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DEVELOPMENT NECESSITIES

Land, water and food are three essentials for socio-economic development. Without these resources individual, communal, national and regional socio-economic growth becomes difficult, if not impossible. Development is not only about the adequate supply of resources but also about proper management, especially where natural disasters can devastate already vulnerable economies. In March 2004 over 3,000 people in Mozambique's Sofala province were facing severe food shortages due to the destruction of crops by flood waters. In Angola's Huambo Province, a quarter of its 1.5 million people required food aid after heavy rains had destroyed 60% of their croplands.

Yet, it is man-made disasters that SADC needs to avoid — political events or upheavals, like the disruption of a country's economy by poor governance practices, civil strife or influxes of refugees. Zimbabwe and the DRC are good examples of these phenomena. Food and water availability can also be affected by political intervention by non-state entities, such as transnational interest groups, which attempt to impose norms on the kinds of aid countries receive. Examples are opposition to genetically modified organisms (for example, cereals grown from certain types of seed), to large water infrastructure (on grounds of ecological and environmental interference) and support of long-term sustainable development. If they are successful in their lobbying against the importation of GMOs and the construction of dams and irrigation systems, interest groups can hinder or prevent the importation of food, the growing of needed crops and the improved supply of water for the relief of people in need. Nevertheless promotion of sustaniable development can assist in protecting biodiversity — the pool of natural resources.

The availability of good quality food, land and water is essential to sustain agriculture. Regenerating this sector is important, not only to reduce the incidence of poverty, but also to enable SADC member countries to realise socio-economic develop-ment. The management of food, agriculture and natural resources within SADC falls mainly on the shoulders of the Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR). Its main aims are to develop, promote and harmonise policies relating to food security, gender development, bio-diversity, agricultural output, the sustainable utilisation of natural resources, phytosanitary and sanitary measures, crop and animal hus-bandry, environmental management and trade in agricultural products.

These are good intentions — and ambitions. However, how can the FANR realise these policy goals? The answer to this question lies in the ability of not only SADC and its member states, but also those of the plethora of non-state entities (NGOs, interest groups and the academic and scientific communities) to solve problems relating to natural resources. In other words, it has to do with the collective will or preparedness of SADC and its members to collaborate with civil society groups. This does not merely entail the signing of memoranda of understanding with NGOs, or the broadening of stakeholder participa-tion within SADC affairs, but instead making full use of the social resources (such as knowledge, networking and governance skills) that all of these forms of civil society can offer. Thus, the management of natural resources needs good governance, and collaborating with civil society is an important aspect of this.

Civil society groups command a comparative advantage in their knowledge and experience of a number of areas. These include agriculture and food security; community-based natural resource management and conservation; education and vocational training; gender issues; combating HIV/AIDS; and cross-border trade and small-scale enterprise development. These are all aspects that have a direct or indirect impact on the harnessing and protection of natural resources, the regeneration of the agricultural sector, and the production of food crops. SADC and its member states would benefit tremendously from collaboration with civil society groups. In this way they will tap into additional social resources so that their laudable agenda can be realised.

Richard Meissner

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Editor: Richard Meissner
PO Box 31596, Braamfontein, 2017
South Africa
Tel: +27 (0)11 339 2021
Fax: +27 (0)11 339 2154
sadcbarometer@saiia.wits.ac.za

Zambia: Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources

Why should a country like Zambia, with reasonably regular rainfall and a network of rivers flowing year-round, experience a food security problem? Moreover, what are Zambia and SADC (which has a dedicated Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Directorate — FANR) doing about it? The answer to the first question lies in geography, infrastructure and government; but a response to the second is not as simple.

> **At present, only 16% of the country's arable land is cultivated**

The Zambia Agribusiness Technical Assistance Centre (ZATAC) points out that 'Zambia's vast natural endowments of land, water, and favourable climatic conditions provide great opportunities for the rural population to increase income and for Zambian agribusinesses to diversify and develop new markets within and outside Zambia. However, so far Zambia has fallen far short of its potential. SADC's FANR notes that Zambia is hampered by being 'marginally self-sufficient, with irregular maize surpluses, internal food distribution problems and land-locked.' In 2002–03, for example, domestic cereal (maize, wheat, rice, and sorghum) production totalled 738,000 metric tonnes, whereas Zambia's gross domestic requirements in that year were 1.4 million metric tonnes. With a shortfall of 702,000 metric tonnes, this means that Zambia produced only 51% of its domestic cereal requirements. At present, only 16% of the country's arable land is cultivated, while the extent of irrigable land is estimated at 423,000 hectares, less than 40,000 hectares (9%) of which are actually irrigated.

The range of factors contributing to Zambia's food insecurity includes geography, infrastructure, urbanisation and badly-planned aid. Being landlocked, Zambia is situated thousands of kilometres from the nearest port. This creates formidable practical and bureaucratic obstacles to trade in food. Another problem is infrastructure. Zambia's domestic transport system tends to be concentrated on the railway line running from Livingstone to the Copperbelt via Lusaka, while the country's vast hinterland is serviced by roads, many of them unpaved.

Furthermore, for years Zambia's entire road and rail transport network was state-owned, and it became grossly inefficient and expensive. Transport accounts for as much as 60–70% of the cost of any goods produced in Zambia. Although rail is normally a natural and cheap form of bulk freight transport, the system in Zambia is only now being privatised. At a recent workshop held in Lusaka, a representative of the sugar industry explained that to move one tonne of sugar from Mazabuka (the central town of a sugar-growing district) to Ndola in the Copperbelt (a prime dome-stic market) costs around $15 by rail and as much as $24 by road.

2002-03 Cereal deficit (tonnes)

Production	**: 738,000**
Requirement	**: 1,440,000**
Deficit	**: 702,000**

Another problem is Zambia's relatively high level of urbanisation. Before independence, Zambia was described as having 'the highest urbanisation rate in Africa'. By 1975, some 34.8% of the population were living in the towns and cities (as against a regional average of 20.8%). It is currently around 50%. Consequently, the rural areas are progressively depopulating. Also, much of the farming is at subsistence level, which, combined with the high percentage of small-scale farming, means that in many years Zambia simply does not grow enough to feed itself.

