In his vote of thanks at the recent SADC summit in Mauritius, President Festus Mogae of Botswana chastised the institution saying it was the ‘weakest in getting things done’.

By any count, SADC has adopted very laudable and ambitious declarations and protocols – from the environment to human rights, democracy and good governance. Yet, few countries honour all these commitments.

When will adherence to such commitments become so important that non-compliance results in some form of sanction – and hence something to be avoided?

There have been attempts to make SADC a more effective institution but if it is to play any role in the region’s human security challenges, its pace of change will have to speed up, and its leaders’ undertakings will have to start showing practical results.

The adoption of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections by the heads of state at the summit in August provides a good solid framework against which the impartiality of the elections can be measured. In this respect, it signals an important milestone for democratic consolidation within SADC. Yet, principles do not prescribe specifics. And it is in this arena that SADC leaders and citizens need to courageously safeguard not only the letter of the principles but also their spirit. Four SADC states are scheduled to go to the polls before the next summit (Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe). These elections will be the first time under a harmonised and binding set of principles against which the electoral process can be evaluated. They provide an opportunity for the official SADC observer missions to objectively assess each poll. However, they also provide benchmarks for civil society observer missions, to hold both other missions and the state in question accountable.

Democracy is not vested only in the narrowly defined bodies that make elections possible, but ultimately in the democratic culture that pervades society. The emergence of this requires commitment from reform-minded leaders in SADC to ensure that principles are respected and implemented, and that there is proper censure (without prevarication) of those who do not.

The new chair of SADC, the Mauritian prime minister, Paul Berenger, said at the summit, ‘really free and fair elections mean not only an independent electoral commission but also include freedom of assembly and absence of physical harassment by the police or another entity, freedom of the press and access to national radio and television, and external and credible observation of the whole electoral process’. In Zimbabwe, notwithstanding the electoral amendments proposed recently, the conditions distorting next year’s elections are already in place, with legislation curbing press freedom and youth militia intimidating the opposition. In addition, if the NGO Bill is passed it will further restrict the democratic space. SADC leaders need to ensure that any attempts to ‘normalise’ the political situation in Zimbabwe are more than just superficial. In Angola it is more than likely that elections, originally scheduled for 2005, will be postponed, against a background of low-level political violence. In the DRC elections are scheduled for 2005. However, the political uncertainty would make the proper application of the SADC Principles very difficult, if not impossible.

While the European process (often used as an example of successful integration) was able to encourage domestic reform by making membership conditional on these requirements, SADC has been unable or unwilling to impose similar sanction.

The resolve of leaders to hold themselves and their fellow presidents to the new principles has yet to be tested. Yet, the adoption of these principles is a positive step for citizens in the region. It provides them with the opportunity to hold their leaders accountable to codes that they themselves have developed – not those of the West or the former colonial powers. Will the next year see SADC move beyond the noble rhetoric?

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos
The South African Election: A blueprint for SADC?

The SADC region is scheduled to hold a number of elections in the next eight to 10 months. Most of these are expected to proceed smoothly. However, people both inside and outside Zimbabwe have begun debating what changes should be made to the electoral system there to ensure that the process is free and fair. This provides a good opportunity to reflect on South Africa’s third democratic elections, which took place in April 2004, and to consider what lessons they might hold for the region.

The election results
The South African elections were assessed as being conducted in a legitimate and democratic manner. Garnering 70% of the votes cast, the African National Congress (ANC) confirmed its dominance in democratic South Africa. The Democratic Alliance (DA) retained its place as the official opposition, increasing its national support by 2.81%. It made a pre-election ‘Coalition for Change’, with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and confidently projected that the combined opposition would garner 30% of the vote: 20% for the DA and 10% for the IFP. The end result was more modest: the combined DA-IFP tally was 19.3%.

The 2004 election was notable for electoral alliances – including that between the ANC and the New National Party (NNP) – but these came to naught. The NNP lost a great deal of its traditional support base because of its co-operation arrangement with the ANC (its historical opponent). The DA gained from NNP defectors, but its alliance with the IFP did not attract more African voters.

However, voter participation (76.7%) was significantly lower than in the elections of 1994 (86.9%) and 1999 (89.3%). In the 2004 elections, about 27.5 million people were eligible to vote. About 20.7 million (75.3%) registered, and 15.8 million, (comprising 57.5% of those eligible) voted. In international terms, this is considered a respectable turnout. States in Europe typically have higher rates of participation, while Latin America, the US and Japan tend to have similar or lower rates of voting. The lower turnout in April can be ascribed primarily to widespread complacency among ANC supporters, confident of the ANC’s re-election.

What does the ANC’s more than two-thirds majority mean? Will it use it to amend the constitution unilaterally? Probably not, for two reasons. First, the constitution is for the most part a creation of the ANC. Second, to alter the basic principles of the constitution requires a 75% majority. However, the size of the ANC’s support indicates that its basic socio-economic policies; commitment to a mixed market economy in which the public and private sectors cooperate; affirmative action; black economic empowerment; involvement in the African Union and Nepal; and its lobbying for the reform of international institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation will be pursued vigorously in the next five years.

The lower turnout can be ascribed to complacency among ANC supporters.

Reflection: The effect on the SADC region
What lessons does this election hold for the region? One cannot underestimate the demonstration effect of the way the elections were held: administratively as well as politically, the conduct of the elections was exemplary. The voters’ registration drives held by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in November 2003 and January 2004 brought millions of previously unregistered voters into the fold. Voters’ education programmes contributed to voter literacy. The electoral roll was up to date and its integrity met no serious challenges from the opposition.

