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New DFA Appointment

Mr Kingsley JN Mamabolo
Deputy Director General for Africa with effect from 1 June 2002

Mr Mamabolo joined the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1995. He was appointed Head of Mission to Zimbabwe until 1999. His next appointment was as Ambassador to Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti. At the same time he also served as South Africa's permanent representative to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Mr Mamabolo replaced Mr Welile Nhlapo.

Important Visits

1-4 August
Deputy President Jacob Zuma
Langkawi International Dialogue, Malaysia

5-9 August
Foreign Minister Nkosazana Zuma
Binational Commission, Brazil

13-15 August
President Thabo Mbeki
State Visit, Botswana

Where Is Union Taking Africa?

The establishment of the AU raises more questions than answers—what are the substantive issues?

African leaders officially launched the African Union (AU) in July, taking several key decisions on AU structures and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which promise to have major foreign policy implications for Africa and South Africa, as the head of the AU for its first year. Member states

- agreed on a protocol creating a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), supported by a Panel of the Wise, a continental early warning system, an African standby military force and a special fund;
- agreed to a NEPAD peer review mechanism;
- adopted a memorandum of understanding on the AU Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA), which significantly overlaps with the NEPAD process and envisions what is essentially a rival peer review process and administrative unit; and
- expanded the NEPAD Presidential Implementation Committee to 20 members, in a move that will likely bring Libya and possibly Kenya into this key governing body.

The two-week AU summit in Durban formally closed the operations of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and began the process of crafting the far more ambitious Union. Although the constitutive act of the AU was written in 1999, it was a bare-bones agreement without operational and procedural rules for the 18 AU organs. So far the Assembly of heads of state, the Executive Council and the Permanent Representatives Council (PSC) have been established. The PSC and the Pan-African Parliament protocols have been drafted but await signature and ratification.

The AU Commission, its operational bureaucracy, will operate on an interim basis this year but contentious negotiations are still ongoing over its structure and which if any of the old OAU staff will be transferred to the AU. Twelve other organs remain to be defined: the Court of Justice, African Central Bank, African Monetary Fund, African Investment Bank, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (to receive input from non-government organisations and civil society), and seven specialised sectoral technical committees of the Executive Council.

The meeting was often overshadowed by the theatrics surrounding Libyan leader Muammar Al-Qaddafi, who slammed NEPAD as a neocolonialist venture and reintroduced his 1999 proposals to change the AU from a loose confederation into a single unified nation with a single national army and common economic, diplomatic and trade policies. The idea of a United States of Africa is unlikely to find broad support in Africa but Qaddafi increasingly serves as a rallying point for leaders unwilling to give up power or abide by NEPAD's proposed democratic norms. Indeed, his radical ideas, open hostility to Europe and the United States, and gifts of cash to garner support spark alarm in many African

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Food crisis in Southern Africa

Food shortages in Southern Africa have brought a number of countries to the brink of disaster. An urgent humanitarian appeal of \$ 611m was launched by the UN last week to address the humanitarian crisis in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

A combination of drought, HIV/AIDS, conflict and the dismal situation in Zimbabwe has created images reminiscent of the famine that struck Ethiopia in the 1980s. By April 2003, 13 million people in Southern Africa will face starvation. A projected food shortage of 4 million mt is predicted for next year, of which 1.2 million mt is emergency food aid.

Instability and the ill-conceived land reform policies of the Zimbabwean government have been pivotal in tilting the balance in Southern Africa towards full-blown famine. Previously the breadbasket of the region, Zimbabwe has been reduced to begging-bowl status. Almost 6m Zimbabweans are on the brink of starvation and the country has to import 1.8 million mt of cereal. The 75% food gap in Zimbabwe—which is the difference between the minimum nutritional requirement and actual supply—is the widest in recent history.

Maize prices have increased up to 400% in recent weeks. According to the SA Department of Agriculture, South Africa's maize crop estimate is 8.7 million mt. Eighty percent of the harvest has already been harvested. Domestic demand is pegged at about 7.4 million mt. However, the expected surplus from SA, Tanzania, and Kenya will not satisfy the emergency food aid requirement. New alternatives

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capitals.

Qaddafi's ideas were deflected to another summit to be held in six months on the procedural grounds that leaders were not given the required lead-time to study the proposals. In some ways Qaddafi serves as a catalyst, pushing other nations to consider more thoroughly how the AU should function.