In addition, many rural traders are reluctant to stock seed and fertiliser, because they are aware that these are periodically distributed free as part of relief efforts. Other problems are more technical. Maize, for example, needs regular rainfall. Millet and sorghum are much more drought-resistant, but need constant supervision to protect them from birds.

Robert Sanyikosa, an economist working for the Zambia National Farmer's Union, identifies two major threats to food security in the country. One is an over-dependence on rain, even when over the years 'it has become quite clear that this is not sustainable'. This exposes farmers to drought, despite the existence of 'abundant' surface and groundwater reserves which are not put to use. The other obstacle is what he terms 'the absence of efficient marketing structures and systems that are self-regulating and sustainable'. The Farmers' Union laments the absence of commodity brokers who could facilitate the movement of crops to markets and thereby assist farmers (especially small-scale ones) to realise higher incomes. Inadequate marketing structures have depressed production levels, particularly in remote areas with underdeveloped infrastructure.

All of this is frustrating. Simply travelling through Zambia during the rainy season gives an observer a sense of its agricultural potential. Yet, despite the presence of some large farms, the overwhelming impression is of subsistence farmers eking out a living from tiny plots of land.

What role can SADC play? The regional body could play a more significant role. For example, customs obstacles could be done away with; and the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission could work harder at planning better regional transport networks. (This has been done to a certain extent.)

Increasingly, solutions are coming not from government or from SADC but the private sector, university and NGO initiatives. The South African company Pannar Seeds is now active in nearly every country in Africa, distributing advanced drought- and disease-resistant crop seed.

The International Crop Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics is co-ordinating increased planting of sorghum and millet, as well as advocating a seed voucher programme for use as drought relief. This allows the recipient to exchange a voucher for seed, which maintains and stimulates the market for seeds. The University of KwaZulu-Natal has recently established the African Centre for Crop Improvement. Again, recent reports indicate that exiled white Zimbabwean farmers moving to Zambia might help alleviate the food shortage through the introduction of commercial techniques in partnership with local landowners.

SADC is ideally positioned to break down barriers and stimulate markets in this and many other areas. Progress is being made, but much is outside and alongside SADC. According to a Zambian agriculture expert, 'SADC has not done enough'.

Sean Willis

Opinion

Zimbabwe's Commercial Farming Expertise

The move by Zimbabwe's commercial farmers into the rest of Africa has gathered pace in the past year, with governments as far afield as Nigeria seeking their expertise.

Some African countries have large tracts of arable land lying fallow due to shortages of skills, equipment and resources, and they want Zimbabwean farmers to help them develop their agricultural sectors. However, a drawback for some farmers is the fact that in most African countries land is only for lease, not for sale, with leases running from anything between 25–99 years. Last year, the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) in Harare appointed an agent to scout for relocation possibilities for its members, as it became clear that there was no future for white farmers in Zimbabwe. Popular destinations are Mozambique and Zambia.

There are less than 400 white farmers still on their land, compared with about 4,500 in 1999. Many of them are running their farms from Harare for fear of violence from state-sponsored gangs and land invaders, while others have become managers for the new black owners.

It was reported in January that Zimbabwean farmers who resettled in Mozambique had created more than 4,000 jobs. Soares Nhaca, governor of Manica province where most of the farmers have settled, said there were about 100 Zimbabwean farmers growing cash crops such as tobacco and cotton. Most of the new jobs are on tobacco farms, and Mozambique is optimistic that it will become a competitive tobacco producer in the future.

Mozambique's ready acceptance of the farmers has not been well received in Harare.

An estimated 50 farmers have settled in Zambia. In 2002, they grew more than 30,000 tonnes of maize, and are now exporting it back to Zimbabwe. Also, Zimbabwe's seed-producing capacity has been severely compromised by the land reform programme, and the country is now buying seeds produced by expatriate farmers in Zambia.

In 2002, Zimbabweans topped the list of foreign investors approved by the Zambian Investment Centre, ploughing US$13.3 million into agriculture, manufacturing and telecommunications. This trend has continued into 2003. However, most farmers had to leave Zimbabwe with almost nothing. In many cases, their equipment was seized along with the land, without compensation, and attempts to move foreign currency out of the country have been blocked. Another drawback for farmers moving into both Mozambique and Zambia has been the lack of financial instruments available locally. Funding has had to be sought from donors, venture capital companies and other such sources.

While both countries have large areas of land and relatively low population densities, which opens up opportunities for new farmers, the same is not true of Malawi, which has a small land area, a high population density and a well-developed agricultural sector. This has meant fewer farming options for Zimba-bweans, although some of them have been absorbed into managerial positions, mostly in the tobacco industry.

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Tanzania, and to a much lesser extent Botswana, have gained farmers. Angola is also looking to disaffected white commercial farmers to help it rebuild its agricultural sector, but there are concerns about political fallout, given the close relationship between President Robert Mugabe and his Angolan counterpart.

Ghana is the latest country in Africa to court white commercial farmers from Zimbabwe. Negotiations are currently underway to arrange a fact-finding visit to Ghana by a delegation of farmers. On the downside it is a long way from Zimbabwe, but Ghana is a stable democracy with an economy that is largely dependent on agriculture, which accounts for 36% of GDP.

The government of Kwara state in Nigeria has also approached Zimbabwean and South African farmers. It has offered to give land for free to farmers who agree to move to the area on a permanent basis. However, the CFU says that farmers are typically looking at opportunities a little closer to home. They are also showing a preference for options that are in line with their experience as far as possible. For example, the DRC has invited farmers to invest in Katanga Province. The CFU reckons this may not be a popular choice, given that it is a tropical area with different farming conditions.

Another concern of farmers is that of political expediency in their adopted countries. They fear that they will be discarded once they have developed the land, or that new incoming governments will not be so welcoming. Nevertheless, for those not wanting to move too far from their roots, it may be a risk they will have to take.

Dianna Games is the editor of the South African Journal of International Affairs.

SADC Needs a Common Land Reform Policy

The recent land crisis in Zimbabwe captured worldwide attention. The invasions of white commercial farms were headline news, and highlighted one particular aspect of the land reform problems in Southern Africa, namely forced restitution, in a country where Africans had been dispossessed by colonial settlers.

Land reform policies in the region have not been applied consistently.

