. Not only has communication from the Secretariat to mine action agencies in the region been infrequent, but feedback by the representatives of participating countries to mine action organisations active in their own countries has been equally inadequate, although there are some rare exceptions.[15] The SADC Secretariat and mine-affected member states have to make a more conscious effort to communicate with other role players.

There is a clear lack of capacity at the Secretariat level. Neither the Secretariat nor the Mine Action Committee have the power to implement decisions. The Secretariat's only route to influence policy and decision-making through the Mine Action Committee is via the Ministerial Council. Without sufficient staff and lacking technical know-how, the Secretariat is powerless to pursue a broader role.

One positive development is the proposal that emanated from the Luanda workshop that provision be made for a technical executive capability under the SADC Mine Action Programme to oversee technical issues relating to mine action. However, at the time of writing (a year after this recommendation was made), the proposal is still in the discussion phase. SADC member states have also given an undertaking to expand the personnel of the Secretariat. If this is approved and implemented it will

alleviate the burden on current staff and should result in a more focused approach to regional mine action.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle is the different levels of commitment that member states show to mine action. This is combined with a natural tendency to focus on the national level first. A country like Mozambique cannot afford to wait for regional support to help solve its own mine problem, which has to be dealt with rapidly and decisively. This also explains why the SADC Mine Action Committee has been so inactive under the chairmanship of Angola. A natural tension between regional and national priorities is to be expected, especially in an environment where resources are scarce.

It is against this background that the capacity of SADC to engage in effective regional mine action should be judged. It seems that the most significant area (given the present constraints) in which SADC can play a positive role is at a political policy level.

Areas that need to be addressed at the policy level relate to SADC's response to the use of APMs by rebel groups, and the joint operations with non-signatories of the Ottawa Convention in regional conflicts. (This is of particular relevance to the region following the past intervention of two State Parties (Zimbabwe and Namibia) and a signatory (Angola) in the DRC in 1998.)

Another area that has yet to receive attention is the participation of SADC on the relevant international platforms for mine action. Regional organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) regularly participate in the Intersessional Work Programme of the Ottawa Convention in Geneva and the annual State Party meetings. Their success clearly demonstrates the importance of developing integrated joint strategies at a political level. SADC has not sent regional representatives to these meetings. Although financial constraints exist, SADC should attempt to become more active internationally. It is not sufficient to state that SADC is represented internationally through its individual members.

Conclusion

There are undeniably good reasons supporting mine action at a regional level despite the constraints facing SADC and its members. Donor fatigue and waning public interest in mine action will diminish the ability of the majority of African states to address the landmine problem on the continent. Such countries, and especially those that are members of SADC, have demonstrated a clear political commitment to addressing the landmines problem by ratifying the Ottawa Convention. It is up to the region to tap

more effectively into the goodwill and interest that exists internationally, to foster continuing support for effective mine action. However, the first step is to strengthen the Secretariat.

Endnotes

1 Dennis Barlow, Director of the Mine Action Information Centre of James Madison University, makes this observation in *Landmines in Africa, Journal of Mine Action*, Mine Action Information Centre, James Madison University, 6(2), 2002, p. 111.
2 SADC was established in 1992. Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe are its member states. The Seychelles submitted notice of its withdrawal from SADC during the annual SADC Summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania from 19-26 August 2003, claiming that is was not getting value for its annual membership fee.
3 The EU was the first organisation to adopt region-to-region mine action assistance in addition to its usual bilateral assistance to mine-affected states. Apart from SADC, mine-affected regions have been much slower to respond with their own initiatives. Only the OAS adopted an integrated, institution-building programme at an early stage. Other regional initiatives, such as the organisation of regional seminars in Southeast Asia, are of recent occurrence.
4 The EU committed funding of 180 million ECU to mine action across the world between 1992–98.
5 Remarks prepared by the SADC Mine Action Programme manager, João Ndlovu, for the SAIIA regional mine action conference, 'De-mining and Development: The missing link?', Johannesburg, 10–11 October 2002.
6 Discussions with the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, March 2001.
7 For example, a meeting in Luanda in June 2002 was supposed to be followed by a second before the end of the year. This never took place.
8 The SADCC is the forerunner of SADC. It was established with the purpose of 'ringfencing' South Africa and protecting states in the region from the South African Nationalist Party government's regional destabilisation policies.
9 For example, although Angola is an oil giant in the region, its energy trade has been largely directed at the trans-Atlantic market. The civil war in Angola also had an adverse effect on regional trade, infrastructure and energy linkages. This has resulted in a scenario where most regional transport links today circumvent Angola.
10 The SADC OPDS was established in 1996 under the then chairmanship of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, but was never fully operationalised. There were serious differences of opinion between South Africa and Zimbabwe on the role of the Organ. Zimbabwe supported the vision of a mutual defence pact, whereas South Africa opted for growing convergence on security, political and defence values and objectives. South Africa and other SADC members also supported a rotating chairmanship of the

Organ. Zimbabwe refused to hand over the chairmanship of the Organ, resulting in a stalemate.

11 The clusters are trade, industry, finance and investment; infrastructure and services; food, agriculture and natural resources; and social and human development.

12 A series of measures were taken. In 2002 Zimbabwe was quietly stripped of its position as chair of the OPDS, and the activities of the OPDS were revised and reorganised.

13 Remarks prepared by the SADC Mine Action Programme manager, João Ndlovu, for the SAIIA regional mine action conference, 'De-mining and Development: The missing link?', Johannesburg, 10–11 October 2002.

14 The SADC Mine Action Committee accepted the recommendations of the working groups, and in turn submitted them to the SADC Foreign Ministers meeting in July 2002 and to the SADC Summit in Angola from 26 September–3 October 2002.

15 In the case of South Africa, the national SADC contact point made a special effort to provide feedback, but this example is rarely followed in the region.

CHAPTER 3

Mine action, resource mobilisation and national development: Assessing national policies[1]

Neuma Grobbelaar

> Although mine action is a recognised development problem, it has not traditionally been addressed within a formal development framework. Mine action has typically been treated as a humanitarian problem that attracts significant funding in the immediate aftermath of hostilities, but considerably less over the long term.
>
> *Excerpt from the UNMAS Presentation to the Second Intersessional Meeting of the Geneva Convention, May 2003*

Introduction

Mine action is generally viewed as a relative newcomer to the myriad of developmental and humanitarian initiatives that fall under the development aid 'toolbox'. However, it is an important element of such initiatives because it builds confidence among conflicting parties. It speeds up the delivery of urgently needed emergency aid, and makes possible the safe return of refugees and IDPs. It also helps to ensure the rehabilitation and long-term development of these communities. However, closer scrutiny of the extent to which mine action is integrated into the overall development strategies and policies of both recipient and donor countries reveals that it is still only marginally integrated in development activities.

This chapter will extract lessons from mine-affected countries in SADC on how to integrate mine action more fully into their national development frameworks. In this process four questions will be addressed:

- Is mine action considered a development activity?
- Is mine action integrated into the national development policies of mine-affected countries?
- How can the integration of mine action into national development policies ensure improved mobilisation of resources?
- What is the relation between mine-affectedness and development in socio-economic terms?

Mine action as a developmental activity

Is humanitarian mine action viewed as an integrated development activity

by both recipients and donors? Some might think this a superfluous question. Instead, this chapter will suggest that this question is not asked often enough, and that it has enormous relevance for donors, national governments, NGOs and operators.

Mine action as an integrated development activity is important because we understand today that mine action is a long-term, cost-intensive activity that requires an equally long-term political and financial commitment and vision — from governments in mine-affected countries and from their partners.

In terms of the Ottawa Convention, all State Parties are obliged under Article 5 to clear their territories of landmines within a 10-year framework. It also requires State Parties that are in a position to do so, to assist in this process. The 2009 deadline is looming for many countries in SADC. (See Chapter 1.)

The ten-year period is not sufficient for seriously mine-affected countries to remove all APMs, UXOs and landmines. For these countries, compliance will take longer, and will require a long-term financial and resource commitment both by national governments and donors.

When humanitarian mine action moves beyond the realm of emergency mine action (that is the opening up of humanitarian corridors for aid workers, returning refugees, the resettlement of IDPs and the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure), many governments are faced with a devastating inheritance that continues to do harm long after the silencing of the guns. Thus although there are many good and some less well-argued reasons for suggesting that humanitarian mine action is a developmental activity,[2] this confidence is not borne out by an analysis of the extent to which mine action is integrated into national development strategies.

The reasons for this vary, but are fundamentally a result of the history of mine action, which evolved in response to the immediate and life-threatening challenges facing development workers in the field. This explains its rapid and disorganised development. It was also shaped by the strong, independent and important roles played by prominent NGOs and donors. In some instances a lack of political commitment and excessive bureaucracy, combined with the nature of governments and governance in mine-affected countries after long periods of conflict (for example, Afghanistan in the 1990s), meant that mine action was not included in overall development and rehabilitation strategies. Instead, mine action has often been viewed as an essential but specialised field that should be left to the technical experts.[3]

In the absence of overarching national or international developmental frameworks, and/or the presence of chaotic, bureaucratic government

Mozambique: A typical example of early mine action interventions

Historically, the early development of mine action in Mozambique after the signing of the Rome peace agreement in 1992 typifies how divisive and unhelpful divergent government, donor, NGO and UN agendas can be in the launching of a national mine action programme. Significantly, the politicisation of the de-mining process by making it party to joint decisions of Renamo and Frelimo delayed the launching of an actual de-mining action plan from January to November 1993. Further delays were incurred following a decision by the UN to develop an implementing de-mining and mine action body that would later be converted to a national implementing agency. This met with resistance from donors who opposed the idea that the national body would have both planning and operational authority.

The lack of central co-ordination was further exacerbated by the decision of several donors to fund some commercial de-mining operators and NGOs directly. The Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Halo Trust, a British agency, established their activities during 1993, before the UN established its operating agency — a feat it managed only a year later. The government allocated mine action in Mozambique to particular donors and operators, mimicking its parcelling out of Mozambique's various provinces to donors with a particular developmental or economic interest. The end result for mine action was the effective division of the country into three regions: the north (Niassa, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Zambezia provinces), where the Halo Trust was the dominant operator; the centre (Manica, Sofala and Tete provinces), covered by the NPA; and the remaining southern provinces (Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo) mainly serviced by the UN Accelerated De-mining Programme (UN-ADP). The 'division' of mine clearance among different agencies and the absence of a structured, systematic survey covering the entire territory of Mozambique severely hampered the integration of mine action into national planning as a core development activity.

The initial establishment of a national co-ordinating body in 1995 failed. It was replaced in 1998 by a new government-based body, the National De-mining Institute (IND). However, it was only after the completion of a national mine impact survey in 2001 that the Mozambican authorities were able to co-ordinate mine action on a strategic national level, despite initial resistance from the independent operators. Thus a national survey was completed in Mozambique eight years after the first clearance work began in 1993, and after at least 13 different agencies, using their own survey methodologies, had engaged in mine clearance in the country.[4] The ADP is now in the process of being established as the national implementing agency which will form the basis of Mozambique's long-term mine action capacity.

Whereas one could argue that the Mozambique programme has been successful[5] despite all the obstacles that it faced, it has also missed several opportunities to 'optimise' mine action as an integrated part of its national development activities. The Mozambique example is not atypical: most of the national mine action programmes in other mine-affected countries followed this route, especially in the early days of mine action. These problems continue to plague many national de-mining programmes in developing countries. It will be interesting to see to what extent the same mistakes made in Mozambique are repeated in the most mine-affected country in sub-Saharan Africa, Angola, now that peace has been achieved there.[6]

policies that did not explicitly provide a 'developmental impetus' to mine action, NGOs involved in the field realised fairly early what was needed. A development framework for mine action was an essential prerequisite for cost-effective and efficient mine action that is guided by humanitarian considerations.

Also, in view of a multitude of demands on scarce resources, the demonstration of the 'developmental link' to the funders was essential. The Bad Honnef framework, with its set of principles inspired by humanitarian-developmental precepts, formulated in 1997 and further refined in 1999, is a direct result of these deliberations and considerations.[7]

However, it could also be argued that these principles were arrived at partly because national governments in mine-affected countries (including those in Southern Africa) were not in a position to provide the essential co-ordination that was required in the mine action field. Besides the lack of political commitment in some cases, effective mine action has been severely hampered by gaps in technical and administrative capacity, a lack of funding, and even more seriously, an absence of information (about mined areas, the location of mines, or of mine-affected communities). The latter is largely the result of the nature of mine-laying by both government and rebel forces in most conflicts in Southern Africa, in which civilians, infrastructure grids (electricity pylons, bridges, railways, dams and roads) and schools among others were indiscriminately targeted. The various forces laid mines over a considerable length of time, and few maps were kept to identify where the minefields were.[8]

As a consequence, most NGOs developed some form of socio-economic impact assessment measure to guide and prioritise humanitarian mine action, and to optimise its developmental impact. Some of these models are fairly recent, and reflect the evolving nature of mine action.

Three examples out of many are the following:

- The Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) has developed a Task Impact Assessment (TIA) procedure, an analytical and planning process that assesses the needs and capacities of local communities as well as the operational and managerial capacities of the de-mining teams. The goal of the TIA is to link mine action more closely to post-clearance development work.[9] (See Chapter 6.)
- The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has developed the Community Liaison (CL) model, in terms of which de-mining operators interact directly with communities, record the history of the affected village, assess its needs, discuss mapping, identify the beneficiaries of clearance tasks, and prioritise which mines are to be cleared first. Mine action following this model also co-ordinate with the local and provincial authorities and other

NGOs to ensure that the agreed prioritisation meets the national or provincial clearance and development plans.[10] The approach has a strong partnership dimension that links mine action intervention with other developmental activities, such as the rehabilitation of wells, water pumps, health centres and schools.

- The German Development and Co-operation Agency (GTZ) and MineTech have developed the IHDD (Integrated Humanitarian Demining for Development) and CMAD (Community Awareness for Development) concepts. IHHD puts communities at the centre of mine action, and relies on the local population both to gather information about mined areas and to help develop appropriate responses. CMAD is directed towards equipping communities to deal effectively and safely with the mine threat, with an emphasis on community-based awareness and risk-reduction behaviour. It entails long-term trust and confidence-building with communities that are mine-affected, and the development of coping strategies that can be transferred and integrated with other development outcomes.[11]

Most of these interventions take place at the community level. Yet, although the decisions that are taken in this local context should in theory be more effective and sound than those made at a national level, they are not ideal.[12] Ultimately the responsibility for mine action prioritisation within the overall context of co-ordination and management should lie with a national body. This is especially the case in countries with a long-term mine problem. The development of national capacities to deal with the problem once the donors have moved on to other, equally important, issues is essential.

Table: Mine action in developing societies

*Phases**	*Mine Action*
Phase 1: Open conflict	Characterised by active mine laying (in most cases by all parties involved in the conflict). Limited mine clearance by NGOs to ensure safety of aid workers, food convoys and 'safe' areas for temporary resettlement of refugees and IDPs. Some mine risk education, mostly in IDP camps. Commercial contractors, usually on behalf of the governing party, are involved in clearance of strategic trade and commerce routes. Mine victims receive limited assistance with prostheses and rehabilitation, mostly from NGOs.

*Phases**	*Mine Action*
Phase 2: *Humanitarian emergency (Peace agreement discussed/signed)*	Entry of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (although possible in the phase of open conflict), with main emphasis on mine clearance and disarmament with a view to creating safe corridors, facilitating confidence-building, and keeping the peace.
	Setting up of a mine action centre.
Phase 3: *Transition assistance (Elections held)*	Mine action centre operational
	Legislation passed/prepared to facilitate mine action.
	Clearance activities directed at reconstruction of basic infrastructure (roads, bridges, railways).
	Mine risk education.
	Prompt destruction of stockpiles.
	National mines impact survey conducted.
Phase 4: *Assisted development*	DKPO hands over responsibility of mine action centre to UNDP, to assist in the development of national capacity.
	National government sets priorities for mine action clearance with the help of the national survey and expert opinion, and its partners both within and outside government.
	NGOs, commercial operators involved in clearance activities.
	Mine risk education campaigns and victim assistance campaigns continue.
Phase 5: *Stable self-dependency*	National mine action centre established, funding secured, long-term planning capacity and ability to carry out clearance activities assured.
	Mine risk education campaigns and victim assistance programmes in place.
	High- and medium-impact mined areas cleared, quality assured and land made available for productive use.
	Low-impact areas cleared as the need arises.

** This table is derived from the phases identified in* A study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*, UNDP and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining, Geneva, March 2001, p.18.*

National governments and mine action

> Mine action is not so much about landmines as it is about people and their interactions with mine-affected environments. Its aim is humanitarian and developmental: to recreate an environment in which people can live safely; in which economic and social well-being can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmines; and in which victims' needs are addressed …
>
> *Excerpt from the UNMAS Presentation to the Second Intersessional Meeting of the Geneva Convention, May 2003*

Mine action co-ordination in conflict-ridden and post-conflict societies usually emerges under the auspices of the UN: its Department of Peacekeeping Operations and, more specifically, its Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[13] National mine action centres (MACs) and in some cases mine action co-ordination centres (MACCs)[14] have been developed to deal with the national co-ordination of operational activities related to mine action. The general tendency is to transfer responsibility for the MAC/Cs to national governments after the conclusion of the UN peacekeeping and peace-monitoring activities.[15] The MAC/Cs assume responsibility for:

- planning and operational co-ordination of mine action activities, ranging from mine risk education and advocacy to training and clearance;
- quality management and assurance in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) adopted by the UN in 2001, which form the foundation for the development of country-specific standards;
- information management linked to the dissemination of information regarding mine action priorities as determined by the various stakeholders, collection of data, survey activities and the management of a national database—which in most cases includes the use of IMSMA (Information Management System for Mine Action); and
- mobilisation of resources from national governments and donors.

The local UNDP office is usually given the task of assisting with the development of long-term national capacity-building programmes. These are intended to deal with the socio-economic consequences of the presence of landmines. The office is usually the main partner of MACs, especially in countries with a significant mine problem and insufficient resources and capacity to deal with it.[16]

The UNDP complements the activities of the national MACs by providing the following services to mine-affected states:

- Helping mine-affected countries to manage the landmine problem on their own over the long term (which includes establishing and supporting MACs that co-ordinate, prioritise, and assure the quality of mine action operations).

- Creating information management structures that support national strategies to integrate mine action with emergency assistance, resettlement, and socio-economic recovery activities.
- Implementing landmine impact surveys that identify the magnitude of a country's mine problem, and establish its socio-economic impact, and facilitate the prioritisation and development of national strategic plans.
- Assisting the governments of mine-affected countries to establish national legislative frameworks that provide a legal foundation for developing and operating national mine action authorities.
- Providing management and technical training to enable national staff working in mine action programmes to manage projects better and to utilise scarce resources effectively.
- Developing resource mobilisation strategies and promoting public–private partnerships that support national mine action programmes.



One would assume that the development of national capacity under the UNDP would be welcomed in view of its various development activities, which include education, policy development, governance and administrative support. However, in many cases the UNDP faces the difficult task of acting as broker between government priorities and donor interests. One of the biggest challenges for governments is to ensure sustained donor interest in mine action once the mine victim statistics have decreased significantly, when there are many competing priorities demanding attention in post-conflict states. Many governments face the possibility that donors will move on to other issues once the 'landmines problem has been fixed'. In assessing whether the problem has been addressed, donors tend to look at the landmine victim statistics. A decrease in these numbers seems a tangible and reasonable indicator of an improvement in the landmines situation. However, the pervasive under-reporting of mine accidents, especially in countries in the midst of conflict or where there has been a substantial breakdown in social service delivery and infrastructure, makes it difficult to use the number of victims as the only indicator of whether mine action funding should continue.

Yet the difficulty of sustaining donor interest in mine action lies partly in the vast range of socio-economic challenges facing many of these mine-affected states.

Mine victims versus HIV/Aids victims

The HIV/Aids epidemic is a typical example of the hard choices in the allocation of resources facing developing countries, especially in Southern Africa, which are beset by large landmine problems.[17] The incidence of landmine victims has come down consistently over the past 10 years in Mozambique, and a question frequently asked within the development and business community is: Do landmines still pose a threat in Mozambique? Most businesses accept that de-mining continues to be necessary, especially in the case of greenfield developments, for example the laying of the Mozal gas pipeline from the Pemba gasfields through Southern Mozambique, and the construction of the Mozal aluminium smelter in Inhambane. Both projects were preceded by extensive mine clearance paid for by the companies involved in the business developments. However, despite the obvious successes that have been achieved in mine action in Mozambique it is important that the donor community in particular (as a great deal of mine action is donor-funded) understands that addressing the landmines threat in a country as vast as Mozambique is a socio-economic and development priority. It is true, however, that in sheer numbers of victims the HIV/Aids epidemic in Mozambique over the next 12 years is likely to become a key concern, as will the illiteracy rate (60.4%) and the pervasive poverty of the population (69.4% live below the average poverty line, that is about half a dollar a day at the 1997 exchange rate).[18]

However, the following considerations are pertinent when evaluating the importance of

continuing the Mozambican mine action programme. Firstly, despite Mozambique's Article 5 commitments under the Ottawa Convention, the reality is that Mozambique will probably never be able to rid itself of all landmines and UXOs, especially within the timeframes that have been set by the Convention. However, the eradication of mines in badly-affected ('high-impact') communities is achievable, as is the possible extension of this process to medium-impact communities. Secondly, effective mine action is a critical enabler that allows for the normalisation of economic activity — an essential precondition for sustainable development in poverty-stricken societies. Thirdly, ongoing mine risk awareness campaigns and the education of affected communities are as important as HIV/Aids educational campaigns. In many countries suffering from a lack of resources this is the most that they can afford. Lastly, the removal of landmines, UXOs and weapons that has already been accomplished in Mozambique has made a substantial contribution to the stabilisation and normalisation of society.

The number of APMs, landmines and UXOs that have been removed by different clearance agencies in Mozambique between 1992 to January 2001 is as follows:

- 71,475 APMs;
- 538 anti-tank mines;
- 34, 386 UXOs;
- 496,317 munitions of diverse caliber; and
- 283,277 metallic fragments.

Estimated number of mine victims in Mozambique, 1995-1998*

1995	600-720 (rough estimate)
1996	126 (reports from six provinces)
1997	69 (from seven provinces)
1998	83 (all 10 provinces)

Source: PRIO Report 1/2000

** Please note that the Mozambique Impact Survey that was conducted by the Canadian International De-mining Corps (CIDC) provides more substantial and detailed figures. The total number of victims registered during the two years preceding the survey amounted to 172 (1999–2000).*

HIV/Aids in Mozambique

Child mortality per 1,000 live births (under age 5) with Aids	208.9
Child mortality per 1,000 live births (under age 5) without Aids	124.2
Life expectancy with Aids (years)	32.6
Life expectancy without Aids (years)	56.2

Source: National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2015 on www.cia.gov

In order to ensure the mobilisation of adequate resources for long-term mine action, the UNDP has recommended that these requirements are incorporated into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs),[19] or Interim PRSPs (I-PRSPs), the Common Country Assessments (CCAs) and the UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) of mine-affected countries. According to the UNDP, the inclusion of mine action within these frameworks 'more accurately reflect[s] the reality that mines pose continuing obstacles to poverty reduction and broader development challenges in post-conflict environments'.[20]

Mine-affected countries definitely draw a link between mine action and development (more specifically, poverty reduction). A preliminary review prepared by the co-ordinator of the Resource Mobilisation Group of the Geneva Convention in May 2003 notes that countries such as Cambodia and Chad mention mine action in their I-PRSPs and that Bosnia–Herzegovina has included a detailed strategy on de-mining as a sector priority in an annexure to its draft PRSP. Other countries that incorporate mine action in their PRSPs are Nicaragua and Sri Lanka. Yemen has inserted mine action into its UNDAF and poverty reduction strategies, and Mozambique has indicated in its five-year national plan that mine action is to contribute to the government's poverty reduction campaign.[21]

However, donors to Mozambique have expressed criticism of the fact that the Mozambican PRSP does not explicitly list mine action as a key sector.[22] The Mozambican poverty reduction strategy or *Plano de Acção para a Reducão da Pobreza Absoluta* (PARPA) has set as its chief objective a 20% reduction in the number of Mozambicans living in absolute poverty by 2010.[23] Mine action is not explicitly mentioned as playing a role in reaching this target. However, scrutiny of Mozambique's Five-Year National Mine Action Plan (NMAP) highlights the extent to which mine action is considered key to bringing about poverty reduction and socio-economic development. It also describes how mine action will support the national objectives in its opening sentence which states that the aim of the plan 'is to reduce the risk of injury or death caused by landmines and to contribute to the Government of Mozambique's poverty reduction strategy'.

In addition it should be noted that mine action is identified as a strategic issue by the government and the UN in the UNDAF 2002–2006 for Mozambique. The NMAP also states that the implementation of the mine action plan will have a direct impact on the ability of rural populations to gain access to government education and health services. Key secondary and tertiary transport routes have been targeted for mine clearance to make this possible. Health will improve as access to potable water sources is secured. De-mining will also enhance food security. The impact on the lives of women and girl children in particular could be positive, as in theory they would spend less time on collecting food and water for household purposes. This would give them greater latitude to attend school or become involved in small businesses.

According to the NMAP, mine action would also support better communication and mobility of 'people, ideas, services and resources', leading to increased economic activity. Finally, it will enhance governance and the ability of the government to supply socio-economic services to isolated communities. (Please note Annexure A for an overview of the

NMAP.) Therefore the concern of donors that the Mozambican PRSP does not include a specific reference to mine action seems overstated.

Cambodia's inclusion of mine action into its National Poverty Reduction Strategy offers an interesting lesson for SADC countries. Cambodia has rightly identified the presence of mines in its society as a major blockage to normal social and economic activities that leads to a lack of opportunities, vulnerability, poor capabilities and social exclusion. It therefore lists landmine clearance as a priority issue, because it will help to reduce this vulnerability and to strengthen social cohesion and inclusion. Below is a summary of Cambodia's approach.[24]

Summary of Cambodia's National Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2002–2005

CAUSES OF POVERTY (EXAMPLES)	GOVERNMENT POLICIES TO ADDRESS POVERTY (EXAMPLES)
Lack of opportunities	***Creating opportunities***
Limited access of the poor to land	Land reform; land tilling; **mine clearance**
Limited access of the poor to jobs	Rapid and balanced economic growth; macro-economic stability; trade; private sector development; pro-poor investments (e.g. to support eco-tourism)
Limited access of the poor to common resources	Community forestry and fisheries; strengthened enforcement of environmental laws; reduced population growth
Lack of infrastructure serving the poor	Rural roads; **mine clearance**
Vulnerability	***Enhancing Security***
Crop failure	Safety net programmes (e.g., food for work programmes); improved irrigation and drainage; improved crop varieties
Violence against, women trafficking in women and children	Judicial reform
Child labour	Scholarships for poor children to attend secondary school

Risk of catastrophic health care costs	Effective exemption mechanisms and equity funds for the poor at government hospitals; effective HIV/Aids prevention
Risk of HIV/Aids infection	Effective HIV/Aids prevention; empowerment of women
Landmines and UXOs	**Mine clearance; mine/UXO clearance; awareness education and victim assistance**
Poor Capabilities	***Strengthening Capabilities***
Poor education	Fee exemptions for children of the poor; [provision of] rural roads; higher salaries for teachers and civil service reform
Poor health	Increased utilisation by the poor of cost-effective preventive health services; higher salaries for health workers and civil service reform; expanded access to safe water and sanitation; [provision of] rural roads
Poor nutritional status (stunted growth)	Improved access for the poor to cost-effective preventive health interventions; nutrition education (as part of basic education programmes for adults)
Social Exclusion	***Empowering the Poor***
Specially vulnerable populations (e.g. orphans, the homeless, female-headed households)	Special programmes for education, training and rehabilitation; social safety nets
Women and ethnic minorities	Improved access to government health and education services; appointment of women and [members of] ethnic minorities to key decision-making positions
Lack of participation	Expanded coverage of village development committees

Source: Cambodia National Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002-2005) on <www.imf.org>

The breakdown of the Cambodian mine action targets in terms of its national poverty reduction strategy further illuminates how mine action is integrated into overall development. The Cambodian example offers a fairly recent model that provides some indication of the long-term funding needs for mine action for Southern African countries. It is particularly relevant in that it places mine action at the heart of fighting poverty in society.

Strategic objectives	**Actionable measures**	**Estimated cost in $ million**	**Indicators of progress/ targets**	**Responsible agencies**
Maintain or reinforce the present level of mine action based on mine action strategy	– Maintain de-mining strength – Continue implementation of standards & regulations – Implement technical survey with efficient methods – Develop the capacity of prioritisation [using] the database -Enhance mine risk reduction and victim assistance functions in CMAA*	Present annual cost is about $30,000,000 (including all operators: CMAC, RCAF, HALO Trust, MAG, as well as technical assistance, in-kind contribution and aid to CMAA)	– National Mine Action Strategy developed – Surface area cleared for poor people – Number of beneficiaries	CMAA & relevant authorities
Co-ordinate all mine clearance to address poverty reduction objectives	– Establish a reliable and pro-poor planning process with ministries, operators, provinces and NGOs – Establish socio-economic cost-benefit analysis system for the sector		– Percentage of the de-mining strength dedicated to poverty reduction – Percentage of high/medium/ low suspected mined areas cleared	CMAA & relevant authorities
Develop national mine risk education & victim assistance programmes	Establish a plan for mine risk education, including mine awareness		Number of civilian casualties reduced	CMAA & relevant authorities

** CMAA - Cambodian Mine Action Authority*

Source: Cambodia National Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002–2005) on www.imf.org

However, on an institutional level there are other ways to ensure better integration of mine action into national development frameworks, including the strategic location of the MACs in government structures. This has the added advantage of ensuring a more integrated approach to resource mobilisation.

Chad is one of the few countries in which an explicit decision was taken that 'mine action activities [should be] fully co-ordinated with other socio-economic development programmes'. Accordingly, the National Commission for De-mining has been located in the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation.

In SADC the picture is a great deal more diverse. In Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe mine action co-ordination resides in their respective Departments of Defence. This has far-reaching implications for mine action funding under the UN framework for humanitarian mine action assistance, as the UN generally discourages co-operation with military and defence authorities. However, it does not preclude bilateral mine action support from individual donors or direct military-to-military assistance.[25]

In Mozambique the IND is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The DRC MAC falls under the auspices of the MONUC. In Angola the situation is less clear. Although the INAROEE was established under the Ministry for Social Reintegration and Assistance in 1993, a new layer, the Inter-Sectoral CNIDAH, has been added to the decision-making process, to bolster donor confidence.

For donors it is more advantageous to have the MAC located in ministries that are responsible for finance, planning or socio-economic development, owing to the accounting burden that would otherwise fall on the shoulders of the government department responsible for mine action. The ministries mentioned above also have a more direct link with the socio-economic rehabilitation and development framework of the country. However, each country has to chart its own course. In many instances, mine-affected countries do not have the luxury of an abundance of either human or financial resources, so mine action has been placed where resources are most readily available for the task in hand. Many mine-affected states with a long-term mines problem could also argue convincingly that mine action should be allocated to those that have the necessary technical expertise to deal with the problem. Therefore the military seems a natural choice as a planning and implementing agency. However, because de-mining is a process that may take years, and involves many activities, the involvement of other government departments such as Health or Social Welfare is neceassary. This in turn makes it clear that regardless of which department is appointed as the key institution responsible for mine action, an approach that integrates

the efforts of a number of departments is the basic requirement. Mine action cuts across a broad spectrum of activities, and touches on the line-function responsibilities of a range of different departments. The role of the point department should not be merely to play an active role in managing mine action; it is equally important that it should ensure that all related departments provide the necessary resources and co-ordinate their activities.

The NMAP of Mozambique places a high premium on co-ordination at all levels. Formal collaboration between government departments is achieved through an Inter-Ministerial Standing Committee that is chaired by the director of the IND.[26] This ensures that all mine action supports the overall national objectives of reconstruction and socio-economic development. At a regional level, the offices of the IND in Nampula and Beira have a co-ordinating role which ensures that all the mine action operations in the regions and provinces adhere to national priorities.