Few incidents of electoral violence and intolerance occurred during the campaigning. Those that did, and were well-publicised, centred on die-hard IFP supporters, who refused access to high-level ANC leaders, such as Deputy President Jacob Zuma, himself a Zulu, to political meetings. However, these relatively isolated events did not disturb either the administration or the process of preparations for the election.

The first and most important lesson for SADC members is that free, fair and tolerant election campaigns and polls are possible as well as desirable. Good governance is inextricably connected to a democratically elected as well as accountable government. In this respect, South Africa sets an example.

Second, the elections as well as the past 10 years of democracy illustrate the importance of independent political institutions such as the High and Constitutional Courts and the IEC. The courts have quite often found against the ANC government, for example as regards the treatment of AIDS, and the government has accepted their
rules. The IEC has administered three general elections and two country-wide local government polls and no serious challenge to its impartiality and competence has been made. On the contrary, its work has earned global recognition and accolades.

Third, for the past 10 years South Africa has had a government of national unity (GNU), in which several of the major opposition parties have been included. For the first five years this was a constitutional prescription. Between 1999-2004, the ANC invited the IFP and the NNP to join a GNU. This collaboration has helped South Africa to become a ‘normal society’. In 1994, there was a great deal of political violence resulting in many deaths, especially in KwaZulu-Natal. By 2004, in no small measure due to efforts by both the ANC and the IFP, political violence had diminished dramatically. Ironically, their participation in the GNU weakened the electoral support of both the IFP and the NNP. While the country benefited, the co-opted parties did not.

Fourth, the elections gave the ANC more seats in the National Assembly, which affirmed its dominance in the South African body politic. This demonstrates a general tendency in SADC states for one-party dominance for a decade or two after the first democratic elections: Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique come to mind. In democratic theory this is a controversial phenomenon. Liberal democrats see one-party dominance as undesirable, since it may become associated, over time, with arrogance, nepotism, corruption and political clientelism – all elements of poor governance. Other theorists of democracy argue that in deeply divided societies with a colonial heritage, rule for a span of about 20 years by a trans-ethnic coalition such as the ANC will heal societal divisions and bring stability and greater longevity to the polity. Examples are Botswana, Namibia, India, Singapore and Malaysia. Two obvious counter-examples are Zambia and Zimbabwe. Kaunda’s rule impoverished Zambia, and as a consequence the economic survival of that state is in jeopardy.

Five, the strong showing of the ANC in the elections strengthens the foreign policy mandate of the Mbeki government, although this aspect had a relatively low profile in the electoral campaign, in which opposition parties, for the most part, focused on domestic politics. Mbeki’s policy towards the Mugabe government is unlikely to change. Indeed, with strengthened ANC mandate, the president can be more confident about pursuing the core aspects of ANC policy. Moreover, other issues in foreign policy are more likely to be vigorously pursued than the Zimbabwe crisis. The government is likely to prioritise the continued development of the AU institutions. Its regional agenda will promote internal reform, widening political participation, free labour unions and the like in SADC states such as Swaziland, which have not yet fully democratised.

Six, the outcome of the election also led to the toning down of the exchange of raucous rhetoric between President Mbeki and the leader of the opposition, Tony Leon. The president reiterated his acceptance of the right of the opposition to exist and to criticise; Leon undertook to oppose in a more constructive manner. Again this is instructive for government and opposition relationships in SADC, especially in Zimbabwe. In deeply divided post-colonial societies, being the official opposition is not a simple matter, especially when the party is largely composed of members of previously advantaged groups, or is associated with them. While the new government can draw on the symbolism of liberation, the opposition has no such position to appeal to. For this reason, it is difficult for the opposition to attract supporters, even if many are sympathetic to its party ideology. South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent, Zambia are all examples of this phenomenon.

Last, but not least, the success of the ANC is illustrative of the progress it has made in actually fulfilling its various mandates. It has achieved this through consistent domestic economic policy, fiscal and monetary discipline, participatory decision-making, and a genuine concern for poverty relief. The visible improvement in the lives of the poor is the result of the government’s providing such services as schooling, housing, electrification and access to water and land. The past 10 years have also witnessed the peaceful transformation from white domination to majority rule, constitutionally guaranteed rights for minorities, a truth and reconciliation process and black economic empowerment. In SADC states where internal conflicts have not been resolved, such as Zimbabwe, Swaziland and the Democratic Republic of Congo, much can be learnt from the manner in which political contestation has been managed in South Africa.

The lesson for SADC members is that free, fair and tolerant polls are possible and desirable.

Good governance Good governance Good governance Good governance
is connected to a democratically elected government.

Albert Venter, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg.
A struggle is under way for the governance, heart and soul, of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This plays itself out in a number of guises – political, economic, cultural and environmental. When the institutional streamlining of SADC has been completed, the policy and political battle lines between states may diminish. However, contestation is emerging between executives and legislatures in the region. By its own admission, SADC is an executive bureaucracy. The SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADCPF) is an attempt to democratise and popularise this bureaucracy, to bring SADC closer to the people of the region. Although it was officially launched in July 1996, the SADCPF was approved as an ‘autonomous institution of SADC in accordance with Article 9 (2) of the Treaty’ only at the 1997 SADC Heads of State Summit in Blantyre, Malawi. The mission of the Forum is: ‘To bring about convergence of economic, political, and social values in SADC and help create an appropriate environment for deeper regional co-operation through popular participation.’