In a recent publication, the South African Human Sciences Research Council comments that land reform policies in the region have been applied inconsistently. Neither colonial nor contemporary practices were ever uniform. Another major concern in Southern Africa is the failure to integrate land reform with tenure issues, resettlement programmes and meaningful land-use policies that cover all land — both rural and urban. Land reform policies should also apply to non-agricultural land, because fertile soil is too scarce a resource in many countries to be made available to everybody. Only 7% of all land in Africa is arable, and in Southern Africa, this percentage is only 6%, with Malawi the highest at 18%, and Botswana, at 0.5%, the lowest. Two other SADC countries where the land reform debate is particularly public fall into the middle range — Zimbabwe has 8% and Namibia 1% of land fertile enough to grow crops.

Regional organisations such as SADC have never expressed an opinion on land reform.

Regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have never expressed an opinion on land reform, let alone tried to deal with it through an appropriate protocol. The tenure variations are great. For example, most of the land in the DRC is held under customary tenure, while communal land has been phased out in Botswana. State ownership varies from 100% in some SADC countries (Mozambique and Zambia) to 1% (Zimbabwe) to 0% (Namibia). Twenty-five percent of land in South Africa is state-owned.

The World Bank and Oxfam support the idea of productive small-scale farms on resettled land. State funding in the form of grants or loans, linked with proper administration and extension services on such resettled land, is what they consider most desirable. Botswana is often cited as an example of the success of this combination. In addition to commercial farm land that may be earmarked for restitution or resettlement, other categories of land could also be made available. Two that come to mind are insufficiently used and unused territory in the possession of traditional authorities, and non-productive state land. Namibia may possess both kinds. Again, in 1994 analysts estimated that 28% of all arable land in Malawi's communal areas was lying fallow. Commercial farmland is therefore not the only land necessarily available for restoration.

In Zambia (as in Mozambique and Angola), all private land was nationalised after decolonisation. The Zambian Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975 completed the nationalisation programme by vesting all land in the president on behalf of the people of Zambia. Formerly private farms were converted into leasehold for 100 years, and land that was not being used was taken over by the state. Under donor pressure, the Zambian government repealed this Act in 1995. Since then, it has been willing to receive white farmers expelled from Zimbabwe and allow them to farm on available land, presumably on a freehold basis. Nevertheless, uncertainty as to the legal status of this arrangement prevents these farmers from approaching banks for loans on which farms can be used as collateral. A draft Land Policy, announced in 2002, is likely to clarify many of the uncertainties that remain when it is finalised, but state land is being privatised.

The absence of land under state ownership that can be used for resettlement explains why the governments of Zimbabwe and Namibia have decided to target privately-owned commercial farms for redistribution. In Zimbabwe, resettlement land is placed under state control. In Namibia, the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995 stipulates that resettled land be held under freehold. In this manner, President Sam Nujoma has acquired farms for himself. Other Acts provide for communal tenure in the areas under the control of traditional authorities, mainly in the northern parts .

In Zimbabwe, the initial legislative framework was provided by Section 57 of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe (1979), negotiated at Lancaster House in the UK (hereafter, the Lancaster House Agreement). This provides for a 'willing seller — willing buyer' arrangement as well as British funding for resettlement (as in Kenya and Swaziland). It was part of the Lancaster House Agreement that the constitution could be amended only after 1990. This was promptly done by way of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Acts, 1990 and 1993. Both Acts allowed for land resettlement with 'fair' (as opposed to 'adequate') compensation, as required in the Lancaster House Agreement. They provided no definition of either concepts, but *adequate* apparently meant 'market value', while *fair* compensation was to be paid only for improvements to the land and not for the land as such. These two Acts amended Section 16 of the Constitution, which, together with the Land Acquisition Act, paved the way for the expropriation of invaded land after 2002. Following the referendum in 2000, the War Veterans Association demanded more land. The invasions began in earnest, this time openly encouraged by the government, which supported the veterans' right to occupy commercial farms. The Rural Land Occupiers Bill of 2001, when passed into law in February 2002, prevented invaders from being evicted by the farmers.

Before the invasions began, land distribution in Zimbabwe had been highly unequal. In 1911, white farms constituted 20% of all land in the former Rhodesia. By 1931, after the passing of the Land Appointment Act, European-owned land constituted 50.8%. These percentages declined gradually to 45% in 1965 (at the time of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence) and 39% in 1980, but still represented a large proportion of the best agricultural land. By 1997, when the first land invasions by war veterans occurred, the percentage owned by white farmers was 28%.

Namibia is the only country in SADC where a national conference has taken place on land reform. This occurred in 1991, and was followed by the conference of the Namibian Non-governmental Organisation Federation (NANGOF) in Mariental in 1994. Ever since, the Namibian land reform and land transfer processes have been backed by law, and about 567,041 ha have been redistributed. Approximately 7.4% of the total land surface area of the country was purchased by government between 1990–2000 to resettle 30,000 people. In contrast to other countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, the more marginal agricultural regions of the country were used which were previously colonised by settlers for resettlement, away from the fertile soils of the north, which were largely left in the hands of indigenous communities.

South Africa's 1996 constitution provides for the protection of existing property rights as well as land reform. In the commercial farming areas in the country, there are about 40,000 full-time and about 20,000 part-time commercial farmers. Their capacities vary, with about 25% producing 80% of all agricultural output. In other words, 75% of these farmers are responsible for only 20% of production. Then there are another 40,000 small-scale black farmers, the majority of whom produce crops for the sugar industry in KwaZulu-Natal. With much better rainfall and soil than in other parts of the country, these farmers can run viable farms on plots of 12–25 hectares. In the dry Karoo areas, where 10 hectares of land is needed for every sheep, commercial viability is achieved only with very large farms.

After 1994, the process of land transfers in South Africa was slow, for the following reasons: all claims had to be ratified by a court; the Commission on

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Restitution of Land Rights and the Department of Land Affairs duplicated many functions, leading to bureaucratic inefficiency and delay; the investigative process was cumbersome; and there were problematic clauses in the Labour Tenants Act and the Extension of Security and Tenure Act of 1997.