The real challenge for mine-affected states when charting their passage through the quagmire of donor conditionalities and requirements is to ensure transparent civil oversight and the conscious integration of mine action with national development strategies at all levels of society. Mozambique has met this challenge successfully.

How do we assess the scale of the landmine problem and its impact on national development?

National landmine impact surveys that measure the socio-economic impact of landmines on communities offer mine-affected states and their partners the most systematic and concrete indicator available (short of a technical survey) of the size of their landmine problem. Such surveys indirectly identify the development spin-offs of effective mine action on the community, district, and ultimately on the provincial and national levels. They can also establish the most direct causal link between de-mining and development activities.[27]

The survey process is not without its flaws. It is impossible to interview every individual who might be affected by the presence of mines. However, the process is refined enough to provide strategic direction to governments and donors on the magnitude of a country's landmine problem and the level of the impact landmines have on the surveyed communities. (Refer to Chapter 7 for a further elaboration of the national survey process and the detailed case study of Mozambique.)

Surveys have been conducted since the beginning of mine action, but rarely in as systematic and comprehensive a fashion as the Global

Landmines Impact Survey programme of the Survey Action Centre (SAC). Initiated in 1998, national surveys have thus far been concluded and certified by SAC in five countries: Mozambique, Yemen, Chad, Thailand and Cambodia. The information gathered from the first four surveys in Mozambique, Chad, Yemen and Thailand has been critical not only in determining the future of mine action in those countries, but also for that of mine action across the world.[28] Surveys are also currently under way in Azerbaijan, Somalia (northern region), Bosnia–Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Lebanon. Surveys in Angola and Afghanistan started in 2003.[29]

The survey methodology ensures that the landmine problem becomes more concrete and measurable. It also enables national governments to develop a far more hands-on approach to mine clearance and other related activities, whilst simultaneously allowing for a better balance to be struck between regional, provincial and community priorities. A survey also allows government to adopt a strategic approach to clearance activities that are more cost-intensive than other mine action interventions. In addition it provides government the opportunity to target mine action interventions so as to provide most beneficial socio-economic and development consequences. A survey and its results allow governments to engage in long-term planning processes, which include timely mobilisation and the most effective distribution of scarce resources.

However, despite the advantages offered by the survey process, the key challenge for national governments and mine action co-ordination centres in affected countries is to ensure co-operation from all the stakeholders. National governments can generally achieve this only if they:

- assume responsibility for determining mine action priorities in a transparent and systematic fashion;
- ensure that enough government resources and attention are allocated to mine action;
- use the information provided in the survey in an open manner;
- interact more effectively with key government departments (such as education, health, defence, transport, trade and industry, finance and planning) to develop sustainable development strategies; and, most importantly;
- use donor funding for mine action in a transparent and accountable fashion.

The answer to the question: Are mine-affected countries integrating mine action into their national development strategies? is a qualified 'Yes'. Those countries with a large, long-term mine problem seem to realise the importance of integrating mine action into their development plans. In many cases this is the only way to assure that long-term resources are provided.

Conclusion

Mine-affected developing states accept it as a truism that landmine contamination has an adverse effect on both national development and the political and social cohesion of society. Although several initiatives to ensure that mine action is integrated more closely with national development policies are already under way, especially with respect to poverty reduction strategies, more could and should be done. The Mozambique and Cambodia examples show to what extent mine action has been incorporated into national development thinking. Their approaches, although divergent in terms of the vehicles that they are using to achieve their goals, generally share the same intent. They also offer the advantage of ensuring that mine action budget planning is integrated into a longer-term cycle that allows for forward planning and implementation.

Endnotes

1 This chapter is based on a presentation made by the author at the third regional landmines conference titled 'Development and De-mining: The Missing Link? Defining holistic, sustainable and cost-effective mine action solutions for Southern Africa' held by SAIIA on 10–11 October 2002.

2 Development is generally measured in socio-economic terms. Mine action can reduce the social vulnerability of marginalised groups. Its positive impact on the economy is measured in access to markets through the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and access to agricultural land for productive and sustainable livelihoods and so on.

3 The integration of mine action into overall development policies is a relatively new phenomenon. It is linked to the connection between mine action and socio-economic impact. More recently it has been associated with resource mobilisation. It has become imperative for mine-affected countries to show that mine action affects development positively. This is especially the case for countries with an endemic long-term mine problem.

4 See Horwood, C. *Humanitarian Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid*. Overseas Development Institute, London, 2000, p. 16.

5 Success is measured in a number of ways. These include the actual de-mining and mine action activities that have freed up land for occupation, agriculture and market activities, and the sustained donor support for the Mozambican mine action programme, despite the growing burden on donor involvement across the world over the past 10 years. A large part of the success of the latter has to be attributed to the hard work and dedication of both local and international NGOs, which have managed to get the job done despite the lack of a supportive development framework.

6 See Millard, AS & Harpviken, KB. *Reassessing the Impact of Humanitarian Mine Action:*

Illustrations from Mozambique. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Report 1/2000 and Boulden, LH & Edmonds, M. *The Politics of De-mining: Mine Clearance in Southern Africa*. SAIIA, 1999 for a more elaborate discussion of the various obstacles that influenced the establishment of the Mozambican Mine Action programme.

7 The Bad Honnef framework identifies three overarching principles that should guide mine action. These are the strengthening and integration of all aspects of mine action related to social, political and technical coherence; an emphasis on community participation, taking into account the aspirations of mine-affected communities; and lastly, the principle of solidarity and mutual assistance. See *www/icbl.org/resources/bh2.html*.

8 See McGrath, R. *Landmines Legacy of Conflict: A Manual for Development Workers*. Oxfam, 1994 and *Landmines in Mozambique*, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, London, 1994. for further reading.

9 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*. New York: Landmine Monitor Core Group, 2002, p.72.

10 Carstairs, T. 'Community liaison in mine action: Partnership for growth' in *Journal of Mine Action*, 6(2), 2002.

11 Scheu, H. 'Humanitarian mine action in Mozambique' in *Journal of Mine Action*, 6(2), 2002.

12 Ananda Millard of the International Peace Research Institute goes into some detail in her *Capirizanje case study: The Challenge of Predicting Impact in Northern Mozambique*. She describes the lack of confidence felt by the local community about occupying a cleared minefield despite significant pressure on available land. It took almost two years after the completion of the clearing exercise for the community to start utilising the cleared land. See Millard, AS & Harpviken, KB, op.cit., pp. 37-51.

13 In SADC the development of mine action co-ordination in Zimbabwe and Zambia have been notable exceptions to this rule.

14 This term reflects specifically the Kosovo situation, in which mine action co-ordination managed by the UN was the key role of the Kosovo MAC.

15 Although strong national government involvement with mine action co-ordination is desirable, it is not necessarily a prerequisite for success as is illustrated by the cases of Afghanistan and Kosovo. In both countries mine action co-ordination fell under the auspices of the UN. Both mine action programmes are considered by specialists as highly effective and ground-breaking.

16 The UNDP currently supports mine action programmes in 21 countries. See 'Resource mobilisation for mine action through the United Nations', Presentation to the Second Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, May 2003. See *www.gichd.ch*.

17 Olaf Juergensen, the UN Chief Technical Adviser to the IND of Mozambique, made the following telling statement during a speech delivered to the Standing Committee of the Experts Meeting to the Ottawa Convention in Geneva on 29 May 2002: 'Importantly, resource mobilisation in Mozambique has been generally successful, and the UNDP hopes to continue to partner with the Government of Mozambique in this regard in the future. Presently 13 countries contribute to mine action in the

country. However, the donors have indicated that there will be reductions to mine action over the next 2–3 years as other priority areas such as HIV/Aids programmes begin to draw funds from this sector.'

18 United Nations Development Programme, *Mozambique: Economic growth and human development: progress, obstacles and challenges, National Human Development Report 1999*, Maputo: UNDP, 2000. pp. 27, 29.

19 PRSPs provide the basis for assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, as well as debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. A PRSP is submitted every three years, although changes can be affected through the annual progress report. Interim PRSPs were introduced to address shortfalls in funding by overcoming delays in assistance. The I-PRSP must not only include an overall assessment of the country's current poverty reduction strategy, but must also lay out action plans of how the country is to achieve its overall PRSP.

20 See 'Resource mobilisation for mine action through the United Nations', Presentation to the Second Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, May 2003.

21 See 'Resources to achieve the Convention's humanitarian aims: A preliminary view', Presented to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention by Norway, Co-ordinator of the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group, 12 May 2003.

22 Discussions in Mozambique with donor agencies, October 2002.

23 As stated earlier in this chapter over 70% of the Mozambican population lives in absolute poverty. Absolute poverty is defined on the basis of access to both material and social services needed for the attainment of a 'set of basic minimum conditions necessary for subsistence and well-being.' PARPA identifies six key priority areas for reducing poverty education; health, agriculture and rural development; infrastructure; good governance; and macro-economic and financial management. See National Mine Action Plan, 2002-2006.

24 See *Cambodia's National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005*, 20 December 2002 on *www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2002/khm/01/122002.pdf*.

25 This issue is of particular relevance to states in Africa that have been highly dependent on defence co-operation and assistance from the US. For example, the Zambian mine action and training programme was launched with US assistance. The US government has insisted that states should sign immunity agreements under Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by 1 July 2003 or face the suspension of military aid. Both Zambia and Bosnia–Herzogovina have signed immunity agreements with the US since 1 July 2003, and military aid to both countries has been restored.

26 The mandate of the IND is 'to successfully establish and develop a co-ordination, supervision and management mechanism, in close co-operation with all other relevant organisations and agencies, to ensure the cost-effective execution of a National Mine Action Plan.' (See NMAP, 2002-2006).

27 A paper published in the *British Medical Journal* in 1995 on the social cost of landmines in Aghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique estimated that agricultural

production could increase by 88–200% in certain parts of Afghanistan, 135% in Cambodia, 36% in Mozambique and 11% in Bosnia without the presence of landmines, UXOs and APMs. See Andersson, N., Palha de Sousa, C. & Parades, S. 'Social cost of landmines in four countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique' in *British Medical Journal*, 1995, 311:718-721 on *www.ciet.org/www/image/country/cambodia.html*.

28 As pointed out by Bob Eaton, executive director of SAC at the fourth State Party Meeting in Geneva in September 2002, the consolidated results of the surveys of Yemen, Mozambique, Chad and Thailand present the following interesting statistics: In all four countries less than 10% of all communities are high-impact; about 25% of all communities are medium-impact; and more than 65% of all communities are low impact. The combined figure of 35% high- and medium-impact means that the Ottawa Convention's 10-year period for mine clearance becomes achievable. These statistics also have critical implications for the way in which mine-affected countries will respond to mine action in those countries. So far Yemen, Cambodia and Mozambique have drawn-up five-year strategic mine action national plans that prioritise high and medium-impact areas. See Eaton, B. *Report to the Fourth Meeting of States Parties: Article V Treaty Obligations*, Geneva, 19 September 2002.

29 See Survey Action Centre, Washington at *www.sac-na.org/surveys.html*.

CHAPTER 4

Mine action, resource mobilisation and national development: Assessing donor policies[1]

Neuma Grobbelaar

> Data compiled for this review point to States in a position to assist others having contributed more than $1.32 billion for mine action over the past six years, with over $0.79 billion of this *having been provided by 33 State Parties* to the Convention.
>
> *Resources to Achieve the Convention's Humanitarian Aims: A Preliminary Review, 12 May 2003*

As the long-term nature of the global mine action challenge has become more apparent, so has the need to find sufficient resources and commitment to address the problem within the humanitarian framework provided by the Ottawa Convention. Under the Convention there is a ten-year timeframe during which mine-affected states that are parties to the Convention have to clear and destroy all deployed APMs under their jurisdiction. State Parties that are in a position to do so are also obliged under the Convention to assist mine-affected states to achieve this goal. However, as more and more states have signed up to the Convention (at the last count 134 State Parties and 147 signatories), the size of the problem has grown, not diminished, as has the burden on resources.[2]

This chapter will attempt to answer three questions. Firstly, how committed are donors to continue supporting mine action in countries belonging to SADC? Secondly, to what extent are donors integrating their mine action activities into the development programmes of recipient states? Thirdly, how can mine action act as a catalyst for improved development strategies?

Introduction

Most mine-affected states that have recently emerged out of war face major rehabilitation, development and reconstruction challenges. In Africa the ability of mine-affected countries to deal with their development challenges is far more limited than that of states which are recovering from fairly brief periods of conflict, like the Balkans. Countries such as Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Ethiopia have undergone long and destructive wars which

have effectively demolished political and social institutions as well as infrastructure. In contrast, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Croatia still have functional infrastructure and institutional capacity, although at a level inferior to those of their Western counterparts.

The endemic nature of conflict in Southern Africa is graphically illustrated by the duration of civil and cross-border hostilities in two of the region's most mine-affected countries. In Mozambique the civil war lasted for 17 years, in Angola for 27 years. Both had a disastrous effect on human development and economic growth in those countries. Angola and Mozambique register very low on the UNDP's human development index, and are rated 161 and 170 respectively out of a total of 173 countries,[3] despite the significant oil wealth of Angola.[4]

Table 1: Human Development Index ranking of SADC countries

HDI rank	*Life Expectancy at birth (years: 2000)*	*Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above: 2000)*	*Combined primary, secondary & tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%:1999)*	*GDP per capita (PPP US$: 2000)*
High human development				
47 Seychelles	72.7	88.0	N/A	12,508
Medium human development				
67 Mauritius	71.3	84.5	63	10,017
107 South Africa	52.1	85.3	93	9,401
122 Namibia	44.7	82.0	78	6,431
125 Swaziland	44.4	79.6	72	4,492
126 Botswana	40.3	77.2	70	7,184
128 Zimbabwe	42.9	88.7	65	2,635
132 Lesotho	45.7	83.4	61	2,031
Low human development				
151 Tanzania	51.1	75.1	32	523
153 Zambia	41.4	78.1	49	780
155 DRC	51.3	61.4	31	765
161 Angola	45.2	42.0	23	2,187
163 Malawi	40.0	60.1	73	615
170 Mozambique	39.3	44.0	23	854

N/A - Not available
Source: Human Development Report 2002

Most mine-affected states are highly aid-dependent by the time conflicts end, owing to the destructive effect of war on their economies and societies. African states receive much less development assistance on average than

other regions, notwithstanding their low social and economic development indicators. The UN protectorates of Kosovo; Bosnia–Herzegovina; Cambodia and some South American and Asian states have received far more generous aid assistance per capita than most African states. This state of affairs is a reflection of both the proximity of these countries and regions to Europe, the US and Japan; and their strategic importance to donor countries. A broad overview of overall development aid assistance (ODA) in comparison to that offered to SADC countries illustrates this situation. (See Table 2.)

Table 2: Development assistance to Southern Africa and selected mine-affected states across the world

Country	*Net ODA $ millions*		*Aid per capita $*		*Aid as % of government expenditure*	
	1995	*2000*	*1995*	*2000*	*1995*	*2000*
Afghanistan*	214	141	10	5	N/A	N/A
Angola	418	307	37	23	N/A	N/A
Bosnia-Herzegovina	932	737	273	185	N/A	N/A
Botswana	90	31	62	19	5.2	N/A
Cambodia	556	398	52	33	N/A	N/A
DRC	196	184	4	5	41.8	N/A
Lesotho	114	41	61	20	24.6	15.0
Malawi	435	445	47	43	N/A	N/A
Mauritius	23	20	21	17	2.6	2.0
Mozambique	1,064	876	67	50	N/A	N/A
Namibia	192	152	121	86	15.4	12.2
Seychelles	13	13 **	172	163**	N/A	N/A
South Africa	389	488	10	11	0.8	1.3
Swaziland	58	13	65	13	N/A	3.2
Tanzania	877	1,045	30	31	N/A	N/A
Zambia	2,034	795	226	79	N/A	N/A
Zimbabwe	492	178	43	14	19.4	N/A

** Afghanistan has received a substantial increase in ODA since 2001 following the US-led campaign against al-Qaeda on its territory.*
***1999 figures*
N/A - Not available

Source: World Bank African Development Indicators 2002

Although mine action funding has generally tended to follow the overall ODA pattern on the African continent, in Southern Africa donors have made substantial contributions to mine action. National mine action programmes in the region have elicited strong donor support, and most national programmes have had their genesis in foreign assistance. Not only have donors given generously, but their contributions have continued over the

long term in most SADC countries, with the exception of Zimbabwe. There, a high proportion of development assistance (including mine action funding support)[5] has been suspended due to the deteriorating political and human rights conditions in that country. In Angola mine action support flagged after the resumption of the war in 1992 and again in 1994 when both parties to the conflict were implicated in renewed mine-laying. However, Angola continued to be one of the best-funded recipients of mine action support in the world.

Continued donor commitment to SADC

As noted, donor commitment to Southern African mine action has been high in the past. Yet, how committed are donors to providing continued mine action support to Africa, and more specifically to SADC countries?

An analysis of the UN Mine Action Investment Database shows that in 2000, seven countries received two-thirds of all mine action investments. These include two SADC countries, namely Mozambique and Angola. (The others are Kosovo, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Laos.) Global mine action funding also increased consistently on an annual basis after 1992, reaching about $237 million in 2001. However, 2001 also registered the first so-called 'stagnation' of international funding since 1992.[6]

The US, the biggest donor to mine action globally, has demonstrated a high commitment to mine action support in Africa. Around 42% of US Humanitarian De-mining Programme funding went to Africa during 1993–2002, in comparison with 21% to Asia, 22% to Europe, 8% to the Middle



East and 7% to the Americas. Mine-affected countries in SADC have received over $72.3 million from the US since 1993, supporting its claim to have a strong political, humanitarian and donor commitment to the region.[7]

Although the US remained the largest donor globally in 2001, its mine action contribution that year fell by $13.2 million. Of the 20 major donors, 11 registered a decline in funding, whereas nine registered an increase.[8]

In 2002, a strong reprioritisation of US funding towards Asia became apparent. Asia's share increased to 38% of total mine action funding as compared with 21% in 1993–2001. This was a result of US involvement in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks on America on 11 September 2001. Africa now receives 34% of US mine action funding in comparison with 42% previously; Europe receives 14%, the Americas 8% and the Middle East 6%.





Much new funding is now going to Afghanistan. The *2002 Landmine Monitor* reports that about $64 million had been pledged to the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan since October 2001. About $43 million of this sum was directly contributed, while a further $13.5 million represented in-kind contributions and payments made directly to NGOs, and a further $7.3 million remained pledged. The biggest single contribution ($18.2 million) was made by Japan.

Some donors have committed themselves to maintaining their current funding levels in mine action. At the Fourth State Party Meeting in September 2002, Norway pledged to match its mine action contribution of the last five years in the coming five years. The Netherlands (a smaller but significant donor) has indicated that although it will continue to spend about $14 million on humanitarian mine action a year, it is unlikely to increase this allocation.[9]

Total donor funding 1993–2001, $millions



Source: UN Mine Action Service Database

It is clear both that mine action funding is finite, and that the demands on available resources are increasing. Whereas there is a clear redirection of funding towards Asia, ironically the main pressure for diverting spending away from SADC countries comes from within Africa itself. The peace processes in the Great Lakes region, Angola, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the fledging peace process in Sudan have all increased the demands on mine action funding.[10]

Mine Action Funding 1997–2002 (Top 10 donors to mine action) in $ million

Country	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*Total*
US*	45.5	39.4	56.8	78.6	62.9	104.2	387.7
Norway	13.3	23.7	22.0	19.3	19.6	25.6	123.5
Japan	2.9	7.8	14.7	12.2	7.2	49.4	94.1
Netherlands	9.6	22.2	9.9	18.6	12.5	15.8	88.6
UK	7.2	7.2	20.2	22.9	17.3	5.2	79.9
Canada	4.3	9.5	15.4	14.7	17.9	15.1	76.8
Germany	7.2	14.8	8.9	10.0	11.1	19.1	71.2
Sweden	11.9	16.6	2.1	7.9	8.5	7.3	54.3
Switzerland	4.0	0.2	4.4	7.5	8.4	9.0	33.6
Finland*	4.5	6.4	5.7	4.8	4.6	4.8	30.7

** The US and Finland have emerged among to 10 top donors to mine action, although they are not State Parties of the Ottawa Convention.*

Source: Resource Mobilisation Contact Group Report, Ottawa Convention, 6 May 2003

Although donors are generally guided by humanitarian considerations accompanied by political and strategic interests, it seems likely that in a situation of competing countries looking for funds, the resources and moreover the political weight that mine-affected states themselves commit to mine action will determine the extent of funding in the region in future.

Cambodia and mine action funding

Cambodia presents an interesting case study of a relationship between donors and a national government that came under severe pressure due to perceptions and actual incidences of corruption and misuse of funds. Cambodia is beyond question one of the most mine-affected countries in the world. One in every 241 Cambodians is an amputee, in a population of around 13 million people.[11] In 2001 alone there were 813 victims of mines and UXOs in Cambodia. A total of 29,358 APMs were cleared in that year. More than 313,586 APMs have been found and destroyed since the beginning of the Cambodian mine action programme in 1992.[12] This is three times the number of mines cleared in Mozambique within almost exactly the same period. Cambodia is a country four times smaller than Mozambique, and it has been particularly vulnerable to the destructive nature of landmines and UXOs on its territory, owing to its high incidence of poverty. Thirty-six percent of all Cambodians live below the poverty line. Of those, 40% live in rural areas. Subsistence farmers are most badly affected within the rural community, because land shortages force them to farm mine-contaminated land. Land pressure is such a prevailing issue in rural areas that it has led to 'spontaneous' de-mining by villagers with some (but mostly limited) technical expertise. The 2001 landmine casualty figures reflect the exposure of civilians (especially farming communities) to APMs, landmines and UXOs, and their tendency to become involved in 'de-mining'. An analysis of the activities that victims were involved in when accidents occurred provides some insight into this problem:

- tampering – 39%;
- farming – 20%;
- travelling – 18 %;
- collecting wood – 8%;
- fishing – 3%;
- herding – 2%; and
- other – 7%.

The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), established in 1993, undertook mine and UXOs clearance, mine risk education, surveying and marking. It received consistently large donor support for mine action from the time of its establishment, in recognition of the vast size of the landmine problem in Cambodia. However, the Cambodian mine action programme experienced a severe crisis in 1999 because of allegations of corruption and misuse of funds in the CMAC itself. Significant donors had such doubts about the lack of credibility of the programme that they cut off their support almost overnight. Donor confidence was restored only after almost all the staff of CMAC had been laid off. Serious efforts were made to rebuild donor trust. These included a greater commitment by Cambodia to national ownership of the landmines problem. A Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), which is responsible for mine action co-ordination in Cambodia and acts as the regulatory authority of the government, was established by royal

decree in September 2000. A further decree clarified the relationship between CMAC and the CMAA in August 2001. Donors have since resumed their funding partnership with the Cambodian government. This case study illustrates vividly the importance of keeping the donor–recipient relationship intact.

Funding in Cambodia



How have mine-affected states responded in providing resources to address the landmine problem?

Although much emphasis is generally placed on the role of external assistance, especially in states that are highly donor-dependent, the contributions that mine-affected states offer in terms of logistical, institutional and political support are often the factors that determine the success or failure of a national mine action programme. For most operators and implementers in the mine action field, the support of government (and its bureaucratic apparatus) is indispensable to the success of their programmes. This type of backing ranges from ensuring the smooth passage of equipment through customs to the efficient processing of visas for international support staff. In one mine-affected country in Southern Africa, it is the current practice to expect international staff to reapply for a work permit every three months. This disrupts the local programmes through work hours lost to the arduous 'navigation' of several bureaucratic institutions. It is a disincentive to mine action organisations, and it also affects critical managerial and strategic decisions over whether these programmes will be expanded, retained at current levels or terminated.

However, most mine-affected states have undertaken a series of positive measures to support mine action in their own countries. A recent review of domestic contributions by the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group under

the Ottawa Convention found that the 18 mine-affected State Parties surveyed by the group had contributed more than $171 million to mine action funding and in-kind resources since 1997. In 2002 alone, resources allocated by this group had totalled more than $38 million. (The contribution of donors was about $237 million in 2001.)

Apart from funds dedicated to mine action in their state budgets, mine-affected states tap into a wide variety of domestic resources. In many cases their armed forces play a significant role. This is particularly true of countries belonging to the OAS, such as Peru. (Most de-mining in the OAS is conducted with military-to-military assistance from the US and, to a certain extent, Canada.)

Croatia has a mine action programme that is almost entirely domestically funded and managed. See the table below for an overview of contributions by mine-affected states.

Mine Action Funding 1997–2002 (Mine-affected State Parties) in $

Country	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
Bosnia–Herzegovina	_	_	_	25,988	170,641	1,328,200
Chad	_	676,667	293,334	539,667	958,333	1,066.667
Chile	_	_	163,514	446,573	799,029	585,186
Croatia	11,157,372	13,763,908	17,694,347	14,048,876	15,932,225	17,864,878
Guatemala	_	153,655	317,443	282,903	280,394	257,158
Honduras	18,865	190,059	250,974	280,796	333,224	549,488
Jordan	4,397,163	5,886,525	6,312,057	6,382,979	5,815,603	6,312,057
Malawi	14,440	1,609	15,696	10,589	16,645	1,292
Mauritania	_	_	350,000	850,000	850,000	850,000
Mozambique	404,858	404,858	454,772	590,708	766,258	598,381
Nicaragua	1,680,000	1,680,000	1,680,000	3,524,500	3,524.500	3,524,500
Peru	23,669	23,669	150,669	36,120	47,240	462,926
Rwanda	250,442	234,386	162,665	127,036	129,690	128,479
Thailand	_	_	316,731	621,736	898,230	929,822
Yemen	_	_	1,000,000	1,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000
Zimbabwe	82,568	84,463	65,272	67,540	76,349	174,813
Total	18,029,377	23,099,799	29,227,474	29,336,010	33,598,361	38,133,846

Source: Reported by mine-affected countries to the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group, Ottawa Convention, 8 May 2003

However, in Southern Africa mine action funding support is highly donor-dependent. It is therefore interesting to analyse the extent to which donors view humanitarian mine action as an integral part of their development initiatives and strategies in recipient countries.

Donors, development and mine action[13]

The EU (one of the biggest financial contributors to all facets of mine action), recognises that:

> Anti-personnel landmines cause suffering and casualties, particularly in the poorest parts of the world, *and constitute a serious obstacle to economic development*, inhibit the return of refugees and displaced persons, *and obstruct humanitarian operations, reconstruction and rehabilitation and the restoration of normal social conditions*' (emphasis added).[14]

The preamble from which the quotation above is taken also states that 'Community mine action is often an integral part of humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, reconstruction or development activities, *whilst being a discrete and specialised activity responding to distinct priorities, operational requirements and political imperatives* (emphasis added).'[15] It therefore recommends under Article 1 of Regulation 1724/2001 that for those developing countries that suffer from the consequences of APMs, mine action should be integrated into all country strategies within the framework of the European Community's development co-operation policy.

On the other hand, discussions with bilateral donors who contribute to mine action programmes outside the ambit of the EU initiative, show that mine action is still viewed as a stand-alone activity, generally funded under the budget lines of head office humanitarian emergency/disaster assistance or peace-keeping programmes. Mine action funding does not fall under the discretionary budgetary and funding capabilities of the local ODA office or mission in the recipient country, even though these programmes are generally managed 'locally'. This implies that countries 'compete' at a global level for mine action funding. It also means that in many cases mine action funding is regarded as a 'transitional emergency' measure, the rationale for which disappears once the humanitarian disaster or emergency is over. At that point funds are shifted to other, more pressing, priorities in the mine-affected country, or even to other countries.

From the perspective of the development aid worker, mine action is generally viewed as humanitarian rather than development assistance. This argument might seem slightly pedantic, but in terms of funding decisions and the amount of attention that is given to mine action in local (in-country) ODA offices it is important, especially when the distinctions between the severity and the long-term impact of the landmine problem is misread by the donors.

Mine action funding can represent anything from 3% to 30% of the total national development assistance budget for programmes that an ODA office has to manage at a national level. Where mine action involvement and sometimes funding is substantial, a local mine action officer is often appointed to manage the programme (especially its budgetary aspects). This

has been the case in countries that have played a key role in mine action globally, such as Norway and Canada. However, in most cases mine action falls under the head of the ODA office, who also has other responsibilities.

At the local level a number of efforts are under way to integrate mine action with the local mission's other developmental activities. Some examples include the combination of mine action with water and sanitation projects, or, as in one case, with a policing project (clearing an area to establish a training ground). However, in most cases mine action is left to the 'experts'. Donors tend to fund NGOs selected for their experience and involvement in mine action in that particular country or even sometimes commercial companies. The latter are given a circumscribed brief usually relating to infrastructure rehabilitation, such as the clearance of rail tracks or roads. (Of course some donors prefer to work directly with the national mine action operator of a particular country, supplying technical expertise, mechanical equipment or simply funding.) Local ODA officers recognise the substantial local knowledge that NGOs have built up, and trust that the interventions that NGOs adopt at a community level will have a broader developmental impact. Examples include the restoration of water wells and access to schools and markets. (See Chapter 8 by Ananda Millard, where this confidence in NGOs is questioned.) Many commercial companies might have the technical capability to become involved in broader development activities, but rarely have the incentive to do so because of the very narrow profit margins, delivery schedules and timeframes they work under.

However, the preference for funding specific NGOs has broader consequences that both donors and national governments need to take into account, especially when they assess the impact of mine action on national development. Some of these consequences are set out below.

Disparities in funding

Although there is nothing wrong with the practice of funding particular partners, and it is certainly up to individual donors to decide whom they prefer to support, this practice can create disparities in funding scales between different projects in the same country. The inequality is exacerbated by the general tendency to allocate specific operational areas to NGOs. Mine action is hampered in areas where NGOs are less well funded.

However, in some countries independent NGOs are better funded than the national operators or the national mine action co-ordination authority. The global mine action track record has shown that this is not necessarily a bad thing, especially where governments are weak and local capacity is poor or non-existent.

Lack of national co-ordination

One of the consequences of donors funding independent NGOs is a lack of national co-ordination — especially where the NGOs have to fulfil a very specific mandate as to the type of activities they pursue. It is obvious that national ownership of a country's mine action programme should be a priority for both governments and donors. Many national governments now have a comprehensive overview of the mines problem in their countries after the completion of a national impact survey, which provides critical information to set priorities at a national level.[16] However, although donors, NGOs and commercial companies might not overtly resist accepting government leadership on this issue, a period of transition and adjustment is almost always required. This poses particular challenges to national governments if they are to ensure continued donor commitment to mine action.

Lack of sensible exit strategies that do not result in long-term national capacity

The UNDP advocates (and most national governments favour) the establishment of a national mine action trust fund in each country which can act as a central depository for mine action funding. The establishment of such a fund would allow governments to allocate resources in a more targeted fashion, based on the greatest need and the highest national priority. On the other hand, most donors that have long-term partners prefer to keep funding them directly. However, it is important that bilateral partners keep a clear exit strategy in mind when they continue this practice. If donors prefer to fund an NGO instead of contributing to a mine action trust fund, they have to prepare both the NGO and the government in advance if they are proposing to withdraw. Many donors would argue that the NGOs they fund are run predominantly by nationals of the recipient country, with perhaps one or two foreign experts in an advisory or management position. Therefore, local capacity is being advanced and built, and in theory will add to the national expertise in mine action. However, once a donor stops funding a particular NGO, the national government rarely has the financial capacity to integrate that de-mining corps into its own operations. There are many examples throughout the African continent of development projects and programmes that have simply disappeared after the donors have abandoned them.

Absence of a development perspective

Lastly it should be noted that not all NGOs and operators have a strong

community-development focus. They readily admit that their background (usually military) does not always provide them with the necessary skills to engage with developmental issues. There are still mine action organisations that believe their only brief is to remove the mines from the ground and destroy them. Of course this does not mean that they are not effective within this limited role, but no attempt is made to address the social dimensions of mine clearance for the communities involved. Therefore they cannot enhance and complement the development activities which are made possible by the removal of mines.

