



## FRANCE

*'France wants to be your best friend in the new struggle that you have undertaken – the African Renaissance'. President Chirac told Mbeki at state dinner in 2003.*

### **France's changing African agenda (historical overview):**

Since the end of WWI, France has been determined to rank among the great powers in the evolving international system. This search, according to Bourmaud<sup>1</sup>, permeated French policy in Africa and explained the particularity and continuity of the measures that France exhibited in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly Guy Martin refers to French policy in Africa as being exclusive, stable and continuous<sup>2</sup>. However, only the end of bipolarity led France to reconsider its stance. Reformulation of France's Africa policy thus appeared to be substantial in measure but remarkably continuous as far as its underlying principles were concerned. In many ways exceptionalist, French policy in Africa served to perpetuate France's self-awareness of exceptionalism (Bourmaud, 2003:14).

During this time, sub-Saharan Africa offered unrivalled opportunities and available resources to France. Africa was perceived as belonging to the French sphere of influence by virtue of its historical links, geographical proximity, and its cultural and linguistic affinity. It was also believed to constitute a natural French preserve that was off limits to other foreign powers<sup>3</sup> (Martin, 2003: 99).

There was a certain specificity regarding France and its relationship with sub-Saharan Africa. Bourmaud describes this relationship as the famous 'independence in

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<sup>1</sup> Bourmaud, D. 2003. 'France and Africa: the constant striving for exceptionalism' in *France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa*. Protea Book House, Pretoria.

<sup>2</sup> Martin, G. 2003. 'France's African policy in transition: disengagement and redeployment' in *France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa*. Protea Book House, Pretoria

<sup>3</sup> Martin, G. 2003. 'France's African policy in transition: disengagement and redeployment' in *France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa*. Protea Book House, Pretoria

independence' that typifies the depth of the ties between France and sub-Saharan Africa. By August 1960 practically all French colonies had gained independence. However, France still needed Africa to exercise a distinctive zone of influence outside its territory. France extended beyond the borders inherited from French West Africa and Equatorial French Africa to progressively integrate the peripheral states ruled from former Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese possessions.

Although former colonies were integrated into a new institutional body, in many respects these were a product of the construction of a neo-colonial mechanism. The structures put into place, such as the CFA franc, affected sovereign state prerogatives and anchored them to the West. France's search for influence was also reinforced through technical military co-operation agreements signed with 23 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Through these agreements France was given the capacity to intervene in the area of African states' security, at the same time as it was provided with knowledge of the internal security structure of each of the states taking part in the agreements. Since 1962 France positioned itself up as a de facto 'policeman' of Africa and directly intervened in numerous disputes south of the Sahara (i.e. In Gabon, Zaire and Chad).

### **1997 onwards:**

However, by 1997 many of the instruments in France's African policy were modernized and adapted, "not sparing any foundation of African policy in its former version" (Bourmaud, 2003)<sup>4</sup>. Bourmaud describes these arrangements as sensitively remodeling the African landscape, "where the means of power were calculated paradoxically to better marry the main themes of the new French power in Africa". This policy was described as being resolutely continental and according to Bourmaud, aimed to reconcile its positioning in the dynamic zones, particularly Southern Africa, without losing its influence in the countries of the former hinterland. France's logic during this time would be to exercise a unique position on the African continent. During the November 1998 Franco-African summit in Paris, France set itself up as the organizing power of a post-bipolar African order.

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<sup>4</sup> Alden, C and Martin, G. 2003. *'France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa'*.

According to Guy Martin, there were six symbolic events that shaped this new French African policy:

- 1) The death of Houphouët-Boigny and Foccart, the former President of Côte d'Ivoire and the ex-advisor to de Gaulle, respectively.
- 2) The La Baule doctrine – establishing a link between the provision of economic and financial assistance and the adoption of political reforms leading to liberal, multi-party democracy.
- 3) The Abidjan doctrine on structural adjustment – requiring good economic governance as a prerequisite for aid, and the devaluation of the CFA franc.
- 4) French policy in the Great Lakes region in the early 1990's – setbacks occurred particularly due to the continued diplomatic, military, technical and financial support France gave to the Hutu extremists in Rwanda.
- 5) France and South Africa moved towards a new engagement in Africa. As France disengaged from francophone sub-Saharan Africa, it looked increasingly toward South Africa as the ideal intermediary and power-broker to penetrate southern African markets. This relationship was evident in the recent mediation efforts of President Mbeki in the conflict situation in Côte d'Ivoire.
- 6) France's restrictive immigration policy towards francophone Africa and its resultant hostility.