Although Section 25(5) of the Constitution of 1996 allows for redistribution, at present the government utilises the provisions of the Land and Assistance Act of 1993 instead. Unlike the national housing policy, for example, land reform in South Africa is not governed by a single piece of legislation. Furthermore, as in Zimbabwe and Namibia, there is no comprehensive rural and urban development strategy. In the final analysis, land reform and black economic empowerment are not big priorities for the African National Congress-led (ANC) government. Instead, it has concentrated on the transformation of the non-agricultural sectors of the modern economy.

Although all governments in the SADC region have land reform policies, they take different forms and are not co-ordinated with those of other member countries. Policy convergence, however, does take place in terms of market-relatedness. SADC does not have a comprehensive land policy, and has not integrated land reform into a wider rural development strategy. The Nepad document also lacks direction on the issue.

A common regional approach to land reform and a SADC protocol on land reform are required, and a shared regulatory framework would do much to enhance the predictability of policies that have been affected by the unpredictable events in Zimbabwe. SADC has managed to produce protocols on water resources; there is no reason why land reform cannot become part of the regional integration agenda in the future.

Willie Breytenbach

The Nexus between Water Security and Poverty

The increasing water scarcity in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region will severely limit efforts by countries to reduce poverty and improve the living standards of their people.

This 'water crisis' is in essence a scarcity of readily available fresh water. Availability problems are an outcome of spatial variability (water is not always available in the location where it is needed most) and temporal fluctuations in freshwater supply and demand. In Southern Africa, the predominantly semi-arid climate is characterised by extreme rainfall variability, which often triggers severe drought or, occasionally, flooding. This, together with high evaporation rates, affects the amount of water available.

In SADC, which has 15 river systems, increased competition for access to water is inevitable in view of the growing population and its water demands. Strengthening regional co-operation through SADC's Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses and Africa-wide initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) can not only help to protect and manage Southern Africa's water resources to the advantage of all, but assist sustainable development, and, in particular, poverty alleviation.

Water is one of the key elements in the path to national prosperity.

The development of integrated approaches to poverty reduction and eradication must reflect both the material and the non-material conditions of people's lives. Though income poverty is one of the most obvious facets of poor people's experiences, it is by no means the only one. Lack of adequate food and shelter, energy, health and education facilities; of a supportive social network; of access to natural resources; and of freedom of choice and expression are all components of poverty. The poor are also extremely vulnerable to economic dislocation, and are those most vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters. They are often exposed to ill-treatment by institutions of the state and society, and frequently find themselves powerless to influence decisions that affect their lives in critical ways.

If we accept that poverty is a multidimensional concept, the supposed vehicle for fighting poverty, development, has to address the full range of these issues. Poverty and development are therefore two sides of the same coin.

The concept of water security is primarily linked to the question of the extent to which people have continuous access to reliable water resources and water services sufficient to meet their basic needs; are able to take advantage of the different opportunities that water resources present; are protected from water-related hazards and have fair recourse where conflicts over water arise. Included in this concept are both a resource dimension (such as scarcity of water, issues of water quality, or the effects of floods or droughts) and a human dimension (for example conflicts over water allocation, limited knowledge, or insufficient capital assets for efficient water management). Water security thus links water resource management issues to wider environmental and developmental concerns.

Water is one of the key elements in the path to national prosperity. No other types of intervention have a greater overall impact upon economic development and public health than the provision of safe drinking water and proper sanitation. Water security is critical at all levels of society. How can that be? Firstly, water improves food security, and is a critical input to industrial production, power generation and transport. Secondly, water contributes to social or human development, mainly through improving health. Thirdly, water contributes to environmental sustainability and regeneration. Water resources are integral to the dynamics of many ecological processes. Wetlands and flood plains, in particular, play a strong role in maintaining the biodiversity and functioning of the environment as a whole. Environmental sus-tainability benefits everybody, but frequently the most direct beneficiaries are the poor, because many rely on the natural environment for their livelihoods.

According to the SADC Water Division (WD), poverty has been rising steadily in the region, with no indication that the number of poor people will diminish over the short term. The availability of water is the key to reversing this trend and meeting SADC's primary development objective of poverty alleviation. Given that the region is served by several shared river systems, sustainable and balanced use of these freshwater resources is crucial, not only for economic development and regional integration, but for ensuring water security in the region as a whole.

The water vision of the SADC WD emphasises the need for increased co-operation and integration among SADC members as a pathway toward meaningful socio-economic development. Several bilateral and multilateral agreements exist to facilitate co-operation within the river basins of the region. These include river basin commissions relating to the Orange, Limpopo and the Okavango; a series of Joint Permanent Technical committees, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project; and the Action Plan for the Common Zambezi River (ZACPLAN). However, full regional co-operation and co-ordination have not yet been attained.

A significant development towards better integration was the signing of SADC's Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems on 28 August 1995, which was later revised and signed by 13 of the 14 SADC members on 7 August 2000. The Revised Protocol seeks to strengthen co-operation in the judicious and co-ordinated utilisation and management of the shared river basins in SADC, so that these resources can be shared equitably, to the benefit of all.

Despite these signs of progress, the overall challenges facing SADC in the water sector are immense, and will not be easily addressed (see box). One of the most important obstacles to achieving water security and sound water resources management is the institutional weakness of SADC as an organisation. Another is the total lack among members of the harmonised policies and strategies needed, not only to provide long-term perspectives for the development and management of the SADC region's water resources, but also to guide the strategic direction of short to medium-term interventions that acknowledge water as a strategic resource. The latter is largely the result of a lack of reliable data.

The ability to harness water resources and secure a constant supply depends mainly on the development of large-scale

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Requirements for developing and managing the SADC region's water sector:

- Improve the legal and regulatory framework at national and regional levels to ensure harmonised policies and legislation, and consistency with international water principles.
- Strengthen shared watercourse institutions in order to facilitate the development of comprehensive, integrated basin-wide plans.
- Strengthen the capacity to develop sustainable policies that provide for monetary incentives, to encourage the conservation and sustainable use of water resources.
- Enhance the knowledge base on water resources through improved information acquisition, management and dissemination and develop research and technology.
- Promote awareness, educate and train the public about the state of water resources and about the economic, social, environmental and management issues related to water. Teach people that water quality should not be degraded, and that contamination leads to water-borne diseases, which affect human health and productivity.
- Promote public participation in policy and programme formulation and implementation.
- Promote the development of strategic water infrastructure.

infrastructure such as dams. Such infrastructural investments are needed throughout the developing world, although previous projects have too often been carried out at great financial, social and environmental cost.