AU leaders sought to appease him by expanding the NEPAD Implementation Committee from three members per region to four, which leaves Libya as the only other possible North African member besides the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. In East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania all desire the extra regional seat.

G-8 nations have been publicly quiet about the prospects of Libya and Kenya on the NEPAD board, but privately they express concerns about Africa's credibility in promoting democracy and good governance in light of this decision. Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo deflected criticism of the expansion by asserting that members brought onto the NEPAD body would simply have to conform to its ideals. He did not explain how NEPAD would deal with existing committee members who diverge from NEPAD goals in important ways. And if he bends the rules for Libya or Kenya, NEPAD's credibility—both in the eyes of donor nations and of African states testing its resolve—will be potentially mortally wounded, after its weak action toward Zimbabwe.

Already the North African NEPAD contingent has a shaky commitment to multiparty democracy and human rights. NEPAD's Central African region is equally problematic. Present members include the corrupt, long-serving autocrats in Gabon and Cameroon. The fourth potential member would have to come from among Equatorial Guinea

(accused of corruption and undemocratic rule), Central African Republic (unstable and plagued by military rebellion) or Congo-Brazzaville (Denis Sassou-Nguesso ousted an elected president by armed force with oil company backing).

Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, among other embattled old-guard leaders, adopted low profiles at the summit, with NEPAD advocates largely driving the agenda. No debate was held on Mugabe's disputed election or the dubious election and rekindled civil war in Congo-Brazzaville. Despite objections from Senegal and Mauritius, the AU refused to recognise Mark Ravalomanana as president of Madagascar even though the US, UK, France and other developed nations have done so. Just days after the AU ended, Senegal and Mauritius also recognised Ravalomanana, illustrating the still divergent views over sanctions and democracy.

Although AU leaders have accepted the idea that the AU should take a more active, interventionist posture than the old OAU, precisely how such intervention will work remains unclear. The PSC is a reasonable first step. The PSC protocol, which still must be signed and ratified, provides for 10 members to be elected to two-year terms and five members elected for three years. The protocol says that members must be able to fulfil their responsibility to the council and contribute to its fund. However, it is unclear whether members must be willing to contribute operational military units to the standby force and who would judge that operational capacity.

The PSC will be supported by a Panel of the Wise composed of five highly respected members whose stature and personal authority may be used to diffuse conflicts and advise on actions of the council. The standby force

will be composed of civilian and military units stationed in their home countries but ready for rapid deployment.

The summit approved the African Peer Review Mechanism but failed to clearly define how the NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee would relate to the PSC in dealing with states that fall foul of NEPAD rules. Peer reviews are voluntary with volunteers expected to undergo their first review within 18 months of acceding to the mechanism. However, reviews are to be based on a national plan indicating how and when a country intends to bring itself in conformance to NEPAD principles and its eight codes of good fiscal, corporate and macro-economic governance. That means members have as little as 18 months to draft their NEPAD plans, which is a highly ambitious target, given that there has as yet been virtually no dialogue between African heads of state and their citizens about NEPAD.

Another potential hurdle for the NEPAD process is the revival of the CSSDCA, a process initiated by Nigeria in the early 1990s that was revived at the Lomé OAU summit in 2000. The CSSDCA-MOU identifies 24 core values, 47 time-bound commitments and 50 key indicators that members will be measured against. In some ways it is much more specific on good governance and democratic practice than NEPAD. It also proposes establishing CSSDCA structures within the AU Commission, as well as national and regional CSSDCA mechanisms and monitoring and review systems, all of which raise questions about the relationship between CSSDCA peer reviews and NEPAD mechanisms. Among the key commitments in the CSSDCA are the requirements that states:

- By 2003 enact legislation to provide for the impartiality of the public service, the independence of the judiciary and the

autonomy of institutions such as the central bank and auditor general.

- Establish firm commitments for all member states to attain customs union status by 2005 and full common market status by 2010.
- Harmonize economic convergence criteria in all regional economic communities and establish a single common investment code and a common industrial policy in each region by 2005.
- Create by 2004 legal mechanisms

AU Parliament

South Africa became a party to the Pan-African Parliament Protocol on 3 July 2002 when Foreign Minister Zuma deposited an Instrument of Ratification with the Secretary-General of the OAU in Durban.