How can mine action be a catalyst for improved development strategies?

Perhaps part of the reason why traditional development workers do not recognise the broader benefits that mine action can offer to development is that mine action is traditionally regarded as simply the 'technical' removal and destruction of mines. Mine action is a great deal more multifaceted in current practice. The introduction of socio-economic impact surveys and measures, in combination with a range of community studies and activities to provide specifically targeted mine action interventions in many countries has ensured that mine action has matured into a multifaceted and targeted development intervention.

Surveys conducted to evaluate the socio-economic impact of landmines on communities are normally carried out in a relative information vacuum. Very little socio-economic assessment has been conducted recently in countries emerging from conflict, especially at the community level. Also, the application of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)[17] to manage that data effectively, produces a technology advantage in countries where information technology skills are rare. IMSMA allows for the compilation of accurate databases that collate statistics on subjects as wide-ranging as the location of minefields, the size of communities affected by mines, the mine action programmes already operational, the location of mine accidents, and the socio-economic activities and character of mine-affected communities. Lastly, in most mine-contaminated countries in the developing world where maps are outdated or incomplete, satellite technology is used to compare not only the physical features of locations with hand-drawn and digitised maps, but also combined with GIS and GPS to pinpoint the location of mines, minefields and communities. This implies that an activity such as mapping could offer further advantages to development activities. The compilation of a comprehensive gazetteer in Mozambique by the CIDC before the launch of the survey is one of many 'extra' development spin-offs resulting from mine action in that country. The

information made available by a landmine impact survey provides an important planning tool for the governments of mine-affected countries that have scant capacity and little information about community needs. It enabled them to determine the spread of mine-affected communities, their size, their gender and age differentiation, and whether they have access to schools and health facilities.

The GICHD is currently developing an exciting project called the Mine Action XML (maXML), which will ensure additional benefits to mine action and development planning.[18] The maXML fosters better integration of IMSMA into development programme management, and provides for data exchange between members of the mine action community, other interested parties and user domains outside the ambit of mine action. It will also allow governments that use IMSMA to transfer the whole database or parts of it to relief agencies or to other government departments. On a practical level it means that a government department such as the Department of Health and Social Welfare in a mine-affected country will be able to integrate IMSMA data on mine accident survivors and their location with its own information, to establish how and where health posts should be located and how social welfare grants should be distributed.

The ICRC will be able to incorporate the same data into its own database to assess the prosthesis requirements of mine accident victims, using the criteria of age to determine the frequency of adjustments and fittings, accessibility, and so on. It will also enable the Department of Agriculture to include data concerning cleared land into its database with a view to planning large-scale agri-industries or small-scale farming activities. The potential of maXML to support humanitarian and development initiatives is endless.

Conclusion

Information is a powerful tool, and reliable and abundant information is one asset that most developing countries emerging from long-term conflict do not have. All the socio-economic data that have been gathered so meticulously through a national impact survey could be incorporated into the overall national development planning activities of government departments and their partners. On the other hand, such data could be either completely ignored or discarded once a mine action intervention has been completed. The added advantage of information in the IMSMA and maXML format is that it can be constantly updated and adjusted to reflect changing circumstances. It also provides a benchmark against which government, mine action organisations, development planners and their

partners can assess their development interventions, and make the necessary adjustments.

For all the reasons mentioned above, mine action can be an important catalyst for national development in mine-affected states. Although it is such a young discipline, it is being driven by highly dedicated individuals and organisations and its strong community focus implies that the planning and management benefits mine action can carry for development programmes can be remarkable. However, it is clear that mine action must be better integrated into national development strategies if this is to be achieved. The onus rests on national governments to ensure that their own government departments and agencies become cognisant of how mine action could be integrated with development. Donors will also need to reorient their thinking on mine action, and decide whether they are willing to integrate it in a more conscious way into other development activities.

Endnotes

1 This chapter is based on a presentation made by the author at the third regional landmines conference titled 'Development and De-mining: The Missing Link? Defining holistic, sustainable and cost-effective mine action solutions for Southern Africa' organised by SAIIA from 10–11 October 2002.

2 Please note the main webpage of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines on *www.icbl.org*.

3 See UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world*. Oxford University Press: New York, 2002.

4 Angola is the second largest oil exporter in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria with an annual estimated oil export revenue of about $5 billion. Angola was also the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in SADC in 2000 with $1.8 billion in FDI inflows. See Grobbelaar, N, Mills, G and Sidiropoulos, E. *Angola: Prospects for Peace and Prosperity*. SAIIA: Johannesburg, 2003.

5 Most foreign assistance for de-mining efforts in Zimbabwe ended by the end of 2000.

6 Major Findings, ICBL fact sheet, *Landmine Monitor Report 2002: Toward a Mine-Free World*, ICBL, 2002.

7 Mozambique had received $28.8 million since 1993, Angola over $25.8 million since 1995, Namibia over $9 million since 1994, Zambia over $2 million since 2001 and Zimbabwe over $6.7 million since 1998. See 'US Humanitarian Demining in Africa', *Journal of Mine Action*, James Madison University: The Mine Action Information Centre, 6.2, 2002, pp.2-5.

8 Ibid.

9 Statement by the Netherlands on assistance and co-operation, Fourth State Party Meeting of the Mine Ban Convention, Geneva, 19 September 2002.

10 Under the US National Security Strategy launched in September 2002, the US identified key strategic partners in Africa for its fight against terrorism. Ethiopia was identified as one of these states. The recent pressure that the US has also brought on the parties to the conflict in Sudan to settle their dispute is an indication of the increasing geopolitical importance of this state.
11 Remarks by Kara L. Bue, deputy assistant secretary for Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State at Embassy of Cambodia in Washington, D.C. on 14 May 2003 at the launch of the US State Department and Warner Bros. Educational Campaign on Mine Risk Education and Mine Survivor Social Integration for Cambodians, MGM Network posting.
12 See *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*, *www.icbl.org/lm* and Cambodian Article 7 Report, Form F, 19 April 2002.
13 This section draws heavily on a series of interviews that were conducted in October 2002 in Mozambique with ODA officers of countries that have demonstrated a key interest in mine action and that have provided significant resources and funding to mine action globally.
14 See point 2 in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July concerning action against APMs in developing countries, Official Journal L234, 1 September 2001, p0001-0005.
15 Ibid.
16 One should caution, however, that the failure to complete a national impact survey is not an excuse for ineffective mine action and absence of national ownership of the mines problem. There are indeed many interim corrective measures that governments can take on the basis of existing surveys, the incidence of mine accidents, as well as mapped minefields (where they exist).
17 IMSMA is based on standard computer technology and provides a platform for information gathering, data storage, mapping and analysis needs of MACs in the field. It enables mine action planners to set priorities for future clearance activities and for the allocation of resources, such as for mine risk education. IMSMA is currently being used in Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Estonia, Guatemala, Kosovo, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Yemen. See GICHD Update on Activities between January and March 2003 on *www.gichd.ch*.
18 Statement by Ambassador Martin Dahinden, Fourth Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 16–20 September 2002.

CHAPTER 5

Recommendations to mine-affected countries in SADC and donors operating in SADC

Neuma Grobbelaar

As mentioned earlier in this book it is not wise to impose mine action practices without due regard for the uniqueness of the challenges that each mine-affected country faces. However, the rich tapestry of mine action interventions and innovations in the region offers some valuable lessons to mine-affected countries, both in Southern Africa and further afield.

The following set of recommendations to mine-affected countries and donors in the region is aimed at ensuring continued donor commitment and support to national mine action programmes and promoting more effective mine action.

Open and continuous communication with all partners in mine action: A successful national mine action programme requires ongoing and open discussion, information gathering and data sharing among donors, mine action agencies, other government departments and affected communities. To secure sustained donor support, mine-affected countries in the region should articulate clear and reasonable goals, make decisions in a transparent manner, and ensure financial openness and accountability. This is especially relevant in a scenario where mine action is largely donor-driven and the regular rotation of diplomatic staff and foreign technical experts means that nationals are often expected 'to reinvent the wheel'. The establishment of a formal framework that includes discussions on a regular basis (preferably quarterly or more often if required) between government, donors and all stakeholders in mine action is a minimum requirement to ensure a constructive dialogue. At the same time, the responsibilities and reporting/accountability lines within government should be unambiguous. For example, the location of the MAC within government and its responsibilities to other line departments, donors and mine action stakeholders should be clearly understood to avoid confusion and to ensure that decisions are reached and implemented effectively.

Political commitment by national governments to mine action: The support of the national government is considered a key ingredient of successful mine action programmes. Some countries unfortunately regard mine action

programmes as externally driven interventions. Consequently, the recipient governments show very little interest in ensuring the success of these interventions. Showing political commitment to mine action extends beyond ratification of the Ottawa Convention. (In this respect SADC has demonstrated more than sufficient commitment.) However, membership of the Convention also implies undertaking a greater commitment of resources and attention to mine action at both a national and international level. An area in which mine-affected countries in the region and Africa should play a more active role is in the intersessional and state party meetings of the Ottawa Convention. Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa have been involved as co-chairs of the standing committees, as has Kenya. Yet African states and SADC members have to be more proactive if they wish to ensure that donors pay more attention to mine-affected states in the region.

National capacity-building in principle and practice: National capacity-building is not only a matter of training or employing x number of nationals in mine clearance programmes or survey teams. It also involves empowering people to become active participants and decision-makers in developing a sensible response to the long-term nature of the landmine problem. It entails building the capacity to deal reasonably and cost-effectively with landmine problems within both government and society; the building of partnerships with affected communities; and a thorough reassessment of the allocation of resources. For example, a country in a relatively stable situation (where there is little migration and no real land hunger) might ask the question: Should we spend our resources on clearance, or on mine risk education and marking?

Effective management and cultivation of good donor relations: Donors have particular preferences with regard to mine action. Some have cultivated long-term relationships with particular NGOs over many years, and prefer to fund NGO activity directly. Some have strong feelings about not using commercial companies for humanitarian de-mining, whereas others believe that commercial companies are more effective, focused and appropriately skilled — especially in the rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads and railways. Some donors use mine action as a way to strengthen their relationship with the military, whereas others don't have a mandate to work with any institution that is linked to the military or the police. Yet irrespective of donor preferences, the recipient governments should cultivate good donor relations as an important part of mine action co-ordination. This involves confidence-building, awareness of donor sensitivities and objectives, and constructive and positive action if and when required.

Constant evaluation and re-evaluation of goals and objectives: It is essential that mine-affected countries use socio-economic impact assessments as the yardstick for successful mine action. Prioritising the socio-economic impact of mine clearance is what Ananda Millard, formerly of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), describes as 'optimising impact', especially after mine action has moved beyond the critical phase of emergency de-mining. It implies ongoing evaluation of strategies; adjusting programmes when necessary; and ensuring that mine action is cost-efficient, effective and led by the best operational decisions for the circumstances. It entails closing the loop between decision-making on a political and operational level and the practical community level. Integrating mine action with other development activities is also a way to optimise its positive effects. Unfortunately there are still some recipient governments, donor agencies and mine action agencies that regard mine action as a stand-alone activity or fail to see the inherent developmental potential of mine action.

Building partnerships by donors, governments and mine action agencies: Mine risk education and victim assistance are both areas that require partnerships between various government, community-based and international humanitarian bodies. Mine clearance in communities has to be an integrated, inclusive process, in terms of assessing the impact of APMs on villages and community life and ensuring community confidence in cleared land. It implies involving traditional leaders and their communities, local government at the district and provincial levels and government institutions at the national level. However, there are far greater opportunities for partnership than merely those essential on a national basis. Mine-affected states in the region should build partnerships with other countries that have the means to assist or can offer useful lessons, both in managing the problem and assisting in the practical implementation of mine action. The case of Mozambique offers valuable lessons for the rest of the region, both in terms of the successes and failures of mine action initiatives. The fact that the most highly affected country in the region, Angola, is also Portuguese-speaking and shares the same colonial legacy as Mozambique is an advantage. What was learnt during the implementation of the national impact survey in Mozambique and the expertise that has been developed by the IND and the ADP could be adapted and transferred to the Angolan situation.

The better integration of mine action into overall development initiatives: Donors should integrate mine action funding into their core ODA budgets to ensure better oversight and a longer-term, more focused approach to the involvement of their agencies in mine action. However, at present a striking

aspect of mine action funding is that the majority of decisions are taken at a government level in the donor country. (This is discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter.) The local development arms of donor countries in the mine-affected countries generally contribute very little to the direction of mine action funding — even where they have officers dedicated to mine action. (Such officers also have to deal with a variety of other tasks in addition to their mine action activities. This is a disadvantage only when there is no clear correlation between the mine action oversight function and the other areas of responsibility that a mine-action officer in an agency or mission has to fulfil.) Yet donors very rarely consider mine action as an integrated part of other development activities. Very few agencies deliberately integrate mine action with their other development work, even though funding for mine action represents a substantial part of total development aid assistance.

Most donor countries have developed certain core activities and programmes that are implemented over several years in a recipient country. However, mine action is described as a special initiative or category, not a purely developmental activity. One ODA official explained that mine action and the funding that is allocated to this activity falls under 'special initiatives' on ODA budgets, and is not generally regarded as a core ODA activity. In a general ODA budget there is a small amount set aside every year for so-called 'special initiatives' that usually flow from the UN development agenda, (for example the year of the child, the year of the woman, and so on).[1] If donor agencies allocate their funding only to 'special initiatives' as they arise from time to time, their activities and programmes would have very little impact and focus. Therefore it is argued that mine action should be elevated from its 'special initiative' status and made a core activity — especially in countries where it is clear that landmines pose a long-term impediment to development.

Donors should introduce flexibility in multi-year funding: Most donors have adopted 'multi-year' funding cycles, which is a positive development in mine action because it allows for better and longer-term planning of mine action programmes. However, some NGOs and operators in the field claim that they seldom have the benefit of a similar approach to their funding requirements, which makes it difficult for them to plan ahead.[2] This lack of consistency could indirectly encourage mine action agencies to take short cuts or to undermine each other in an effort to secure funding. However, there is also a down-side to multi-year commitments, namely a lack of flexibility. The commitment of funds to particular organisations only could undermine a donor's ability to adjust its funding allocations according to the

changing situation. For example, in those cases where the national government has developed greater national managerial capacity to respond to the mines situation, this advance should be recognised with active support, accompanied by the appropriate checks and balances, from donors.

Donors should move away from the tendency to regard mine action as a purely technical activity: Most donors consider mine action a technical activity and profess that they do not have the expertise to judge the effectiveness of mine action. They generally rely on the feedback of specialists in the field, expertise that is provided at head office level or by the mine action agencies they use. Although some clearance agencies prefer it this way, donors would be better served if they took a greater interest in the development impact of the work done by these agencies. All mine action interventions, from clearance to mine risk awareness, have consequences at the community level. It should be at this level that activities are evaluated. A focus on the technicalities of de-mining alone has limited value for this type of approach.

Using local expertise and capacity: The African continent abounds with examples of failed external development and humanitarian interventions. The reasons for these failures vary. However, one of the main causes is the use of inappropriate technology. There are several anecdotal references to brand new machines lying obsolete all over the region, simply because it was found too expensive or difficult to obtain high-tech, usually imported, spare parts. Another reason for the failure of external interventions is that external partners often fail to recognise local capacity and expertise. The SADC region is a leader in mine-resistant vehicles and other technologies and several international mine clearance organisations have shaped their technologies here. It is important that donors recognise local or regional capacity when they select partners for mine action. This also ensures that a capacity to respond to the long-term nature of the mines problem is developed. However, local expertise is not restricted to mechanical equipment and technologies. The management training of middle-level mine action managers conducted by the Institute of Military Engineers of Southern Africa provides a good example of tapping into expertise that is locally available. In a region that often suffers from 'survey fatigue', and where the local population can in some cases justly ask when something will be done to address their problems (instead of having them analysed to death by every foreign doctoral or masters student that passes through the region), national governments should insist that these types of survey are used to supplement local capacity and expertise. Governments should be more pro-active, and should identify areas where they can enter into partnerships with

international research organisations to develop appropriate responses to the mines problem.

Donors and governments should develop proper exit strategies: Donor withdrawal affects the long-term planning capacity of both national governments and mine action agencies. As mentioned previously in this book, many laudable mine action programmes tend to simply disappear when donor funds dry up. Whereas it seems feasible that mine-affected countries such as Mozambique and Angola will be able to address the high- and medium-impact areas in their countries within the ten-year framework specified by the Convention, it is unlikely that the entire mine problem will be resolved within this period. This means that mine-affected countries and their partners need to focus on ways of addressing the problem in the long term. Many NGOs complain that they face a high level of uncertainty with regard to continued donor commitment to mine action funding. The reasons for this vary, and are partly the result of competing domestic priorities (as explained in Chapter 3). The uncertainty of donor funding is also a result of the increasing demand for mine action assistance globally. Donors will shift their support to those countries which they perceive as having the greatest need. They are also less willing to provide funding to a country whose government appears to be lukewarm, unengaged or unaccountable.

The introduction of a mine action trust fund by the UNDP as a way to ensure that the governments of mine-affected countries can respond to the problem according to local need is useful. However, many donors are reluctant to provide funding in this manner because of a perceived lack of oversight and accountability at government level, as well as their desire to maintain long-established relationships with preferred partners. Thus it is in the interest of every mine-affected government to develop appropriate strategies, policies and accountability benchmarks to ensure a commitment from donors beyond the ambit of a preferred partner. Both donors and governments also need to give some thought to how locally trained de-miners and other mine action workers can be absorbed into the economy once the donors have moved or the task completed. The skills developed by mine action workers (such as social survey skills, project management, procurement and information technology skills) are valuable to developing economies. It should be in the interest of governments to tap into those skills on a broader basis. That is another key reason why mine action should not be viewed as a stand-alone activity, but should be integrated with broader development interventions.

SADC governments should find an appropriate regional platform: Africa is the continent most heavily affected by landmines, UXOs and APMs. SADC

itself has two of the most mine-affected countries in the world. It is a major advantage to SADC members that all states in the region are now State Parties to the Ottawa Convention. However, mine-affected countries in SADC should be very clear about the role that the organisation can and should play in regional mine action. There is a place for national and regional initiatives, although the operational side of mine action is the main concern at the national level.

Other regions such as the OAS have demonstrated how effective a regional strategy can be. Of course it is true that SADC does not enjoy the advantage that the geographical proximity of the US and Canada offers to the OAS. (Both states are prominent players in the OAS mine action field.) However, there has been significant interest in mine action in SADC from the EU, the US and other donor states.

There are many forms that regional action can take. The development of region-wide standards, technical capacities and information-sharing mechanisms are obvious examples. However, the most important role for SADC is at the political policy level. SADC as an organisation should advance the regional mines problem more prominently in international fora. Its participation at the intersessional and State Party meetings of the Ottawa Convention has not been sufficiently frequent or prominent. Its role in providing political impetus to persuade member states to accede to the Convention has been very positive; but this needs to be extended to broader issues than government compliance. These include looking at the role of non-state actors in the region and their use of APMs, considering broader disarmament issues, and deciding where the region positions itself on these matters. More concretely, SADC's role entails concerted political effort and attention to ensure that the region rids itself of the remaining mines in this part of the world.

Conclusion

Perhaps it is most appropriate to conclude this section with the words of a representative of one of the mine-affected states in Southern Africa. Artur Verissimo, then director of Mozambique's IND, made the following presentation to the Standing Committee of the Experts Meeting to the Ottawa Convention at the GICHD on 29 May 2002, on the overall lessons learned in his country:

> There have been many lessons learned over the past 10 years. From the Government of Mozambique's perspective there have been five key lessons learned:
>
> • First, create a MAC as early as possible within the overall peacebuilding/

humanitarian relief process to help ensure a nationally co-ordinated approach to the problem, which in most cases will take decades to address.

- Second, conduct an impact survey as soon as the MAC is established so that information is centralised and standardised between the government, operators and donors. This will improve co-ordination, planning and result in targeting limited resources at the most urgent need.
- Third, follow up the impact survey with a Technical II survey as soon as possible so that all partners and stakeholders (impacted communities, governments, donors, operators, UN, etc.) will have a clear understanding of the extent, cost, and duration it will take to reduce or eradicate the problem.
- Fourth, [develop] an integrated development-focused national plan which has clearly defined targets to reduce poverty and suffering if the landmine problem is determined to be a medium-term problem for the country. If, as [in] the case with Kosovo, there are resources available to clear the problem more quickly, then a humanitarian emergency response plan will suffice.
- Last, stay involved with the international mine action community. There are really a small number of actors in this sector which makes it easy to communicate and co-ordinate activities; attend meetings like this one here today whenever possible to gain insights and, yes, to meet donors. Finally, share lessons learned with other mine-affected countries so that the fight to eradicate and reduce the problems associated with landmines and UXO can happen in years, not decades.

Endnotes

1 Discussions in Mozambique with donor agencies, October 2002.
2 Remarks made by a NGO at the third regional SAIIA conference, 'Development and De-mining: The Missing Link? Defining holistic, sustainable and cost-effective mine action solutions for Southern Africa', 10–11 October 2002.

Section Two

Experiences in the region

CHAPTER 6

De-mining experiences and challenges in Angola

Aksel Steen-Nilsen

Executive summary

Mine action in Angola has reached a critical stage. It is necessary for the national authorities responsible for de-mining in Angola to rebuild credibility and international trust as the only way to ensure continued interest from donors in supporting mine action in that country. Greater commitment from the government would also assist the development of a sustainable Angolan mine action strategy. Previous attempts to create a functional national programme of this kind have been unsuccessful. Thus it may be necessary to look at new ways of managing the mine action process in Angola, to ensure that the mine action sector works more effectively and has sustainable sources of income. One new way might be provided by the inter-sectoral Commission on De-mining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH), but by the time of writing (April 2003) this body had not been able to show any real signs of supplying a functional solution to the many problems de-mining faces in Angola. Although progress has been made, CNIDAH has yet to become an effective co-ordinating body for the overall de-mining effort in Angola.

A stronger commitment is also needed from international donors. The establishment of a donor board would be one way in which greater collaboration between donors and the government could be achieved. This, combined with donor guarantees of long-term funding for de-mining in Angola, would allow NGOs involved in mine action (for example, Norwegian People's Aid — NPA) to build strong and sustainable de-mining programmes in close co-operation with the national mine action authorities.

Introduction: De-mining in Angola

Many different organisations have been involved in de-mining in Angola over the last decade. Although much knowledge has been gained from the experiences of these groups, the Angolan de-mining programme is still beset by problems. Some of the most significant of these are how to identify the most pressing priorities, given the limited resources available for de-mining operations and the lack of political will to establish a functional mine action

strategy in Angola. Other issues of concern are the involvement and continuation of support from international donors; and the perennial need to conduct de-mining in a more cost efficient way.

After nearly four decades of war, Angola finally seems to have ended its long conflict. There is now hope for a more prosperous future. On 4 April 2002 a cease-fire agreement was signed between the military forces of the MPLA and Unita. This, together with the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty in the same year, has given the organisations involved in mine action in Angola hope that a permanent solution to the landmine problem in that country is possible.

Even though a vast number of challenges need to be addressed on all fronts in Angola, a new optimism is being expressed at all levels of the population.

However, the explosive remnants of war are still very much present. After such a long period of conflict, weapons of every kind are still at large, especially in the rural areas. In particular, landmines and UXOs will continue to present a physical threat to Angolans for many years to come.

The NPA's mine action experiences in Angola

The NPA de-mining programme in Angola[1] was established in 1994 in response to the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord, which signalled the dawning of renewed hope for stability in the country. Initially, the NPA's involvement was a response to a request by the UN that the NPA should undertake a landmine survey to evaluate the extent and impact of mine contamination in Angola. Later, the UN approached the NPA and asked it to contribute a de-mining team that would re-open the important road link between Luanda, the capital of Angola, and the provincial city of Malanje.

The NPA's operations in Angola commenced in 1995. Since then, the NPA's involvement has grown significantly. It is now one of the most important international organisations working to address the landmine problem in Angola. Its programme uses a wide range of state-of-the-art de-mining tools, and currently employs 500 staff members in Angola. The NPA undertakes priority de-mining tasks, and assists in the provision of emergency aid and the establishment of development initiatives related to de-mining on a nation-wide scale.

The NPA mine action programme rests on a detailed understanding of the extent of the landmine contamination in Angola, and of the impact of mines on the living conditions of the population. This knowledge has been acquired through the use of a GIS landmine database, which is constantly being brought up to date by the reports of the NPA's survey teams. The

information gleaned by the NPA's extensive survey activities, combined with additional criteria for task selection, known as task impact assessment (TIA), forms the basis on which the NPA makes decisions on which de-mining activities are most urgently required.

The NPA has developed a broad spectrum of mine action capacities. These include conducting surveys; promoting mine awareness; employing three different mechanical verification and clearance units (Aardvark, Hydrema and mine-protected Casspir vehicles); and using two different explosive-detecting dog projects for remote explosive scent tracing and mine detection to support its manual de-mining teams.

The methodology of task impact assessment (TIA)

TIA is a methodology developed and used by the NPA to make accurate identifications of de-mining priorities. It was first used by the NPA's survey department in Angola, and was applied only before the undertaking of a clearance task, as in the case of most mine action survey methodologies.[2] In its present form it is applied at four different phases: before, during and after the mine clearance task, and finally in retrospect. Each phase has to be conducted by the field personnel and approved by the NPA's mine action management in Luanda, which authorises each phase separately.

Phase 1: In this phase the responsible personnel will seek information about the context of a requested task, to check whether the indicators advanced for clearance meet the NPA's own priorities and criteria when the de-mining task was requested. Four factors contribute to the evaluation.

- The target groups and beneficiaries that will be using the area after it has been cleared of mines are identified. Information looked for includes the type and numbers of beneficiaries, their origin (local or new influx of IDPs) and the main income-generating activities that will be practised in the area.
- The humanitarian and development partner organisations responsible for carrying out development support activities (such as water rehabilitation, sanitation, agricultural assistance) after the mines have been cleared are selected and evaluated. One of the problems experienced by the NPA in the past has been the failure of such parties to actually provide the necessary services to the target groups and beneficiaries after the de-mining has taken place. To avoid this, NPA calls for the submission by the relevant parties of plans and budgets for their activities, so that a group can be selected and appointed.
- The mine clearance capacities needed to conduct the task must be assessed in terms of their availability in the area. This evaluation takes into account the type of terrain and other geographical characteristics of the area to be demined. (Not all mine clearance equipment is suitable for every type of terrain.) A qualified estimate is made of the time the task is expected to take. Choices between different de-mining methods will also depend on the most cost-effective option in any particular case.
- The NPA also assesses the history, humanitarian priority and socio-economic situation of the area where de-mining has been requested. This information, combined with any other relevant data (for example, relating to finance or operational capacity) is used to determine the priority the requested task should be given.

The information gathered in phase one is sent back to the NPA national headquarters for a final decision on which tasks should be given highest priority.

Phase 2: The second phase normally occurs when the de-mining is well under way. Its aim is to confirm that the indicators for both priority setting and the support activities that will follow the de-mining have remained the same. If any changes are reported, the priority given to the task may alter. For example, if the indicators have changed dramatically, the de-mining task might be suspended until the new information has been verified and a final decision taken. In a situation where the new indicators show an even greater need for de-mining in an area, the budget and operational tools for that task might be increased.

In this phase a re-assessment is made of the time needed to complete the task, to enable the NPA to estimate when the personnel and equipment allotted to that project will become available for new tasks. This helps the forward planning of the NPA management.

Phase 3: The third phase occurs when the mine clearance has been completed, and the demined area is to be handed over to the parties contracted to conduct the necessary follow-up operations. The main focus is to confirm that these activities will go ahead as planned. Starting dates and timeframes are required to help the NPA to chart expected progress. A date for completion is agreed between the NPA and the organisation involved in the support phase.

Phase 4: The fourth phase is the assessment of the operations that followed the de-mining phase. This evaluation could take place some months or even a year or more after the end of the de-mining task as such, depending on the type of rehabilitation or development activity previously agreed. If there have been deviations from the schedule or any change in the target groups and beneficiaries that use the demined area, this will be reported. The final result will influence the allocation of similar tasks by the NPA on future occasions.

The organisational structures of these functional sections have been designed to respond equally to both large- and small-scale tasks. The operational units are flexible, versatile and capable of being deployed over vast distances across the country. All of the above enable the NPA to adapt its operations to meet humanitarian needs as they occur.

The various mine clearance and verification units work out of three regional bases, located in Malanje, Luena and Lubango. This geographical spread has enabled the NPA to adapt its resources to respond to changing humanitarian needs. It has also supported emergency as well as longer-term development initiatives carried out by national and international NGOs, UN agencies, provincial and local authorities and government bodies countrywide.

In addition to its regional bases, the NPA has established a Mine Dog Training Centre in Lubango to train dogs in mine detection and maintain the skills needed for the programme. Analyses of the filters used in the remote scent tracing system are also carried out at the centre.

To date, the NPA has undertaken mine action activities in all 18 provinces of Angola. The organisation has surveyed more than 1,500 suspected mine

sites and provided mine awareness training to over 1.5 million Angolans with the assistance of auxiliary and partner organisations.

Furthermore, the NPA's clearance teams have completed over 1,200 de-mining and UXO clearance tasks. In the process they have removed and destroyed more than 9,000 mines and 200,000 unexploded pieces of ordnance. Its manual de-mining teams alone have cleared over 3,000,000 m^2 of designated land, which has subsequently been used for the resettlement of IDPs and refugees, cultivation and the rebuilding of Angola's infrastructure.

The NPA's goal is to increase its operational output, assist the nationalisation process of its mine action programme and improve co-operation with the Angolan government, UN agencies and other NGOs.

The UN's rapid assessment of critical needs following the ceasefire

After the signing of the ceasefire in 2002, the UN decided to conduct a Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs (RACN) for the whole of Angola. This would supply an overview of humanitarian needs in regions that had been more or less inaccessible since the war resumed in 1998. The assessments were conducted in all the provinces, but due to broken bridges as well as the threat posed by landmines it was difficult (and in some cases impossible) to reach all the locations on the UN's priority list. Helicopters and mine-protected vehicles provided by NPA and the British mine action NGO, Halo Trust, had to be used to reach some of the most inaccessible areas.

The NGOs that helped the UN to make its assessment focused on the extent of the mine and UXO threat in the areas under investigation, and also provided mine risk education to the people living in those areas. A particularly urgent priority was to identify zones that could be used for agricultural purposes, and to identify access routes that might be mined. Plans were made to have them demined, or marked off, to await de-mining as soon as the equipment and personnel became available. Equally important was the identification of safe areas (that is, land free from mines and UXOs) that IDPs and refugees could settle on immediately.

The UN used the RACN to develop a plan of action which focused on those areas where the humanitarian situation was most dire and required immediate intervention from the different humanitarian aid organisations.

The UN's assessments have continued into 2003, as new rural areas not previously penetrable have been opened up for investigation by analysts. The ongoing aim is to build up a comprehensive picture of the humanitarian situation in Angola and the danger that mines pose to resettlement and rehabilitation activities.[3]

Obstacles that continue to hamper effective mine action in Angola

The mine and UXO problem in Angola is likely to persist for another 30–50 years, although on a diminishing scale as time passes. Today, buried explosives constitute a huge problem in Angola. The threat will, however, be reduced to an acceptable minimum within the next 10 years if de-mining activities are allowed to continue at the same or (ideally) on a larger scale than at present, supported by an adequate national management framework.

National co-ordination

Until mid-2001 the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROEE) was the organ responsible for the co-ordination and quality assurance of all de-mining activities in Angola. It also had operational de-mining capacity. INAROEE was criticised by UN, mine action NGOs and donors, both for its dual mandate and for its inability to ensure co-ordination between, and quality assurance in, de-mining activities. Accordingly, the Angolan government announced that a new organ would take over the co-ordination of de-mining activities and provision of assistance to mine victims.

The inter-sectoral CNIDAH was established in July 2001. This body will be responsible to the Council of Ministers, whilst INAROEE will become the national operational capacity and will answer to both the Ministry of Reintegration and Social Assistance (MINARS) and to CNIDAH.