The need to improve the water supply in the region is recognised in the Protocol. Recent studies have shown that an average of 60% of people in rural areas across SADC still lack access to safe and reliable sources of drinking water. This is despite the fact that South Africa and Zimbabwe have 752 dams between them; while the region's other nine countries have only 55 in total. There is therefore a need for further development of water infrastructure elsewhere in the region. The region's wetter countries, such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, have among the lowest densities of dams in the world. The region's most economically developed states — South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia — are water-stressed, and need to develop inter-basin transfers to sustain their economic growth. This is a clear incentive for integration between countries, and for the formulation of strategic regional infrastructure programmes for water storage, transfers, irrigation, drought mitigation and flood control.

Fresh water is the very essence of life. It is an all-pervasive need that underpins the social fabric of every society. It is therefore not surprising that improving water security and management is fundamental to achieving all of the Millennium Development Goals (particularly the eradication of extreme hunger and poverty, and ensuring environmental sustainability) and the specific strategies designed by Nepad to combat the continent's present state of under-development. Water underpins development initiatives — food security, power supply, health, economic growth and environ-mental regeneration. Water is also one of the prime reasons for regional integration, being the core aspect of equitable and sustainable development. An investment in water security is therefore an investment in the development prospects of the region.

Mapule Kgomongoe is a scientist at CSIR-Environmenttek.

Agricultural Trade and Food Security in SADC

From the multilateral to the national level, agricultural trade is one of the most sensitive sectors of the region's economy, because it attracts blatant forms of protectionism and distortion. The paranoia exhibited by most governments when it comes to trade in agricultural products is partly a result of the close relationship of this sector to food security, and the resulting implications for social and political stability.

Furthermore, most SADC economies are mainly agro-based.

Agricultural trade patterns

Intra-SADC trade currently constitutes about 20% of the region's total global trade. The region as a whole is a net exporter of agricultural products; agricultural imports are generally lower than exports. However, the recent focus on trade as a vehicle for regional economic development has led to significant increases in agricultural trade between members of SADC.

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), together with Zimbabwe, accounts for around 94% of total regional exports. As the largest economy, South Africa generates about 75% of the region's GDP, and effectively dominates intra-SADC trade. Agricultural trade makes up a relatively small proportion of its total GDP, and its regional exports far exceed its imports. Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe are South Africa's largest importers.

A study of five SADC countries conducted by the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) concludes that Tanzania's imports from SADC exceed its exports, although it is a supply-rich country when it comes to agricultural products. While its trade with the region is gradually increasing owing to trade liberalisation and regional integration processes, its current trade with SADC is below its potential. In the case of Malawi, regional trade in general is minimal and declining, as most of its market is in Europe and the USA. For its part, Zambia has experienced a positive increase in non-traditional agricultural exports (such as flowers), and a rise in total imports of primary and processed products from SACU.

With regard to Namibia, recent data shows that about 83% of its trade is with SACU members, South Africa being its biggest market. Only 7% of its agricultural and food trade is with non-SADC countries and 10% with other countries. However, Namibia's trade with Angola is developing, and there is an enormous potential for growth. Angola is currently not exporting agricultural products to the rest of SADC, and imports food products only from SACU. In the case of Mozambique, it trades more with SACU countries than with other SADC members and third parties, which makes some analysts see it as a natural SACU state.

The most heavily-traded agricultural products are tobacco, tea, sugar, maize, cotton and timber. A number of SADC countries that do not belong to SACU are competitive producers of such agricultural goods as food, beverages, tobacco and cotton yarn. It is disheartening to note, however, that although these goods are produced in the region, South Africa generally imports them from other parts of the world. It is not alone in this behaviour, because the rest of SACU, Tanzania and Mauritius do the same. The reasons (as discussed below) are the prohibitive levels of tariff protection in the region, which act as serious deterrents to importing goods produced by other SADC countries.

Shortages of food in one country should be easily supplied by surpluses in another.

Can SADC Feed Itself?

It is disappointing to note that over the last three years, at least four SADC countries — Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia — have had to appeal for the international community's intervention to avert serious food crises caused primarily by drought. Given the region's huge potential to feed itself, it is a shame that any SADC state should need to ask for international food aid. Shortages of food in one country should be easily supplied by surpluses in another.

The potential for improved intra-SADC agricultural trade is immense. The co-variant climatic conditions across the region allow for the production of a variety of crops and different cropping seasons, which results in variable vulnerability to food crises. The differences in factor endowments can be exploited to ensure that the region trades itself out of hunger. Countries 'rich' in foodstuffs like South Africa, Tanzania and potentially Zimbabwe (formerly the bread-basket of SADC) should aim to increase production so as to supply countries like Botswana and Namibia, which have limited arable land and whose comparative advantages lie in livestock rearing and beef exports. Again, levels of manufacturing sophistication vary from country to country, which should allow countries like South Africa to import raw materials and export the processed agricultural products to other countries in the region.

Whilst the potential for increased intra-SADC agricultural trade is beyond question, the current economic environment is replete with hurdles and bottlenecks.

According to studies conducted by the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FRANRPAN), Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and at times Swaziland are regular importers of substantial amounts of maize to meet their annual requirements. This represents a relatively consistent export demand on supply-rich countries. Only South Africa, which generates about half of the total SADC maize production, is generally able to meet its local requirements domestically.

A FANRPAN study analysing the 2002 food crisis in the region revealed that disaster management and contingency plans were either non-existent or inadequate in most countries and at the regional level, despite early warnings from national and regional sources. However, the humanitarian response by individual countries, the region and the international community helped to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in SADC. The crisis demonstrated graphically to governments the importance of encouraging the private sector, both formal and informal, to play a supportive role in supplying the national food deficits. This calls for a non-restrictive trade and marketing environment that is more conducive to the efficient and timely importation of food products, especially staples like maize. In Zimbabwe, price controls on basic commodities have aggravated the situation, resulting in severe food shortages. Most foodstuffs are sold illegally at high prices on the parallel market, and many unscrupulous traders are taking advantage of the situation for profiteering purposes. Food supplies are hoarded to increase scarcity and push up prices. Yet inappropriate interventionist policies may cause domestic market failures that exacerbate food insecurity.