This is a daunting task, and one that, despite the Forum’s best efforts, has seen little tangible success. Nevertheless, the expected conversion of the SADCPF to a fully-fledged regional assembly is likely to deepen popular engagement with SADC and improve regional political governance. However, the SADCPF has already made some positive moves. Along with strengthening gender representation in the parliaments and programmes of SADC, the SADCPF has taken a lead in election monitoring in the region.

Converting experience into credibility

The first SADCPF election observation missions were carried out in Namibia and Mozambique in 1999 and were relatively straightforward, as were those conducted in Mauritius and Tanzania during 2000. But it was the direct experiences of the SADCPF observer team during the controversial and deeply-flawed Zimbabwean parliamentary elections in 2000 that prompted SADC parliamentarians and civil society institutions to convene a series of meetings, under the auspices of the Southern African Elections Forum, to develop a set of norms and standards for the conduct of elections. The implicit assumption was that progress in electoral governance can be measured only against a mutually agreed set of criteria and principles which seek to ameliorate common electoral problems. They do so by addressing the broader political, electoral, legal, and constitutional and governance challenges that inhibit the deepening of institutional democracy in the region. They also represent the closest the region has come to the establishment of a code of electoral best practice. At the recent SADC summit in Mauritius in August, these Norms were adopted by member states as the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. These should now provide a binding framework against which all future SADC elections can be monitored.

The norms tested

In February and March 2002 the SADCPF faced its sternest test when it undertook its second mission to Zim-
babwe, this time to monitor the presidential elections. Although pressure was allegedly brought to bear on it to endorse the elections, from a number of countries, the SADCPF Observer Mission concluded that, ‘[the electoral process could not be said to adequately comply with the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region’. This rejection of the legitimacy of the Zimbabwean presidential election process contrasted starkly with the conclusions of a number of other African election monitoring teams. The 50-person multi-sector South African Observer Mission (SAOM) appointed by President Mbeki (which included representatives from government, unions, business, NGOs, religious organisations and the agricultural sector) concluded that the election result was legitimate. The 20-person South African Parliamentary Observer Mission (SAPOM) pronounced the elections a ‘credible expression of the will of the people’. (A minority report, signed by the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the New National Party, the African Christian Democratic Party, the United Christian Democratic Party and the Pan Africanist Congress, however, declined to endorse the elections. This made the SAPOM report declaring the elections legitimate effectively an ANC document.) The 16-member Nigerian mission reported that it had observed no incident that threatened the integrity and outcome of the elections, while the Tanzanian president, Benjamin Mkapa, congratulated Mugabe on his victory and said that the people of Zimbabwe had spoken loudly and clearly. In congratulating Mugabe, the Kenyan president at the time, Daniel Arap Moi, commented that his victory testified to the confidence and high esteem in which the people of Zimbabwe held him. By contrast, all of the non-African observer missions were critical of the electoral process.

How can this dissonance between the conclusion reached by the SADCPF Observer Mission and those of the other African leaders be explained?

Same election, different lens
The endorsement of Mugabe’s election victory by a number of SADC political leaders can be ascribed to personal reverence, political affiliations and expressions of historic solidarity, rather than a commentary on the conduct of the 2002 election. These SADC political leaders were approving the outcome of the election rather than the process by which it was achieved. The strength of support for Mugabe’s victory has a strong correlation with those countries that suffered anti-colonial and civil wars and whose leaders identify with Zimbabwe’s recent history. Their expressions of support, in part reflect democratic immaturity and the difficulty former liberation movement leaders have in embracing robust plural democracy. For some SADC leaders, principles of solidarity trump principles of democracy. By contrast, the SADCPF election team operated under no such ties of solidarity, but rather carried out a specific mandate in accordance with its published criteria.

Other SADC leaders who lacked liberation struggle credentials and historic ties with Mugabe, supported the election results for different reasons. They viewed the populist and trade union-affiliated challenge of the Movement for Democratic Change leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, as an uncomfortable potent applicable to their own domestic political circumstances. They therefore adopted a default position in support of a fellow Southern African head of state. Exercising its institutional autonomy, the multi-party and regionally representative SADCPF electoral team operated under no such stricture.

Yet another reason for the Forum team’s arriving at its contrarian conclusion was operational in nature – it simply carried out a more thoroughgoing analysis of the election process in Zimbabwe than a number of other national and international teams. The SADCPF team had more personnel, arrived in the country earlier, observed more regions and constituencies and conducted its research more diligently than a number of other observation missions. Furthermore, there was an internal coherence and logic to the SADCPF team’s report and conclusions, partly because the Forum election observer team realised that the 2002 Zimbabwean presidential elections would be viewed as a test case, both regionally and internationally.

But despite its achievements, the SADCPF team occupies an uncomfortable space between the processes of election observation and election monitoring. The latter is regarded as a more multi-faceted engagement, usually between local election observation teams and the national Election Management Authority (EMA). It also implies an interactive relationship in which civil society groups provide input into the conduct of the elections, from the campaign stage through to the announcement of the results. This broader and deeper role includes early conflict warning and the pinpointing of shortcomings, infractions and deviations from the regul-
Good Governance... more women in politics

In 1997 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Heads of State and Government adopted the Declaration on Gender and Development. They committed themselves to ‘ensuring the equal representation of women and men in the decision making of member states and SADC structures at all levels [...] and the achievement of at least a thirty per cent target of women in political and decision making structures by [the] year 2005’.

However, as 2005 approaches, most of the SADC countries are still far from meeting this target although a few of them will be having elections later in 2004, and the results may affect this picture. This failure could indicate the propensity of leaders to sign declarations without making any genuine commitment to adhere to them. It is against this background that it is vital to discuss why it is important to have women in politics and decision-making roles; why they are still underrepresented in these offices; and how state and non-state actors can assist in encouraging women to participate.