The Pan-African Parliament will eventually comprise five representatives from each of the national parliaments of the member states. The protocol makes provision for at least two female parliamentary representatives per country. It also envisages broad political representation across the political spectrum from each member country. This would imply that the major opposition parties of the African continent would also be represented in the Pan-African Parliament.

South Africa was the 21st member state to sign the protocol. Twenty-eight countries are presently signatories whereas only four countries have ratified the Protocol. Article 22 of the Protocol stipulates that it will enter into force thirty days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a simple majority of the 53 member states.

to disclose sources of political party funds and adopt public proportional funding for all political parties.

- Adopt by 2004 a bill of rights to every national constitution to protect citizens from arbitrary arrest, detention without trial and cruel and degrading treatment.
- Adopt bilateral and regional security and non-aggression pacts where they do not exist by 2006.
- Create an independent anti-corruption authority by 2004 reporting to parliament.
- Adopt by 2005 constitutional limits on the tenure of elected political office holders.

Such timeframes are arguably over-ambitious but in the hands of domestic opposition parties could serve as useful tools for provoking faster reform. The next step is to elevate the CSSDCA from MOU to formal protocol.

For SA as first chairman of the AU, the diplomatic challenges are enormous. The principle mission of the inaugural year is institution building. But the dead-wood from the old OAU Secretariat is fighting hard to wrest control of the new AU structures. Their desire to find jobs partially explains why the overlapping CSSDCA process has not been rationalised with NEPAD. Suggestions have been put forward to force OAU staff to pass competency tests or reapply for their jobs, but it is not clear that reform-minded nations will win that fight.

Ending conflict in Africa is top of president Thabo Mbeki's agenda as the first chairman of the AU. However, the PSC is unlikely to be ratified and operational before his chairmanship ends in a year. The sheer number of ongoing conflicts and the many AU institutions still to be defined pose an enormous challenge to Mbeki. Even with the PSC machinery in place, there are few diplomatic options available for dealing with intransigent rogue states.

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have to be found.

South Africa is making a modest contribution of R1 million through the humanitarian disaster relief fund of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The funding is channelled through the World Food Programme and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and targets the worst-affected countries in Southern Africa, specifically Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Logistically there have been many hurdles. The emergency food aid is channelled according to the standard SADC export/import regime, hampering thus the processing of food aid and supplies. Although a suggestion has been made that a SADC Logistic Advisory Committee should be re-established—a system that previously facilitated the more effective movement of disaster relief during the 1992 drought-SADC

has been slow to respond to the emergency.

However, the broader question beyond the immediate requirements of the famine is the development of a sustainable agricultural policy within SADC that not only takes cognisance of the seasonal fluctuations plaguing the region, but that addresses the role of government in supporting sustainable agriculture policies and food security in a more focused manner.

Review of CAP

While certain countries are suffering from a food shortage in Southern Africa, the EU has begun the difficult process of reviewing its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). According to UNCTAD, total agricultural support in OECD countries averaged \$350 billion from 1996-1998. In contrast, total agricultural exports from developing countries during the same period amounted to only \$170 billion. Direct export subsidies account for around one sixth of total EU agricultural subsidies. Over 80% of all agricultural export subsidies in 1995 and 1996 were granted by the EU, compared with under 2.5% by developing countries.

Winners and Losers from the Common Agricultural Policy (Euro billion)

Country	CAP funds received in 1999	CAP funds received in 2001	Profit/Loss in 1999
Austria	0.96	1.06	-0.17
Belgium	1.06	0.94	-0.58
Denmark	1.27	1.13	+0.44
Finland	0.62	0.84	-0.04
France	10.13	9.35	+2.51
Germany	6.38	6.23	-4.64
Greece	2.99	2.89	+1.90
Ireland	1.83	1.59	+1.20
Italy	5.03	5.85	-0.66
Luxembourg	0.30	0.32	-0.07
The Netherlands	1.32	1.13	-1.22
Portugal	1.04	0.96	+0.05
Spain	6.34	6.80	+2.16
Sweden	0.77	0.79	-0.43
United Kingdom	4.05	4.04	-1.56
Total EU	43.86	43.65	

Source: <http://www/EurActiv.com>

Calendar of Events

26 August - 4 September
12 - 20 September
16 September
26 September - 3 October

World Summit on Sustainable Development
57th United Nations General Debate (UNGA57)
Plenary discussion on NEPAD, UNGA57
8th Annual SADC Summit

Johannesburg
New York
New York
Luanda