Martin explains the French policy was no longer determined by politico-diplomatic and geo-political factors, but rather by economic and financial considerations, namely the search for new African and Third World markets and a renewed focus on European integration. Thus, France's reforms from 1997 onwards aimed to reflect current international realities and interests and were based on four principles:

- Unilateral intervention in internal affairs was discarded, but the defense agreements were retained against external aggression. These resulted in the introduction of Reinforcement of African Capacity to Maintain Peace (RECAMP) programmes and the tripartite initiative launched by France, UK and the US on sub-regional and pan-African peacekeeping forces. France

altered its strategy of direct military intervention to one of African-owned processes and indirect assistance.

- Although partnership with French speaking Africa had been modernized and maintained, France widened its co-operation to include the whole continent, particularly South Africa and Angola.
- The direction of the French government was prompted by a strategy of gathering the means and rationalizing their use. Henceforth, the main target of French ODA became the 'solidarity priority area' (ZSP). The ZSP comprises essentially of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, (signatories of the Lomé Convention), plus South Africa.
- France worked at transforming institutions and departments in charge of African policy in order to obtain coherence in its external policy. The Ministry of Co-operation was integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It moved from a separate department into a ministerial delegate that is in charge of a General Directorate for International Co-operation and Development. The Ministerial Department of Defense and Finance was placed under the control of an Interministerial Committee for International Co-operation and Development (CICID), and is now linked directly to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Author Bourmaud argues that these changes have reduced the margin of autonomous action that these networks previously had.
- The European dimension of French policy became increasingly emphasized – prioritizing the renewal of Lomé Convention, linking the CFA Franc and the Euro. According to Dubertrand, France has integrated her 'special relationship' with Africa into the wider European context. This was illustrated for example in the resolution of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. France's interaction must be seen in line with the new EU's co-ordinated foreign policy under which France's bilateral African policy must henceforth be subsumed.

According to Guy Martin, there are two opposing viewpoints of this evolving Franco-African relationship. The first highlights French disengagement from francophone Africa and the simultaneous redeployment of French politico-diplomatic, strategic and economic interests away from francophone Africa and into new territories in Africa

(Nigeria, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa) and other Third World countries (Brazil, India, Vietnam etc)<sup>5</sup>.

French ODA has decreased substantially and has transformed into long-term, project-based type of assistance. French disengagement also took place in the security arena. From 1997 to 2002 troops decreased from 8000 to 5600. These troops were concentrated in five areas only (Abidjan, Dakar, Djibouti, Libreville and N'Djamena) and two bases were closed in the Central African Republic (Bangui and Bouar). France also relocated its military training from France to sub-regional training centers in Africa (Thies in Senegal, Koulikoro in Mali, Bouake in Côte d'Ivoire). It is important to note that the French policy still maintains a colonial character – with bases in countries considered of strategic importance for the perpetration of French political, economic and strategic influence

The opposing viewpoint indicates clearly that France did not intend to change its African policy and that it remains faithful to its traditional African allies. Martin (2003:103) says that the decolonisation policy was a mere smokescreen behind which the traditional status quo policy of *la Francafrique* is actually maintained.

### **France's foreign policy and its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa:**

Since the end of the Second World War, it is clear that France's major concern has been to preserve its national independence while simultaneously working to foster regional and international solidarity. France has progressively withdrawn economically from its former colonial empire and has become more integrated with Europe and the world. France today has closer relations with major non-franc zone countries in Africa (Nigeria and South Africa) than with franc zone countries (Hugon, 2003:114). French state corporation, Elf-Total, has a dominate position in Central African oil-producing countries, particularly Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville (Hugon, 2003:115).

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<sup>5</sup> Data provided in the French National Assembly Parliamentary Financial Committee's Report on Foreign Affairs and co-operation for 1998 (A Adevah-Poeuf, rapporteur) in 'France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa. 2003,

France's trade with francophone Africa is highly unequal. With a population 25 percent greater than that of France, African countries from the franc zone account for only 4% of France's GDP or only 1,5% of its money supply. The share of the franc zone in French foreign trade dropped to 1,3% in 1998, while France absorbed about one-fourth of the zone's exports<sup>6</sup>.