Why is having more women in politics a good thing?

Equal gender representation in decision-making structures is recognised as a fundamental human right. The first and most commonly cited reason for increasing the participation of women is that they constitute the majority of the population in SADC countries; it is therefore in line with good democratic practice that they be represented in proportion to their numbers, or at least in equal number to men. After all, equality of opportunity in political competition and the absence of discrimination based on gender are prerequisites of a well-functioning democratic system.

Male-led governments have often reinforced women’s inferior social position. Many government development policies have not addressed the feminisation of poverty, or changed women’s status for the better. Increased participation by women would also make a qualitative difference to governance: women have different interests, perspectives and experiences than men. For example, they are far more committed to ensuring effective health and education policies, and are likely to vote in favour of increasing budgetary allocations to these sectors. The presence of women in decision-making is also a powerful tool for challenging societal stereotypes and creating role models.

If women’s participation in public office reaches a ‘critical mass’, there is a greater chance of their making an impact. Women’s engagement in politics is collaborative and non-hierarchical, reflecting their way of working. Such an approach would contribute to a qualitative transformation in institutions, laws and policies.

Above all, democracy stands on two pillars: representative democracy which has to do with the quantitative representation of all groups; and participatory democracy, which takes into account qualitative considerations that draw on the experiences and aspirations of those represented. Under-representation of women contradicts one of the central tenets of representative democracy: by definition democracy cannot afford to be gender blind.

Persisting stereotypes?

Why are women still under-represented in politics and decision-making? Some explanations may be:

- socialisation, which entrenches perceptions that a woman’s role is con-
...fined to the private (home) and the man’s to the public sphere;  
• the burden of multiple roles for women in the home;  
• the unwillingness of male colleagues to accept women as equals or superiors in the workplace;  
• the way parliamentary candidates are selected, for instance that women are usually at the bottom of the party list;  
• women’s low self-esteem;  
• lack of resources, such as money to campaign;  
• women’s being generally less educated than men;  
• a media that hound or ridicule women who dare to venture into the political sphere, focusing on their personal lives rather than their work for their parties; and  
• inappropriate electoral systems that do not create space for women to participate on an equal basis.

Given the above constraints, governments and civil society have a crucial role to play in encouraging women to participate in elections, in the complementary roles of candidates and voters. The government should introduce educational policies that increase the number of girls attending school and apply affirmative action to encourage women to participate in the political life of the country.

Capacity building and training for both men and women at grassroots level would assist, as would a campaign to assure women that their participation in politics is as important as that of men. (Women generally think that men are better leaders than they are.)

Political parties in SADC could show their commitment to gender equality by adopting manifestos and setting targets for gender representivity in their political offices. Women’s wings of political parties can also lobby for influence within the larger organisation.

Civil society can do much to assist the advancement of women, for example by persuading them of the contribution they can make to development.

The Fifty-Fifty Campaign is an example of an initiative to help women to become legislators and ensure that political representation is equal. This campaign, which is global, has been coordinated by the Women’s Environment and Development Organisation (W EDO), which has played a key role in enabling women’s organisations to be represented at global conferences convened by the UN. Several civil society groups in Namibia and South Africa have joined the campaign. Other such initiatives should be introduced across the region.

There is overwhelming evidence internationally that women stand a better chance of getting elected under the proportional representation (PR) as opposed to the constituency-based electoral system. But even in the former, women need to be placed in high positions on the party list to ensure that they are voted in. Mozambique and South Africa have reached the 30% target through the use of this type of electoral system.

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process. The quota system, as contained in the constitution, is also a useful concept because it entails the inclusion of women in the political and decision-making processes. Tanzania is the only SADC country that specifies a quota in favour of women in its national constitution. This has allowed the number of women members of parliament in that country to increase to 22% to date. The above suggests that if the quota and PR systems are combined, women will stand their best chance of achieving equal representation.

The SADC Parliamentary Forum and the SADC Gender Unit have initiated a project called ‘Engendering SADC Parliaments’ for their 2000-05 Strategic Plan. Its goal is to make parliaments in SADC countries gender representative. It also intended to strengthen the capacity of MPs to articulate gender issues, and to implement the recommendations of the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development.

The SADC Parliamentary Forum has also created women’s parliamentary caucuses for awareness raising, lobbying, promoting the equal participation of women and bringing a gender perspective to parliamentary debates. This move has been accompanied by the formation of caucuses at country level in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho in response to the need for supportive structures. The SADC Gender Unit has also offered a number of workshops that have brought women politicians from the region together on a regular basis, to learn from each other’s situations. The establishment of a network of women judges in SADC also provides a platform for sharing ideas, and supports a more proactive regional approach towards gender issues in justice. All in all, SADC is committed to ensuring that women are represented in proportion to their demographic profile.

Saenna Chingamuka

Red and green cards for SADC:
Governance and accountability

At the July summit of the African Union, four more SADC countries acceded to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) when Angola, Lesotho, Malawi and Tanzania joined the ranks of Mauritius, Mozambique and South Africa. Although the new recruits will not be assessed for some time yet, the willingness of so many SADC states to be scrutinised by their peers marks an important step towards the consolidation of democratic principles such as good governance and accountability. Or does it?

This article explores two critical indicators of governance - voice and accountability, and control of corruption - in two very different SADC member states: Angola, which although it has acceded to the APRM has a history of civil war and poor governance; and Botswana, which has refused to join the APRM but is considered to be the best-governed country in Africa. In one respect, however, these countries are similar. Both have abundant natural resources. Botswana has a vibrant diamond industry and Angola possesses vast oil and diamond reserves.