By March 2003 Angola still lacked a national strategic plan for mine action. The national authorities of Angola are currently drawing up such a plan, but it is taking far too long. This makes it difficult for the different organisations offering humanitarian assistance to prioritise their activities. Decisions as to where NGOs should best direct their de-mining efforts continue to depend on guesswork and on pressure from — or in some cases, the participation of — the provincial authorities.

At the national level, communication and co-ordination with the NGOs involved in de-mining are still below acceptable levels, although they are working well in some provinces. In others, local governments show little or no interest in collaborating with the mine action groups.

Lack of governmental support for the humanitarian actors

The national mine action authorities have insufficient influence and power to help the humanitarian organisations in their efforts to get goods and equipment into Angola without being hampered by the obstacles created by bureaucracy. These are problems all NGOs face, and they interfere

drastically with their attempts to carry out their work efficiently. It is not uncommon for NGOs to have new and desperately needed equipment standing idle at the port of entry for months, while all the different papers required for importing the goods are sorted out. The national authorities also lack the influence to help on issues such as getting working visas to enable international staff to join their NGOs in Angola. These staff members are needed to help build up the competence of Angolan deminers, and to boost the effectiveness of de-mining overall.

Logistical constraints

All humanitarian aid NGOs involved in de-mining in Angola face continuing logistical constraints. As mentioned before, de-mining equipment arriving at the harbours is kept there indefinitely by the process of customs clearance. This makes it difficult to anticipate when these goods will be usable for mine action projects. It also generates increased costs because rent has to be paid for storage at the harbour while the equipment awaits release by customs officials.

Another logistical problem is the struggle to get the goods to the areas where they are to be used. The infrastructure of Angola is in an appalling state after so many years of conflict. Little or no maintenance has been done to roads and bridges.

In most areas the roads are barely navigable, while some roads are completely unusable. Many of the bridges crossing the innumerable rivers in Angola have been destroyed in the war or have collapsed due to lack of maintenance. For these reasons it is impossible to drive to many of the rural areas. Consequently, much of the transportation of equipment has to be done by air, which limits the amount of freight carried and is extremely costly.

Climatic conditions and topography

The climate of Angola is another factor that militates against fully efficient de-mining. For four to five months of every year, most of the country experiences heavy rainfall. Although this may be a blessing for farmers, it is a serious obstacle to deminers. De-mining cannot take place in heavy rain because it diminishes the security of the personnel involved. As a result, work often has to be suspended during the rainy months.

Angola's wet season also affects de-mining in the dry season, as the vegetation grows extremely fast and densely after the rains. This means that the ground needs careful preparation before the mine clearance can take place — a time-consuming process that slows down the actual de-mining.

An absence of maps and great variety of mine types

At least eight different warring parties used landmines during the conflict in Angola. Very few records appear to have been kept to identify the locations that were mined. The lack of such records makes it very difficult for de-mining organisations to pinpoint the mined areas. Therefore at present, all de-mining task groups are clearing large areas not mined, in order to chart those areas that were mined.

A greater effort should be made to get hold of some of the information relating to where mines were buried, now that armed operations in Angola have officially ended. Such information could then be shared between the different humanitarian organisations working in the provinces, to help them clear the mines as effectively as possible.

Another problem is the huge variety of mine types used during the conflict. Over 70 different types of mines have been positively identified so far by deminers. This means that a great number of different techniques of disarming the mines are called for. This adds to the uncertainties that complicate the actual de-mining. The use of different anti-lifting devices has also been extensive in some areas of Angola, adding to the hazards and the time consumed by mine clearance.

The role of the donors (and the need to ensure sustainable funding)

As the conflict in Angola dragged on, aid donors started to tire of funding what looked like a lost cause. Owing to the constant fear that new mines were being laid and that the de-mining already performed had had little real effect, international donors became reluctant to commit more funds to de-mining in Angola.

Now that the peace process has started, the situation in Angola has changed completely. More funding is coming into the country, but donors in general have indicated that they want to see a more decisive contribution to de-mining from the Angolan government. Only under that condition are they prepared to continue to supply international funding for de-mining.

With the hope of more funding, most NGOs will be tempted to expand their programmes, hire new staff and procure more equipment. However, without guarantees of sustainable funding for several years from the donors, this would be unwise. As has been seen in many developing countries, the focus of international donors moves from one country or area to another as the 'limelight' changes. Right now Angola possesses some of this attractiveness, but there is no guarantee that the world's attention will last for more than the current funding period. NGOs therefore cannot make long-term plans that affect such factors as the size of the work force they

employ and the investments they might wish to make in long-range planning and new equipment.

As it is the international donors that mostly bear the burden of funding de-mining in Angola, it is fair to suggest that they should be invited to participate in and, to some degree, oversee the national mine action management process. As in other comparable situations, donors to Angola tend to act in a poorly co-ordinated manner, which sends conflicting signals to the national mine action authorities. This is not desirable. A solution would be the creation of a board of donors that could work with CNIDAH to select the priority areas to be focused on by the mine action NGOs. Such a donor board could also prove useful in other respects, since it would then be easier to co-ordinate external evaluations, reports and budgets. This would again reduce the overall costs and the burden currently carried by the mine action operators.

Conclusion

Mine action in Angola has entered a critical phase. It is important that NGOs, donors and the government act together to ensure the establishment of a sustainable and effective mine action programme in Angola.

Endnotes

1 The NPA is a humanitarian NGO that was founded in 1939, beginning with the Norwegian Labour movement's support of the Spanish resistance to the fascist regime of Franco. NPA's de-mining activities started in Cambodia in 1992. This operation was directly linked to the peace process in 1992–93, and among other actions made possible the repatriation of approximately 350,000 Cambodian refugees from Thailand. In more recent years, the NPA has become one of the leading humanitarian mine-clearing organisations in the world. Mine action is one of the six areas in which the NPA works. The other five are land and resource rights; democracy; women's rights; youth and the right to participate; and indigenous peoples' rights. The NPA adheres to the UN definition of mine action. Its activities encompass: survey and impact assessments; mine clearance using a variety of techniques (manual, mechanical and mine detection by means of sniffer dogs); mine awareness training and mine awareness campaigns; advocacy; work related to mine policy; research and development initiatives; mine victim assistance; and support for the development of a national de-mining capacity in the host country. The overall objective of NPA's mine action is to provide a permanent improvement in the living conditions of target groups in mine-affected areas.

2 Sara Sekkenes was instrumental in introducing the TIA, first as a technical advisor to the survey department and now as a mine action policy advisor at the NPA Head Office in Oslo, Norway.
3 Discussions are presently under way between CNIDAH and the Washington-based Survey Action Centre to conduct a comprehensive national survey that will assess the socio-economic impact of mine contamination in Angola.

CHAPTER 7

Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey: Optimising mine action

Paul F Wilkinson and Brigitte Masella

> It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.
>
> Unknown source

Introduction

This chapter looks at the successful completion of the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey (MLIS) in 2001 and the value that the MLIS adds to mine action planning and implementation in Mozambique. The Canadian International De-mining Corps and Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates Inc. (collectively referred to as 'the CIDC') carried out the MLIS, on behalf of the mine-action authorities of the Government of Mozambique between January 1999–August 2001.[1] Funding totalling approximately $2.2 million was provided by CIDA as part of the Canadian Mine Action Programme in Mozambique.

Forming part of the Global Survey Initiative, the MLIS is a tangible product of the Ottawa Convention. In the words of the Survey Working Group (SWG), landmine impact surveys (LISs) are intended to '… facilitate the prioritising of human, material and financial resources supporting humanitarian mine action at the national, regional, and global level'. They assist national authorities to formulate plans that focus on the most heavily affected regions and communities, assist donors to apportion funds on the basis of human needs (as measured by the effects of mined areas on communities), and provide implementing authorities with baseline data against which to measure the success of mine action initiatives.

The MLIS was implemented in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the SWG. Independent quality assurance was provided primarily through a Quality Assurance Monitor (QAM) contracted initially by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and later by UNMAS. The National De-mining Institute (IND) and CIDA supplied secondary, independent quality assurance.

The primary product of the MLIS was a populated Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database developed by the GICHD on behalf of the UNMAS and the SAC, which was formally handed

over to the IND on 15 June 2001. This report serves principally to explain how the data in the IMSMA database were collected, to summarise the principal findings, to illustrate a few of the ways in which those data might be used, and to discuss some of the lessons that the MLIS offers.

Methodology

The MLIS employed two principal tools. The first was a review of existing data and interviews with knowledgeable officials (jointly referred to as 'expert opinion collection' — EOC) to identify communities or areas believed to be landmine affected or landmine free. The second was the holding of group interviews in consenting communities to solicit the views of community members on SMAs and the social and economic impact of such areas on them.

Expert opinion collection

EOC began at the national level. Between February–September 1999, interviews and data-collection meetings were held with 39 sources, and the databases of the IND (DITERS), the ADP and Handicap International (*Programa para Prevenção a Acidentes contra Minas* — PEPAM) were searched. Much useful information was collected, but it became evident that more effort than had originally been anticipated would have to be devoted to EOC at the provincial and district levels.

A further 202 interviews were therefore conducted at the provincial and district levels between March 2000–February 2001, and the databases of the Halo Trust and the NPA, among others, were searched.

The results of the EOC were twofold: 1,973 communities were selected for visits by survey teams, and 12 cities and two islands were accepted as being free of landmine impacts.

Group interviews

Table 1 presents an overview of the group interviews, which were conducted in all 791 communities that identified themselves as landmine affected. The 938 communities that described themselves as not being landmine affected did not require group interviews. Two hundred and eight communities were inaccessible to the interviewers, predominantly on account of flooding and damaged transportation infrastructure. Group interviews could not be conducted in four communities, principally because the *Regulo* (community leader) was absent. Thirty-two other communities no longer existed or could

not be found. Basic information about those villages that were inaccessible, including the reasons for their inaccessibility, was entered in the IMSMA database.

Table 1: Overview of group interviews

Province	*Group interview conducted*	*Group interview not conducted*	*Community inaccessible*	*Other#*	*Total*
Cabo Delgado	84	50	7	0	141
Gaza	46	95	20	0	161
Inhambane	157	125	19	10	311
Manica	60	58	21	3	142
Maputo	100	97	25	6	228
Nampula	81	72	14	2	169
Niassa	40	76	25	3	144
Sofala	52	32	37	6	127
Tete	58	161	20	2	241
Zambézia	113	172	20	4	309
Total	**791**	**938**	**208**	**36**	**1973**

#Includes communities that declined to participate, could not be found, or had been abandoned.

The accessibility of communities was a significant problem in Sofala and Niassa provinces, but relatively less so in Cabo Delgado, Inhambane, and Tete provinces. The figures on inaccessibility shown in Table 1 for Nampula and Zambézia provinces are understated, since parts of Lalaua district in the former and the whole of Chinde district in the latter were inaccessible. Comparative figures on accessibility are rare, but a re-survey of Zambézia province by the Halo Trust reported that at least 7.3% of communities or mined areas were permanently or seasonally inaccessible.

The total number of participants in group interviews was 6,772, with an average of 8.6 persons per group interview. Numbers ranged from less than five persons in 3.8% of cases to 16 persons in one case. In order to ascertain that 938 villages were not landmine affected, a further 5,228 persons were consulted individually, an average of 5.6 persons per community.

The average duration of the group interviews was 104 minutes, with a range of 15 to 250 minutes.

Group interviews were conducted in 31 languages. Portuguese was used exclusively in 76 (9.6%) of the group interviews, and partially in a further 532 (67.3%). However, a significant number of group interviews was conducted exclusively in a language other than Portuguese, of which Macua (8.1%) was by far the most important. A total of 453 group interviews (57.3%) was conducted in a combination of two, and occasionally three, languages.

Using group interviews to obtain accurate and comprehensive information about the location of SMAs and the effect they have on socio-economic conditions requires that those interviewed be representative of their communities. Representativity applies to such attributes as age, sex and occupation. There were fewer women among the interviewees than representativity required. The reasons were partly cultural, but mainly because women tended to be working in the fields or were otherwise occupied when the group interviews were held. Women constituted 17.6% (1,189/6,772) of the interviewees, but at least one woman participated in 53.7% (425/791) of the group interviews. In most of these cases the women participated actively.

The age composition of the interviewees was as follows: 24.7% (1,600/6,465) of those whose age was recorded were aged between 15–29 years; 35.2% (2,273) between 30–44 years; 27.6% (1,784) between 45–59 years; and 12.5% (808) 60 years or more. The participants generally mirrored the national population structure,[2] except that persons aged 15–29 years were relatively under-represented. Collectively, the interviewees can be assumed to have had good recall of both periods of conflict and of the years that followed.

As was to be expected with interviews conducted predominantly in rural areas, 78.5% (5,305/6,761) of interviewees who reported their occupation were active in agriculture and other land-based activities; 7.9% (533) were employed in primary- and secondary-sector activities such as mining and manufacturing (not necessarily in their home communities); 5.7% (387) worked in the defence and public sectors; 1.9% (130) were unemployed; 0.5% (35) worked in the service sector; and 5.5% (371) reported 'other' activities.

Findings

Landmine-affected communities

In total 791 communities declared themselves as landmine-affected.

Distribution

The 791 landmine-affected communities identified are distributed throughout every province (Figure 1): 96.1% (123/128) districts are landmine-affected; 3.1% (four) districts are reported as not being landmine-affected; and no data was available for 0.8% (one) district, which was completely inaccessible. Above-average numbers of landmine-affected communities

Figure 1: Landmine-affected communities



occur in Inhambane, Maputo and Zambézia provinces, while the number of such communities in Gaza, Niassa, Sofala and Tete provinces is below the national average.

The landmine problem is both urban and rural. Twenty-three landmine-affected communities, 13 being district seats and 10 the seats of administrative localities, are classified as urban. They are concentrated in Maputo (nine) and Gaza (six) provinces, with smaller numbers in Inhambane (two), Sofala (two), Tete (one) and Nampula (three) provinces (*see Figure 1*). Of the 768 landmine-affected communities classified as rural, 92.2% (708) are classified as villages, 1.8% (14) as district seats and 6% (46) as the seats of administrative localities.

Numbers of persons affected

At least 1,488,590 persons, representing 9% of the 1997 population of Mozambique, live in communities affected by landmines. Several of the 34 landmine-affected communities for which a population total was not available are classified as urban, and they are therefore likely to have large populations. The preceding total does not include transients and temporary residents.

Slightly over 40% of the landmine-affected communities with known populations comprise less than 1,000 persons, while approximately 75% have populations of less than 2,000. Twelve landmine-affected communities have populations of between 10,000–30,000, and three of them have populations greater than 30,000.

Inhambane province accounts for one-quarter of all the persons affected by SMAs, and Cabo Delgado and Zambézia provinces together account for almost another quarter. Nevertheless, a great many persons are affected in each of the other provinces.

Suspected mined areas per community

Over one half of the landmine-affected communities reported a single SMA. Only 6.3% reported four or more.

Distance between communities and suspected mined areas

The majority of landmine-affected communities reported SMAs that are relatively close to them. In 24.2% (333/1,374) cases, the SMAs reported were within, or immediately adjacent to, the built-up area of the community, while 68.9% of them were within four kilometres, and 93.7% were within 10

km. Nevertheless, some communities reported being affected by SMAs as far away as 20.3 km.

Suspected mined areas

The 791 landmine-affected communities reported a total of 1,374 SMAs (see Table 2 and Figure 2, over page).

Table 2: Suspected mined areas and population affected, by province

Province	*Number of suspected mined areas*	*Affected population*
Cabo Delgado	166	170,566
Gaza	70	90,766
Inhambane	261	373,033
Manica	110	89,823
Maputo	184	126,592
Nampula	130	178,152
Niassa	62	60,379
Sofala	102	134,156
Tete	89	93,596
Zambézia	200	171,527
Total	**1,374**	**1,488,590**

Distribution

Like landmine-affected communities, SMAs are found in every province and virtually every district (see Figure 2, over page). They are particularly numerous in Inhambane and Zambézia provinces, present in above-average numbers in Maputo and Cabo Delgado provinces, and are reported in below-average numbers in Gaza, Niassa and Tete provinces.

SMAs do not seem to be distributed randomly. In Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces, for example, they seem to cluster close to major routes. Such assumptions should, however, be treated with caution.

The MLIS was designed to collect information only about SMAs that are currently affecting communities, and therefore did not include other mined areas. Also the pattern revealed does not take into account the many mined areas that have been cleared since 1992, which did not form part of the MLIS research.

Dating of minefields

The majority of SMAs date from the civil conflict of 1976–92. The dates when

Figure 2: Suspected mined areas



mines were first laid were reported for 58.4% (802/1,374) of SMAs. Only 8.4% fall within the period of the independence struggle, between 1964–75.[3] The dates when mines were last laid were reported for 50.3% (691/1,374) SMAs, and included many of those areas for which the dates of the first mine-laying had been reported. A total of only 6.4% of those dates belong to the period of the independence struggle. SMAs dating from that period are concentrated in Cabo Delgado province and to a lesser extent in Tete province, with small numbers in Gaza, Manica, Nampula, Niassa and Sofala provinces.

The majority of the SMAs reported were laid between 1982–92, namely in the last two-thirds of the civil conflict.

Extent of area affected by mines

The total area covered by the SMAs is 561,689,063 m². Given the expected tendency of interviewees to overestimate the size of SMAs, for reasons of personal safety, the preceding figure may be overstated to an unknown degree. Some 41.2% (566) SMAs occupy an area of less than 1,000 m², including 245 covering less than 10 m² that almost certainly contain only one or two landmines or items of UXO. A further 125 cover between 10–100 m² and probably contain only a small number of mines or items of UXO (Figure 3). A total of 78.6% (1,081) SMAs are less than 100,000 m², and 4.3% (59) are

Figure 3: Size distribution of suspected mine area



larger than 1,000,000 m². The consensus among knowledgeable persons in Mozambique is that very large (above 1,000,000 m²) mined areas have never existed. However, reports of very large SMAs cannot easily be reconciled with that consensus in the absence of further research.

SMAs of each category size occur in every province, with no clear indications of spatial clustering.

Types of ordnance

According to the interviewees, 82.8% (1,139) of SMAs with a total area of 445,290,078 m² are contaminated by landmines only, while 12.2% (168) with a total area of 82,757,987 m² are contaminated by UXO only, and 67 (4.9%) with an area of 33,640,998 m² are contaminated by both landmines and UXO.

Marking of SMAs

Less than 40% of SMAs by number and by area are marked in any way that might serve to reduce the likelihood of accidents. Approximately 50% by number and 28.6% by area of those that are marked have official signs.

Topography and vegetation

Information on the topography and vegetation cover of SMAs is relevant to assessing the techniques of clearing that are most appropriate, and to estimating the resources, costs and time span required for clearance.

In terms of SMAs for which data are available, 96.7% (951/983) occupy flat terrain, while the balance are on hills, ridges, or other uneven terrain. The flat SMAs represent 98.9% of the area of the SMAs for which information on topography is available.

Tall and short grass and bush are the most important types of vegetation on SMAs, followed by bush and by trees. Bearing in mind that only 33,860,105 m² of the SMAs described as having mixed vegetation are reported to have some trees, the dominant vegetation cover of the SMAs, probably of the order of 86% by area, is bush and grasses of various types.

Functional classification

Understanding the purposes for which mines were originally laid can sometimes assist in determining priorities for clearance. For example, mines laid to protect a former military installation may currently affect communities less than those mines around the perimeter of a community or

a well. Roads, trails and former military installations (39.7%) are the most numerous of the functional categories of SMAs, but SMAs at wells, bridges and village perimeters (12.2%), though fewer, have a greater impact on communities and therefore a higher priority.

Victims

The interviewees reported 172 'recent' victims — that is, persons injured or killed by landmines and UXO — in the two years preceding the group interview, and 2,145 victims in total since the start of the independence struggle in 1964. Recent or earlier victims were reported by 59.7% of landmine-affected communities.

The total number of victims — that is, earlier and recent victims combined — must be considered a minimum, since 31 communities reported 'many' victims but could not estimate even an approximate number, making it impossible to include their information in the IMSMA database. A further 12 communities did not know whether there had been any victims. If each of those communities had experienced the average number of victims reported by the communities that could identify a precise number, the total figure would increase to over 2,300. Only two communities did not know whether there had been any recent victims.

Distribution

Counting both early and recent casualties, victims were recorded in every province, with concentrations reported in Maputo and eastern Inhambane provinces. They are widely distributed throughout Zambézia province, the eastern parts of Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces, and the northern area of Manica province. Despite the presence of landmine-affected communities, fewer victims have been reported in northern Gaza, northwestern Inhambane, northern Sofala, north-western Tete, and north-central Niassa provinces.

The overall distribution of recent victims mirrors that of total victims, but their incidence is relatively greater in Nampula, southern Cabo Delgado, eastern Tete, southern Maputo and south-eastern Inhambane provinces.

Age and sex

Information on the age and sex of 108 recent victims was collected. Men outnumbered women by a factor of almost three to one. A similar imbalance in favour of men was also reported in an earlier study.[4] All age groups were

represented, but victims were most often in the 30–59 age range among women (62.1%) and in the 15–44 years range among men (57.4%).

Consequences of accidents

Almost one-third of the recent accidents were fatal, while one-quarter resulted in loss of a limb or vision.

Circumstances in which accidents took place

The majority (71.3%) of recent accidents, the circumstances of which were reported to relate to landmines and UXOs, occurred when the victims were involved in economic activities. In contrast, accidents during travel (6.9%) and as a result of tampering (0.9%) were rare. It has been claimed that there is an association between accidents and the types of economic activities most often performed by women, but that claim cannot be reconciled with the significantly higher frequency of accidents in which men are the victims. Further research is required to explore this topic in greater detail.

Civilian status

Only 1.9% (2/102) of recent accidents on which information was collected involved military personnel.

Blockage impacts[5]

By every criterion used, blocked access to rainfed cropland is the most significant effect of SMAs, being caused by 55.3% (760) of SMAs. This means that the livelihoods of 58.7% (464) of the landmine-affected communities and a total of over 940,000 persons are disrupted. Blocked access to roads is also a problem for many (29.2%) of the communities and a large number of persons (368,610), the more so since the cases reported reflect situations where satisfactory alternative roads have not been provided in the years since the end of the civil conflict. Blocked access to non-agricultural land, which is a source of game, edible and medicinal plants, firewood and building materials, affects 22.7% (180) communities and over 290,000 persons, and must also be considered a serious problem. Blocked access to drinking water, although it occurs infrequently and affects fewer persons than most other blockage impacts, must be considered very serious, on account of its implications for human health and the additional burden that fetching water from other sources places on women and girls.

Table 3: Overview of blockage impacts

Blockage impact	*Communities*	*Population*	*No. of SMAs*	*Area SMAs (m²)*
Rainfed cropland	464	941,547	760	369,081,414
Pasture	91	143,291	144	70,689,960
Water for irrigation, washing, etc.	82	124,646	99	36,253,627
Drinking water	55	87,221	70	13,784,317
Non-agricultural land	180	291,049	281	136,854,458
Roads	231	368,610	358	104,773,441
Infrastructure	96	238,745	130	46,533,910
Service points	49	63,179	51	10,938,557

Table 3 presents an overview of the blockage impacts reported. The totals in Table 3 cannot be summed, since a single community may have reported several types of blockage impact, and each SMA may be responsible for several types of blockage. (See Figures 4 and 5, over page, for an overview of blocked access to agricultural land and roads.)

Losses of animals

A total of 148 communities reported losing animals to landmines. The greatest number involved cattle, but losses of goats and pigs were also reported. The highest number of animals killed, especially cattle, occurred in Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces. Most of the losses in Zambézia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces involved pigs.

Psychological/behavioural effects of landmines

A total of 90.1% (6,101/6,772) of interviewees provided information on the psychological effects landmines had had on them. The majority (73.5%) worry about landmines a great deal or moderately (5.2%), while 11.1% worry a little, 5.9% do not worry at all, 3.9% do not consider the issue applicable to them, and a very few do not know whether they worry.

In sum, 89.6% (6,070/6,772) of the interviewees provided information on whether worry about landmines causes them to modify their behaviour. The majority asserted that they modify their behaviour a great deal (63.0%) or moderately (8.3%).

A total of 8.8% stated that they do not change their behaviour out of fear of landmines, 12.7% replied that they modify their behaviour a little, 6.5% considered the question to be inapplicable to them, and the remainder (0.7%) claimed not to know.

Figure 4: Blocked access to agricultural land



Figure 5: Blocked access to roads



Community assessment of the severity of threat over time

The interviewees in 83.8% (663) of the communities provided information on how their perceptions of the severity of the effects of landmines are evolving. Roughly equal numbers thought that the impact of landmines is becoming more severe (35.6%) and (38.2%) that they are unchanged in severity, while 26.2% believed that their severity is declining. The belief that severity is increasing is widely dispersed in all of the provinces except Gaza, where it is concentrated in the south-west, and in Inhambane province, where it is concentrated in the south-eastern and coastal regions.

The belief that the effects of landmines are increasing in severity despite the passing of over 10 years since they were last laid may appear counter-intuitive. On the other hand, large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons have returned since the end of the civil conflict, the population has grown, and economic activity has expanded. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the hindrances to free movement that were non-existent or minor some years ago are taking on greater importance with the passing of time, as pressure on land availability increases.

Seasonal variation in risks posed by landmines

In total, 82.1% (649/791) of landmine-affected communities reported that there is no season during which the threats posed by landmines are greater than at other seasons, while 3.1% (24) either did not know or considered the question inapplicable.

The majority of the communities that reported seasonal variation distinguished between wet and dry seasons. Some 8.9% (71) reported that risks are greater during the wet season (corresponding roughly to the period from December to April), because pools of water and the lush vegetation make landmines difficult to see, the soft soil allows landmines to move closer to the surface, flood waters displace mines, and larger areas are cultivated during that season. The 4% (32) of the communities that reported that the risks imposed by landmines are greater during the dry season cited reasons such as the need to take animals to water sources that are not used at other seasons, the requirement to hunt over large areas, and the preparation of the soil for planting.

Two (0.3%) communities identified winter, which corresponds roughly to the dry season, as the season of greatest impact, citing the need to collect wood for fuel and the preparation of the soil for planting. Finally, 13 (1.6%) communities identified summer as the season of greatest vulnerability, essentially for the same reasons as those identified by other communities for the wet season.

Mine impact score

Calculation

A primary purpose of an LIS is to help government authorities to prioritise the country's human, material and financial resources by giving them a tool with which to develop national mine action plans focusing on communities or regions suffering the greatest disruption to their lives owing to the presence of landmines and UXO. A mechanism is therefore required to rank communities in terms of the severity of the impacts of landmines. Since LISs are to be conducted globally using a standardised methodology, it is desirable that a common approach be adopted for ranking communities. That objective implies the use of a generalised, weak-metric ranking instrument that can be applied in widely differing settings and with data of varying types and completeness. The SWG endorsed such an instrument, known as the mine impact score (MIS), developed by the SAC, which is intended to be used in every LIS. Its principal features are summarised below.

The MIS reflects three aspects of the mine situation as it affects a given community:

- *Group 1:* the types of munitions, landmines or UXO believed to be present by the participants in the group interview;
- *Group 2:* the categories of land, infrastructure, and service areas to which landmines or UXO are blocking access; and
- *Group 3:* the number of victims of landmines or UXO in the two years preceding the group interview.

There is a range of factors towards which the MIS is not designed to be sensitive. These include the number and size of the SMAs affecting a given community, and the total number of victims of landmines.

For the variables in Groups 1 and 2, the scores are binary, meaning that a score of 1 is assigned if the impact in question was identified in a given community, while a score of 0 is assigned if that impact was not identified. In contrast, the variable in Group 3 is a count variable, meaning that the actual number of victims during that period is entered as the score.

In order to calculate the MIS, the score for each recognised category is multiplied by a weight. Each national LIS is permitted to vary the weights for the variables in Group 2 within certain limits, but the weights for the variables in Groups 1 and 3 are fixed. Thus, the presence of landmines must be weighted 2, the presence of UXO must be weighted 1, and recent victims must be weighted 2. The principal restrictions on weighting the variables within Group 2 are that weights must be 0, 1, 2, or 3, and that the total of all the weights must equal 10.

Ranked according to the MIS, 2.5% (20) of communities belong to the high-impact category, 20.7% (164) to the medium-impact category, and 607 (76.7%) to the low-impact category. The population of the high-impact communities is at least 36,254 persons; that of the medium-impact communities at least 393,406 persons; and that of the low-impact communities no less than 1,058,930 persons.

With the exception of Niassa province, there is at least one high-impact community in each of the provinces. The greatest number of high-impact communities is found in Nampula province, but there is relatively little variation among provinces. Particularly high numbers of medium-impact communities occur in Inhambane and Maputo provinces, and only Niassa province has significantly fewer than the national average.

The major clusters of impact categories by province are: high-impact communities in central Nampula province and near the Sofala-Tete-Zambézia-Malawi borders; medium-impact communities in south-eastern and coastal Inhambane province and throughout Maputo province, in north-central Zambézia, south-east Niassa, on or near the Tete-Zimbabwe border, and in east-central Manica province; and low-impact communities in Maputo, Inhambane and Zambézia provinces.

The SAC, which devised the MIS, has also taken the lead in evaluating it.[6] It has described it, accurately in our opinion, as 'a qualitative and compassionate construct', and has concluded tentatively that it 'has little value for cost-benefit concerns in de-mining', but that it 'does better for accident reduction'.

The IMSMA contains data that allow national authorities to devise alternative indices that might be better adapted to their situation and that might better accommodate cost-benefit analysis and other national or regional concerns.

Discussion

Coverage

If an LIS is to permit planning at the national level, it is desirable that it should identify all landmine-affected communities.

Statistical analysis based on village-level findings suggests, however, that the MLIS may have visited only between 17.8–22.5% of the landmine-affected communities, which may number between 3,519–4,433.

Numerous factors contributed to that seemingly low level of coverage: the inadequacy of many of the databases examined; logistical difficulties; the lack of a national gazetteer; and the available time and resources.

The figures above may, in any case, be deceptive. The MLIS identified a total of 1,374 SMAs. That represents a very high proportion (78%) of the 1,761 landmine- or UXO-affected areas that have been identified for the country as a whole by a range of other sources,[7] especially when one bears in mind that at least 5% of the country was inaccessible when the MLIS was conducted.

Unless the number of landmine-affected areas in Mozambique has been consistently and significantly underestimated by sources other than the MLIS, it seems improbable that the MLIS would have identified some 78% of the mined areas (this figure is probably a minimum, because some of those 1,761 mined areas have already been cleared), but only 17.8–22.5% of the landmine-affected communities.

This seeming inconsistency may be partly attributable to the fact that what are called 'villages' in Mozambique are often not clearly defined, distinct units. Rather, they are dispersed residential groupings with diffuse boundaries that often merge imperceptibly into one another. The locality, which is an administrative unit comprising on average 12 communities, may be a more appropriate unit for the collection of socio-economic data and for statistical analysis, as was recognised by Rebelo.[8]

There are 1,198 localities in Mozambique. Statistical analysis suggests that 90.4% of all those affected were identified and visited by the MLIS, which is broadly consistent with the number and distribution of SMAs identified.

Alternative insights into the extent of the coverage achieved by the MLIS can be gained by considering the spatial extent of the areas about which it gathered information.

Group interviews yielded information about SMAs situated as far away as approximately 20 km from the communities in which interviews were conducted. Nevertheless, some 94% of the reported SMAs were within 10 km of the community in question.

One may assume conservatively, therefore, that a group interview in a community provided information about the territory defined roughly by a 10 km radius from that community. If the communities visited had all been more than 10 km apart, information would have been available for 543,079 km^2. Given the proximity of many of the communities to one another, we estimate that information was collected, often from more than one source, for an area of approximately 320,000 km^2. The high degree of spatial overlap is beneficial from two perspectives: it compensates for the assumption that the territory known to the residents of each community is roughly circular; and it protects against the danger that the radius of 10 km is unrealistically high. It is also consistent with the view that the locality may be a more appropriate unit of study than the village in Mozambique.