In 1994, French total trade with non-franc zone countries – namely South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius and Madagascar, valued at FF 22 billion – exceeded French trade with franc zone countries (Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon and Senegal, valued at FF 17 billion). French economic interests in the no-franc zone countries are essentially in the mining and oil sectors (Angola and Nigeria). In 1997, less than half of French official development assistance (ODA) was earmarked for franc zone countries (FF 22 billion), while FF 822 million was set aside for non-franc zone African countries. (including FF 210 million for South Africa alone).

France no longer has vital strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas North Africa is of specific strategic importance. Immigrant communities from sub-Saharan Africa don't weigh as much as those from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia – the political class and the opinion leaders are bound by a tight network of personal relationships and reciprocal influences. Although sub-Saharan Africa cannot endanger France's independence and existence, it does play a substantial role in France's internal policy.

This being true, France's foreign policy priorities define the development of its relations with African countries, particularly the LDC's. France has shown a commitment to secure the better integration of African countries into the world economy. As a result France has been a major force behind the EU plan to create fairer trading conditions for African cotton producing countries. France's actions in this area were in pursuit of reforms, which would assist developing countries' exports in sectors where they have a comparative advantage. France also has increasingly established itself as the western champion of NEPAD. This was evident by the manner in which it put the African agenda as a precedent at the G8 summit it hosted

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<sup>6</sup> Hugon, P. 2003. The economic relations with France and South Africa with Africa' in *France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa*. 114.

in Evian in 2003<sup>7</sup>. France, holding the Presidency of the G8 at the time, maneuvered the debate successfully in order to include the African continent as a main theme of the Summit.

France has gone beyond the consensus at Kananaskis, which is enshrined in the G8 Action Plan on Africa, to define its own position on NEPAD and identify its priorities for the partnership. The French government labels NEPAD simply as a 'shooting list' of Africa's needs, of which G8 nations are invited to address<sup>8</sup>. The first French contribution to NEPAD is the development of infrastructure, and water and sanitation assistance – encouraging the establishment of public-private partnerships. Due to the importance that France plays on governance and democracy, it aims to facilitate the peer review mechanism between African states, and supports the creation of a pan-African peacekeeping force by 2010.

Finally, in keeping with Chirac's statements at the Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey in 2002, and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, the French contribution to NEPAD and the G8 Action Plan will focus on fulfilling certain Millennium Development Goals (MDG's). Access to medicines and improving the education systems in sub-Saharan French-speaking Africa are among France's principal objectives.

Agricultural development in Africa has also been prioritised on the French agenda. After the last Franco-African Summit, the French President surprised everyone by announcing that he would propose that G8 members adopt a moratorium on subsidies for agricultural exports from developed countries to Africa. This seemed astonishing considering that France categorically refused to discuss reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) by 2006.

Chirac's proposal in February 2005 to create an 'international solidarity levy' on international financial transactions or airline ticket sales, so as to finance African development and the fight against HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, won him the acclaim

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<sup>7</sup> 'South Africa's French lesson' in *Daily Mail & Guardian*. 21 November 2003.

<sup>8</sup> 'Evian G8 Summit- France plays the NEPAD card', BOND. [www.bond.org.uk](http://www.bond.org.uk).

of the third-world lobby<sup>9</sup>. 'Development is both the greatest challenge and the greatest urgency of our time', he declared in a speech broadcast at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2005, calling African poverty 'morally unacceptable'.

Nevertheless, pressing domestic issues and the renewed internal European focus are diverting attention away from the African agenda. France 's unemployment rate stands at 10.2%, close to a five year high and more than double the level of Britain, and the government's consumer-confidence index has plunged to its lowest since the index was created in late 2003<sup>10</sup>. France is in desperate need of regulating its labour market, and its focus in recent months has been on securing the service directive. The negative outcome of the recent constitutional vote held on 29 May 2005 has sparked concern in the French government. France decisively rejected the EU body of law, by 55% to 45% on a remarkably high turnout of 70%. Neighbourhood issues are also clouding the African agenda. President Chirac is strongly opposed to Blair's pro-American, economically liberal views. Chirac, on the other hand, wants to build the EU as a counterweight to the US, and has become deeply suspicious of EU's liberalizing tendencies. This has resulted in recent disagreements over the EU budget. France is resentful of the large rebate in the British net contribution to the budget, and yet not willing to budge on its CAP benefits. With Presidential elections taking place in France in 2007, many leaders will find themselves facing a choice between implementing economic reforms or winning a second term. As a result France has pushed through some political measures to shake up labour markets, cut pension burdens and income taxes.