‘Goverance’, according to the World Bank Institute (WBI), refers to the traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised. This includes: the processes by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern the economic and social interactions of that country by aggregating different interests and acting as checks and balances.

The WBI has developed a unique ‘traffic light’ approach to measure the state of governance in individual societies. Red indicates countries in a ‘goverance crisis’; yellow, countries ‘at risk’; and green, countries ‘not at risk’. Voice, accountability and corruption are important indicators that determine the governance risk profile, according to the WBI. How do Botswana and Angola fare?

The score card shows wide divergences between the two. The WBI ranks voice and accountability in Angola as 9.6 (red), on a country percentile ranking of zero to 100. In contrast, Botswana receives a ranking of 71.2 (yellow). These scores deserve a closer look.

Years of civil war have entrenched an authoritarian form of government in Angola, which is very uncomfortable with opinions that differ from its own. After the signing of the peace accord between Unita and the MPLA in April 2002, there was a general expectation that the peace would herald constitutional reform and that elections would

Voice and accountability

There are many components to an indicator such as voice and accountability. To what extent are public officials accountable to the public? Are elections free and fair? To what extent are citizens allowed to form voluntary interest groups and NGOs (freedom of association)? Are NGOs and interest groups independent from the ruling party or are they merely its ‘clients’? Is the establishment of NGOs and interest groups restricted? How free are the media to monitor those in authority and hold them accountable for their actions (i.e. are they independent of state control)?

Saenna Chingamuka
occur soon. However, the Angolan election timetable has shifted again and again, from 2004 to 2005 and now to 2006. Although a so-called debate over amendments to the constitution is continuing, Unita and other opposition parties withdrew from the constitutional commission in May 2004 owing to the government’s insistence that elections can take place only once the constitution has been amended.

The government continues to restrict the right of association, although there have been some improvements over the last year. However, existing legislation still permits the government to deny the registration of private associations on security grounds. The government also arbitrarily restricts associations that are considered to be opposed to the government. Only those that toe the party line are allowed to form without restrictions. The government is especially sensitive about NGOs and interest groups that advocate democracy, as threatening its hold on power.

However, some organisations have managed to carve out a political space for themselves. The church in Angola plays a much more active role than other civil society organisations, partly because of the work it does in the humanitarian arena. Already the church is emerging as a powerful political actor in Angola’s landscape, because the government has afforded it a certain degree of insider status.

According to the New York-based Human Rights Watch, Angola’s two years of peace have brought some advances in freedom of expression, association and assembly overall. However, in the interior of the country, these freedoms are continually violated. Government agents seldom hesitate to use violence against opposition activists, and no independent media exist. The limited infrastructure, the consequences of the dispossession and dispersal of a large part of the Angolan population during the civil war, and the sheer inaccessibility of some of the rural areas will make the holding of free and fair elections very difficult in the interior.

Despite expectations that the media could play an important role in ensuring greater accountability in the government, this has not proved to be the case. The Media Institute of Southern Africa recently expressed the view that the Angolan media serve merely as conveyors of ‘state information’. Investigative journalism is not practised, and no progress has been made towards reviewing information rights. Although the constitution provides for press freedom and holds that the media may not be subjected to ideological, political or artistic censorship, the government continues to treat journalists harshly. The Angolan Journalists Union works closely with the ruling MPLA, and puts pressure on writers to adhere to government guidelines.

How strikingly different is the situation in Botswana. Regular and properly conducted multiparty elections are held every five years (the next is due in October 2004). Although the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has held a majority of seats in the National Assembly since independence, Botswana’s institutions of governance such as the judiciary and legislature are well respected. Domestic and international observers pronounced the 1999 National Assembly elections having been free and fair. However, access to information is an issue in Botswana. BDP candidates generally enjoyed preferential access to state-owned media, including radio, which is the only source of news for most of the rural population, throughout much of the 1999 campaign. There have also been reports at times that the government has attempted to limit press freedom. Yet, Botswana’s small but vigorous independent press has a long tradition of frank communication. Reporters actively cover the political arena, and often criticise the government and the president, without fear of reprisal.

The constitution also allows for freedom of assembly and association, and the government generally respects these rights. About 85 NGOs are affiliated

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to the Botswana Council of Non-governmental Organisations (BOCONGO), although not all the country’s NGOs are members, and many communal interest groups are excluded.

How are both countries rated in terms of corruption? While Botswana is regarded as the least corrupt country in Africa, Angola is considered one of the most badly affected. Angola’s ranking by the WBI is a dismal 7.2 (red), whereas Botswana achieves a rating of 75.3 (green).

In 2003, Transparency International ranked Angola as the third most corrupt country in Africa, on a scale of zero (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). Out of 133 countries assessed worldwide, Angola’s country grading is 124th. According to Human Rights Watch, over $4 billion in state oil revenue disappeared during the period 1997-2002. In 2002 the country established a special court to investigate government budget expenditure. However, it has had limited success in controlling corruption. Moreover, the president appoints the attorney-general, who does not wield much independent power, to identify and prosecute cases of corruption. There are no known records of the attorney-general’s having investigated such charges against any high-ranking member of government.

Botswana, the least corrupt country of 21 African economies rated by the World Economic Forum, is ranked by Transparency International at 5.7, which is 30th in the total of 133 countries world-wide. Following a number of corruption scandals in the 1990s (including the purchasing of school textbooks resulting in a loss of $15 million, and land distribution and housing mismanagement), the Botswana government enacted the Corruption and Crime Act of 1994, which established the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). This body has the power to investigate both cases of corruption and economic crimes against the state. In 1995, for instance, it conducted an enquiry into opposition party councillors who had misappropriated government funds. Since its establishment in 1994, the DCEC has investigated 1,313 cases. By 1998, 180 people had been charged with corruption.