If one assumes, less conservatively, that visits to communities provided information about the territory defined by a 15 km radius from each community, the area for which information is available would increase to some 506,000 km².

The area of the 12 cities and two islands that were accepted as being free of the impacts of landmines on the basis of expert opinion is approximately 4,000 km².

The size of the inaccessible areas is at least 39,000 km². In the case of individual inaccessible communities, that area was calculated using a radius of 10 km from the reference point in the community, and the total area was adjusted to take into account territorial overlaps between adjacent communities.

Finally, the absence of communities and significant road infrastructure suggests that at least 50,000 km² of Mozambique are currently unoccupied or very sparsely occupied and cannot, by definition, contain mined areas that currently pose direct social and economic threats to adjacent communities. To be designated as unoccupied, an area had to meet the following criteria: no community name recorded in the toponymy database; no significant transportation infrastructure shown on any map; no community within a distance of 20 km; minimum size of 200 km². It is likely, therefore, that the figure of 50,000 km² significantly underestimates the size of the unoccupied areas. These areas are concentrated in north-central Niassa province and west-central Cabo Delgado province, but there are several such areas in Gaza and Tete provinces, and a small number in all of the other provinces except Nampula.

From a spatial perspective, the situation may be summarised as follows:

Total area of Mozambique	799,380 km²
Area accepted as impact-free	4,000 km² (0.5%)
Inaccessible areas/no information	>39,000 km² (4.9%)
Area deemed unoccupied and impact-free	>50,000 km² (6.3%)
Area covered by the MLIS	320,000 km² (40.0%)–506,000 km² (63.3%)
No coverage	<200,380 km² (25.1%)–<386,380 km² (48.3%)

In summary, therefore, through the analysis of the available data and visits to 1,729/11,435 (15.1%) of the communities in Mozambique, the MLIS was able to record the perceptions of local informants about the landmine status and impact of 50–70% of the surface area of Mozambique. That finding is broadly consistent with our estimate that the MLIS identified some 80% of the mined areas that are believed to exist.

The practical importance of visiting every landmine-affected community

can be overstated, at least in the case of Mozambique, for two reasons. First, the purpose of an LIS is to provide the national authorities with an additional, national-level impact-based planning tool for mine action. The 791 landmine-affected communities identified by the MLIS are distributed throughout all 10 provinces, thus satisfying the need for data with which to formulate a nation-wide plan. Realistically, using mine clearance or other forms of mine action to resolve the social and economic problems that the 791 communities identified is likely to take seven to 10 years, assuming that generous funding and technical assistance are forthcoming. Ten years is probably the longest realistic planning horizon that can be adopted. Even if more landmine-affected communities had been identified, it is unlikely that the resources to address their problems could be mobilised in the short or medium terms. We recognise, however, that some such communities might have been high priorities under the MIS or other indices.

Second, it is virtually certain that many of the landmine-affected communities that could not be visited are affected by one or more of the SMAs that were identified. There are, for example, 4,296 communities within a radius of 10 km of the 1,374 SMAs identified, and it is likely that they account for a high proportion of the 2,728–3,642 unvisited landmine-affected communities that one form of statistical analysis suggests may exist. If the SMAs that were identified are demined or otherwise addressed so as to eliminate their threat, the beneficial effects will be felt not only in the 791 communities that reported them, but also in all the other communities that are also likely to be experiencing similar socio-economic constraints owing to the presence of the SMAs.

Competing methodologies

It goes without saying that the value of the results of an LIS for purposes of national-level mine action planning depends heavily on its accuracy. The research instruments used in the MLIS and the training given to those administering them were designed to reduce as much as possible inadvertent or deliberate errors, omissions and exaggerations on the part of the interviewers or the interviewees. Nevertheless, it cannot be expected that a short interview with a group of persons, who happen to be available at short notice when an interview team arrives in a village, will yield the same quality of information as a study conducted over several days or weeks. The sacrifice in accuracy is, however, part of the trade-off for acquiring nation-wide information over a relatively short period and at a moderate cost.

One organisation, the Halo Trust, has criticised the MLIS for overstating the extent of the landmine problem in the northern provinces of Zambézia,

Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa. However, this was not a new position,[9] although its opposition to the MLIS was surprising. The Halo Trust was responsible, on behalf of the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance, for the implementation of a national survey of the mine situation in Mozambique in 1993 and 1994.

In the words of the GICHD:[10]

> … The survey was completed by late 1994, and remains — in spite of major criticisms — the only national level minefield registration to date. *Perhaps its most significant shortcoming is that it did not in any way address the socio-economic impacts of landmines in Mozambique.* (Emphasis added.)

Similarly, Rebelo[11] noted of the survey that it:

> …suffered from an absence of [detail on] the size of mined (or suspect) areas and contained no assessment of their impact. *It has thus been of little help in determining priorities and a national mine clearance strategy*. (Emphasis added.)

This is perhaps the crux of the matter. The surveys had different mandates. The introduction of the measurement of social and economic impacts/effects of landmines on communities is a new development that evolved out of earlier surveys to better target mine action.

The following observations with reference to the MLIS underscore this difference in approach:

- First, the MLIS was designed to record the perceptions of community members about the impact of landmines on their lives. The criticism might be correct that some areas perceived as mined by community members have in fact been cleared, while others are unlikely to be mined. The issue remains that the perceptions are 'real' whether or not they are founded in objective reality available to an external observer. Community members will avoid areas that they believe, even incorrectly, to be mined. De-mining will achieve its objectives only when the members of the communities affected by a given mined area are sufficiently involved in, and informed about, the de-mining in question. Only then will they accept that the area demined is in fact safe and can once again be used. The experience of the MLIS and descriptions — admittedly anecdotal — of the way in which several organisations have conducted de-mining in Mozambique suggest that its social dimensions have often received insufficient attention. The difference between the approach of the MLIS and that of other surveys is that the MLIS was designed to record the views of those potentially affected by landmines and not the technical judgments of external observers that there are no mines.
- Second, there is an incomplete understanding among some organisations of the purpose of, and anticipated follow-up to, the MLIS. In particular, they fail to recognise that an '… Impact Survey can only give a rough

overview on the basis on (sic) which one can select areas for more careful investigation'.[12] The results of the MLIS are intended to complement, not to supersede, other sources of information about the nature and extent of the landmine problem in Mozambique. In other words, the results of the MLIS are only one of the sources to be considered by the national authorities in developing a national mine action plan. Where the results of the MLIS and information from other sources are in agreement that an area is indeed mined and causes social and economic disadvantages to the local population, it would seem reasonable, other things being equal, to identify that area for urgent de-mining or other remedial action. If, on the other hand, the results of the MLIS and information from another source conflict, the appropriate course of action would not be to discard either source of information, but rather to investigate which is true. In either case, the MLIS would have played the contributory role in planning for which it was designed. Validation should, however, be conducted by a disinterested party, using a tested methodology accepted by the national authorities and applied by trained personnel.

- Finally, the criticisms levelled at the MLIS might carry more weight if the MLIS had claimed to achieve an unrealistic degree of coverage or accuracy. In fact, the final report on the MLIS[13] was scrupulous in identifying, evaluating and explaining its limitations in certain contexts.

Optimisation

In our view, the MLIS made a contribution to mine action at the national level in the following ways:

- it produced the first national village-level overview of the social and economic effects of SMAs, which assisted the IND in preparing Mozambique's first truly national mine action plan;
- it strengthened the capacity of the IND to assume authority over the numerous mine action agencies operating (often quasi-independently and without co-ordination) in Mozambique by putting the IMSMA in the hands of, and subject to the control of, the IND;
- it identified some previously unknown SMAs and confirmed the existence — in the eyes of local persons — of many others;
- it provided, in English and Portuguese, a GIS-linked internationally recognised database and management system that includes data from every part of the country, and has the capacity to accommodate future data on virtually any aspect of mine action;
- it yielded, in English and Portuguese, research protocols and instruments suitable for use in ongoing research;

- it provided the personnel of the IND with experience in the monitoring and quality control of field operations by third-party organisations;
- it produced a large number of trained and experienced field researchers, logistical support personnel, data-entry personnel and analysts for employment by the IND, NGOs and the private sector;
- it enhanced the capacity of the IND to accomplish its mission by transferring to it 15 vehicles, numerous computers and a large quantity of field equipment;
- it compiled the first national gazetteer of place names and locations, in the form of a computerised toponymy database containing the official and alternate names of some 11,300 communities; a unique numeric identification code for each; geographic co-ordinates; total population figures broken down into sex and number of families; and administrative attribution (province, district, administrative post and locality);
- it prepared computerised base maps suitable for use in future landmine-related or other types of socio-economic planning and research; and
- it made the data from the MLIS accessible electronically and in hard copy to all interested parties in Mozambique, subject to the consent of the IND.

At the levels of Southern Africa and internationally, the MLIS made the following contributions:

- it made the relevant data available to non-Mozambican organisations and individuals in the standard international format, subject to the consent of the IND;
- in virtue of its certification by the UNMAS in September, 2001, it gave international donors and other agencies an improved understanding of the social and economic dimensions of the landmine problem in Mozambique, and enhanced confidence in the way in which those data were collected;
- it produced trained and experienced personnel and tested research protocols and instruments in Portuguese that can be used for similar assignments in other countries, especially Portuguese-speaking countries such as Angola;
- it provided numerous 'lessons learned'[14] that can be used to enhance the efficiency and reduce the costs of LISs in other landmine-affected countries; and
- it offered a model for national authorities who wish to ensure that mine action agencies operating on their territory are responsive to domestically defined priorities, rather than pursuing their own agendas.

Endnotes

1 The successful completion of the MLIS depended on the collaborative efforts of a large number of Mozambicans and a small number of international staff. The contributions of the following are recognised in particular: Sr Artur D. Veríssimo and the staff of the IND; the field and analytical staff; David Horton, Alberto Alface and Mike Wilson of the CIDC; Ian Hatton and Steve Driscoll of Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates Inc.; and John Lewis of McGill University.

2 *Anuário Estatístico Statistical Yearbook 1997*. Maputo: Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 1998.

3 For reasons of simplicity, only two broad periods of conflict were recognised in the questionnaire rather than the three that are sometimes differentiated: (1) the pre-independence colonial period and the Portuguese army–Frelimo conflict in the north and in central Tete province; (2) the 1975–80 conflict between the Rhodesian army and Mozambican and Zimbabwe African National Union troops in the western provinces and the border between Tete province and Rhodesia; and (3) the conflict between the Government of Mozambique and Renamo between the early 1980s and 1992 that eventually spread to the entire country. See Rebelo PL, *Level One Surveys and the Socio-Economic Impact Component with Specific Reference to Mozambique*. Maputo: International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 16 September 1998, p.2.

4 Sheehan E & M Croll, *Landmine Casualties in Mozambique*. London: The Halo Trust, October 1993.

5 A 'blockage impact' is the effect landmines and UXOs have in hindering access to important facilities, like roads and water resources.

6 Benini A, *The Global Landmine Level–1 Survey and Socio-Economic Indicators*. Washington, DC: Survey Action Centre, 1999.

7 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report, 1999*. New York: Landmine Monitor Core Group, 1999, p.53.

8 Rebelo PL, op. cit., p.17.

9 The Halo Trust stated in 1998 that it viewed an additional survey as unnecessary: 'The organi[s]ation [the Halo Trust] feels it could hand over within five years since on the whole the mine problem in the north is "relatively small" (an opinion not shared by others) and could be brought down to "acceptable limits" within three years. It also considers that a Level One Survey at this point in time is not needed and could even be counter-productive, by producing new inflated figures.' Rebelo PL, op. cit., p.5.

10 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining, *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*. Geneva: UN Development Programme and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining, 2001, p.151.

11 Rebelo PL, op. cit., p.3.

12 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining, op. cit., pp.166–167

13 Canadian International De-mining Corps & Paul F. Wilkinson and Associates Inc., *Landmine Impact Survey Republic of Mozambique*, September 2001.

14 Ibid.

CHAPTER 8

Communities in Southern Africa and landmines: Capacities, training and lessons learnt

Ananda S Millard

Introduction

This chapter reviews how mine action may increase its own chances of success. The approach presented here is based on the need for better understanding of how communities affected by landmines function, how they are affected by landmines, and what kind of capacities they retain. Moreover, this chapter proposes that operating organisations should take a much more proactive role in ensuring the success of mine clearance beyond the technical issues of concern. A variety of examples presented here suggest that training, learning, institutional change and a more co-operative relationship between operators and mine-affected communities are key factors for the improvement of mine clearance in the future.[1]

Harnessing community capacities: Being pragmatic

In the early days of humanitarian mine action, de-mining was regarded as a principally technical task. The difficulties associated with de-mining were primarily linked to technical and logistical issues regarding the training of deminers, usage of different techniques and the logistical concerns associated with the deployment, maintenance and security of de-mining teams. From this point of view, there was little space to recognise that de-mining, like other humanitarian endeavours, had communities at its centre, and that the principal goal should be an improvement in people's social and economic lives. In the early days of de-mining, there was little attention paid to the idea that much more could be accomplished than merely the removal and demolition of landmines. However, over the last decade, it has been recognised that successful de-mining also involves a concern for the social and economic wellbeing of the communities living in the area, such as what to use the land for after clearance. This realisation has posed a new challenge to de-mining agencies. Operators recognise the need to expand their knowledge base from the initial technical and logistical aspects to include issues such as social structures, confidence-building, and community ownership.

These challenges are not unique in a context of humanitarian assistance or

development efforts. Indeed, many other humanitarian efforts have found that operational failure was founded on a lack of knowledge and understanding of the groups they aimed to assist. In response to this gap, numerous studies have been undertaken. Some of the most prominent and well-recognised concepts introduced by such studies are 'Do no Harm' and the 'Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis (CVA)'.

Mary B Anderson first introduced the concept of 'Do No Harm' in her book of the same title.[2] She proposed that any kind of effort made to assist communities in need should be underscored by a thorough understanding of the local situation. She further argued that an inability to understand the complexities of the situation and environment in which assistance was provided might lead to an agency's causing harm to the community it was aiming to help. In short, Anderson categorically refuted the notion that intentions to do good necessarily lead to positive results.

A decade earlier, Anderson, together with Peter J Woodrow, introduced CVA in the book *Rising from the Ashes*.[3] CVA rests on the premise that knowledge of both the capacities and vulnerabilities of the community identified as requiring intervention are essential to the aid provider. Populations affected by any kind of hardship, as in the case of mine-affected communities, do not lose their inherent abilities to survive, although the way they would 'normally' conduct their lives is hindered. Therefore, in order to assist it is imperative that the organisation or people providing aid understand how the community affected would have lived if there had been no hindrance. Knowledge of how the community has been able to cope with the hindrance will aid positive development. The above two concepts point to one principal need on the part of the aid provider: understanding the situation in order to be able to harness community capacities.

This so-called understanding, however, is no simple endeavour. The very nature of de-mining, which includes the technical issues and expense, means that most communities have been forced to live with landmines for long periods. Communities affected by landmines often have to find alternatives to the resources that are blocked by mines. In Southern Africa (for example Angola and Mozambique), the relative availability of land means that communities are often able to avoid the areas in which landmines are present, but with some disadvantages. Using other land often leads to increased hardship in the conduct of daily life and a reduction in the potential for development. For example, longer walking distances to alternative crop-producing land or drinking water may mean less ability to produce crops for sale, or less time to dedicate to other income-generating activities. However, the availability of such alternatives often means that communities will not use demined land if they doubt the trustworthiness of

the de-mining process. In cases where cleared areas are not used after the completion of de-mining operations, the value of the de-mining is greatly reduced because the newly restored resources are not used to yield a better quality of life or promote development. Hence, building confidence is a concern for de-mining agencies today.[4] How this can be done is a question that cannot be answered in an overarching manner. Rather, it appears that operators should build relationships with the affected community that recognise its possible mistrust of the operation and aim to build confidence through strong co-ordination, co-operation and dialogue.

Communities affected by landmines have more trust in operations where the level of communication, co-ordination and co-operation between deminers and villagers is high. The dangers involved in, and the technical proficiency needed for, de-mining tend to limit the potential for co-operative work. Despite this, some organisations have found ways to include the community in the work they conduct, for instance, involving them in the preparations for de-mining. The preparation of a camp area and the improvement of roads and landing strips for evacuation purposes are tasks that require skills, which are also known to villagers. Notably, people living in an area will have extensive experience in dealing with local bush clearing and road improvement. This presents a prime opportunity for the community to be included in the preparation process. The inclusion of villagers in this type of task can also assist aid organisations to measure the level of importance that the villagers place on de-mining. At the same time participation in the preparatory stage allows the villagers to feel a level of ownership over the operation.[5]

Another example of including the community in de-mining is by clearly recognising what the community's needs are. In some cases, several different mined areas, or one extremely large area, can affect the villagers' livelihoods. Care should be taken to determine the area regarded as most important to the community, and priority given to clearing that area first. It is also useful to hand over portions of the area as they are demined, rather than waiting years for the whole area to be cleared.

In addition, it is important that communities understand the task that is being undertaken. Often villagers destroy operators' minefield markings, or visit the mined area in order to inspect the work conducted. In both such cases, communication and explanation of the task have proved helpful ways of resolving the problem. All too often de-mining agencies resort to calling the police or other authorities in such instances, instead of recognising that community members may not understand the impact of their actions.

Another factor that must not be underestimated is that of personal relationships and interaction. If de-mining agencies ensure that their field

staff regard themselves as service providers, the community in turn will view them in that light, which will raise the possibility of a positive relationship. The attitude of de-mining staff, the way they conduct themselves outside the minefield, and the community's perception of these individuals are all key factors to a successful operation. In some cases, de-mining agencies make little effort to liaise with, and relate to, the community, even though their staff may remain in an area for long periods. It is important that de-mining staff keep the villagers informed of their activities instead of establishing themselves as an island within the community.

Many successful de-mining operations have combined the factors mentioned above in a variety of ways, including participation in recreational activities such as Sunday football matches, meetings with the community that involved the whole de-mining team, and demonstrations of de-mining in mock de-mining pits.

Learning how to work with communities

Identifying exactly how communities are affected by landmines, and how the implementing operators may best interact with the community, can hardly follow an established blueprint. On the contrary, the examples provided above are based on individual experiences of work in the field. What is consistent is that an understanding of the community is needed on the part of the operator. At its lowest level, this requires that deminers and de-mining supervisors understand their task as being broader than merely fulfilling the technical objectives.

Whilst mine action has progressed dramatically in recent years, we must not disregard the need for training, and for learning how the ideas embodied in the concepts of 'Do no Harm' and CVA can be practically introduced into day-to-day practice. What experience has taught the Assistance to Mine Affected Communities (AMAC) project is that operators in the field need to learn how to apply these concepts. This requires understanding at the management level (so that operations are launched and commenced appropriately), but also at the operational level, throughout the course of the individual de-mining operation. In addition, both management decisions and operational practices need to be monitored to improve the overall chance of meeting the expanded criteria.

The operational aspect

In this section the focus is placed on the conduct of individual de-mining operations, and the influence that personnel can have. The AMAC project

conducted a course for de-mining supervisors, teaching them techniques and methodological approaches for gathering and analysing information on mine-affected communities. The goal was both to embed the Do No Harm and CVA concepts in the way field staff thought and worked, and to provide tools that would help ensure the quality of information they gathered and analysed. The training course brought together 18 de-mining staff members working in four different African countries. During the course it became clear that trainees had little difficulty understanding the need for co-operation with communities. The course also trained them in techniques for interviewing, surveying and validating information. A particularly useful aspect of the course was improving the trainees' ability to share information with other participants. Whether or not the skills learned during the course were introduced into the operational workings of the individual institutions fell outside the scope of the training.

Details of the content and methods employed during the course do not fit within the parameters of this chapter.[6] Yet it is important to review the outcome of the visits made to monitor the progress of staff who had participated in the course in order to attempt to assess, to some degree, its value at the field level.

The monitoring visits took place approximately eight months after the end of the training course. By and large, the monitors found that staff continued to work within the same organisational structures as before, despite the clear need for changes at the organisational level. However, although they lacked institutional support, some trainees had managed to find ways to include their newly-gained skills in the work they conducted. Some examples are provided below.

One de-mining supervisor, a former AMAC trainee, started each operation by requesting a meeting with the community concerned, to which he brought all of his de-mining staff. He took the opportunity to introduce all the members of the team to the community, and to make himself personally responsible for any misbehaviour by de-mining staff under his command during the course of the operation. At discussions held during the monitoring visit, he said he believed that the community had welcomed this initiative. When compared with his previous experiences of working in villages, this initial meeting, he reported, had led to an increased level of partnership and co-operation between the de-mining team and the community. In the same case, the supervisor had noticed that the minefield separated the community from its cemetery: therefore an access route for the villagers was the first area to be cleared. The supervisor justified his decision to clear this route first by explaining that villagers would go to the cemetery regardless of the presence of mines. After the clearance another meeting was

held with the community, at which the supervisor explained what they had done, and also offered to provide an escort to those that needed access to the cemetery as an additional precaution (because although a safe lane had been cleared to the defined technical standards, the lane was still very close to the minefield). The community, according to the supervisor, had been very enthusiastic about regaining relatively safe access to the cemetery. The additional efforts made by the de-mining team in this instance were minimal, but evoked a very favourable response from the community. This in turn meant that the chances of success for the de-mining operation were substantially increased.

Another former trainee working as a supervisor for a technical survey team found that the communities concerned had very little understanding of the de-mining process. He found that in some cases communities thought that the presence of survey teams meant that de-mining had already taken place. In such cases animals were allowed to venture into the mined areas. This inevitably led to accidents, and consequently to a reduction in the level of trust. Understandably, news of these accidents in areas believed to have been cleared was devastating to confidence in de-mining, and this lack of confidence rapidly spread to neighbouring communities. The trainee also found that people were often angered at seeing numerous teams of deminers who they thought were working on de-mining, but never showed results (not realising that these staff members were engaged in impact or technical surveys). The trainee stated that these findings were perhaps not new, but that a better understanding of the task confronting him had made him aware of what to look for.

He added that even though the organisation he worked for did not require him to do so, he had started including meetings with the community and fact-finding interviews with a larger proportion of the population at the beginning of every new operation. He felt that he had achieved a level of damage control by explaining to communities both the role of technical survey and the process of de-mining. This would also help the communities to understand why groups claiming to be working on de-mining had visited the area without the community's having gained any further access to the mined areas.

The above shows that individuals can be successful in implementing the two concepts identified earlier (Do No Harm and CVA) at the field level. Moreover, organisations need to build the ability to put them into practice, which would involve changes both to their practical procedures and to their organisations.

Overall, the effectiveness of de-mining on a broader basis remains contingent on institutional change. In other words, operators need to train

all their field staff in ways that can increase the chances of success by implementing the modes of work described above on a standardised basis.

The analytical aspect

In addition to practical concerns (how to improve co-operation and communication between operators and communities in the field), the training conducted by AMAC included aspects of data gathering and analysis. These skills may not be essential for all de-mining personnel, but at the more basic level of understanding the impact of their work, deminers must become more aware of how to gather, evaluate and analyse information. Only then can they make their new-found knowledge an integral part of each operation. The benefits of using information gained in order to respond proactively to potential drawbacks were seen in the examples already provided.

The analytical aspects of improving the conduct of de-mining operations are somewhat complex. Analysis of the way communities are affected by landmines requires that the operator value and support the use of effective fact-finding missions that venture into issues more complex than the technical and logistical aspects of de-mining. The operator needs to gain extensive knowledge of how landmines affect communities, and how the communities respond. This is necessary to establish an operational plan that recognises the overarching issues, rather than only focusing on the individual challenges (as illustrated in the examples given above). For instance it is necessary to identify information diffusion mechanisms at the village level. Whilst individuals working in a village may know the make-up of the local leadership structure, and use its members as a way of keeping the population informed, the existence of a leadership structure does not necessarily imply that this institution is effective in diffusing information. One community study conducted by AMAC found that the villagers were clearly divided politically. This meant that one part of the population respected, valued and followed requests by the government-appointed leader, whilst the other had little respect for him, and instead regarded the traditional leader as the legitimate local authority. In practical terms this meant that if information was to reach the whole population, both the government-appointed and the traditional leaders had to be informed. In cases of community meetings it was imperative that both supported the meeting and requested participation from their sections of the community, otherwise only one part of the population (or none) would attend the meeting.[7]

An even more compelling reason for making in-depth studies of

communities relates to issues of impact. The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) represents fundamental progress in assessing the effects of landmines on communities.[8] Nonetheless, the speed at which such a survey is conducted prevents the gathering of in-depth information at the village level. Moreover, circumstances are likely to change over time, making some findings obsolete. This means, particularly as time goes by, that confirmation of findings made by the survey is required before operations can be undertaken.

An assessment of the impact of one or several mined areas on the adjacent community is an essential preliminary for any de-mining operation. However, such an assessment cannot rest on individual intuitions or individuals, but needs to be based on standardised methodology that is understood within the organisation (and has been explained to all parties concerned, including the community affected). The fact-finding involved in the assessment is necessary to enable supervisors to plan the de-mining operation. Relevant information includes factors such as the identification of information diffusion mechanisms within a community, as described in the example above.

Data gathering and analysis are both skills that require intensive training in methods and techniques, and close monitoring and review. Individuals often regard data gathering as not requiring the use of standardised, evaluated and recognisably successful data-gathering methods. However, whilst it is true that any individual can gather data by simply asking a question, the ability to gather useful and reliable data and to assess its value requires skill. Therefore, requesting de-mining staff or any other staff working in any one field to either gather or analyse data without thorough training could be more harmful than not having any information at all. The presumption that data as such may give more legitimacy to a given programme or project may be true, but unless this is reliable information it will not contribute to the improvement of the operation.

The monitoring aspect

In addition to the individual field practices of deminers and de-mining supervisors, and to fact-finding and the analysis of the mine-affected community to be undertaken prior to any de-mining mission, monitoring of the operation itself is essential. There is a need for information from the field to reach management and be communicated to other field operations to increase institutional and sectoral knowledge and, as a consequence, the likelihood of favourable outcomes.

If we return to the case where a former AMAC trainee found that

communities did not understand the role of the technical surveys, it is quite plausible that this was true not only in the village visited by the trainee in question, but also in many other areas. It is also likely that not all technical supervisors would respond in the manner he did. AMAC's experience in drawing up the profiles of mine-affected communities in Africa and elsewhere shows that all too often individual deminers are well aware that communities do not have confidence that land that has been demined is safe to use, is one example of this. Deminers may be unaware of the importance of the information they hold, as well as how they may channel these insights back to the decision-makers within their own organisations. This means that essential knowledge on how communities respond to de-mining is lost, and consequently operations are sometimes not as successful as they could have been.

This illustrates the need for management to take a more proactive role in the monitoring of community-operator dynamics and in the recognition that insights developed by de-mining staff constitute a unique asset for the organisation.

The way forward

In recent years, co-operation between de-mining operators and mine-affected communities has been identified as an important factor in mine action. The perspective that the impact of an operation is the ultimate proof of success is a clear shift from the viewpoint that de-mining should be seen mainly in technical terms. The successful removal and destruction of landmines is no longer recognised as the sole goal of de-mining. Rather, it is now recognised that de-mining must also ensure that communities affected by landmines benefit from the de-mining operation in terms of greater community development and an improved quality of life.

This new perspective translates into a need for de-mining operators to expand their body of knowledge to include (in addition to technical proficiency) first, an understanding of how communities are affected by landmines, and, second, how operations must be conducted at the field level to accommodate those communities. These two factors call for the gathering of information at the community level before and during the conduct of operations. At its most basic, this can simply mean providing de-mining staff with a clear understanding of the implications of their jobs and how their general conduct can affect the overall results of the operation. It means having an institutionalised information channel that ensures that information gathered by deminers in the course of their work and their interaction with the community is used to refine operational planning. It also

involves recognising that communities affected by landmines retain numerous capacities which can be employed during a de-mining operation to assist in the non-technical aspects of de-mining. Examples are working with communities when identifying areas suitable for camps and improving transport and evacuation routes.

The training course provided by AMAC illustrates an attempt to raise the awareness in de-mining supervisors of non-technical aspects of their work in the field. It also included instruction in techniques of gathering information and assessing the validity of such information. The latter is a factor that deserves special mention because, traditionally, operators have chosen a very limited number of individuals as their sources of information and their links to the community. Most often these individuals are selected because they are believed to have technical knowledge of the mined areas or are members of the local leadership. However, what operators have often failed to assess appropriately has been the extent to which those informants can give a truly representative picture of the community and its reaction to the presence of landmines. This is one example of how organisations have underestimated some of the complexities of communities and the need to understand them appropriately.

Whilst all communities are somewhat different from one another, lessons can be transferred from one experience to the next. Organisations must have a way to gain knowledge from each experience and treat it as a living organism. However, although each case is regarded as presenting new challenges and information, a review of past experiences can help deminers to find an appropriate way to address the particular needs of the operation in hand.

Unfortunately, in working with communities a blueprint of how operations ought to be conducted is not necessarily useful. Indeed, mine action, like many other humanitarian and development endeavours, has suffered from attempts to design an infallible way of working that can be endlessly replicated. Since all communities are unique in one way or another, it is impossible to predetermine how de-mining should be best conducted without an understanding of the individual community. There is a fine balance between having an all-purpose blueprint for action, as can more or less be done with the technical factors, and having to start from zero every time. What is needed is a set of standards, values, and objectives which allow mine action organisations to look back at former experiences and use them to assist their response to new challenges.

In the introduction, the concepts of Do No Harm and CVA were introduced as foundations for the improved conduct of de-mining. In practical terms these concepts can be summarised as follows. First, it is

essential for operators to recognise that de-mining operations may cause damage to communities, not directly in removing and destroying mines, but from a broader perspective. This can include the way de-mining is conducted. For example, how do the deminers interact with the villagers? Does the de-mining operation pose a strain on local resources, such as the water supply? How can the planning of the operation be adapted to better meet local needs, to free access to those resources that are essential to improving the lives of this particular community?

Second, operators must come to regard communities as capable despite the presence of landmines. They should investigate how individual communities can become involved in the operation, rather than keeping them detached from all aspects of the operation. Is there a need to clear bush land for a de-mining camp, for example? Does the road need repairing in order to ensure an evacuation line in case of need? Is there a landing strip that requires repair for evacuation purposes? Does the de-mining operator require non-technical staff that can be hired locally, such as guards, camp keepers, cooks?

Third, operators should explore ways in which they may be able to access information gained by deminers throughout the operation and to then use it to improve the way in which the operation is conducted. Are there members of the population who do not have confidence in the work conducted? If so, why, and how could this be changed? Are there members of the population who are unhappy about the presence of deminers? If so, why, and how can this be changed? And so on.

Fourth, de-mining agencies should recognise the multiple levels at which community dynamics must be considered. It is essential that the potential impact of landmine removal be identified before the operation commences, but this alone is not sufficient. Wise, information-based management decisions must be supported by mechanisms to ensure that information from the field is assimilated and used to change the operation if necessary. Clearly, the gathering and analysis of information at this level must be in accordance with defined guidelines and be conducted by staff that have been appropriately trained. Moreover, it is important that field staff also have a clear understanding that their role within the de-mining process extends further than merely achieving technical success.

In short, de-mining now includes a recognition of the need for understanding and adapting to the communities being assisted. This is something that requires the support of all levels of operational staff. Earlier examples showed how individuals achieved positive results by modifying the way they operated. Clearly, the innovative approaches tried out by these individuals proves not only that changes are possible, but also that they may

contribute to success at the operational level. However, small advances made by field staff in single communities are insufficient to transform current practice. For that to happen, organisations in the sector will have to consider how the knowledge gained through new modes of analysis can be integrated into organisational communication and decision-making at all levels.

Endnotes

1 This article is based on the research and capacity-building activities of the AMAC project, based at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). For more on AMAC, including full text versions of several of the publications referred to in this article, see www.prio.no/amac.