#### **Africa-France security co-operation:**

As mentioned previously, France has also completely revised its military institutions dealing with Africa and has shifted its military co-operation to allow African countries to take responsibility for the continent's security themselves. RECAP transferred the mission of maintaining security south of the Sahara to African troops to whom France would supply logistics.

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<sup>9</sup> 'Jacques Chirac, socialist', The Economist. 19 March 2005: 35.

<sup>10</sup> 'Chirac makes a risky choice', Global Agenda. The Economist. 1 June 2005.



Further, France has participated in a number of UN operations, such as the UN mission to Somalia, Rwanda, and the Central African Republic in 1997. France more recently expressed its determination through the deployment of 4000 troops deployed in Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire, the 300 present in Bangui (Central African Republic), and the 1,500 sent to provide security to Bunia (DRC). As stipulated in Ethiopian prime ministers visit to France in April 2005, Frances priorities include the regional situation in the Horn of Africa: the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the situation in Sudan and in Somalia.

In April 2005 France contributed 566 observers/ troops to UN Missions abroad. Of this, 25 observers were deployed to MINURSO in Western Sahara, 20 to MONUC in the DRC, 1 troop to Ethiopia and Eritrea, 1 to Liberia, and 199 to UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire. In total, France deployed 246 troops throughout Africa<sup>11</sup>.

It is interesting to note that France spends 5 times as much on military expenses than it does on development assistance<sup>12</sup>.

### **France-Africa Development Co-operation:**

Long-established relations with many countries in the Southern hemisphere and the special solidarity between them have led France to define an ambitious co-operation policy. According to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in a visit to South Africa in 2003, France's international involvement today is based on the principles of the legitimacy of the government, the respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the need to encourage regional integration and the systematic support for African mediation<sup>13</sup>.

In 1997, France was the second largest donor in the world, providing official development assistance (ODA) of 37 billion francs. This placed France first among the seven members of the G7 group of most industrialized countries and sixth among

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<sup>11</sup> 'UN Mission's Summary detailed by country: monthly report for April 2005'.  
[www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions](http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions)

<sup>12</sup> Europe: A true Global Partner for Development'. CIDSE Shadow report on European Progress towards Millennium Development Goal 8. Final version. May 2005:18.

<sup>13</sup> 'Embassy of France in the United States, 30 June 2003.

the member states of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Today, the US and Japan are the two largest donors in volume terms, but France is the most generous G7 country in terms of ODA/GNI ratio<sup>14</sup>. The OECD has commended the rise in the ODA from 0.32% in 2001 to 0.41% in 2003. France is further committed to increasing its bilateral ODA as part of an ambitious plan to meet the UN target of 0.7% by 2012, with an interim target of 0.5% by 2007. France will dedicate more than half this to Africa to assist with the MDG's. According to the OECD, France was the 6<sup>th</sup> largest donor of ODA during 2002 and 2003, giving a total of US\$33 million<sup>15</sup>.

Some authors describe France's development co-operation strategy as suffering from insurmountable contradictions. The French government's commitment to the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), reaffirmed by Chirac, is the clearest example of France's incoherent approach. In 2001, 20% of French agricultural producers, which have historically constituted a major social and political force, received 75% of European and national agricultural aid packages. There have disastrous developmental consequences of the subsidies and trade protectionism. However, France moulds its bilateral strategy on the Cotonou Agreement between EU and ACP countries. Yet critics find it hard to see how the objectives will be achieved while France continues to support CAP which clearly discriminates against agricultural producers in developing countries.