In Southern Africa, informal cross-border trade plays an important role in moving food from surplus to deficit areas. It helps to sustain many poor households and provides a livelihood for traders. The impact of the humanitarian food crisis was at least partially alleviated by high volumes of cross-border trade in Malawi and Zambia. Although there are positive

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developments in this sector, such as the banding together of informal traders into associations (like the Cross-Border Traders Association in Zimbabwe) in order to get better recognition and funding, current trade policies like visa requirements and border procedures are too restrictive of formal trade.

Challenges and opportunities for growth

Whilst the potential for increased intra-SADC agricultural trade is beyond question, the current economic environment is replete with hurdles and bottlenecks, which together act as serious though not insurmountable barriers. Such impediments include tariff and non-tariff barriers; macro-economic concerns; trade imbalances; difficulties facing regional integration; transport costs and supply-side weaknesses.

Tariff and non-tariff barriers

SADC countries still impose high tariffs, and non-tariff and technical barriers to cross-border agricultural trade within the region. Studies indicate that these include cumbersome customs procedures, excessive paperwork, general inefficiency, corruption, and inordinate border and port delays, which add up to enormous additional costs for cross-border trade.

With respect to South Africa, the demand by importers for a plentiful and consistent flow of high quality fresh produce is regarded as another obstacle to regional trade. Whilst standards are necessary, for example to safeguard health and safety and to protect the environment, excessive insistence on compliance can limit market access for some countries. There is a need for harmonisation of product standards to ensure that local requirements are not unduly protectionist, and are in step with the provisions of the WTO's agreements on both sanitary and phytosanitary measures and the removal of such barriers to trade by means of harmonisation and mutual recognition.

A further limitation to the full realisation of the dividends of trade liberalisation and regional integration is the poor co-ordination of tax systems in SADC. The negative effects include large-scale cross-border smuggling of beer from South Africa to Mozambique, and tobacco into South Africa from Zimbabwe.

SADC countries have engaged in positive policy shifts, emphasising export-led growth that is in line with the aim of harmonising trade policies.

Macro-economic concerns

Although most Southern African economies embarked on painful economic policy reforms in the name of structural adjustment programmes in the mid-1980s, vestiges of import substitution industrialisation as opposed to export-led growth remain. Inward development thinking occasionally rears its ugly head, and persists as a weakness in the reasoning of many policymakers.

The following macro-economic policy issues have been identified as obstacles to intra-agricultural trade: exchange rate difficulties (overvalued currencies sparking the development of a lucrative parallel market, leading to foreign currency shortages as economic agents hoard it for speculative purposes); prohibitive rules of origin; inadequate diversification in tradable commodities; improper government interventions in the market (price controls); insufficient support given to informal cross-border trade and unsynchronised trade policies.

The Trade Protocol's implementation may increase intra-regional trade from 20% to 35% by 2008.

Existing trade imbalances

Trade flows in the region are skewed in favour of SACU countries, particularly South Africa. Although the latter has opened its market to regional suppliers (many of whom are paying low tariffs in terms of the asymmetry principle), its share of SADC trade rose from 75% to about 80% between 1995–2000. This glaring trade imbalance makes some governments reluctant to speed up regional trade liberalisation, because they fear that their industries will not survive South African competition. This leads to slower liberalisation and detrimental effects on intra-agricultural trade.

Regional integration difficulties

Southern Africa has a multiplicity of overlapping regional integration initiatives. In addition, there are a number of bilateral trade agreements between SADC states.

The problem with this trend is that countries that are signatories to a number of regional trade agreements face the difficulty of having to conform to different tariff reduction schedules and rules of origin, amongst other issues. For instance, Malawi's membership of overlapping regional and bilateral arrangements with divergent trade liberalisation agendas complicates its trade regime and affects its performance.

Transport costs

A significant number of studies have shown that transport is a key sector because it has a direct impact on a country or region's trade competitiveness. There is a strong relationship between transport costs and economic growth in that the more countries spend on imports, the less they receive for their exports. This means that the profits from exports are significantly reduced by excessive transport costs. In SADC, transport poses a serious barrier to increased agricultural trade, the more so because agricultural products are normally bulky. Inefficiencies in the transportation system are a result of lack of investment in infrastructure and maintenance. Constant refurbishment of tracks and trains as well as road repairs is necessary as a result.

Some countries in the region are faced with inadequate national transport systems, especially in the rural areas. Most smallholders find it difficult to transport their produce to the market, which reduces the incentive to increase production. At a national level, difficulties in delivering goods by road or rail mean that supplying regional destinations becomes too costly. The net effects are reduced agricultural exports and lower food prices. In Zimbabwe, the recent economic meltdown has had serious repercussions on transport and other infrastructure. The bulk of the country's agricultural products are transported to and from the seaports by rail. The National Railways of Zimbabwe has no cash to finance the refurbishment of its railway tracks and rolling stock. This has adversely effected the delivery of maize imports and other food aid to various parts of the country.

Trade flows in the region are skewed in favour of SACU, particularly South Africa.

Owing to the legacy of colonialism, transport facilities in Southern Africa and the rest of the continent, are mainly geared to the needs of overseas markets rather than directed towards intra-regional trade. For this and other reasons, most countries find it less time-consuming and expensive to export to Europe rather than to their neighbours. Moreover the discrepancies in cost between road and sea freight make it cheaper for a Gauteng-based producer to transport maize to a US port via Durban by sea

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Membership of Regional Organisations in Southern Africa

Country	*SACU*	*CMA*	*SADC*	*COMESA*	*CBI*
Angola			X	X	
Botswana	X		X		
DRC			X	X	
Lesotho	X	X	X		
Malawi			X	X	X
Mauritius			X	X	X
Mozambique			X		X
Namibia	X	X	X	X	
Seychelles			X	X	X
South Africa	X	X	X		
Swaziland	X	X	X	X	X
Tanzania			X		X
Zambia			X	X	X
Zimbabwe			X	X	X

Source: Economic and Social Research Foundation than it is to send it to some countries within the SADC region. This emphasises the importance of better linkages to support both deeper regional integration and international trade.

Supply-side weaknesses

Apart from demand-side problems, African countries have to overcome a plethora of challenges in order to take advantage of market access opportunities for agricultural exports at both regional and international levels. SADC is no exception. A considerable number of countries in the region (including Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia) find that their agricultural exports are more constrained by supply-side problems than by international trade barriers.

The major limitations on production and export growth are: insufficient capacity to prevent the spread of diseases like foot-and-mouth; a failure to deliver products of sufficiently high quality and in the right packaging; inadequate trade-related infrastructure and services; poor storage and marketing facilities; inefficient cargo handling; high energy costs; poor telecommunications networks; insufficient use of modern technology and an inconsistent flow of supply. All of these lead to loss of market share to more competitive third suppliers.

There is a need for substantial investments in inputs like seeds, fertiliser and machinery in order to expand production of agricultural staples as well as cash crops (eg, spices and flowers).

A considerable number of countries in the region find that their agricultural exports are more constrained by supply-side problems than by international trade barriers.

Future prospects

It is reassuring to note that none of the impediments to intra-SADC agricultural trade mentioned above is intractable. Many current developments presage a more prosperous and food secure SADC.

First, the SADC Trade Protocol, which was adopted in 1996 and entered into force in 2000, promises to bring about a new economic dispensation in the region. In terms of this protocol, members commit themselves to progressive liberalisation of intra-regional trade. A free trade area, which will come into force in 2008, will lead to the creation of a customs union by 2012. The stated objectives of the protocol are to further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services; ensure efficient production; contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment; and enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialisation of the region. The protocol also contains detailed provisions for rules of origin, and requires the harmonisation of sanitary and phytosanitary standards and technical regulations. By 2008 over 85% of SADC trade is expected to be duty-free. The remaining tariffs on sensitive products like sugar and cotton are to be eliminated during the period 2008–12.

The successful implementation of the protocol will undoubtedly lead to increased intra-regional trade from the current levels of about 20% to 35% by 2008. The tariff reduction process has begun, and is expected to lead to increased market access for agricultural goods. This is likely to serve as an incentive for increased production, which will improve food security.

Second, there is increased awareness among policy-makers that tariff liberalisation alone is not enough to ensure trade growth and a consequent improvement in human welfare. There is consensus among researchers on intra-SADC trade that improved regional infrastructure and services (transport, telecommunications and finance) and addressing of institutional weaknesses (corruption, inefficient customs and tax regimes and poor transit facilitation) deserve greater attention if they are to complement tariff liberalisation. Already some regional leaders have displayed considerable political will in support of this more complex agenda. The successful Maputo and Trans-Kalahari Corridors serve as shining examples.

Most smallholders find it difficult to transport their produce to the market, which reduces the incentive to increase production

Finally, while there is still a lot to be done, there is reason for optimism. On average, SADC countries have engaged in positive policy shifts, with an emphasis on export-led growth that is in line with the aim of harmonising their trade policies. For example, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi are reported to have liberalised their exchange rates and pricing systems, and abolished the fixing of pan-territorial, uniform prices by agricultural boards. Governments in the region have gradually stopped making uncalled-for interventions in the agricultural cycle of production, marketing and distribution.

Nkululeko Khumalo

SADC contact details:
Private Bag 0095
Gaborone, Botswana
Tel: +267 3951863
Fax: +267 3972848
/581070
Website: *www.sadc.int*
E-mail: *registry@sadc.int*

Special Feature

ECOWAS: Blazing a Trail for SADC

Moving people and goods freely from Lagos to Abidjan, without visa requirements or border clearances, has been a reality within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) since April 2000. A common passport, in use since 1999, further reinforces the sense of ECOWAS citizenship and the popular awareness of the regional integration process. Regional integration is seen as a means of fostering economic growth, development and political strength through increased intra-regional trade, cross-border investments nd common institutions in order to compete in the globalised market. ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are generally considered positive examples of regional integration in Africa, because they are the only groupings in which intra-community trade accounted for considerably more than 10% of their total exports in 2002, at 17% and 22%, respectively. The economic benefits to be gained by the use of co-ordinated regional instruments are also illustrated by initiatives such as the Trans-Kalahari Corridor in Southern Africa and the gas pipeline project in West Africa.

The treaty establishing an Economic Union in West Africa was signed in Lagos, Nigeria, on 28 May 1975, and the protocols governing the ECOWAS institutions were signed on 5 November 1976. The revised protocol was formalised on 25 July 1993. ECOWAS has 15 members.

In terms of political co-operation, the instruments adopted by ECOWAS are far in advance of those applicable to other regional bodies in Africa. The Defence Protocols of 22 April 1978 and 14 December 1981, introduced and promoted by Nigeria, allow for limited intervention by ECOWAS in the internal affairs of member states. These provisions have facilitated regional conflict resolution in Liberia and Sierra Leone through the

In building political institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms, SADC lags behind ECOWAS.

ECOWAS Economic Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In July 1991, the member states adopted the ECOWAS Principles of Good Governance by agreeing to a declaration committing signatories to uphold democracy and the rule of law. On 10 December 1999, the signing of a protocol establishing a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security reinforced the ECOMOG mandate. These undertakings were given concrete form in September 2003, when the ECOWAS Heads of States intervened in São-Tomé e Principe to reinstate President Fradique de Menendez after a military coup.

The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was initially launched on 28 June 1996. Following a controversy over its role vis-à-vis SADC's overall structures, it remained dormant for several years. It was integrated into the other SADC institutions on 9 March 2001. The OPDS has not yet entered into force. In the meantime, the SADC region has experienced a series of conflicts (in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho and Zimbabwe), which SADC has not been able to deal with collectively. In similar fashion, SADC's institutions are undermined by a lack of political leadership. Economically, South Africa, which accounts for 75% of the region's GDP, is the obvious candidate. However, South Africa has not been granted leadership status in SADC, as many of the member states resent its economic dominance. In contrast, Nigeria accounts for about 51% of ECOWAS's GDP, but unlike South Africa, is also the political and military power in its region. ECOWAS's political framework, unlike SADC's, is oriented towards solving specific regional problems, and creating a minimum level of stability before economic development can be achieved.