In 2000, amendments to the Proceeds of Serious Crimes Act were enacted, which made dealing in illegally acquired assets a criminal offence and empowered the DCEC to probe suspected money laundering and related crimes. The DCEC falls under the office of the president, to whom the director submits annual reports of the DCEC’s activities. No other public or civil society body has the authority to scrutinise its work.

What does the future hold for voice and accountability and control of corruption in these two countries?

In Angola, the outlook is bleak. Voter apathy is pervasive. Simple survival is the main priority for most of the population, and therefore participation in the forthcoming elections ranks low. People are also unlikely to engage the government to lobby for more stringent mechanisms to control corruption.

However, Angola’s signing up to the APRM is a positive step which could bring about an improvement in quality of governance. The lobbying efforts made by interest groups to press the government to publish its oil revenues is also encouraging. Should the ruling party accede to these demands, governance practice in Angola will become more transparent, which in turn may make it more accountable, especially in the way it spends these revenues.

Voice and accountability are expected to remain at their present levels in Botswana as long as the BDP remains in power. Structurally, the ruling party continues to be kept in check by the independent press, local communities and minority groups, like the Basarwa in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, who actively lobby the government when they deem that policies have been implemented without consultation. Botswana’s efforts to control corruption should be applauded, but these could be made more transparent by allowing civil society to scrutinise the activities of the DCEC and its director. The Directorate might also be made more independent of the presidency and allowed to report to parliament instead.

Angola can learn much from Botswana on the subjects of regular elections, freedom of association and the press, and the control of corruption. Botswana, on the other hand, can learn from Angola’s accession to the APRM. No matter how mature an entity seems to be, there is always room for improvement, even if the lesson comes from a less democratically developed state.

Richard Meissner
Civil Society’s Involvement in SADC’s Peace and Security Apparatus

A dramatic shift has taken place in regional civil-military relations owing to a growing recognition by governments that the provision of a peaceful and secure environment is not the responsibility of the state and its security apparatus alone. Civil society has a role to play in the creation of a regional community in which the threat of conflict is mitigated by greater access to economic, social and political opportunities. The provision of such openings is the task of individual governments, but because of the interdependence of Southern African states, some of these can be attained only through co-operation at regional level.

Nevertheless, despite the express commitment of SADC’s leaders to involve civil society (including NGOs, the private sector, trade unions and employers’ organisations) in its integration agenda, to date such partnerships have been limited and strained. Nowhere is this more so than in the ambit of peace and security.

African governments are notoriously ‘sensitive’ about the activity of non-state actors. However, it would be unfair to blame this lack of co-operation between civil society and governments only on the recalcitrance of state structures and politicians. They have, after all, created some channels for interaction. These can be found in the SADC treaty, the region’s 10-year development plan, a memorandum of understanding with the SADC Council of NGOs, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security and the implementation plan for the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. These initiatives mirror commitments made by states at the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional organisations, where civil society’s role in conflict prevention, management and resolution is being recognised and institutionalised. Currently, a working group is reviewing the statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, an organ of the AU to bridge the gap between governments and the people, which comprises different social and professional groups from member states. In East Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development makes use of research institutes and civil society organisations to co-ordinate information on potential conflict to feed into their regional early warning mechanism.

Civil society also needs to build trust in its interactions with politicians and bureaucrats by adopting better democratic practices in its own organisations. This includes improved accountability to their social constituencies, whereas at present many such groupings answer only to external (often Western) donors. Civil society organisations could also nurture the development of common norms and values in Southern Africa by creating networks that allow organisations to share both experiences and resources. Also, they will have to accept that a confrontational approach towards government has limited value when state structures are weak and under-resourced. It is important that these organisations search for creative ways of engaging constructively with policy-makers.

Ways in which civil society groups could contribute to SADC’s peace and security agenda are diverse. Furthermore, it is important that their activities remain fluid and responsive to changing circumstances and new threats. These groups should promote public debates and raise awareness of SADC’s activities and initiatives among ordinary citizens. This will ensure a greater sense of ownership of SADC in the public mind, and contribute to good governance by empowering citizens to call for their political leaders to make greater regional integration efforts. Organisations such as churches can assist in strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms, monitoring electoral processes and creating forums for peace building and reconciliation. Research institutes and non-governmental organisations can co-operate by identifying policy priorities and contributing to policy-making processes. Civil society organisations could also embark on lobbying initiatives, the ‘naming and shaming’ of human rights abusers or corrupt politicians, and media training. They could also identify best practices regarding issues such as press freedom, the conduct of elections and the activities of parliamentary oversight committees charged with peace and security issues.

Despite these channels for formal engagement, several obstacles continue to hinder effective interaction. Critically, the lack of information sharing and distribution between state and civil organisations is a huge impediment. The SADC bureaucracy

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(including agencies within member countries) is known for its reluctance to publish documentation. Until the establishment of the SADC website a few years ago, it was virtually impossible to get hold of public documents such as treaties and protocols. Today this situation is much improved, but allegations persist that requests for contributions are often lodged at the last minute, and that poor translation of documents (into French and Portuguese) hinders effective consultation. Regrettably, civil society often does its own cause no good when it shares its findings with the media and external stakeholders before presenting them to policymakers. Of course, this kind of action by research organisations may be explained by their fear that their reports might be suppressed or changed by unreceptive governments. Another structural/institutional factor that hampers cooperation is the incomplete status of the SADC National Committees, the primary vehicles for consultations and implementation of SADC activities at the national level.