Despite these contradictions, France has consistently pleaded the cause of developing countries in international organizations dealing with debt and aid related issues. In 1992 it went so far as to cancel its debts owed to it by the LDC's, so as to make it easier for them to manage their debt. France for example, in the context of the HIPC initiative, has cancelled the whole of its bilateral debt with Ethiopia, a total of 6.5 million euros. It has also signed a tripartite agreement on food aid with the World Food Programme for a total of €2 million<sup>16</sup>. It has also taken a number of measures to help stabilize the price of the raw materials on which the export earnings of southern developing countries depend. In 1994 in Francophone Africa, France took specific aid measures to limit the effects on the people of the devaluation of the CFA franc, which

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<sup>14</sup> 'Improving the Aid Effectiveness of Europe's Largest Donor Country', OECD, 27 May 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Europe: A true Global Partner for Development'. CIDSE Shadow report on European Progress towards Millennium Development Goal 8. Final version. May 2005:11.

<sup>16</sup> 'Third African Union summit', French Department of Foreign Affairs. 9 July 2004.

enabled the countries concerned to continue working with international financial institutions.

Although France has clearly renewed commitment to development, it is evident that France has recently turned towards 're-nationalisation' or bilateralisation of French aid in an attempt to reassert the geo-political role of development as a tool for foreign policy<sup>17</sup>. A geographical breakdown of France's bilateral aid reveals, however, a heavy concentration on sub-Saharan Africa, which in 1996 received 42.4% of net payments. There is nevertheless a growing diversification of the geographical distribution of the aid.

### **France-South Africa political and historical relations:**

French immigrants have been involved in the history of South Africa for the past 330 years. From the arrival of the first Huguenots in 1671, to the French-Dutch occupation of the Cape Colony in 1781-1784, to the French involvement in the Anglo-Boer war in 1899 and 1902. France finally normalized diplomatic relations with South Africa after the first elections were held in 1994. Since then numerous high-profile state visits have taken place, enhancing diplomatic and economic relations between the two states.

Diplomatic relations between Paris and Pretoria have been improving substantially over the years since the aftermath of the crisis in Central Africa and the resultant hostility between the two. In 2003 alone, the South African President visited France four times: In January 2003 Mbeki attended the Paris conference in the wake of the inter-Ivorian agreements; in February he participated in the Africa-France Summit; in May he attended the enlarged G8 Summit dialogue; and in November 2003, Mbeki made an official state visit

Concrete steps were taken to put the relationship on a political footing with the establishment of the Forum on Political Dialogue in October 1997. However, South Africa was not prepared to create a bi-national commission until 2001 when a France-

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<sup>17</sup> Development and Foreign Policies in Italy, France, Denmark and Sweden: Implications for the EU'. Europe in the World. Chapter 5: 50.

South Africa joint commission was set up. As a result target priorities have been set out for the next few years. These include an improved access to services, the strengthening of institutional capacities, training historically disadvantaged people and the greater integration at the regional and continent-wide level as part of the NEPAD initiative.

Today there are some 5250 registered French nationals living in South Africa, and 2600 French nationals that do not care to be registered here. There are various French schools throughout the country and cultural institutions. In 2002, 8 % of French citizens abroad lived in Sub-Saharan Africa, a total of 142,013 people <sup>18</sup>.

### **South Africa-France economic co-operation:**

While the structure of the French-South African exchanges has remained stable since the early 1990's, the performance of French business in South Africa has shown clear progress over the past decade. In 1994, France was South Africa's 14<sup>th</sup> biggest trading partner, with total trade comprising of R3,712.00 million. By 2003 there was a percentage increase of 455.6 %, with France ascending to South Africa's 6<sup>th</sup> biggest trading partner, trade increasing to a total of R20,625.09 million<sup>19</sup>. This total bilateral trade figure represents imports making up R15,463.95 million and exports equaling R5,161.14 million. South Africa has thus become the leading outlet for French companies in sub-Saharan Africa.

Exports from France to South Africa mainly consist of equipment goods and intermediate goods. The clear growth of French sales is explained by the tripling of automobile exports in 2000. Meanwhile, South African exports to France consist mainly of raw materials, in particular coal. Other products imported by France also come from the mining sector, with the exception of fruit.

France is the largest agricultural country in Western Europe and, after Italy, the world's biggest producer of wine. It is also one of the world's leading industrial

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<sup>18</sup> French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [www.france.diplomatie.fr](http://www.france.diplomatie.fr).

<sup>19</sup> Farlam, Giralt and Ngubentombi. 2004. 'South Africa's foreign policy from 1994-2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future'. SAIIA. 331.

countries, prominent in the area of steel production, cars and aerospace. Major international exports sectors include motor vehicle and aircraft, pharmaceuticals, electrical machinery, plastics and plastic products. Imports consist mainly of mineral fuels, motor vehicles and aircraft (including parts thereof), pharmaceuticals and telecommunications equipment.