After many years of difficulties, SADC has overcome its long inertia and initiated vital reforms of its structure, establishing directorates at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. Interestingly, ECOWAS seems to have an extended institutional framework, whose functions cover areas such as regional funding for development, energy resources and even the setting up, in February 2003, of a sub-regional intelligence network to combat drug trafficking. The ECOWAS Secretary, like his SADC counterpart, has no formal autonomy, being responsible for managing the Secretariat under the supervision of the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, the Executive Secretary initiates draft texts for adoption by the Council, participates actively in regional peacekeeping talks, co-ordinates trade policies and negotiations on behalf of ECOWAS. The Community's parliament is based in Abuja, and has limited consulting powers, such as reviewing the status of contribution payments, the implementation of the community levy, and the security situation in the sub-region. Parliament makes recommendations to the Community, and also initiated talks to settle the war between government and rebel groups in Liberia in November 2002. The Court of Justice is empowered to address complaints from member states and ECOWAS institutions in respect of the interpretation of treaties. Sanctions may be imposed, but only if a member state 'persistently fails to honour' its obligations. A revision of the court's status, to accommodate complaints by individuals against the Community or a member state, is under way. The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) is in charge of financing development projects in member states.

SADC's main instruments include various protocols on issues relating to regional integration. Eleven out of the 22 protocols have yet to be ratified to become legally binding. SADC citizens are still restricted in their movements, largely owing to South Africa's stringent immigration policy. In comparison, free circulation within the West African region has been made possible by the 29 May 1979 Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the progressive elimination of resident permit requirements, the introduction of the ECOWAS passport and the harmonised registration of motor vehicles.

The SADC Trade Protocol, launched on 1 September 2000, attempts to eliminate obstacles to trade among member states. SADC has achieved the highest level of intra-community trade, 22%, within any African regional grouping. Clearly, this is the most prominent form of integration within SADC. By 2012 all products are expected to be tradable duty-free. Yet there are some obstacles to increased intra-regional trade. These include inefficient border posts, high levies and overlapping memberships in different regional integration bodies. As an illustration, the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) customs union, due to be established in 2004, could affect SADC's plans to develop its own customs union. This is problematic because, while some countries have overlapping membership of various regional groups, no country can belong to more than one customs union. This implies that countries that have joined the COMESA customs union are automatically precluded from becoming members of SADC's.

Ghana and Nigeria adopted a fast-track approach to accelerate economic integration in ECOWAS by bringing the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) member states and non-member states closer together. The Union is a strong, well-integrated grouping of francophone countries with a customs union, a common currency (the CFA Franc) and a central bank. ECOWAS member states have comprehensively approved a second monetary zone comprising non-UEMOA members, with a monetary institute to monitor the process until they merge into a single monetary zone in 2004.

Unlike its counterpart, Nigeria, South Africa is already committed to SACU, and might find it difficult to engineer greater economic co-operation in SADC.

To secure funding for member states' contributions to ECOWAS, an agreement on a community levy provides that 0.5% of the cost of goods (CIF) is to be deducted from the price of all goods imported from a third country. This levy is intended to provide a stable source of funding for the operations of ECOWAS institutions. It should also help to increase the autonomy of the Secretariat. The adoption of a single goods declaration form by all customs services is already in effect, and a working calendar for the establishment of Common External Tariffs by 2007 has been set in motion. It appears that accelerated integration requires a strong community that has secured budgetary resources through specific taxation mechanisms, standardised customs practices, and, if necessary, adopted a politically-backed fast-track approach to foster economic integration. However, the customs union mechanisms used within SACU might be tailored to accommodate integration factors already existing in SADC.

In building institutions and creating mechanisms for conflict resolution, SADC lags behind ECOWAS. Nevertheless, with stronger political backing, coupled with a trade-led agenda, SADC should be able to move towards a viable economic community. ECOWAS, on the other hand, needs to balance its ultra-comprehensive approach with a more sustainable integration process.

Serge Ntamack

Protocol Update

On 31 October 2003 South Africa ratified the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement allowing for the Protocol to enter into force on the 30th of November 2003. Mauritius ratified the SADC Protocol on Forestry on 8 October 2003.

Forthcoming SAIIA Publications





Countries in Southern Africa requiring external food assistance in March 2004	
Country	***Reason(s) for Emergency***
Angola	Returnees and floods
DRC	Civil strife, internally displaced persons (IDPS) and refugees
Lesotho	Drought
Malawi	Drought in parts
Mozambique	Drought in southern parts
Swaziland	Drought in parts
Tanzania	Drought in parts and refugees
Zimbabwe	Drought in parts and economic disruption
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation	

SADC elections calendar 2004			
Country	***Presidential***	***Parliamentary/legislative***	***Local government***
Botswana	2004	October 2004	October 2004
Lesotho	Monarchy: No presidential election	May 2007	2004
Malawi	May 2004	May 2004	May 2004
Mozambique	November/December 2004	November/December 2004	October 2004
Namibia	November/December 2004	October/November 2004	November 2004
South Africa	April 2004	April 2004	2005
Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA).			

Selected SADC meetings: April - July 2004		
April		
SADC Special Summit on Agriculture and Food Security	10 April	Tanzania
Extraordinary Food Security Summit	10 April	Tanzania
Meeting (workshop) on strengthening the capacity of Mechanisms through the effective use of Information Communications and Technologies (ICTs)	19-23 April	Namibia
SADC Regional Anti-Corruption Conference	20-22 April	South Africa
Workshop on Relations between AU and Regional Economic Communities	28-29 April	South Africa
Launching of the Joint Maputo Basin Study Meeting	April	Mozambique, South Africa or Swaziland
Orange-Senqu Commission (ORASECOM) Meeting	April	South Africa
May		
Mining Legislative and Policy Harmonisation Workshop	3 May	Botswana
High Level SADC / Nepad Ministerial Meeting	15-18 May	Tanzania
4th Steering Committee Meeting for the Regional Environmental Education Programme	20 May	Botswana
Workshop to Review the Consultant's Report on the SADC Food Reserve Facility	May	South Africa
June		
SADC / EU Joint Steering Committee Meeting	14 June	Belgium
Environment Sector Technical Committee Meeting	June	Botswana
Regional Adjudication Committee Meeting on the SADC Media Awards	21-24 June	Botswana
A number of other committee and sub-committee meetings will be taking place. Further details can be obtained from the SADC website: *www.sadc.int*		