In the regional context, the SADC habit of top-level decision-making affords little independent authority to the Secretariat. It is therefore unable to strengthen its limited capacity (aggravated by the ongoing restructuring process) through consultative and other collaborative relations with civil society organisations. Often the Secretariat has to delay decisions until SADC ministerial or summit meetings, or those of the relevant substructures, are held. The mandate of the Secretariat on issues of peace and security is limited, and all decisions are referred to the SADC heads of state and government.

Despite these obstacles, civil society has proven its value to state actors, and has forged sustainable and mutually beneficial relationships. Partnerships on peace and security often include a training element. For example, the Training for Peace Programme at the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies provides tuition to the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes in Durban supplies assistance and training to a wide range of actors in the areas of conflict resolution, management and negotiations. Other organisations such as the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT), based in Harare, have assisted in the harmonisation of legislation with regard to the SADC Corruption Protocol. While some of these examples relate to traditional security issues, there are also initiatives that reflect a broader view — including governance and economic, social and political stability — commonly known as a human security approach.

The above examples are not attempts to force SADC’s hand, but are responses to commitments made by political leaders to the Community’s various treaties and protocols. Although it remains the primary responsibility of the state to govern and to provide security and opportunities for its citizens, it would be unwise to ignore the role civil society can play. Where states fail to perform adequately, civil society groups can mobilise support against the ruling elite. For example, the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe started as a labour movement, and is today a vital political force in that country. Civil society groups also raised their voices against the unconstitutional ‘third terms’ in office proposed by the presidents of Malawi and Zambia. On the other hand, civil society organisations may step in and find ways to provide what the state cannot. The community policing systems, or the conflict resolution efforts of local women’s groups in the DRC offer relevant instances. Similarly, af

Africa’s anti-corruption drive
To date, seven countries have ratified the SADC Protocol Against Corruption. These are Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia.

The AU Anti-Corruption Convention was adopted in July 2003. Thirty countries have signed the Convention, including the following SADC states: Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

The ‘Global Corruption Industry’
Annual worldwide bribes amount to some $1 trillion, according to the World Bank. This excludes the extensive embezzlement of public funds (from central and local budgets), or from theft (or misuse) of public assets.

Countries that improve control on corruption and rule of law can expect (on average) in the long run, a four-fold increase in incomes per capita. The business sector also grows significantly faster where corruption is lower and property rights and the rule of law is safeguarded. On average it can make a difference of about 3% per year in annual growth for enterprises.

One study of foreign direct investment estimates that corruption is the equivalent of a 20% tax to foreign investors.

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(Continued on the next page)
ter natural or man-made disasters, it is often civil society groups such as churches or NGOs that provide emergency relief, counselling and even reconstruction assistance after the emergency is over.

In seeking constructive engagement with civil society, the state can tap into the varied abilities of a wide range of people to supplement and complement its own weaknesses. Civil society organisations can do much to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and practices in the sub-region.

However, peace and security are generally regarded as highly sensitive areas by states. The power to govern is vested, after all, in the monopoly by the state on the legitimate use of force. Indeed, the opening of matters concerning security to too much civil society participation could hinder the establishment of a more stable and peaceful sub-region by diluting the authority of governments. The suspicion felt by governments that foreign donors use assistance to civil society organisations to collect intelligence and exert influence are not unfounded. It is also true that most civil society organisations are not representative of broad sections of the population. If those interests that are served by certain (more powerful) civil society groups gain precedence over others that are not equally well organised or resourced, further inequality and even conflict may result.

Nevertheless, by opening up the security debate to include a broader range of issues that focuses on conflict prevention rather than conflict management and resolution, the role civil society can play expands substantially. To forge a regional security community of people rather than states, it is essential that the mutual distrust between the state and civil society in Southern Africa be transformed into a relationship of interdependence and sharing.

**SADC in the Public Mind**

More than two decades after the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) set out to promote development and alleviate poverty within its member states, what, in the public mind, has the organisation achieved? Are Southern Africans aware of SADC and its work in the region? If they are, how do they rate the organisation’s performance? And what are the implications of these evaluations for the promotion of good governance in the region?

The results of recent Afrobarometer surveys can help to answer these questions. The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets, civil society, and a host of related topics. They are based on the responses of nationally representative samples of citizens aged 18 years and older, who have been selected through a random, multi-stage sampling process.

The second survey of the Afrobarometer, conducted from 2002-03 in 15 African countries, included a question about the performance of a number of international organisations. In seven Southern African countries, the list included SADC.

The question asked was: ‘Giving marks out of 10, where 0 is “very badly” and 10 is “very well”, how well do you think the following institutions do their jobs? Or haven’t you heard enough about the institutions to have an opinion?’

The results of the survey indicate that although popular awareness of SADC is low, it is slightly better known than other international organisations, and receives the highest average performance ratings. Awareness of SADC is linked strongly to both education level and access to radio and newspapers. Explaining the performance ratings is more difficult, but respondents appear to base their assessments of all international organisations on whether their general attitude toward the international community is positive or negative.

**Low Popular awareness of SADC**

Southern Africans are not entirely familiar with SADC and its work. Just half (51%) of those interviewed know enough about the organisation to offer opinions about its performance. However, the level of familiarity with the organisation varies significantly across countries (Figure 1). While just

![Figure 1: Awareness of SADC across countries](image)

(Continued on the next page)

Gina van Schalkwyk, Institute for Security Studies.
30% of Mozambicans and 35% of Basotho know anything about SADC, two-thirds of Batswana (67%), and fully 89% of Namibians are familiar enough with the organisation to rate its performance.

Nonetheless, Southern Africans are more familiar with SADC than with any of the other multilateral or international organisations listed in the questionnaire, including the African Union, although the differences are not large (Figure 2). At 51%, SADC is about as familiar as the United Nations (UN) (50%), but is somewhat better known than the African Union (AU) (46%), the World Bank (44%), and the other organisations.

**SADC’s ratings highest**
The good news for SADC is that those who are aware of the organisation rate its performance relatively positively. Among the 51% who could venture an opinion, the mean rating on the scale of 0:10 was 6.91, a moderately positive score. Moreover, Southern Africans evaluate the performance of SADC more positively than that of any other organisation included in the study (Figure 3). It scored slightly higher than the UN (6.67 points), and one full point above the lowest scorer, the AU (5.94 points). However, the relatively small overall variation of just one point on an 11-point scale suggests that respondents are not making clear distinctions between these organisations, and instead give them all fairly similar ratings. The scores across various organisations are highly correlated.

**Ratings – and rankings – vary**
There is greater variation in SADC’s ratings across countries: it earns high scores of 7.61 in Namibia and 7.59 in Mozambique, and a low of 5.77 in South Africa, a total spread of nearly two points. However, the ratings on the 11-point scale do not tell the full story. For example, although SADC received one of its highest scores in Mozambique (7.59), it ranked sixth out of the seven organisations listed. (The UN had the highest score, with 8.06.) On the other hand, SADC earned the lowest score in South Africa, yet is the highest-rated among the seven organisations surveyed within that country. In sum, SADC receives the highest rating in three of seven countries, and the lowest or second lowest in another three. Only in Zambia does it fall in the middle. This raises the question: is the organisation perceived as doing more for the region’s wealthier members — including the three where it is rated highest — than it does for some of its poorest members — including those who rate it lowest.

**Who knows SADC?**
Wide differences in awareness of SADC are evident not only between countries, but within them as well. Gender, urban or rural location, age and education are all significantly linked to familiarity with SADC’s work (Figure 4). In particular, people with some tertiary education are more than three times as likely to know of SADC than those with no formal education, and those over 45 are only about two-thirds as likely to be aware of it as young people (under 30). Income is also a factor: only 41% of those reporting no income know of SADC, compared to around 70% of those placing themselves in the top two income deciles in their country.

Access to news sources is also clearly linked to awareness of SADC (Figure 5). Radio is still the most common source of information in Africa. The 78% of the public who listen to radio news regularly are more than twice as likely to know of SADC than the small minority (13%) who never listen. Similarly, the third (32%) of the public who frequently read newspapers is more than twice as likely to know of SADC than the half (48%) who do not.

Further analysis reveals that education is the major factor in awareness of SADC. For example, the apparent dif-
ferences between urban and rural residents can be reduced to the disparities in access to education. The same holds true for age-related differences. Moreover, even after education differences are accounted for, there is also a small gender-based difference in knowledge of SADC. Exposure to newspapers and radio news follows education as a major determinant of public awareness.

Explaining performance ratings

What explains the ratings given to SADC by those who know of its work? This question is not easy to answer, at least with the data currently available. Numerous factors influence performance ratings. In particular, it appears that those citizens who are satisfied with their domestic political system and the government’s performance are likely to rate SADC more highly. For example, those who have higher trust in their president and assess his performance positively are also likely to rate SADC more positively. Similarly, those who give their own government higher performance ratings for management of the economy or provision of education give SADC better reviews. Higher ratings for SADC are also associated with satisfaction with the degree of democracy and the condition of the national economy in the respondent’s country.

However, all of these influences are relatively weak. The relationship between ratings of SADC and those of other international organisations is far stronger. An individual who rates one international organisation highly is quite likely to rate all others highly as well, and vice versa. This suggests that the primary factor determining performance ratings for SADC (and all international organisations) is a general, as yet undefined or unexplained, ‘affect’ (or ‘attitude’) towards such organisations or even the international community. Domestic factors play a role in evaluations of SADC, but they appear to be much less important than whether or not the respondent perceives the general role of the international community positively or negatively.

Raising SADC’s profile

The already relatively positive attitudes expressed by those who are aware of SADC could assist it in its effort to promote good governance and the consolidation of democracy in the region because they give it greater influence and credibility. This in turn could serve as a positive ‘change agent’, that could help SADC in lobbying, pressuring and persuading member governments to continue to improve the quality of the democracy their citizens experience.

It may therefore be worthwhile for SADC to raise its public profile across the region. SADC may have a competitive advantage among international organisations within the region because of its more local roots and focus, so it may also be in its interest to set itself apart from the rest of the international community with which it is, at present, closely linked.

A frobarometer findings suggest that there are two productive avenues for SADC to follow. First, expanding access to education, along with producing a host of other benefits will also increase the awareness of the region’s citizens of the world beyond their national borders, including, though by no means limited to, SADC and its efforts. Second, the links between media access (especially radio and print) and awareness of SADC suggest that the organisation will benefit if it improves the availability of news to the public and also ensures specific coverage of SADC’s work in the media. By doing so, the organisation can expand and deepen its base of support within the region, creating a stronger foundation from which to pursue its objectives: the betterment of the people of Southern Africa.

Carolyn Logan
## Human Development in SADC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI rank out of 177 countries</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years) 2002</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 2002</th>
<th>Combined gross enrolment - primary, secondary, tertiary (%) 2001/02</th>
<th>Human development index value 2002</th>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>38.5</td>
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Source: Human Development Report 2004

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