France was the ninth biggest foreign investor in South Africa in 2002, pouring more than US\$448 million into South Africa's economy<sup>20</sup>. About 160 French subsidiaries are present in South Africa today, and there are 300 small industries owned and managed by French people, mostly established in Gauteng and around Cape Town. Two significant contracts were signed on Mbeki's visit to France at the end of November 2003. French telecommunications equipment maker Alcatel agreed to sell a 30% stake to a local South African firm as part of the Black Economic Empowerment program. A subsidiary of European aircraft maker Airbus has also recently announced the creation of a new company in cooperation with South African firm Beams. This French presence is structured around large corporate groups operating in diverse sectors and implementing a highly dynamic investment policy. French interests represent 33% of foreign investments in Cote d'Ivoire and 30 % of its gross domestic product<sup>21</sup>

South Africa and France are key partners in the emerging dialogue around the major contemporary issues such as the war in Iraq, the Middle East conflict, the fight against terrorism and proliferation, and the means to ensure a development that is both equitable, sustainable, and shared. South Africa and France shared similar views on the situation in Iraq – both Chirac and Mbeki stressed the need to return sovereignty to that country without delay. France, a permanent veto power on the UNSC, has stated that it is in favour of enlarging the Security Council, in particular to include Germany and Japan, and has stressed that representatives from developing countries should not be left on the sidelines in the proposed future reform. As a regional leader,

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<sup>20</sup> 'Mbeki end state visit to France, hails strong bilateral ties', Special Edition. Hot News. 19 November 2003. [http://quickstart.clari.net/qs\\_se?webnews/wed/de/Qsafrica-france.R9vK\\_DNI.html](http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se?webnews/wed/de/Qsafrica-france.R9vK_DNI.html).

<sup>21</sup> Diop, B. April 2005. 'France in Francophone Africa: Ivory Coasts colonial adventure' in *Le Monde Diplomatique*.

South Africa stands a good chance of representing the African contingency on the Council.

However, France and South Africa also have conflicting opinions on various issues. The French endorsement of Moroccan bid for the 2010 Soccer World Cup was not welcomed by South African officials. France, on the other hand, did not believe that South Africa showed enough regard for the linguistic needs of the Francophone nations on the continent. Individuals in the ANC are occasionally hostile in that they believe France to have showed double standards during the apartheid regime, continuing dialogue before the first free and fair elections. Paris was unsatisfied with the lack of acknowledgement it was given by South Africa in assisting in the brokering of peace deals in the DRC and Burundi. France and South Africa also share differing opinions regarding the situation in Zimbabwe. In February 2002, the EU placed various sanctions on Zimbabwe. Britain was under pressure from both the South African and Nigerian governments to rescind its condemnation of Mugabe, and South Africa is under pressure from France to abandon its quiet diplomatic stance and intervene more forcefully.

#### **South Africa-France Development Co-operation:**

According to the European Commission in South Africa, the priority areas of development co-operation between France and South Africa are in human resource development, science and technology development, concessional credit facilities and culture<sup>22</sup>. This co-operation mainly takes the form of training of professional staff and specialized personnel through seminars run by French experts, scholarships or invitations to France, exchanges and the joint creation of new structures such as specialized training centers and university masters degrees. Projects such as an extensive €350 million government programme to ensure household linkages to drinkable water and drainage networks is being implemented over the period of 2001-2004<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> From fifteen to twenty-five member states: The European Union in South Africa. Delegation of the European Commission. 2004:34.

<sup>23</sup> 'Development Cooperation', French embassy in South Africa. [www.ambafrance-rsa.org](http://www.ambafrance-rsa.org).

**Possible Questions for embassy and research trip:**

- What is France's economic co-operation with francophone Africa in comparison to the rest of Africa?
- What areas do you prioritise in Africa? And why?
- Previously SA used to be on the priority list of the French Development Agency as one of the seven priority emerging markets. Is this still the case? And what other countries are on the list?
- How many Africans are there living in France?

**Things still to do:**

- Need to meet with the French embassy in Pretoria
- Update data
- Provide tables and charts with distribution of development aid, debt relief, trade etc