

## INSIDE

NAM: Past and future ..... page 3

AU: The role of the PSC ....page 4

## BRIEFS

### Davos: Outcomes for Africa

The 33<sup>rd</sup> Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos took place in a climate of global uncertainty and complexity. This can partly be attributed to the Iraqi crisis, the negative consequences of globalisation trends and the expanding gap between the developed and the developing world.

However, for Africa there were some important outcomes. More than 50 companies doing business on the continent pledged to practise good corporate governance and to promote clean business practices. This is a recognition that corruption in Africa is a two-way street and that businesses have a social responsibility towards the broader populations of the countries that they operate in.

The companies were invited to sign four comprehensive declarations at the meeting that were developed by the Nepad Business Group following the WEF's Africa summit in Durban in September 2002. These were:

- *The Business Covenant on Corporate Governance*
- *The Business Declaration on Corporate Responsibility*
- *The Business Covenant on the Elimination of Corruption and Bribery*
- *The Business Declaration on Accounting and Audit Practices*

*continued on page 4*

### Critical Partner or Reactionary Opponent: Africa and the US over Iraq

*The Iraqi crisis both highlights and detracts from some of the recent positive developments in Africa. The implications of the crisis for the present international institutional framework could be severe. However, it also underlines the importance for African states and especially SA to develop a more proactive, nuanced and engaged policy towards the US and vice versa.*

At one level the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> and the ensuing scrutiny of socio-political conditions within Arab and Muslim states have cast a much more favourable light on the efforts of African states to introduce and stick to liberal political and economic systems, even though Africa remains poorer and less developed. For all of Africa's problems of poverty, violence and corruption, the importance of the policy reforms and achievements on the continent, should not be understated.

Although the focus on Iraq threatens to eclipse Africa and especially the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) from the international spotlight, there are a number of unexpected upsides. The events of September 11<sup>th</sup> and the Iraqi crisis highlight the importance of not allowing African states to collapse, ensuring at the same time the conditions to reward performing states by, *inter alia*, improved access to global markets through initiatives such as the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. While Western responses to African development needs are still schizophrenic — vacillating between protectionism through domestic subsidies and greater trade access and more aid — there has arguably been much more generous and proactive engagement by the Bush administration than any of its predecessors, Clinton's included.

This is partly about oil. Expect greater US focus on the non-OPEC African oil-producing countries, notably Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Sudan, reflecting the imperative to both diminish the impact of the cartel and create alternative sources of oil supply. Africa now accounts for around 15% of US oil imports, a figure that is rapidly climbing.

Expect continued US focus on working with powers such as Kenya, SA, Nigeria and Ethiopia as a means of projecting stability in their regions. Indeed, Washington's hunger for allies has created a unique opportunity for African states to use their qualified support as a bargaining chip in return for assistance in realising Nepad's ambitious goals.

Until now, however, SA has preferred to see Iraq in moral terms, reflecting a wider power play in (and need for restructuring of) the

*continued on page 2*

*continued from page 1*

international system. At the ANC conference in December 2002, **Nelson Mandela** attacked the US, saying its approach to Iraq was arrogant and marked an alarming indifference towards the UN. President **Thabo Mbeki** has also sent out a clear message that there are no grounds for war in Iraq.

The role that SA apparently seeks as an honest broker over Iraq has been confused since November 2002, however, by various trade and investment delegations, ministerial visits and the current disarmament mission. And cosyng up to **Saddam** might backfire badly with the Iraqi people post-Saddam, since it is impossible to determine the degree of support he actually enjoys in the absence of democracy. How would SA look if Iraqis overwhelmingly cheered his departure?

Given the bipartisan support for action against Iraq in the US, this show of support for Saddam may prove costly to US-SA relations whatever the administration in power in Washington. Indeed, there seems to be some recognition in government that SA's position on Iraq has been perceived as too soft. Foreign Minister **Dlamini-Zuma** recently stated that SA would await the UN inspectors' report before taking a formal position, despite the positive assessment made by the SA disarmament team led by Deputy Minister **Pahad**.

Pretoria's concerns in doing the 'right thing' in avoiding war with Iraq and advocating the multilateral route contrast starkly with its policy preferences over Zimbabwe and in the Commonwealth. Its role within SADC has not replicated the leadership it displays in the wider international community.

It is difficult to ignore the deeply held views within the ANC about the West in general,

and the US and Republicans in particular. As ANC Secretary-General **Kgalema Motlanthe** reportedly noted in a march on the US Embassy in February 2003, South Africa with its rich mineral resources could become the next victim of 'unilateral' action by the US. 'The primary crime of Iraq is the fact that it floats on oil,' he said. 'Because we are endowed with several rich minerals, if we don't stop this unilateral action against Iraq today, tomorrow they will come for us.'