2 Anderson MB, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — or War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

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6 Millard AS, *Assessing Landmine Impact at the Community Level: A Training Manual*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2002. Also available in Portuguese, *Avaliação do Impacto das Minas Terrestres ao Nível da Comunidade: Um Manual de Formação*.

7 Millard AS & KB Harpviken, *Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2001.

8 For more on the Landmine Impact Survey, see *www.sac-na.org*.

CHAPTER 9

South Africa: Developing world-class enabling legislation through consultation

Neuma Grobbelaar[1]

Introduction

South Africa has a special association with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, more commonly known as Ottawa Convention. South Africa was the third country after Canada and Norway to sign the Convention on 3 December 1997, having played a critical role as a bridge-builder between the developed and developing world in negotiating the Ottawa Convention outside the framework of the Convention against Conventional Weapons of 1980 and its Protocols, which regulated the use and composition of APMs but did not ban them. Today, South Africa, Norway and Canada are considered the three states that were pivotal in galvanising sufficient international support with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) — a broad church of civil society organisations — to ensure that the Ottawa Convention became a reality.[2] The results have been spectacular. The Ottawa Convention has emerged as an effective instrument of disarmament. Of all present arms control agreements it has been the most rapidly adopted, ratified and implemented internationally. More than 134 states are State Parties to the Convention, and more than 147 states are signatories. More importantly, the use, manufacture and export of APMs have decreased significantly.

One of the key requirements of the Convention under Article 9 is to develop enabling domestic legislation. It states quite explicitly that all State Party members should take 'the appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions' to ensure that all their citizens adhere to the obligations agreed, and that any activity that is prohibited under the Convention is adhered to on all territory under its jurisdiction or control. This is an explicit instruction that each State Party should develop a set of appropriate sanctions and legal regulations to guarantee that the Convention is implemented at a national level.[3]

This chapter looks at the way South Africa developed its enabling legislation. The process included unprecedented consultation with a broad range of actors from government, parliamentarians, civil society and

business. This has resulted in world-class legislation that has broken new ground in a number of ways. It was the first time that the South African government had drafted enabling legislation to implement an international arms control agreement. Also, the draft legislation, which has taken well over two years to develop, represents not only a new approach to the process but a precedent for developing appropriate domestic disarmament legislation in the future. The South African experience also offers interesting lessons for the region.

Two basic approaches with regard to the development of national legislation to incorporate the obligations on State Parties under the Convention have emerged at an international level.

One is a *minimalist* approach, which implies that the Convention regulations are adopted in national legislation without any further elaboration of definitions, provision for any specific domestic measures to ensure the implementation of the Convention, or determination of reporting responsibilities. Although the adoption of a minimalist approach is more than adequate to give effect to the Convention, it could lead to the development of certain inconsistencies of application in individual states. For a monist state, such as Namibia, international legislation automatically becomes binding once the state has deposited its international legal instruments with the secretary-general of the UN. However, because the international legislation in the case of the Ottawa Convention does not specify the scope and nature of domestic penalties to be introduced, this leaves a serious gap in the legal and practical prosecution of transgressors and transgressions, in the event that they occur. The Namibian government is aware of this anomaly, and is in the process of adopting enabling legislation that addresses the problem in more specific terms.

Most states follow the above approach in the introduction and adoption of national implementation measures. Mauritius and Zimbabwe are examples of other countries in Southern Africa that have adopted minimalist enabling legislation. However, it should also be recognised that they were among the first countries in the world to have adopted appropriate enabling legislation.[4]

The second approach is more *comprehensive* in nature. It attempts to strengthen and expand the domestic application of the particular international legal obligations, thereby enhancing the legal scope of the Convention through further codification of international law into national law. It is in this sphere that an individual state's interpretation of a legally binding international treaty can enhance and strengthen the implementation of international law. Indeed the incorporation of international law into domestic law can contribute significantly to the

standardisation of international law and its application. It can also contribute to the development of international consensus on the implementation of the Convention through domestic regulation.[5] South Africa's approach to the development of national implementation measures has followed the latter approach.

Main government agencies, consultation and process

Most of the responsibility for the development of South African legislation to incorporate the Convention into domestic law and introduce penal sanctions for transgressors has devolved on two departments, the DoD — as the main developer of the legislation — and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) — as the department reporting progress at an international level.

The drafting committee for the legislation comprised representatives of all the government bodies and departments who would be involved in the implementation of the Convention. Representatives from the DoD included specifically members of the Defence Secretariat: Policy and Planning, Military Legal Services, Chief of Joint Operations and Legal Support. The South African DFA was represented, particularly by the multilateral division responsible for arms control and disarmament. Other committee members came from the CSIR; Defencetek; Denel; the South African Police Service; and lastly the ICRC in an advisory capacity. Preliminary consultations on the establishment of a drafting committee began in October 1999, seven months after the Convention came into force on 1 March 1999.

The drafting committee began its activities in earnest at the end of 2000. First it made a comprehensive analysis of existing international and domestic legislation and identified the main policy thrusts, requirements and obligations of the Convention. The purpose was to avoid duplication of existing domestic legislation and to ensure that all obligations were addressed. The initial analysis was followed by the drafting of a document that contained the main policy commitments of the Convention, and could serve as the foundation for the draft legislation.

The draft Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Bill itself went through a further 15 revisions and refinements before it was posted on the website of the DoD for comment.

Following its publication on the web, the draft legislation was submitted to civil society for further scrutiny and suggestions. Three consultative workshops were arranged by Mine Action Southern Africa (MASA) and held by its associate or member organisations to discuss the draft legislation.[6] The conclusion reached at these workshops was that before proceeding it would be necessary to consult the South African de-mining industry and foreign

de-mining operators with branches in South Africa, in view of the impact the legislation would have on their activities.[7]

After incorporating the legitimate concerns raised by civil society, the drafting committee referred the draft legislation to two interdepartmental committees at director-general and cabinet committee level. The aim was to guarantee coherence, clarity and congruence in the legislation and to ensure that the line-function responsibilities of the different departments were clearly understood. The two committees involved included the IRPS cluster (International Relations, Peace and Security) and the JCPS cluster (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security). The draft legislation was submitted in a memorandum to the cabinet after consultation with the State Legal Advisers. Thereafter, in November 2002, it was introduced as a draft bill for discussion in the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence. Civil society was once again invited to make presentations on the draft bill. The minister of defence introduced the bill in Parliament for its first reading in February 2003 and for a second reading in June 2003. The bill is currently awaiting signature by the president to be formally promulgated as an Act.

What is new?

The bill that has emerged out of the various consultations is a much shorter, pared-down version of the 'draft legislative document' that was discussed with civil society. However, in essence it does not depart from either the intent or the scope of the original. The severity of the penalties recommended by the State Legal Advisers is an indication of the seriousness with which this legislation is being approached as well as the seriousness with which transgressions are viewed. The bill makes provision for a fine of R1 million and/or imprisonment for a maximum of 25 years for transgressions. Any weapon, vehicle, uniform, equipment or other property used to commit an offence under the proposed bill could be forfeited to the state by order of any convicting court.

The most important aspect of any form of legislation is the clarity of its definitions (in terms of the application of the law). The drafting committee spent a great deal of time achieving consensus on these. A total of 25 definitions is included in the draft bill.[8] These cover the persons, institutions and competencies defined in the legislation, such as 'domestic inspectors' and a 'competent court'. The definition of an APM is central to the application and effectiveness of the legislation. The draft legislation that was discussed with civil society in October/November 2001 not only included the exact Convention definition of an APM, but expanded it by referring specifically to the impact of an APM. The altered definition reads as follows:

Drafting process and implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Bill

Process	*Activity*	*Dates*
Stage 1	Preliminary consultations to establish a drafting committee by the DoD and DFA.	Oct 1999
Stage 2	Formal constitution of a drafting committee consisting of the DoD, DFA, Denel, CSIR and ICRC as technical adviser.	March 2001
Stage 3	Analysis of international legislation and domestic body of legislation to identify policy thrust, requirements and obligations.	
Stage 4	Policy commitments implied in terms of the Mine Ban Convention extracted and combined into a policy document.	
Stage 5	Draft legislation conceptualised in the form of a draft bill after 15 revisions/refinements.	Aug 2001
Stage 6	Publication of draft bill on DoD website (*www.defence.gov.za*) and opening for public comment.	Oct 2001
Stage 7	Consultations with civil society through focused workshops.	October/ Nov 2001
Stage 8	Consultations with de-mining operators.	Dec 2001/ Feb 2002
Stage 9	Discussion at director-general level (DG-clusters) in the IRPS cluster (International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster) and the JCPS cluster (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster).	
Stage 10	Incorporation into cabinet memorandum and submission to cabinet for consideration.	
Stage 11	Referral to the State Legal Advisers for comment and identification of penal sanctions.	
Stage 12	Publication and submission of draft bill to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence for discussion, consideration. Public submissions invited.	Oct/Nov 2002
Stage 13	First reading in Parliament by the minister of defence for discussion	Feb 2003
Stage 14	Second reading in Parliament.	June 2003
Stage 15	Signature by the president and formal promulgation as an Act.	By end of second session of Parliament 2003

> For the purposes of this Act, a mine other than an anti-personnel mine shall be considered to be an anti-personnel mine if it is designed to be or can be detonated by:
>
> (1) a trip-wire or break-wire;
>
> (2) a direct or indirect weight less than 150 kilograms;
>
> (3) a sensitive fuse which can be unintentionally activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person;
>
> (4) an anti-handling device which can be unintentionally activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person;
>
> (5) any other mine or device which performs in a manner consistent with Section 1(c) (i).

The expanded definition reflected the drafting committee's awareness of the concerns and arguments raised by humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC, during the various Convention review meetings held to discuss the effect of certain explosive devices. The argument is that because these devices act as APMs — despite being named otherwise — they should be banned owing to their indiscriminate effects.

Interestingly enough, the final draft of the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Bill does not include this definition or that given in the original Convention, but merely states that an APM 'includes any other mine or device which performs in a manner consistent with an anti-personnel mine as defined in the Convention'. This was accepted by representatives of civil society on the grounds that the exclusion of the expanded definition from the bill did not weaken the legislation, as its formulation encapsulated the sentiment expressed in the original draft.[9]

A second factor important to the application of the legislation is clarity on its prohibitions and allowances. The latter refers to actions allowed under the legislation to ensure that a soldier, employee or agent is able to carry out his or her natural duties without inadvertently contravening the law.

In terms of reporting obligations, the competencies of the minister of defence are clearly defined, granting him (or her) the power to obtain the information required under the Convention and the right to report the information to the UN secretary-general.

The bill is also very clear on the scope of the legislation. It will apply not only to all South Africans or 'persons' on South African soil, but is also binding on any South African 'person' outside South African territory. The term means 'a natural or juristic person and includes a natural or juristic person of foreign nationality present or acting within the borders of the Republic'. Therefore international de-mining companies that are registered in South Africa or are operating from South African territory are also bound by the legislation. A South African de-mining company or deminer working

abroad, even in a country that is not a State Party to the Convention, is equally bound by the competencies and restrictions of the legislation, and could be prosecuted under the legislation in the event of transgression. In the view of the many companies that operate in the subregion, especially in Mozambique and Angola, awareness of, and compliance with, the stipulations of the bill will be extremely important.

Perhaps one failure of the bill is that the responsibilities and obligations of the de-mining community are not clearly specified. Although the scope of the legislation is clear, the scale of the activities of the South African de-mining community should have warranted special mention in the legislation. Instead, the de-mining community's activities will be policed under broader defence services legislation.

The legislation also makes very clear provision for compliance with other requirements of the Convention as they relate to international inspections under Article 8. The bill places explicit obligations on the South African state to receive international fact-finding missions as authorised by the State Parties and appointed by the UN secretary-general. Under Chapter 6: 'International Inspections', provision is made for the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and to ensure for its members security, access to information and installations, immunity, privileges and conditions relevant to their functions. However, the bill also makes it clear that the costs of the international fact-finding missions have to be borne by the State Parties.

The legislation breaks new ground as a body of law by providing for the appointment of domestic inspectors, which is not included in the terms of the Convention. To strengthen compliance with the Convention, the South African minister of defence — under Chapter 5: 'Domestic Inspections' —

South Africa and the Convention

- South Africa played an instrumental role with like-minded countries in negotiating the Ottawa Convention.
- South Africa, previously a producer and exporter of APMs, fully dismantled its anti-personnel landmine production capacity and completely stripped its assembly lines. The production of all APMs had been halted by 1995.
- South Africa completed the destruction of its stockpile of 313,779 APMs on 30 October 1997, retaining only 5,000 mines. These will be used to train soldiers who might be exposed to landmines during peacekeeping operations; to develop effective de-mining equipment; for de-mining training; and for military/civilian education purposes, such as displaying disabled mines as exhibits in war museums.
- South African companies have been involved in mine clearance activities in neighbouring states and other mine-afflicted states (such as Bosnia), and have developed various mine clearance capabilities, mainly in mechanically assisted de-mining.

will have the authority to appoint a competent person as a domestic inspector, to assist with inspections aimed at 'investigating and enforcing compliance with [the] Act; or assisting or accompanying an international inspector investigating alleged non-compliance with the Convention'.[10]

Conclusion

The strengths of the bill are a clear indication of the benefits of a consultative approach, which has enabled the South African government to develop legislation that not only reflects the concerns of civil society but leads international best practice. This procedure (an innovation in South Africa) has allowed civil society to contribute to the drafting process before the formal comment phase, which normally starts at parliamentary level when the bill is published for discussion in the relevant portfolio committees. This approach reflects the unique character of the Convention, which promotes a consultative relationship between State Parties/Signatories at governmental level and concerned representatives of civil society.

In effect, civil society acts as a watchdog both at national and international level. This function is encapsulated in the annual *Landmine Monitor Report*, which provides another incentive for State Parties and Signatories to comply with the Convention in ways additional to the formal reporting requirements encapsulated in Article 7 reports.[11] It also checks on non-Signatories and reports on current use of landmines. There are few examples, especially in the disarmament field, where an international convention has managed to garner an equivalent level of support from civil society, and where the relationship between government and civil society has been formalised to the extent that it has in the case of the Ottawa Convention. It is broadly accepted that non-government actors played a crucial role in ensuring the rapid adoption, ratification and implementation of the Convention internationally. The South African bill illustrates the positive role that civil society can play in the formulation of policy and legislation.

Endnotes

1 This chapter first appeared as 'South Africa and anti-personnel mines: Setting an international precedent', *SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2002/03*. Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2003.

2 South Africa deposited its instrument of ratification at the UN on 26 June 1998. The South African delegation publicly declared both at the time of signature and when it deposited its instrument of ratification that it consented to be bound by the

Convention. MASA noted that the effect of this statement was to render the Ottawa Convention binding on South Africa prior to its entering into force on 1 March 1999.

3 The South African constitution makes provision to ensure that South Africa is bound by all the international agreements it signs once they have been ratified by Parliament, if those agreements are consistent with the constitution or an act of Parliament. However, under South African domestic legislation, as embodied by Section 231 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the development of enabling legislation is required to ensure *the implementation of any obligations* on the South African state in terms of its membership of international treaties.

4 The Zimbabwean legislation makes provision for a fine not exceeding Zimbabwean $100,000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or both. The severity of the penalties is an indication of the seriousness with which transgressions are viewed.

5 International law is subject to a series of constraints: in essence it presupposes voluntary adherence by national governments and its scope is further limited by narrow interpretations of the extent to which an international agreement can impinge on national sovereignty.

6 The meetings took place in Johannesburg under the auspices of the Group for Environmental Monitoring on 19 October 2001; in Cape Town under the auspices of the Centre for Conflict Resolution on 26 October 2001; and in Durban under the auspices of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Accord) on 2 November 2001. The DFA and DoD made comprehensive presentations on the development of the draft legislation at the workshops, and an opportunity was given for representations to be made by representatives of civil society.

7 Two workshops were arranged in consultation with the African De-mining Institute at Armscor in Pretoria on 3 December 2001 and 18 February 2002. The purpose of these two meetings was, first, to ensure that the de-mining industry is aware of the legislation and of its obligations under the Convention, and second, to ensure that the proposed legislation does not have an adverse impact on legitimate activities of the industry (as the main agents involved with the handling, dismantling and destruction of APMs).

8 The original draft legislation included 40 definitions.

9 Discussion with Noel Stott, MASA. However, to ensure that the Convention in its entirety is incorporated into the South African body of domestic legislation, the Convention is included as a schedule to the draft bill.

10 This South African innovation and the process of developing the legislation were presented at the second intersessional meeting of the Convention in Geneva during the full plenary session in May 2002 by SAIIA and MASA. Several delegations commented positively on the process, and expressed interest in the introduction of domestic inspectors.

11 Article 7 reports refer to the reporting obligations of each State Party to the UN secretary-general under the Convention. The transparency measures include a range of reporting obligations on an annual basis on the total of stockpiled APMs, the location of mined areas, types and quantity of mines retained for training in mine-detection, and the status of destruction programmes, amongst others.

ANNEXURE A

Mozambique Five-Year National Mine Action Plan 2002–2006

República de Moçambique
Instituto Nacional de Desminagem

Republic of Mozambique
National De-mining Institute

19 November 2001

1. Background and rationale

The objective of the National Mine Action Plan (NMAP) is to reduce the risk of injury or death caused by landmines and to contribute to the government of Mozambique's poverty reduction strategy — *Plano de Acção para a Reducão da Pobreza Absoluta* (PARPA) — which calls for a 20% reduction in the number of Mozambicans living in absolute poverty by 2010. Based on these two inter-related humanitarian and developmental aims, the long-term vision of the government is to work towards a mine free Mozambique.

The NMAP is drafted in accordance with the role and responsibilities assumed by the Government of Mozambique when it signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty calling for the destruction of all of Mozambique's stockpiles by 2003 and the removal of all landmines by 2009. It is therefore also under the Articles of the Treaty that Mozambique is seeking support from the international community in striving to meet these internationally agreed to deadlines.

Presently, it is estimated that 70% of the Mozambican population lives in absolute poverty, which the government defines on the basis of access to both material and social services needed for the attainment of a 'set of basic minimum conditions necessary for subsistence and well-being.' PARPA identifies six key priority areas for reducing poverty, namely:

- education;
- health;
- agriculture and rural development;
- infrastructure;
- good governance; and
- macro-economics and financial management.

In keeping with these national priority concerns, the NMAP adopts a 'development orientated' approach that seeks to maximise the socio-economic impact and benefit of mine action in Mozambique by integrating its programme framework into the overall PARPA strategy. A second function of the plan is to provide operators with a rational set of national priorities that will more effectively target mine action in the country over the next five years. By providing greater guidance in this area the government will also be in the position to measure and report to the donors on the outputs and outcomes brought about through investments in mine action in Mozambique. Thirdly, the NMAP will act as the blueprint for all future detailed annual workplans prepared by the National De-mining Institute (IND), which is responsible for the overall management and administration of mine action in the country. Ultimately, the NMAP is intended to provide the government's mine action partners with a clear global vision of how it systematically intends to address the problem of landmines in Mozambique.

1.1 Mine action's link to development in Mozambique

Mine action is about eliminating exposure to the dangers posed by the presence of landmines and freeing up the social spaces in which daily human activity takes place. In Mozambique the importance given to work in this area is captured in the UN Development Assistance Framework 2002–2006 in which the government and the UN have identified mine action as one of the key strategic tasks to be tackled in their joint efforts in providing an environment in which personal security is ensured for all citizens of Mozambique. Similar conclusions were found in the recently published UNDP Study on the Socio-Economic Impact of Mine Action that included Mozambique as one of the case study countries.

In this regard, it is anticipated that the NMAP will directly affect the ability of rural populations to better access planned government initiatives described in the ministerial responsibilities in the PARPA. For example, to improve access to educational and health infrastructure, key secondary and tertiary transportation routes will be prioritised for clearance. The removal of landmines will also have a significant impact on health and sanitation as food security and the access to potable water sources will improve. There will be an indirect extra benefit for girls and women as they will potentially need to spend less time on the collection of food and water for the household and perhaps will be able to devote more energy towards furthering their education or small-scale economic activities.

Broadly based, mine action also supports the need for increased communication and mobility of people, ideas, services and resources. This expanded human geography can take many forms. For example, by easing the transportation of surplus goods markets, much needed rural monitised economic activity is stimulated. Its contribution can also be viewed from a governance perspective, whereby populations that are presently isolated will be in a better position to receive a wide range of existent or planned government social services.

There are five related components to mine action, namely:

- mine risk education;
- surveys and mine clearance;
- victim assistance;
- stockpile destruction; and
- advocacy.

An objective in the designing of the NMAP was to integrate and operationalise all five of these elements. This approach will help ensure that a comprehensive and sustainable Mozambican mine action programme is constructed. There is also a clear attempt at incorporating the planning and evaluation process into all activities.

In drafting the NMAP, the IND has synthesised the Mozambican Mine Action Standards (MMAS) and the new International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance (IMAS) into the basic framework for all operations. The IMAS, which were endorsed by the UN and came into effect on 1 October 2001, provide guidance on the scope and criteria on which a safe and effective national mine action programme and standard operating procedures should be structured. In adopting this approach it can be assured that the NMAP meets both the internationally agreed upon regulations for mine action, while maintaining an appreciation for the local Mozambican conditions in which mine action takes place.

1.2 General mine action assessment

Although Mozambique has successfully moved from a state of conflict to one of political stability and economic growth, many of the problems associated with the existence of landmines remain. Indeed, in some cases the impact of mines have actually become more acute as the increased economic and social activity that has accompanied the transition has also resulted in a greater proportion of the country's territory being utilised.

Based on the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey (MLIS), which was certified by the UN in September 2001, it is estimated that more than 10% of the population are facing direct threats to their lives and livelihoods. The MLIS is a critical step forward for mine action in Mozambique as it provides the first general overview of the scope and impact of landmines in the country and acts as one of the key sources of information for the NMAP.

The MLIS confirmed that the distribution of landmines and UXOs in the country is large, geographically diffuse and random. The survey measured in very basic terms the socio-economic 'blockages' presented by this irregular pattern of contamination and calculated that more than 1.7 million people are directly affected by the existence of landmines.

The survey helped to identify 791 villages that are still living with one or more suspected mined areas (SMAs) in their vicinity. The total estimated number of SMAs in the country — which range in size from one square metre to over several square kilometres — is 1,374.

The data collected through the survey process has been deposited in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database at the IND and provides a central point of departure for future mine action planning and management in Mozambique.

To re-cap some of the original findings from the study:

- Landmines and UXOs are found in all 10 provinces (123/128 districts).
- At least 558 km^2 are suspected of having some degree of contamination.

- There have been 172 known accidents in the past two years.
- The most frequently reported blockages were:
  – agricultural land (464 communities, 950,000 persons, 369 km^2)
  – roads (231 communities, 369,000 persons)
  – non-agricultural land used for hunting, gathering firewood and other economic and cultural purposes (180 communities, 291,000 persons, 137 km^2)
  – blocked access to drinking water is less frequent (55 communities, 87,000 persons).

The MLIS provides the names and co-ordinates of the 791 villages and their corresponding SMAs. The IND has built on this information as well as the mine impact score which ranks villages as either high, medium or low impact, to develop a set of specific targets for the 2002–2006 NMAP.

It must be remembered that the exact size of each SMA needs still to be determined as this was not part of the survey's terms of reference. Therefore, the NMAP priority list is driven by the rationale that there is an urgent need to quickly undertake area reduction of the 1,374 SMAs through further analysis and technical surveys followed by comprehensive explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), mine clearance and mine risk education (MRE) programmes.

1.3 NMAP milestones

The mission of the NMAP is to move Mozambique towards the intermediate goal of being mine impact free within 10 years. Thus, at the end of the first five-year NMAP the following milestones will have been reached:

Impact free milestones 2002–2006

- All high- and medium-impact sites cleared.
- All UXOs destroyed.
- All existing stockpiles destroyed.
- Remaining low-impact areas surveyed and marked.
- Fully operational national MRE/marking programme.
- Long-term survivor and victim assistance programmes established.

Impact free, as defined here, includes the elimination of impediments to fundamental socio-economic activity and a significant reduction in the risk of encountering landmines. Adopting this goal, the NMAP concentrates on development-orientated priority-setting criteria that balance the needs of the local communities with those of the nation as a whole. Secondly, on the issue of decreasing the number of mine related accidents, there is an emphasis on area reduction, mine awareness and developing a comprehensive marking system.

The NMAP should be seen as a 'living' document that will be reviewed annually to ensure that targets are being met and, if need be, programming modifications are contemplated in consultation with key partners. This will allow the IND to react to new trends, technological advancements or requests from stakeholders in best delivering mine action programming.

2. Mine Action resources

2.1 National De-mining Institute

The legal framework for the creation of the IND was laid down in Government of Mozambique Decree 37/99 and 38/99 of 10 June 1999. Decree 37/99 authorises the establishment of the IND, spells out the institutional framework and defines the IND's mandate. Decree 38/99 determines the national priorities and strategy for the execution of mine action activities in Mozambique.

Provisions are made for the establishment of co-ordination mechanisms at national, regional and provincial level. These will include the following:

- An Inter-Ministerial Standing Committee chaired by the director of IND to ensure that mine action efforts are directed towards achieving the national objectives for reconstruction and socio-economic development.
- Regional co-ordination offices to ensure that all mine action activities in the regions and provinces are executed within the national priorities.

The mandate of the IND is clearly defined:

> To successfully establish and develop a co-ordination, supervision and management mechanism, in close co-operation with all other relevant organisations and agencies, to ensure the cost-effective execution of a National Mine Action Plan.

According to the national priorities for mine action, which are identified in Decree 38/99, resettlement of the population in areas where it has access to public sector investments such as education centres, hospitals, commercial centres and other vital infrastructure is deemed to have primary importance. The decree goes on to identify specific socio-economic objectives with special reference to areas already identified as high potential agricultural land, roads and bridges, railway lines, energy and industry.

Furthermore, the government has determined the National Strategy for Mine Action in Mozambique concentrate on the following eight goals:

- Create national capacity to ensure sustainable mine action programme management.
- Create mechanisms to meet the needs of communities and to create participation by civil society at sub-national, provincial and district levels.

- Promote an integrated approach for the support of socio-economic reconstruction and development.
- Promote the use and development of technology to improve safety and efficiency.
- Collect, verify, classify and disseminate all information related to the five pillars of mine action.
- Co-ordinate mine awareness to prevent future accidents.
- Co-ordinate assistance to mine victims and survivors.
- Facilitate mine action, with special reference to quality assurance management.

IND strategy

IND's role is to facilitate mine action, establish national priorities, ensure technical and safety standards to safeguard its citizens and keep the overall mine action efforts in line with national priorities, which include:

- acting as focal point and co-ordination mechanism for all mine action activities;
- co-ordinating mine action support to humanitarian relief and resettlement programmes, keeping the recent and possible future natural disasters in mind for contingency purposes;
- co-ordinating mine action support for reconstruction and socio-economic development;
- developing a sustainable comprehensive and integrated NMAP;
- facilitating the development and maintenance of an indigenous mine action capability;
- Upgrading the existing database to an IMSMA, in order to supply user-friendly information to all agencies involved in mines and to other interested partners;
- developing, implementing and distributing technical and safety standards for mine action activities;
- developing criteria and procedures for the accreditation of all mine action operators (commercial entities, NGOs, local and international) in Mozambique;
- developing and implementing a quality assurance system for verification of mine action activities in conformity with the international standards for humanitarian and commercial mine action;
- participating actively in resource mobilisation for the support of mine action;
- leading mine risk education initiatives;
- providing leadership in the area of survivor and victim assistance; and

- completing the Article 7 Reporting tasks as part of the Ottawa Treaty obligations.

2.2 Humanitarian operators

Mozambique has been fortunate to have strong and long-standing working relationships with several internationally known humanitarian operators, including the ADP, Halo Trust, NPA, Handicap International and Menschen Gegen Minen (MgM). Historically, based on the need to rapidly deploy mine clearance assets as part of the overall peace-building process, Halo Trust was tasked with working in the north of the country, while NPA and ADP began operations in the centre and south respectively. Handicap International and MgM arrived later on the scene and are both operational in the southern third of the country.

Humanitarian operators

Operator	*Province*	*Clearance mix*			*Projected clearance for 2001 (m²)*	*Donors*
		Manual	*Dog*	*Mechanical*		
Accelerated De-mining Programme	Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane	X	X	X	2,000,000	UNDP/ SWT/SWE IRL/GER/NZL
Norwegian Peoples' Aid	Sofala, Manica and Tete	X	X		2,800,000	NRW/SWE/ HOL/DNK/USA
Handicap International	Inhambane	X	X		1,100,000	HOL/FNL SWE/HOL/USA
Halo Trust	Zambézia, Nampula C.Delgado, Niassa	X			1,200,000	UK/SWT
Menschen Gegen Minen	Gaza	X	X	X	1,500,000	GER
Total					**8,600,000**	

Funding for humanitarian operators is normally received via donor governments and is allocated on a multi-year basis and targeted in most cases for work in a specific province. In 2000 over $10 million was pledged to these five operators who employ over 1,000 Mozambicans. Since 1992 the humanitarian operators have cleared or destroyed:

- 8,129 km of roads;
- 1,852 km of high-tension electrical wiring;
- 90 km of railroad;
- 61,068,551 m^2 of land;
- 72,209 mines;
- 34,406 UXOs; and
- 495,136 small arms and munitions.

Most of the operators utilise a 'clearance mix' or 'tool box approach' that includes manual, dog and mechanical de-mining capabilities. This allows for increased productivity based on exploiting the best technical tool for the job. In many instances the different techniques are used in combination. Based on this methodology, it is estimated that the humanitarian operators will clear approximately 8.6 million m^2 in 2001.

2.3 Private contractors

There are several joint venture commercial contractors active in Mozambique. Initially the commercial operators represented almost exclusively foreign companies but over time this sector has come to include a substantial number of Mozambican enterprises. Collectively, these operators normally undertake smaller focused clearance tasks, such as power lines, dams, highway expansion, industrial development and commercial agricultural investments.

There are presently 12 commercial joint venture mine clearance contractors and two quality assurance companies authorised to work in Mozambique. The majority are Mozambican registered and included: *Empresa Moçambicana de Desminagem* (EMD), *Associação Africana para a Desminagem e Desenvolvimento* (Afrovita), Mozambique Mine Action (MMA), Necochaminas, Xibulukwa, JV Desminagem, Lince, CIDC, Qualitas, and *Companhia de Garantia, Controle de Qualidade e Consultoria de Desminagem* (CCQ). Foreign operators include: Mechem, Mine-Tech, Ronco and the International De-mining Alliance.

The annual output of this group is difficult to judge and predict as in some cases they are directly requested to perform a task, except when the donor funds are managed by the IND, which is required to launch an open-tender competition process in such cases. In either case, it is difficult to calculate how much work a commercial contractor will obtain from one year to the next.

Similar to the humanitarian operators, the contractors with the financial wherewithal use a mix of methods when conducting operations. It is fully expected and required that the private operators will continue to play an

important role in future mine action in the country if the objective of becoming impact free by 2012 is to be reached.

2.4 Mozambique Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) play an important role in the area of mine clearance and stockpile destruction. As part of Mozambique's obligations under the Ottawa Treaty it must destroy its remaining stockpile of mines (minus a small cache for training purposes) by 2003. The first such destruction was held in September 2001 and events will be carried out until the end of 2003.

In the area of clearance, FADM has approximately 70 deminers posted in each of the country's three regions. So far they have removed landmines from high economic installations such as the Maputo–Ressano Garcia powerline; CFM extension between Goba–Salamanga; and the towers for the cellular telephone network line in the south of the country. In the north and centre the emphasis has also been on power lines and railroad infrastructure. FADM is also responsible for the destruction of Mozambique's existing landmine stockpiles.

It should be noted that the IND and FADM have a close working relationship and it is anticipated that as the size of the mine problem is reduced, FADM will provide the long-term national mobile clearance capacity.

3. Inputs and transition

The development of the NMAP is predicated on extensive consultations with key members of the mine action community, donors, provincial level authorities, government line-ministries and approximately 7,000 people who were interviewed for the MLIS. The IND firmly intends to continue this open process of consultations in future development of annual work-plans and iterations of the NMAP.

The plan is built on the standard operational procedures outlined in the Mozambique and IMAS. The structure of the NMAP follows a simple results-based management methodology that is a common organisational tool utilised in development planning, monitoring and evaluation. The IND will manage, administer and use the NMAP as the framework for its annual operational and resource mobilisation planning efforts.

Based on a deeper analysis of the original MLIS outputs several further strategic assumptions have been calculated and form the basis for the operational component of the NMAP found below in Section 4. It must be

stressed that there will be a period of transition during the first year of the plan when the focus will be primarily on technical surveys designed to define exactly the boundaries and characteristics of the SMAs. Once this process is completed, it is expected that all future mine clearance tasks will be drawn from the IND database. However, during the interim period when the surveys are being completed, mine clearance plans devised by the NGOs for 2002 will remain in place.

To meet the goal of a mine impact free Mozambique by 2012, the following minimum inputs are required over the period ending in 2006:

Core inputs 2002–2006

- Create and maintain three IND quality assurance teams by 2002.
- Clear 245 UXO sites by the end of 2003.
- Destroy existing stockpiles of 37,500 landmines by 2003.
- Complete all technical II surveys by 2006.
- Increase annual mine clearance to 10 million m^2 by 2006.
- Deliver national mine risk awareness programme to three million people by 2006.
- Reduce landmine accidents by 80% by 2006.

4. Mine Action activities 2002–2006

This section gives an overview of the major mine action initiatives planned for Mozambique over the next five years. As is illustrated in the Mozambique Mine Action Framework on the following page, most of the activities are mutually supporting and dependent on the existence of a strong organisational and management capacity at the IND. The framework helps demonstrate IND's core strategic position within the overall management of mine action in Mozambique.

As will be explained in detail, several technical activities will be executed by the IND, namely: additional landmine impact surveys (LISs); quality assurance; and certification. While other undertakings such as MRE and survivor and victim assistance (SVA) will require more of a co-ordinating role on behalf of the Institute. There are also several IND internal operations, in particular: research, monitoring and evaluation; capacity building; information management; and resource mobilisation outlined in the NMAP.

In some areas there are overlaps between IND's co-ordinating responsibilities and actual programme delivery by the mine action partners. This is the case for MRE and SVA where IND will have a limited facilitator role, while mine action partners will actually be responsible for programme delivery at the field level.

The circumstances related to technical surveys, mine clearance, explosive

ordnance disposal, and stockpile destruction are more clear-cut in that they will be carried out by either FADM, private, or humanitarian organisations accredited by the IND.

Based on the Mine Action Framework each of the core activities in the NMAP are described in terms of: objectives; activities; inputs; outputs; and outcomes. Budgets are included for IND inputs, however, the process of costing all partner-executed activities will be based on further consultations and joint programme development. As stated earlier, the objective for now is to provide a global overview of the government's priorities and its expected impact and duration.



4.1 Mozambican Landmine Impact Survey

Given that over 30% of the communities in the MLIS were reported as 'false-negatives' — in other words, they were indeed impacted when expert opinion had indicated there was no problem — there is a need to conduct a limited amount of further MLIS work in order to strengthen the planning and priority-setting accuracy of the IND. It is envisioned that there will be a need for in-house LIS capacity for at least the first 18 months of the NMAP.

- *Objective:* Supplement findings of MLIS with limited further survey activities designed to broaden the geographic coverage area of the original findings.
- *Activities:* Conduct a thorough analysis of all the current MLIS data to determine the cause of the high rate of false negatives as well as to visit areas not reached by the survey teams due to logistical complications, but still suspected of being contaminated. Additionally, closely cross-reference

MLIS with on-going survey activities conducted by the four major humanitarian NGOs and undertake follow-up surveys to address shortfalls in coverage in the original survey.

- *Inputs:* This activity will benefit greatly from the existence of a range of LIS equipment donated by the Government of Canada. The key input requirement would be the creation of a four-person mobile team based at IND in Maputo. The unit would fall under the direction of the Department of Research, Planning and Information (DEPI).
- *Outputs:* Accurate and complete coverage of all SMAs, their location, physical geography and socio-economic impact on the communities at risk. This information will be deposited in the IND -IMSMA database and will serve to better orientate Technical Survey II (T2) and area reduction described in detail in Section 4.2.
- *Outcomes:* Improved co-ordination, priority setting, monitoring, and evaluation capacity.

4.2 Technical surveys and marking

Technical surveys and marking represent two of the most important activities within the NMAP. A T2 follows an LIS and provides more detailed technical information on known or suspected hazardous areas.

It should be remembered that the MLIS concentrated on trying to measure the socio-economic impact of landmines, and, in crude-terms, to establish the location and size of a given SMA.

Specifically, T2s provide the exact size and location of the area to be cleared, as well as information on depth of clearance, soils and vegetation. All of these pieces of data are factored into the final terms of reference for the designing of an accurate and safe operation. The process of eliminating land that was considered to be contaminated, but in actuality is determined to be free of mines, is known as area reduction. Area reduction is a quick and very cost-effective way of returning suspected areas to its inhabitants without actually deploying costly mine clearance assets. In Mozambique, area reduction of SMAs can be as high as 70% of the original total suspected areas.

It is therefore critical that a rigorous T2 process is launched as soon as possible so that a more exact picture of the size and nature of the mine problem in the country can be obtained. This refined analysis will provide more accurate timelines and costs for clearance over the next five years. It is only after an SMA has been precisely demarcated that mine clearance operations will take place. After the clearance operation is completed a Technical Survey III (T3) will be conducted by the IND to certify the land free of landmines: thereafter the land will be returned to the local community.

In the case of Mozambique where the total area under suspicion is considerable, the T2 process provides the additional benefit of being able to direct marking efforts that in some instances can be done at the same time as the T2.

- *Objectives:* First, to significantly, and accurately, reduce the number and size of all suspected mined areas within five years. Second, to use this information to task mine clearance, marking and mine risk education initiatives.
- *Activities:* Based on the provincial data breakdown in the appendix, the focus of the T2 surveys will be to concentrate on the following priorities:
  – High- and medium-impact SMAs over 1 km^2. This cohort alone represents 20.6% of the national total area of 558,348,588 m^2, accounts for 3.2% of the SMAs, and 8.9% of the population at risk.
  – High- and medium-impact SMAs between 10 m^2—1 km^2. This cluster constitutes 27% and 6% of the total area and SMAs respectively. The population at risk is estimated at 23% of the national total.
  – There are three SMAs in the low-impact category that contain a disproportionately large 34% (187,370,000 m^2) of the total national suspected area under threat and are therefore viewed as needing an immediate reassessment.
  – Remaining low-impact communities, representing approximately 56% of the population, 10.5% of the landmass, and 753 of the total SMAs, will receive a T2 starting in year three of the NMAP.
  – Develop a marking system that incorporates a combination of markers, signs and physical barriers in all recognised minefield locations which clearly identify the boundaries of the zone. A marking maintenance schedule will also be established.
- *Inputs:* In keeping with the IMAS, it will be necessary to perform T2s on the 1,129 out 1,374 SMAs that IND has determined are minefields (as opposed to the 245 UXO sites described in Section 4.3). The total area contained in the 1,129 SMAs is 558,348,588 m^2. Presently the humanitarian operators possess T2 capacity, however, given the scale and urgency of the problem it is anticipated that in some cases the resources dedicated to this exercise will have to be increased. In order to meet the five-year target of T2 surveying the entire country by 2006, the IND estimates there will be a need for at least 50 (four-man) T2 teams working in the country on an annual basis.
- *Outputs:* The T2 process will provide documented reports pinpointing the exact size and location of the 1,129 minefields highlighted in the MLIS. On average the T2 can be expected to reduce the SMAs by between 50-70%. A second crucial output of the T2s will be a guide to where marking and

MRE should be targeted in lieu of mine clearance, which is some instances could be delayed for several years due to priority rankings.
- *Outcomes:* Sound tendering, resource mobilisation and tasking framework.

4.3 Explosive ordnance disposal

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) involves the detection, identification, recovery and disposal of a UXO. Of the 1,374 SMAs, 18% (245) were discovered to be UXO tasks. This is a large proportion and from a clearance perspective, is easier to deal with than actual minefields that require more time, as well as larger human and financial inputs. Occurring concurrently with the T2 activities will be an intensive campaign to eliminate UXOs within the first two years of the NMAP.

Traditionally EOD has been undertaken on an ad hoc or emergency response basis with no systematic approach to addressing this resolvable problem. At present, the humanitarian operators do not have dedicated EOD teams, and there is therefore a need to build a short-term small devoted capacity in this area.
- *Objectives:* Destroy all UXOs in Mozambique by 2004.
- *Activities:* The creating and deployment by the major regional humanitarian operators of specially trained EOD teams expert in UXO removal to all provinces in Mozambique. Given the anticipated pace of removal, the IND Department of Operations would assign one person to assist in the co-ordination and timely reporting of completed tasks.
- *Inputs:* Based on the provincial distribution of the UXO problem in the country and the capacity of the operators involved, the creation of the requisite small number of four-person mobile teams to clear all known UXOs by 2004. The teams would normally consist of at least a supervisor, deminer, driver and medic.
- *Outputs:* An 18% reduction in the number of SMAs within two years of launching the NMAP.
- *Outcomes:* UXO contamination affecting 280,000 people (16% of impacted population) removed, allowing for unencumbered pursuit of basic human development activities.

4.4 Mine clearance

Without completed T2s it will be difficult to judge the exact size and cost of mine clearance over the next five years. For example, if the MLIS data is to be used without any further analysis, area reduction, or T2 work, the minimum total cost to clear the entire country would be approximately $380 million. Clearly this number does not accurately represent the resources

required to rid Mozambique of its landmine problem. At this early juncture in the planning process it is therefore not possible to establish reasonable estimates for the size, cost and clearance outputs for the period ending 2006.

Given this unrealistic estimate, due diligence compels that in the first six months of 2002 the operators continue with current clearance tasks with the objective of completing these targets by June 2002. After this time it is expected that the first T2s will have been completed and will from that point forward form the basis on which mine clearance will be tasked. This six-month transition period will also provide the IND and operators time to synchronise the sharing of information and individual provincial planning prospectuses based on the NMAP objectives.

Nevertheless, several strategic assumptions can still be offered at this early stage that will help provide direction and establish a general framework in which the high and medium priority tasks can be addressed.

- *Objectives:* To safely and cost effectively clear all high- and medium-impact SMAs by 2006.
- *Activities:* Based on the MLIS, the current SMAs in the high- and medium-impact cohort totals 146,804,320 m^2. Building on the more definitive T2 findings (which could conservatively reduce this number by 50%), the mine impact score, input from provincial authorities and operators, a list of exactly defined tasks will be produced within the first six months of 2002. This priority list will form the basis for all future mine clearance assignments. Lastly, the IND will conduct all post-clearance certification through the T3 process.
- *Inputs:* There will be a need to maintain the present minimum annual 8.6 million m^2 clearance capacity — which should include an appropriate combination of manual, canine and mechanical clearance assets. Given the desire to be impact free within 10 years, it is fully expected that there will be a continued need to involve private contractors to augment this annual output.
- *Outputs:* Based on this measured approach, all of the high- and medium-impact SMAs affecting more than 530,000 people and at one time consisting of 146,804,320 m^2 of unproductive land will be cleared by 2006.
- *Outcomes:* Eliminating the risk to 304 communities of the most effected populations in Mozambique that will provide them the basic living environment in which they can freely pursue, and be supported, in their own material and human development quests.

4.5 Quality assurance and certification

As an integral component of mine clearance, quality assurance (QA) involves

the accreditation of all operators prior to the commencement of operations and the monitoring of all operations during the clearance process to ensure that management and operational standards are being achieved. The purpose is for government to be confident that operations are carried out in a safe, effective and efficient manner. QA in the Mozambican context will therefore also include on-going formal discussions with managers and deminers based on reports and records submitted to the IND.

The QA process also includes an important sub-activity known as quality control (QC). QC is a final physical inspection that takes place at the end of the clearance procedure but prior to the official handover of the land to the local community. It should be noted that the communities will be informed as to the progress of mine clearance so that they become part of the process and will help ensure a necessary degree of trust when eventual handover takes place.

Based on the QA/QC reports the final component of mine clearance, the T3 post-clearance sampling and certification process, takes place. If an area is found to contain no mines, UXOs, residue or fragments it is certified as 'cleared,' returned to the community or local authorities, and the co-ordinates entered into the IND database.

- *Objective:* Compliance with all MMAS and IMAS mine clearance operating procedures, including adopting appropriate clearance procedures that are deemed by the IND to be effective, efficient and safe.
- *Activities:* Undertake close monitoring throughout the mine clearance process, certify compliance with procedures and sample cleared areas as part of the final inspection process prior to turning-over the land to the local community.
- *Inputs:* Three regional QA teams created, consisting of five persons each and overseen by a QA manager based at IND in Maputo. There will be one team based in Nampula, Beira and Maputo respectively.
- *Outputs:* In following a rigorous QA/QC and post-clearance set of procedures the government will be able to declare and document all lands safely cleared of landmines.
- *Outcomes:* Beneficiaries will be confident that their lands are safe from hazards associated with landmines and re-occupy the territory. This outcome will have a meaningful humanitarian and developmental impact as communities will finally be able to put the legacy of landmines behind them.

4.6 Mine risk education

There is an urgent need for aggressive and sustained MRE and marking

campaigns to be re-launched. Over the past several years it has become well understood that mine clearance and MRE must be more closely linked if the optimum desired impact of reducing risk and accidents is to be achieved. The proposed UNICEF standards for MRE advance the view that a comprehensive approach to MRE should include joint planning and information sharing processes with partners from within, and outside of, mine action. In particular, this means that the impacted communities must be involved in the design and maintenance of MRE and marking initiatives in their areas. Involving the communities will help make sure that the appropriate response and resources are allocated to the particular problem from a local perspective.

A number of different communication and educational techniques and materials are presently in use in the area of MRE, including posters, radio, theatre, leaflets, audio tapes, photographs and games. As noted in Section 4.2, marking must go hand-in-hand with MRE and both should be systematised, culturally sensitive and locally relevant if materials used and messages broadcasted are to be effective. Both these efforts are designed to raise public awareness and change behaviour in all communities at risk in Mozambique. Since there are over 1,000 communities who will not have the SMAs in their vicinity cleared until the T2s are completed and mine clearance assets dispatched thereafter, a MRE/marking process must be put in place as soon as possible.

Until recently Mozambique benefited from the Programme for the Prevention of Mine Accidents (PEPAM) that was executed by Handicap International in concert with the government between 1995 and 2001. PEPAM was designed to deliver MRE and build national capacity to take over the programme after its conclusion. In total there were 500 fieldworkers responsible for delivering locally produced Mozambican MRE and marking materials to districts in the country that were suspected of being heavily impacted by mines (this was done without the benefit of the MLIS). It is estimated that at least 2.7 million people have received some form of MRE through the project. However, as the MLIS points out, there have been 172 reported victims in the past two years, which is a positive reduction in the numbers which followed the civil conflict when there were between 50 and 60 accidents a month, but this still represents an unacceptable human toll.

PEPAM also collected information on the general character of the landmine problem and data on the nature and number of accidents a year. This information was placed into a database and then transferred to IND in August 2001 when the project ended.

The main PEPAM partners included the IND, and its predecessor, the National De-mining Commission, the ministries of Education, Health,

Agriculture and Social Action, provincial authorities and the police. Furthermore, there was a network of 84 NGOs and CBOs which included the Mozambican Red Cross.

It is now the desire of the government to re-kindle PEPAM. In an effort to preserve the momentum and capacity created through the project, there is a need to promptly re-establish the networks of people and organisations that worked on PEPAM. IND currently possesses three MRE teams of eight persons each working in the flood impact areas in south and central Mozambique as part of the emergency response effort launched in 1999 and expected to conclude at the end of 2001. The IND plans on retaining some of this capacity and have it form the core of a managerial–co-ordinator team in the new national MRE/marking programme to be based at IND in Maputo.

- *Objectives:* Re-launch a comprehensive Mozambican MRE and marking programme based on the original tenants of PEPAM.
- *Activities:* Utilising in-house capacity and building on existing PEPAM and MLIS data, the IND would conduct a systematic MRE/marking needs assessment of the population under threat and what further steps in the area of co-ordination, data, information, methodologies and materials would be required to deliver a national programme. Further detail on the nature and number of recent accidents would also be an imperative to help engineer a programme that would successfully stimulate a lasting behaviour change. Continuing to develop Mozambican pedagogical approaches would be central to success and therefore predicates the involvement of a wide network of actors working in tandem with the IND. At the intra-governmental level, the IND will work closely with counterparts that would be based at the ministries of Health, Education, Women and Social Action, and Agriculture to ensure a government-wide effort. The permanent inclusion of MRE in the primary school curricula and developing a sustainable marking system will be pursued.
- *Inputs:* It is expected that five core staff from the emergency flood project would be retained to form the nucleus of the IND MRE unit. The unit would be under the direction of the Department of Operations. There would be a requirement to hire a nationally recruited MRE technical advisor for the initial two-year start-up phase.
- *Outputs:* Nationally co-ordinated MRE database and information collection and exchange; development and inclusion of updated MRE materials included in all primary school curricula; extensive and sustainable marking system; contact with three million persons per year.
- *Outcomes:* An effective MRE/marking programme which continues to help decrease the number of victims on an annual basis. Also, a population that is informed and able to recognise, report and negotiate the environmental

hazards posed by landmines while awaiting mine clearance will be materially and psychologically better off.

4.7 Survivor and victim assistance

As part of an integrated response to SVA a decision was taken in 1998 at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Treaty in Maputo that SVA would become the general responsibility of Ministries of Health in affected countries. In the case of Mozambique, this responsibility is to be shared between the Ministry of Health (MINSAU) and the Ministry for Women and the Co-ordination of Social Action (MMCAS).

The Treaty adopts an all-inclusive definition of survivors and victims, which consists of the individual(s) involved in a mine incident, their immediate families and the mine impacted communities in which they live. It goes on to state in more specific terms that these efforts should include the 'assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims'. Thus, it is widely held that programmes should be designed to support the long-term shared responsibility of SVA within all three of these affected groups.

The main sub-parts of SVA are:

- disability policy and law;
- health and social welfare research and data collection;
- first aid and primary health care;
- hospital-medical care;
- rehabilitation (physical and physiological); and
- social and economic reintegration (skills and vocational training, income-generation activities, social/sports associations).

- *Objectives:* To develop a coherent and co-ordinated national SVA policy and programme which adopts an integrated long-term approach to the plight of victims and survivors.
- *Activities:* Working closely with MINSAU and MMCAS, the IND will draw upon international mine action standards and techniques to assist the ministries to help develop appropriate strategies and methodologies for providing long-term assistance to survivors and victims. The IND will also share all accident information gathered through its regional networks and act as a resource mobilisation focal point. Within the NMAP, IND's role will concentrate on co-ordination and information dissemination. It is foreseen that an integrated and detailed governmental response will be tabled by mid-2002 at which time a global budget and plan of work for this activity will be added to the NMAP.

- *Inputs:* There will be a need for one full-time SVA co-ordinator to be based at the IND. The co-ordinator will be responsible for working closely with the MINSAU and MMCAS and co-developing a national SVA response.
- *Outputs:* Needs of survivors and victims are addressed in government national policy, accurate and timely data collection and analysis, adequate multi-year fund raising and practical programmes delivered at the district level.
- *Outcomes:* With socio-economic vulnerabilities reduced and self-reliance enhanced — and by extension other disabled persons who would also benefit directly or indirectly from the government action on SVA — there would be a significant improvement in the individual quality of life for all persons suffering from a mine incident in Mozambique.

4.8 Stockpile destruction

As part of its obligations as a signatory to the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, Mozambique has begun the process of destroying its stockpiles: the first demolition took place on 18 September 2001. As Article 4 of the Treaty notes, all stockpiles in the possession or under the jurisdiction of the State Party must be destroyed not later than five years after ratification: which in the case of Mozambique is 2003. The Government of Mozambique will rely on the FADM for this important task. Once the destruction has taken place all data related to date will be included in the Article 7 Transparency Reports that the government will submit to the UN on an annual basis. FADM has submitted a detailed workplan and budget for the destruction of the existing 37,500 mines in its possession. The demolition will be co-ordinated from Maputo and carried out under the command of the regional military base structure.

- *Objectives:* Destroy all of Mozambique's stockpiled APMs by 2003.
- *Activities:* FADM will conduct safe and public destruction of the country's remaining stockpiles.
- *Inputs:* In the case of Mozambique the open detonation process is the preferred option. FADM will require budget support for training, transportation, explosives and ground preparations.
- *Outputs:* Destruction of all remaining stockpiled landmines and compliance with Ottawa Treaty obligations.
- *Outcomes:* Although the remaining stockpiled mines pose no immediate threat to the general population, their destruction does guarantee that they will not be used in Mozambique, or elsewhere in the future. It is also a powerful statement to other post-conflict countries regarding the demilitarisation process which Mozambique is still under-going years after the Peace Accords were signed in 1992.

4.9 Research, monitoring and evaluation

Central to IND's role in managing the NMAP will be to conduct research, monitoring and evaluation (RM&E) on the impact that mine action is having on reducing poverty and physical risk.

Unlike QA, which focuses on the technical work of mine clearance, RM&E will concentrate on the broader process of mine action and its measurable socio-economic impact.

- *Objectives:* To better understand and explain the link between mine action and poverty and risk reduction in Mozambique.
- *Activities:* Under the direction of DEPI, the IND will undertake three thematic socio-economic impact studies a year exploring the development consequences of mine action. In year one, the three research projects under consideration include: socio-economic reintegration of victims; MRE as a long-term public health initiative; and relevance to decreasing food systems under stress in post-clearance communities. In following years issues of children, gender and the psychological impact of living long-term with landmines are potential topics.
- *Inputs:* The IND will be responsible for organising and managing the three annual studies. In some instances it would team with local research partners such as Desminagem Sofala, University Catolica, University Eduardo Mondlane or other line-ministries. DEPI will be required to hire a additional staff members for each of the two regional offices plus one more to be based in Maputo to help facilitate the studies.
- *Outputs:* Three formal impact studies a year disseminated to all relevant national and international partners. Internationally, the studies will add to the literature and methodologies on best practices in this new sub-field of development. Meanwhile, new management and policy recommendations will be produced at the national level to better target mine clearance interventions.
- *Outcomes:* A more formal and articulated approach to integrating mine action into the larger PARPA process.

4.10 Co-ordination and information management

The heart of IND's reporting and information management structure is the database unit. With the completion of the MLIS, the introduction of the IMSA database system and the co-development with Cranfield University of a new mine action interface software programme known as Pathway, the IND is now positioned to begin providing accurate and timely information to all stakeholders and partners regarding most aspects of mine action in Mozambique.

Traditionally, information and data have been poorly collected, archived and disseminated due in large part to the lack of a firm system and capacity at the IND to receive, report and monitor operations.

Indispensable to the successful execution of the NMAP is the ability to co-ordinate and register mine action activities as they are planned, tasked and completed. The information flows need to be two-way in nature with the IND acting as the central repository of information sent to Maputo to be included in the IMSMA database. The IND, in turn, must be able to supply this information in publishable GIS/map formats.

- *Objectives:* Provide precise and timely information to the government, operators, donors and stakeholders to facilitate better planning, management and reporting of all mine action activities in Mozambique.
- *Activities:* Meet internal information demands from the IND departments of Planning and Research and Operations in their quest to develop and monitor priority lists and de-mining tasks. Externally, share data with partners and stakeholders regarding specific material requests. Maintain physical and logical data base architecture for maximum retrieval efficiency; review and approve databases to ensure that the storage, security, selection and retrieval of information is in a logical, orderly manner; and train, equip and link through the internet to the Maputo headquarters with data collection in the regional offices of Nampula and Beira.
- *Inputs:* Based on funding received from Canada the primary inputs for the unit have been covered until the end of the first quarter of 2003. The support includes budgets for headquarter and regional office staffing, technical assistance and the purchasing of hardware and software.
- *Outputs:* The outputs would include:
  – maps and reports (hard-copy and digital);
  – location and impact of minefields: surveyed and cleared;
  – present and future operational targets (LIS, T2, clearance, etc.);
  – plotting of all accidents;
  – planned and on-going MRE programmes; and
  – planned and on-going SVA programmes.
- *Outcomes:* At a national level, a fully functional database unit will readily allow the government to portray the mine action situation in textual and graphical form, which will be useful in the quantification and qualification of the landmine and UXO problem in the country. On a more operational plain, the data and information streams that are established via the unit will allow for the partners and government ministries responsible for delivering mine action programme activities in the country to ensure they are properly targeting and reporting their location and status to one central information node.

4.11 Capacity building

The UNDP Support for Capacity Building to the National De-mining Institute Project has been fully operational since June 2001 when the entire complement of five technical advisors began working at the IND. Presently the project is funded through contributions from Denmark, Canada and Sweden. An over-riding concern of the initiative is to make sure that the interventions made at the IND are sustainable and process orientated. The primary aim is therefore for the transfer and utilisation of technical expertise to take place within well-defined operational systems and broader knowledge networks. In support of these goals the project is addressing the current 'capacity gaps' from three integrated perspectives: individual training needs; IND's strategic planning and management requirements; and global mine action trends.

- *Objectives:* To build sustainable human and organisational national capacity at the IND that will allow for the accurate definition, formulation, management and monitoring of all future mine action in Mozambique.
- *Activities:* Develop mine action systems and training packages that will strengthen institutional performance and individual skill levels in the areas of: organisational and financial management; strategic planning, policy formulation, co-ordination and execution; surveying; quality assurance; MRE; research, monitoring and evaluation; information management/GIS mapping; and resource mobilisation.
- *Inputs:* Continuation of the work of the chief, operations and finance technical advisors until the end of 2004. The information and database advisors will be required until the end of 2003.
- *Outputs:* Trained, qualified and experienced managerial and operational staff capable of forwarding the government's stated objectives and obligations as outlined in its decrees, NMA and the Ottawa Treaty.
- *Outcomes:* On completion of the project it is expected that IND will be in the position to visibly lead a nationally co-ordinated mine action effort utilising modern management and technical approaches. It is anticipated that the IND will be held up as a model for how the Mozambican civil sector can, with adequate financial and technical support, perform in a highly efficient and professional manner.

5. Resource mobilisation and National Mine Action Fund

5.1 Rationale and objectives

Mine action in Mozambique is highly dependent on resource mobilisation (RM). In the past RM was normally conducted on a bilateral basis between

operators and donors. To assist in streamlining RM efforts and co-ordinating them with priority activities on the ground, the government outlined its vision of the creation of a National Mine Action Fund (NMAF) in the original decrees establishing the IND.

The fund is seen as an essential tool for ensuring that all future mine action operators and donors co-ordinate their efforts based on the priorities spelt out in the NMAP, and its creation is therefore seen as crucial to the success and sustainability of mine action in Mozambique. It is expected that the centralisation of donor funds will allow for more efficient use of resources and improve the ability of the government to co-ordinate and report on issues related to progress, impact and future resource mobilisation requirements.

5.2 Operationalisation of funds

Based on priorities established in the NMAP, operators will submit formal proposals to the IND to undertake a specific activity in a given locale. Once the activity is approved by the IND the funds will be released from the fund. On completion of the work a full report will be produced by the IND and submitted to the fund's Board of Governors (BoG).

5.3 Structure

Financial resources earmarked for mine action would be deposited in a locally administered account overseen by the BoG. The BoG would be made up of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, the donor community and the UNDP. IND would be *ex efficio* to the BoG and act as the fund managers. To ensure transparency and accountability, the UNDP will provide technical assistance to the IND on the day-to-day execution of the fund through the Capacity Building Project, while the UNDP country office will review all quarterly financial disbursements and requests for further funding.

5.4 Administration and reporting

The fund will be subject to internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial rules, regulations and procedures of the Government of Mozambique and the UNDP.

The IND will report to the BoG quarterly on incomes and expenditures of contributions to the fund. On request, individual donor reports will be produced.



5.5 Contribution and disbursements

Contributions to the fund, in cash or kind, would be accepted by the fund managers from governments, specialised agencies, inter-governmental or NGOs and/or private sources. Contributions in support of the NMAP will be possible through a number of different measures:

- Voluntary contribution with limitations to a specific activity and/or partner organisation.
- Voluntary contribution without limitation to a specific activity.

These options will allow donors to maintain current working relationships with a specific operator or sub-theme within mine action. It will also allow for the provincial channelling of funds if desired by a given donor.

Appendix: Operational priorities by province

High- and medium-impact SMAs 10 m²–1 million m²

	Province	*Villages*	*SMAs*	*Population*	*Area*
1	Niassa	3	6	7,078	137,000
2	Cabo Delgado	12	24	34,070	2,653,149
3	Nampula	15	25	23,747	4,889,026
4	Zambezia	18	34	34,088	2,684,650
5	Tete	15	18	36,032	3,052,188
6	Manica	15	30	19,778	1,630,851
7	Sofala	15	33	48,178	3,136,964
8	Inhambane	31	53	145,873	6,768,252
9	Gaza	12	18	15,186	1,610,900
10	Maputo	36	63	37,455	5,230,671
	Totals	**172**	**304**	**401,485**	**31,793,651**

High- and medium-impact SMAs +1 million m²

	Province	*Villages*	*SMAs*	*Population*	*Area*
1	Niassa	0	0	0	0
2	Cabo Delgado	2	2	3,149	17,560,000
3	Nampula	4	4	9,351	9,750,000
4	Zambézia	6	6	8,668	18,536,784
5	Tete	3	4	2,154	9,000,000
6	Manica	1	1	824	1,275,000
7	Sofala	2	2	604	2,273,885
8	Inhambane	4	5	97,552	10,415,000
9	Gaza	4	4	5,944	34,200,000
10	Maputo	7	8	1,110	12,000,000
	Totals	**33**	**36**	**129,356**	**115,010,669**

SMAs +40 million m²

	Province	*Villages*	*SMAs*	*Population*	*Area*
1	Nampula	1	1	3,569	73,500,000
2	Cabo Delgado	1	1	4,979	68,000,000
3	Zambezia	1	1	879	45,870,000
	Totals	**3**	**3**	**9,427**	**187,370,000**

Low-impact SMAs by province

	Province	*Villages*	*SMAs*	*Population*	*Area*
1	Niassa	28	37	39,159	3,711,012
2	Cabo Delgado	53	80	106,858	5,837,156
3	Nampula	60	88	115,030	11,826,481
4	Zambézia	82	128	114,713	6,114,493
5	Tete	30	36	31,870	3,203,371
6	Manica	34	53	52,457	2,853,273
7	Sofala	31	51	54,979	6,542,554
8	Inhambane	110	168	166,151	10,054,578
9	Gaza	24	33	66,144	3,495,860
10	Maputo	51	79	69,435	4,965,800
	Totals	**503**	**753**	**816,796**	**58,604,578**

Unexploded ordnance by province

	Province	*Villages*	*SMAs*	*Population*	*Area*
1	Niassa	13	15	21,931	15
2	Cabo Delgado	33	53	55,913	70
3	Nampula	8	8	8,029	8
4	Zambézia	21	28	32,480	92
5	Tete	19	28	24,695	69
6	Manica	14	20	25,484	47
7	Sofala	11	14	21,942	28
8	Inhambane	23	33	51,406	121
9	Gaza	11	13	15,225	34
10	Maputo	22	33	22,973	81
	Totals	**175**	**245**	**280,078**	**565**

ANNEXURE B

Turning words into actions: SADC, the Ottawa Convention and assistance to landmine survivors

Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining
Centre International de
Déminage Humanitaire - Genève

Kerry Brinkert

Manager, Implementation Support Unit
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining

A paper presented at the conference, De-mining and development: The missing link?, organised by SAIIA and sponsored by the Government of Finland

10–11 October 2002 — Johannesburg

African states and their regional organisations have been at the forefront of efforts to prohibit APMs. In addition they have been at the cutting edge of ensuring that prominence is given to the matter of assistance to landmine survivors. At the February 1995 regional seminar on landmines, organised by the ICRC and the OAU, a number of participants proposed the 'strengthening of national social welfare systems for the care of victims of landmines'.[1] One month later at an ICRC/OAU organised seminar in Harare, participants recommended that 'states should seriously consider working towards a total ban of anti-personnel mines', at least in part because of 'the immense suffering of the victims'.[2] The April 1995 ICRC/OAU seminar for African ambassadors accredited to Ethiopia '(appealed) to the International Community to give increased support to the African national structures, including those which had a regional vocation, in charge of assistance to victims of anti-personnel mines'.[3]

The call made by African states and others for attention to be given to landmine victims continued beyond the 1995–96 First Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and was a prominent feature of landmine discussions in African during the time of the Ottawa Process in 1997. In April 1997 at an ICRC convened meeting of defence and foreign affairs officials from the states of SADC, participants called upon 'as a matter of urgency' the need for 'support of national programmes for victim assistance'.[4] The next month in Kempton Park, South Africa, the First Continental Conference on African Experts on Landmines produced a detailed plan of action, including the agreement that 'governments in Africa, and the OAU, should address the plight of victims and survivors and take renewed cognisance of their problems with a view to meet the health and social needs of all landmine survivors in Africa.'[5]

Much of the Kempton Park Plan of Action can be seen as inspiration for the APM ban Convention,[6] which was finalised in September 1997. The Convention was a major step forward in ensuring that the calls made by SADC members and other African states regarding victim assistance led to meaningful actions. The Convention that emerged from the Ottawa Process in 1997 is a humanitarian instrument, with one of its core humanitarian aims being to assist victims. Indeed, the preamble to the Convention states that when countries formally accepted the Convention, they literally indicated their wish 'to do their utmost in providing for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of landmine victims'. In Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Convention, this wish has been converted into a unique obligation in that it says that States Parties 'shall provide assistance in the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims'. And paragraph 7 of Article 6 suggests that States Parties may

request assistance in the elaboration of a programme for the fulfillment of its obligations — a programme which should determine *inter alia* 'assistance to mine victims'.

In sum, Article 6 uniquely has codified co-operation to ensure the fulfillment of the Convention's humanitarian aims — including its aim to provide for the care, assistance and reintegration of landmine survivors. On the one hand it indicates the rights of States Parties 'to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible'. On the other hand, Article 6 lists a series of responsibilities of States Parties 'in a position to do so' to provide assistance. And it states that assistance may be provided through a variety of means, including 'the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations, or on a bilateral basis.'

Serving as an important forum for dialogue on pursuit of the Convention's core humanitarian aims is the annual Meeting of the States Parties, which is mandated to consider 'international co-operation and assistance in accordance with Article 6'.[7] At their First Meeting of the States Parties, which was held in Maputo in May of 1999, the States Parties created the innovative Intersessional Work Programme 'to ensure the systematic, effective implementation of the Convention through a more regularised programme of work.' That is, 'informal, open-ended intersessional working groups' – or Standing Committees as they are now known – were created to 'engage a broad international community for the purpose of advancing the achievement of the humanitarian objectives of the Convention.'[8] These committees include the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, which during the 2002–2003 intersessional period is co-chaired by Colombia and France.

The Intersessional Work Programme has achieved a great deal to date. The work of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration has resulted in the common understandings of some of the central concepts related to this matter. The term 'mine victim' now generally is understood as 'those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical, emotional and psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilisation'. The main elements of what is considered to be 'victim assistance' are now well known as including emergency and ongoing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological and social support, and employment and economic reintegration.[9] Most significantly, it now is widely understood that efforts to provide for the care and rehabilitation of

landmine survivors do not nor should not occur in isolation but rather are inextricably part of broader efforts related to development, poverty alleviation, national health care delivery, human rights and disability.

The Standing Committee has served as a useful forum for propagating best practices, guidelines and methodologies. These have included the WHO's *Guidance for Surveillance of Injuries Due to Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance*, the World Rehabilitation Fund's *Guidelines for Socio-Economic Reintegration of Landmine Survivors*, the ICBL's *Guidelines for the Care and Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors*, the UN's *Standing Rules on Full Participation and Equalisation of Opportunities for People with Disabilities*, and other important documents prepared by a variety of other organisations, including the ICRC and Handicap International. Many of these best practices and guidelines have been distributed through national victim assistance focal points, the identification of which was another important gain made by the Standing Committee.

An additional achievement made by the Standing Committee has been to deepen the participation of landmine survivors in order 'to ensure their effective involvement in the expression of their needs and means developed to meet those needs'. Through an innovative programme co-ordinated by the Landmine Survivors Network entitled *Raising the Voices of Landmine Survivors*, to date two groups of survivors from Africa and one from Latin America have received skills training, participated in meetings of the Standing Committees and have returned to their home countries as 'survivor advocates'.[10]

The Standing Committee has also succeeded in identifying critical issues in order to provide greater direction to the work of the Standing Committee. Through a consultative process co-ordinated by the UN Mine Action Service in 2002, respondents placed a priority on focusing efforts on areas such as emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, employment and socio-economic reintegration and legislation and national planning.[11]

While the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration — and the other three Standing Committees established by the States Parties — have produced important results, States Parties at their fourth annual meeting in September 2002 indicated that stepped up action was needed to ensure that the Convention would live up to its humanitarian promise. At the Fourth Meeting of the States Parties, it was expressed that the Intersessional Work Programme in the lead-up to the First Review Conference in 2004 'should focus with even greater clarity on those areas most directly related to the core humanitarian objectives of the Convention'.[12] And it was noted that this can be done 'by increasing the

participation of States Parties, strengthening dialogue among relevant actors, comprehensively assessing progress, diligently identifying needs and the means to answer those needs, and promoting the universalisation of the Convention'.[13]

What does all of this mean for SADC — a region severely impacted by APMs and a regional association whose members are now all parties to the Convention? It means that a great opportunity exists for a bottom-up process of affected States Parties in the region bringing their victim assistance challenges, plans and needs forward to the Standing Committee. Whereas the Standing Committee has served a useful purpose in advancing understanding of challenges in general terms, an opportunity now exists to raise the voices of the States Parties through these parties themselves each expressing what its current situation is, what it desires it to be, what its plan is to get there, and what its priorities are for assistance. By raising their voices in an effective manner, the affected States Parties in the region could promote more effective co-operation by demonstrating national ownership and focusing on where assistance in the care and rehabilitation of survivors is most required and desired. In addition, doing so can establish a marker to measure progress at certain key milestones for the Convention, such as the 2004 Review Conference.

How can SADC States Parties take advantage of this potential that exists? I would propose that the first step would involve undertaking some sort of internal assessment of those areas considered to be of highest priority in making advances in the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine survivors. A number of tools exist to support such assessments, including a questionnaire prepared by Landmine Monitor's Victim Assistance Co-ordinator and a methodology developed by Handicap International. In addition, in a manner consistent with Article 6 of the Convention, a number of organisations stand ready to assist States Parties in undertaking this work, including the ICRC, the ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance and its member organisations, and the UN Mine Action Service.

The second step in taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the Standing Committee would be to convert detailed internal assessments into presentations that would be effective in delivering key information and messages to the audience assembled at Standing Committee meetings. Standing Committee participants come from diverse backgrounds but for the most part are generalists. If a message is going to be absorbed by this audience it needs to be concise, to the point and simple enough for this generalist audience to relay back to colleagues who may share the responsibility of responding to calls for assistance.

As someone who has been mandated to support the work of the Standing

Committees, my advice to representatives of affected countries in the SADC region would be to use a simplified, common template to organise information obtained from a national assessment into a presentation which will effectively deliver your messages to your fellow States Parties and to others who could be in a position to provide assistance.[14] (See Attachment 1.) I would suggest that this presentation should first provide information on landmine survivors in your respective countries, including information on their demographics, general locations and predominant disabilities and needs.

Second — and most significantly — this type of presentation would be quite successful if it covered the four main areas of victim assistance identified by the Standing Committee: emergency and ongoing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics; psychological and social support; and, economic reintegration. For each of these categories, it would be useful to hear from you four things: the current situation; what you desire the situation to be; what your plan is to achieve what is desired; and, what your priorities are for outside assistance.

Finally, as it has been identified as a priority by the Standing Committee's consultative process, it would be useful to receive an overview of existing or pending laws and policies to promote and enhance the effective treatment, care and protection of the rights of all persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors.

In conclusion, let me applaud the SADC member states for having taken an important step forward on victim assistance through the *Indicative Plan of Action* that was agreed to at the September 2000 SADC Workshop on Victim Assistance. Let me also encourage these states to make use of the Ottawa Convention's implementation mechanisms to help promote means to further turn words into actions when it comes to victim assistance. In using these mechanisms it is essential that the affected States Parties themselves define their needs and priorities when it comes to victim assistance. No one legitimately can replace your voice nor provide a substitute for national ownership. And just as the Convention speaks of national ownership, it also embodies a new spirit of international co-operation. My hope, therefore, is that through an effective articulation of your challenges, plans and priority needs, the international community will be able to rally its efforts to effectively make a difference in the lives of landmine survivors in Southern Africa and other mine affected regions of the world.

Attachment 1: Framework to assist mine-affected States Parties in preparing for meetings of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration[15]

Introduction

One of the enhancements made during the May 2002 meetings of the Standing Committees established by the States Parties to the Convention banning APMs was to increase the number of opportunities for participation by States Parties. Mine affected States Parties may wish to maximise these opportunities during meetings of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration by preparing presentations on the challenges they face and efforts that are being taken to overcome these challenges. In order to assist these States Parties in preparing written and oral presentations (maximum: 10–12 minutes) on these matters, the following framework has been developed.

The extent of the challenge

Provide an overview of the information that is available on landmine survivors, including information on their demographics and the types of injuries that they have suffered, and areas in the country where survivors are most prevalent. Is there an ongoing data collection mechanism to track new mine victims?

Addressing the challenge

In each of the following four areas, provide a brief overview of:
- the current situation with respect to services and facilities required to meet the needs of landmine survivors;
- what you desire the situation to be;
- your plan to achieve the desired results; and,
- your priorities for outside assistance.

Emergency and continuing medical care
For example, first aid and transportation to respond effectively to landmine and other traumatic injuries, surgery, pain management, and additional medical care to assist in the rehabilitation of survivors.

Physical rehabilitation/prosthetics
For example, physiotherapy, production and fitting of prostheses, pre- and

post-prosthetic care, repair and adjustment of prostheses, provision and maintenance of assistive devices and wheelchairs, and rehabilitative assistance for the deaf and blind.

Psychological and social support
For example, peer support groups, professional counselling, sports and associations for the disabled.

Economic reintegration
For example, skills and vocational training, literacy training, income-generating projects, small business loans and job placement.

Laws and public policies

Provide an overview of any laws and policies that are in place to promote and enhance the effective treatment, care and protection for all disabled citizens, including landmine survivors. In addition, what laws or policies are in place with respect to accessibility to the built-up environment? What mechanisms and/or organisations exist to promote the rights of persons with disabilities? What programmes exist to raise public awareness on disability issues?

Attachment 2: Contacts to assist States Parties in preparing for meetings of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration

Representing the Standing Committee Co-Chairs:

Fulviva Benvides-Cotes
Permanent Mission of Colombia
Geneva, Switzerland

Yann Hwang
Permanent Mission of France
Geneva, Switzerland

Implementation Support Unit of the GICHD:

Kerry Brinkert
Manager, Implementation Support Unit
Email: k.brinkert@gichd.ch
Tel: 41-22-906-1637
Fax: 41-22-906-1690

International Committee of the Red Cross:

Isabelle Daoust
Legal officer

Email: idaoust@icrc.org
Tel: 41-22-730-2772
Fax: 41-22-733-2057

United Nations Mine Action Service:
Judith Dunne
Victim assistance consultant
Email: dunne@un.org
Tel: 1-917-367-2429
Fax: 1-212-963-2498

International Campaign to Ban Landmines:
Becky Jordan
Co-ordinator, Working Group on Victim Assistance
Email: becky@landminesurvivors.org
Tel: 1-202-464-0007
Fax: 1-202-464-0011

Endnotes

1 *Final Declaration,* Regional Seminar on Landmines and the 1980 UN Convention on Conventional Weapons, Addis Ababa. 23-24 February 1995.
2 *Report and Recommendations,* Regional Seminar on Landmines and the 1980 Weapons Convention, Harare. 2-3 March 1995.
3 *Recommendations,* Second OAU/ICRC Seminar for African Ambassadors Accredited to Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. 11-12 April 1995.
4 *Anti-personnel Mines: What Future for Southern Africa – Final Declaration of Participants,* ICRC Regional Seminar for States of the Southern Africa Development Community, Harare. 21-23 April 1997.
5 *Plan of Action,* First Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines, Kempton Park. 19-21 May 1997.
6 The Convention in question is the *1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction*, which is commonly referred to as the *Ottawa Convention* or *Mine Ban Treaty*.
7 See Article 11, paragraph 1.c of the Convention.
8 *President's Paper on Intersessional Work,* First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention, Maputo. 3-7 May 1999.
9 The wording of these definitions is based on the pamphlet, *Victim Assistance: Contexts, Principles and Issues*, which was produced by the ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance in 2000.
10 For more information, see *www.landminesurvivors.org/services/raising.php*.

11 *The Consultative Process on priorities of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration*, UN Mine Action Service. September 2002.
12 *Final Report*, Fourth Meeting of the States Parties, Geneva. 16-20 September 2002.
13 *President's Paper on the Intersessional Work Programme*, Fourth Meeting of the States Parties, Geneva. 16-20 September 2002.
14 In addition to maximising the potential of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, States Parties also may wish to communicate this information using the voluntary 'Form J', which is part of the Article 7 Reporting Format.
15 This framework has been prepared simply as a suggestion for possible use by States Parties. States Parties, of course, are free to participate in Standing Committee meetings in whatever way they wish.

ANNEXURE C

Contact details of mine action organisations in SADC

ANGOLA

Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária (CNIDAH)
National Inter-Sectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance to Mine Victims
General Santana André Pitra 'Petroff'
Rua Furtado Pinheiro 32
Cidade Alta (Ex-edificio do MAPESS)
Luanda
Tel/Fax: +244 - 2 - 37 2218
E-mail: cnidah@cmc.angola.com
Type of organisation: National contact point for mine action

National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROEE)
General H Cruz
Director
Av. Comandante Valodia 206-6
Luanda
Tel: +244 - 2 - 44 8782
Fax: +244 - 2 - 44 6218
E-mail: hcruz@snet.ao.co

UNDP Angola
Mr R de Castro
Chief Technical Advisor
Rua Major Kanhangulo, 197
C.P. 910
Luanda
Tel: +244 - 2 - 33 1249/33 1181/ 33 1193
Fax: +244 - 2 - 33 5609
E-mail: rcastro@undp.org

Halo Trust, Angola
Mr Christian Richmond
Programme Manager
Central Mines Action Office/UCAH
United Nations, Av Comandante Valodia 206
5 Andar, Luanda
HALO headquarters - Kuito
Tel: +244 - 2 309704 / +244 41 22331/ +244 41 21575
E-mail: thehalotrust@huambo.angonet.org
htang@inmarsat.francetelecom.fr
Type of organisation: NGO, de-mining

Handicap International
Ms C Henon
Programme Director
6 Largo Ché Guevara
Bairro Maculusso
Luanda
Tel/Fax: +244 - 2 - 33 9059
E-mail: hif.angola@netangola.com
Type of organisation: NGO

Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Mr R Leighton
Country Programme Manager
Rua Americo de Carvalho 198/Caixa Postal 939
Bairro Azul
Luanda
Tel: +244 - 2 - 35 4730
Fax: +244 - 2 - 35 8059
E-mail: mag_Angola@hotmail.com
Website: www.magclearsmines.org
Type of organisation: NGO
Activities: survey, demarcation, mine and UXO clearance, EOD, mechanically assisted clearance, MRE

MgM Angola
Mr K O'Connell
Programme Director
E-mail: mgmang04@mail.station.com, ken@mgm.org
Website: www.mgm.org
Type of organisation: NGO, de-mining

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA - Angola)
Mr A Steen-Nilsen
Programme Director
Rua Fernao Mendes Pinto 54-56
Luanda
Tel: +244 - 91 - 50 5366
Fax: +244 - 2 - 32 4499
E-mail: npa.ang.mcpm@ebonet.net
Type of organisation: NGO, de-mining

VVAF - Angola
Mr R Doorten
Tel: +244 - 2 - 35 2309
Fax: +244 - 2 - 35 2309
E-mail: vvaf@netangola.com
Type of organisation: NGO

DRC

UNDP Office/Bureau PNUD Kinshasa
Immeuble des Nations Unies (Losonia)
Boulevard du 30 Jun/ Commune de la Gombe
Boite Postale 7248
Kinshasa
Tel: +243 - 12 - 33 424/33 425
Fax: +243 - 88 - 43 675
E-mail: registry.cd@undp.org

MONUC - UN Mission in the DRC
Mr M Quiron
Programme Manager
Mine Action Co-ordination Centre
12. Av. des Aviateurs/Boite Postale 8811
Kinshasa
Gombe
Tel: +243 - 98 - 24 5666 (Kinshasa)
Tel: +252 - 541 2383 (Kisangani)
E-mail: info@monuc.org

MALAWI

Ministry of Defence
Colonol HL Odilo
Tel: +265 79 0452/78 9600
Fax: +265 79 2216
Type of organisation: National contact point for mine action

MOZAMBIQUE

National Demining Institute (IND)
Mr G Munguambe
Director
Rua Resistencia 1746 6B
Maputo
Tel: +258 - 1 - 41 6153
Fax: +258 - 1 - 41 8578/835
Type of organisation: National contact point for mine action

UNDP Mozambique
Mr A Mazarambroz
Programme Officer: Mine Action
931 Av. Kenneth Kaunda
Maputo
Tel: +258 - 1 - 49 0337/8
Fax: +258 - 1 - 49 1691
E-mail: @undp.org

Accelerated Demining Programme (APD)
Mr J D'Almeida
National Programme Director
2770 Avenida de Angola
Maputo
Tel: +258 - 1 - 46 6012/4
Fax: +258 - 1 - 46 6013
E-mail: adpundp@virconn.com
Type of organisation: NGO, de-mining

Afrovita
Mr C Stein
Tel: +258 - 1 - 49 5130/1
Fax: +258 - 1 - 49 5132
E-mail: afrogest@teledata.mz, or afrovita@teledata.mz
Type of organisation: NGO

APOPO
Mr B Weetjens
PO Box 649
Maputo
E-mail: apopo@ruca.ua.ac.be
Website: www.apopo.org
Type of organisation: NGO
Activities: R&D, mine detection rats
(Also active in Tanzania - see Tanzania for telephone numbers, etc.)

Canadian International Demining Corps/CIDC Mozambique
Mr A Alface
National Director
Rua Francisco Barreto 75
Maputo
Tel: +258 - 1 - 49 4714
Fax: +258 - 1 - 49 4732
E-mail: cidcdir@teledata.mz
Type of organisation: NGO

Chirgwin Services Group
Mr C Chirgwin
151 Golf Links Road
Maiden Gully
Australia
3551
Tel: +61 417 - 52 7264
Fax: +61 354 - 46 2481
E-mail: chirgwinsg@bigpond.com
Type of organisation: Commercial, Consultancy
Activities: Situational analysis and needs assessment, project design, tendering and contract development, project monitoring, auditing and evaluation, project management (currently conducting a demining consultancy for the Peace Parks Foundation for the establishment of the Limpopo National Park in Mozambique)

Halo Trust, Mozambique
Mr Cameron Imber
Programme Manager
Bairro de Chamanculo - A
Maputo
Halo Headquarters - Nampula
Tel: +258 - 6 - 21 7701/+258 6 218 818
Fax: +258 - 6 - 21 7700
E-mail: halomoz@teledata.mz
Type of organisation: NGO, de-mining

Mozambique Mine Action Limitada (MMA)
Mr D Fondo
Director
Av. Ahmed Sekou Touré 2085
Bairro Central B
Maputo

Tel: +258 - 1 - 31 1766/792
Fax: +258 - 1 - 42 0800
Type of organisation: Commercial

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
Mr F Muzima
Programme Manager
PO Box 9
Tete
Tel: +258 - 52 - 22 182/505
Fax: +258 - 52 - 22 184/23 552
E-mail: muzima@crisna.garp.co.moz
Type of organisation: NGO, De-mining

Ronco
Mr L Brown
Manager
Tel: +258 - 1 - 42 1214 (Maputo)/ +258 - 3 - 30 2262 (Beira)
Fax: +258 - 1 - 42 1724 (Maputo)/ +258 - 3 - 30 2263 (Beira)
E-mail: lbrown@roncowash.com
Type of organisation: Commercial

NAMIBIA

Ministry of Defence
Major F Kotokeni
Private Bag 13307
Windhoek
Tel: +264 - 67 - 23 4196
Fax: +264 - 67 - 23 4048
Type of organisation: National contact point for mine action

MgM Mine Clearance NGO
Mr H Ehlers
Director
International Desk Namibia
Windhoek
Tel: +264 - 81 - 127 7020
Fax: +264 - 61 - 24 3477
E-mail: ehlers@mgm.org
Website: www.mgm.org
Type of organisation: NGO, De-mining

Humanitarian Force International
Mr W Haynes
President
PO Box 629
Outjo
Namibia
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Fax: +264 - 67 - 31 3391
E-mail: info@humanitarianforce.com
Website: www.humanitarianforce.com

SOUTH AFRICA

Department of Foreign Affairs
Dr R Wensley
Director: Disarmament
Private Bag X152
Pretoria
0001
Tel: +27 - 12 - 351 1000
Fax: +27 - 12 - 351 0449
E-mail: Wensleydr@foreign.gov.za, disarm@foreign.gov.za
Type of organisation: Official contact point: Mine Action in South Africa

African De-mining Institute (ADI)
Mrs H de Beer
Director
PO Box 709
Montanapark
0159
Tel: +27 - 12 - 663 5715
Fax: +27 - 12 - 663 5720

E-mail: hannelie@icon.co.za
Type of organisation: NGO - research

AMA/PISA
Mr C Schutte
PO Box 950
Groenkloof
0027
Tel: +27 - 82 - 809 5058
E-mail: c.s@mweb.co.za
Type of organisation: Prosthetics manufacturing

Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) - Defencetek
Mr E Jele
PO Box 395
Pretoria
0001
Tel: +27 - 12 - 841 3449
Fax: +27 - 12 - 349 1159
E-mail: ejele@csir.co.za
Type of organisation: Research

CGTVA
Mr G Cheboub
Box 783167
Sandton
2146
Tel: +27 - 12 - 663 2133
Fax: +27 - 12 - 663 2136
E-mail: aerospace@global.co.za
Type of organisation: Commercial, De-mining

DEMCO Pty Ltd
(Demining Equipment Manufacturing Co)
Mr L Quaroni
PO Box 188
Lyndhurst
2108
Tel: +27 - 11 - 393 2092/3705
Fax: +27 - 11 - 976 4508
Type of organisation: Commercial company
Activities: Landmine clearing equipment

Demining Enterprises International
Mr J van den Heever
PO Box 51803
Wierda Park
0149
Tel: +27 - 12 - 660 3563
Fax: +27 - 12 - 654 3401
E-mail: sant@mweb.co.za
Type of organisation: Commercial company
Activities: Supplying and training of MDDs, Training of manual demining and clearance teams, surveys

European Landmine Solutions
Mr M Craig
Regional Director (Africa)
Box 317
Wingate Park
0153
Tel: +27 - 12 - 345 1514
Fax: +27 - 12 - 345 6013
E-mail: elsafrica@iafrica.com
Type of organisation: Commercial company, De-mining

Farreach Logistics
Mr D Odendaal
PO Box 21598
Valhalla
0137
Tel: +27 - 82 - 872 9516

E-mail: farreach@mweb.co.za
Type of organisation: Commercial, De-mining

Foundation for Military Engineering Excellence in Southern Africa
(Sappers Foundation)
Mr K Bolton
PO Box 14
Skeerpoort
0232
Tel/Fax: +27 - 12 - 207 1306
E-mail: sappers@mweb.co.za
Type of organisation: Charitable organisation

Mechem Consultants
Mr AJ Rossouw
PO Box 14864
Lyttleton
Pretoria
0140
Tel: +27 - 12 - 620 3291
Fax: +27 - 12 - 664 3528
E-mail: braamr@liw.denel.co.za
Website: www.mechemdemining.com
Type of organisation: Commercial company
Country of operations: Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa

Naschem
Mr R Menyatso
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Pretoria
0001
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E-mail: rathari@naschem.denel.co.za
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Poldicam
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0040
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Type of organisation: Commercial, mine-detection dogs

Regis Training International (Pty) Ltd
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Managing Director
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E-mail: regis@pixie.co.za

RSD - Dorbyl
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Boksburg
1460
Tel: +27 - 11 - 914 1400
Fax: +27 - 11 - 914 4280
E-mail: japie@rsd.dorbyl.co.za
Type of organisation: Commercial, de-mining

Securicor Gray Africa (Pty) Ltd
Mr L Maree
Manager Mine Action Division
PO Box 13330
Hatfield
0028
Tel: +27 - 12 - 362 5876
Fax: +27 - 12 - 362 5881
E-Mail: Laurence_Maree@graysecurity.com
Type of organisation: Commercial company - de-mining

Specialised Dog Services (SDS)
Mr G Rossam
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Hercules
0030
Tel/Fax: +27 - 12 - 504 1699
Type of organisation: Mine-detection, dog procurement and training

TNT De-mining
Mr A Wagenaar
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Centurion
0157
Tel: +27 - 12 - 663 7960
Fax: +27 - 12 - 663 7060
E-mail: mwtntdem@mweb.co.za
Type of organisation: Commercial, De-mining

UXB Africa (Pty) Ltd
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General Manager
6 Quantum Street
Technopark
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7600
Tel: +27 - 21 - 880 1760
Fax: +27 - 21 - 880 1908
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Type of organisation: Commercial, De-mining

TANZANIA

APOPO
Mr B Weetjens
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Morogoro
Tel: +255 - 232 - 60 0635
Fax: +255 - 232 - 60 0636
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Website: www.apopo.org
Type of organisation: NGO
Activities: R&D, mine detection rats

ZAMBIA

Zambia Mine Action Centre
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Lusaka
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Fax: +260 - 1 - 25 4634
Type of organisation: National contact point for mine action

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe National Demining Office
Lt Colonel TJ Munongwa
National Coordinator
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7720 Causeway
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E-mail: munongwa@iafricaonline.co.zw
Type of organisation: National contact point for mine action

Mine Clearance International
Mr P Makumbe
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Tel: +263 - 91 - 40 5303
Fax: +263 - 4 - 77 3906
E-mail: makumbep@yahoo.co.uk
Type of organisation: De-mining

Mine Tech
HG 632
Highlands
Harare
Tel: +263 - 4 - 77 6216/530/1
Type of organisation: De-mining

Southern Africa Demining Services Agency (SADSA)
Mr T Kanganga
Managing Director
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Fax: +263 - 4 - 79 5010
E-mail: tembakan@telco.co.zw

WE Lawrence Consultancy
Mr WE Lawrence
22 Worpleston Way
Glen Lorne
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E-mail: willielawrence@hotmail.com
Type of organisation: Commercial consultancy
Activities: quality assurance, training operations management

OTHER

International Committee of the Red Cross: Regional Delegation for Southern Africa
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Legal Advisor: Humanitarian law
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0132
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Fax: +27 - 12 - 430 4471
E-mail: ihl.pre@icrc.org
Website: www.icrc.org

Mine Action Southern Africa (MASA)
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Florida
1709
South Africa
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Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
Mr J Ndlovu
Mine Action Programme Manager
SADC Secretariat
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Fax: +267 - 397 2848
E-mail: jmndlovu@sadc.int

USEFUL WEBSITES

E-mine: The Electronic Mine Information Network
www.mineaction.org

Geneva Centre for International Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
www.gichd.ch

International Campaign to Ban Landmines
www.icbl.org

Mine Action Information Centre, James Madison University/Journal of Mine Action
www.maic.jmu.edu

National De-mining Institute of Mozambique (IND)
www.ind.gov.mz

Survey Action Centre, Washington
www.sac-na.org

ANNEXURE D

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

18 September 1997

Preamble

The States Parties,

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and co-ordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognising that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and

recognising the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organisations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasising the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalisation in all relevant fora including, *inter alia*, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organisations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 2

Definitions

1. 'Anti-personnel mine' means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. 'Mine' means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. 'Anti-handling device' means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. 'Transfer' involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. 'Mined area' means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Article 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
a) The duration of the proposed extension;
b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:

(i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programmes;
(ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
(iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;

c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6

International co-operation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programmes. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross,

national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international or regional organisations or institutions, non-governmental organisations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organisations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining programme to determine, *inter alia*:

a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the programme;
c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
e) Assistance to mine victims;
f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the programme.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes.

Article 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorised by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
e) The status of programmes for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
f) The status of programmes for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance;

and

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and co-operate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of co-operation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall co-operate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorised in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorise a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorise such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilise in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the

compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of co-operative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States

Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

Article 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and co-operate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

Article 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:

a) The operation and status of this Convention;
b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
c) International co-operation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;

d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.

2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.

3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month

after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

Article 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

Article 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Selected glossary of acronyms

Accord	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ADP	Accelerated De-mining Programme
AMAC	Assistance to mine-affected communities
APM	Anti-personnel mine
AR	Area reduction
BoG	Board of Governors
CBO	Community-based organisation
CCA	Common country assessment
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDC	Canadian International De-mining Corps
CL	Community liaison
CMAA	Cambodian Mine Action Authority
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CMAD	Community Awareness for Development
CNIDAH	Commission on De-mining and Humanitarian Assistance
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
CVA	Capacities and vulnerabilities analysis
DEPI	Department of Research, Planning and Information
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DoD	Department of Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EOC	Expert opinion collection
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
FADM	Armed Forces of Mozambique
FDI	Foreign direct investment
Frelimo	*Frente de Liberação de Moçambique*
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining
GIS	Geographical information system
GPS	Geographical positioning system
GTZ	German Development and Co-operation Agency
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor country
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IHDD	Integrated Humanitarian De-mining for Development
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards

IMEESA	Institute of Military Engineering Excellence of Southern Africa
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
INAROEE	National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices
IND	National De-mining Institute
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IRPS	International Relations, Peace and Security
JCPS	Justice, Crime Prevention and Security
LIS	Landmine impact survey
MAC	Mine action centre
MACC	Mine action co-ordination centre
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MASA	Mine Action Southern Africa
maXML	Mine Action XML
MgM	Menschen Gegen Minen
MINARS	Ministry of Reintegration and Social Assistance
MINSAU	Ministry of Health
MIS	Mine impact score
MLIS	Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey
MMAS	Mozambique Mine Action Standards
MMCAS	Ministry for Women and Co-ordination of Social Action
MONUS	UN Mission in the DRC
MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola*
MRE	Mine risk education
NCP	National contact point
NDO	National De-mining Office
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NMAF	National Mine Action Fund
NMAP	National Mine Action Plan
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Overall development aid
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty *Plano de Acção para a Reducão da Pobreza Absoluta*
PEPAM	Programme for the Prevention of Mine Accidents
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo *Programa para Prevenção a Acidentes contra Minas*
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

QA	Quality assurance
QAM	Quality assurance monitor
QC	Quality control
R&D	Research and Development
RACN	Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs
Renamo	*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*
REST	Remote scent tracing system
SAC	Survey Action Centre
SAC	Survey action centre
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-operation Committee
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SMA	Suspected mine area
SMAC	SADC Mine Action Committee
SVA	Survivor and victim assistance
SWG	Survey working group
T2	Technical Survey II
T3	Technical survey III
TIA	Task impact assessment
UN DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UN	United Nations
UN-ACP	United Nations Accelerated De-mining Programme
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	*União Naçional para a Independênçia Total de Angola*
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
US	United States
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
WHO	World Health Organisation