Such sentiment is dangerous to both SA and US longer-term interests, and one that is both as misinformed about the realities of US domestic and foreign policy as it is founded on a combination of perceptions about race, domination, exclusion and imperialism. At another level, Pretoria's line on Iraq is unlikely to assist in creating greater sympathy in Washington for Nepad. The stance is likely to be counter-productive to wider African ambitions, including the aim of restructuring the UN Security Council to inter alia provide permanent representation for the continent, an objective that Pretoria has not only expressed strong support for but self-interest in.

The international policy split over Iraq will also have an impact on the UN's position in the international system. Inevitably, it may also be weakened. One related implication of the split over the US-led Iraqi policy is for the very systems of governance that working through the UN was supposed to strengthen. If the US and its allies go to war without a second resolution (as they did over Kosovo) on account of opposition from Security Council members such as France, China and Russia, the UN runs the risk of redundancy

and irrelevance. This would confirm for the hardline sceptics its (lack of) value in managing international relations and would undermine those in the US (including Secretary of State Colin Powell) viewed as supportive of the multilateral path. But if there is a second resolution anointing military action, the UN runs the risk of being seen as a US pawn, despite Iraqi non-compliance.

Indeed, the Iraqi crisis in 2003 may well be a signal moment in international relations, a moment of historical change which may well shape the future – one of multilateralism or unilateralism, inside or outside of international law, or of balance of power? However, as the decision on an intervention in Kosovo illustrates, there may sometimes be good reason to act outside the framework of the UN.

The Iraqi crisis has seen an outpouring of a widespread, visceral anti-US sentiment in much of the Middle East, Africa and, indeed, the developing world, located in a complex mythology of US imperialism and hegemony. Avoiding such a stereotype and its destructive consequences for international relations will require action by both the US and leaders in Africa. Washington has not only to remain within the UN system, but also to rid itself of the harsher aspects of this image. Importantly, that will require moving with speed in settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Africa, too, will have to tone down its rhetoric, seek means of engagement, and be seen as a critical partner rather than reactionary opponent of US policy.

*Greg Mills*

*There has been an increase in SA trade with Iraq during 2002, amounting to over R400 million during the period 31 May 2001 to 1 June 2002.*

## NAM in Malaysia: SA's Tenure

*Has SA succeeded in resuscitating NAM into a credible representative of the South and in focusing international attention on the right to development, opposition to unilateral coercive measures and the enhancement of international co-operation as promised when it assumed the chair?*

SA recently handed over the reigns of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to Malaysia after a much longer than initially anticipated four-year term that started in September 1998.

It is difficult to assess the success of SA's leadership of the body. The 116-member movement has always been plagued by divergent ideologies, regional and national agendas and different levels of commitment. However, in certain areas it is clear that NAM has emerged as a more vocal player since SA's chairmanship especially within the context of the UN. The Iraqi crisis is a good example. Under SA's leadership, two UN Security Council reports on the situation in Iraq were presented for the first time in the history of the UN for debate by the General Assembly. Thus the 18 February 2003 debate on the UN inspectors included the general membership of the UN and not only the UN Security Council.

Another issue that has galvanised relatively broad-based support within NAM has been the Israel-Palestine issue. SA has taken an active interest in the Middle East peace process. A meeting called by President **Mbeki** on 3 May 2001 of the Foreign Ministers of the NAM Committee in Pretoria, was followed by a Retreat hosted by President Mbeki in Cape Town in January 2002 to broker peace in the Middle East and to enable Palestinians and Israelis to meet on neutral ground and learn from the SA experience. A NAM ministerial visit led by Minister **Dlamini-Zuma** to Ramallah in

April 2002 and several resolutions on the crisis in the Middle East were sponsored by NAM during SA's term.

SA's most notable success has been in raising the profile of the development concerns of the South. Under SA leadership more emphasis was given to developing a dialogue and a coherent agenda with the G-8 leaders and addressing issues related to poverty, globalisation and development. The most recent NAM troika, G-77 and G-8 dialogue on 13 July 2002 in Kananaskis was a clear outcome of these efforts, a process begun at the Okinawa G-8 summit in July 2000, the first G-8 summit which provided a platform for the South to raise development issues with the world's richest countries. Ongoing discussions at a ministerial level between the NAM troika and the chairs of the EU and the G-8 now take place annually in New York. These sensitisation efforts have born fruit although some initiatives have been more successful than others. Notably, the G-8 endorsement of Nepad, the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, the emphasis at the Doha trade negotiations round on the concerns of developing countries, and more mixed successes during the World Conference on Sustainable Development in 2002 and the World Conference against Racism in 2001.

Disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control were also important issues during SA's term. The negotiation of the Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Convention in 2001 is

an example of successful lobbying and support by NAM members. Officially NAM supports a multilateral approach in matters relating to disarmament and non-proliferation. Unfortunately, NAM members—especially from Africa—have not been very involved and engaged on disarmament issues, with the exception of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention.

In Malaysia, at the 13<sup>th</sup> NAM summit, Iraq was the main topic of discussion. Yet, true to its nature, NAM has been careful about condemning other members, although it is an important signal that it called on Iraq to comply with UNSC resolution 1441 to disarm. It was far less vocal on the North Korean nuclear crisis. Closer to home, NAM adopted a resolution calling for an end to sanctions against Zimbabwe.

It is clear that for Malaysia, the incoming chair, economic co-operation and trade issues will be critical topics on the NAM agenda. Prime Minister **Mahathir** proposed that NAM members should strengthen links with their regional groupings to further economic co-operation and to develop mutually beneficial business linkages.

**Mahathir** also promised that NAM would be promoted as the voice of the developing world and that South-South co-operation would be a priority. He undertook to work closely with the other members of the leadership troika, comprising the past chair, SA, and the future chair, Cuba.

## The AU Summit in Addis: PSC Outcomes

*Discussions in Addis Ababa focused primarily on ongoing conflict on the continent. The most recent crisis in Côte d'Ivoire raises the question whether Africa will be able to deal with its own conflicts, or whether it will remain reliant on external intervention.*

The AU met in Addis Ababa in an extraordinary summit in February for the first time since its launch in Durban 2002. On the agenda were a number of issues impeding the continent's development, namely ongoing protracted conflict on the continent; the impending war on Iraq; and a range of AU constitutional issues. However, security issues dominated the discussions.

The current chair, SA President **Thabo Mbeki**, stated in his opening speech that conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Burundi and Sudan, were the most pressing issues challenging the AU and that the speedy ratification of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) should be the most critical objective of the summit.

The 15-member PSC is to be composed of 10 elected members for a two-year term and five elected members for a three-year term (to be re-elected in continuity). All 15 members will have equal voting rights. No provision has been made for veto rights or permanent seats on the PSC. The PSC also makes provision for equitable regional representation from Africa's five regions and for the rotation of members.

The PSC Protocol requires a simple majority to enter into force. In Addis Ababa, more than 34 countries had already

signed the protocol, a number that has grown significantly since the 27 countries that signed in Durban in 2002. However some problems remain. Only Algeria has ratified the PSC Protocol. The AU chair expressed the hope that the other 52 members would have ratified the protocol by the next summit in Mozambique in July.

The PSC will be a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of the conflicts on the continent. It will meet at least twice a month at the level of Permanent Representatives and annually at the level of Ministers and Heads of State. The Addis summit did not discuss funding for the operations of the PSC as procedural and legal issues now enjoy priority. The scale of contributions by individual members is presently under revision.

Analysis by the Institute for Security Studies suggests that the AU will require an annual budget of at least \$80 million to function effectively. The OAU had an annual budget of \$30 million, which ran into substantial arrears. The OAU Peace Fund (now the AU Peace Fund) was heavily reliant on contributions from non-African sources and international organisations. It is clear that the PSC, like the AU, still faces considerable hurdles despite the

progress made so far before it can assume its duties and that the support of the international community is critical if Africa wishes to become more engaged in solving its own security problems.

*Nomazulu Mda*

*continued from page 1*

These covenants and business's continued positive response to Nepad is an important achievement for Africa and will assist in translating into reality the Nepad vision of sustainable growth and development.

*Princess Tabata*

### The Iraqi War and Energy Security: Implications for Africa

The Davos discussions pointed to three important economic consequences should war break out in Iraq. These are: the negative short-term impact of war on global economic growth; the potential disruption of a steady supply of oil; and the longer-term consideration of a stable energy security policy. Since most indicators are pointing to war in Iraq, African countries are expected to suffer in terms of meeting their development objectives and their economies may experience negative growth.

### Calendar of Events

9-10 March	SADC Council of Ministers	Angola
13-15 March	AU Council of Ministers	UNECA, Addis Ababa
9 March-3 April	Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) meetings	Colombo
7-9 April	Commonwealth Business Council Africa Investment Forum	Johannesburg
28-30 April	Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting	Johannesburg
28-30 April	19 <sup>th</sup> Session of the UNIDO Programme & Budget Committee	Vienna
28 April-9 May	Meeting of UN Commission on Sustainable Development	New York
29-30 April	OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris