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Off Track? Findings from South Africa's First APRM Implementation Report

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ABSTRACT

This paper summarises and analyses the *First Report on the Implementation of South Africa's African Peer Review Mechanism Programme of Action* (Implementation Report). Although the Implementation Report was initially praised at the African Union Summit in January 2009, a closer look reveals many of its faults and deficiencies. It appears that the report was rushed in order to meet a deadline, which is evident from its inconsistencies, contradictions and errors. Instead of discussing the progress and achievements made in response to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) National Programme of Action (NPoA), the Implementation Report mostly notes accomplishments since the end of apartheid and the country's democratic transition in 1994. Their inclusion and a lack of evidence on NPoA progress cause the Implementation Report to lose focus, as a result of which it fails to provide an adequate assessment of the work done on implementing the NPoA. This paper also attempts to analyse the context within which the Implementation Report was written, which includes the changing and restructuring of government; a change of personnel and loss of institutional memory in the national APRM structures; controversies arising from the country's APRM Review itself; and, finally, South Africa's self-perceived exceptionalism on governance matters in Africa. The author concludes by making recommendations to improve the implementation of the APRM in South Africa.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASGISA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
BRT	Bus Rapid Transport
CRR	Country Review Report
DPSA	Department of Public Service and Administration
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
FMSP	Forced Migration Studies Programme
GPoA	government Programme of Action
IAAF	International Athletics Associations Federation
IDP	integrated development planning
JIPSA	Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition
Nedlac	National Economic Development and Labour Council
Nepad	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGC	National Governing Council
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NPoA	National Programme of Action
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SMS	Senior Management Service
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
TB	Tuberculosis
UNECA	UN Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

INTRODUCTION

According to a report in *Business Day* newspaper,[1]

> A statement released by SA's [South Africa's] APRM [African Peer Review Mechanism] office said the African Union summit 'commended SA on the quality and standard of its first implementation' of the APRM Programme of Action. It also said summit chairman, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, 'called on other African states to emulate SA's report'.

South Africa acceded to the APRM in March 2003. The APRM is a voluntary initiative to track progress on governance and implement remedies for deficiencies through a National Programme of Action (NPoA). The Country Self-Assessment Report process occurred between September 2005 and June 2006, and South Africa received a Country Review Mission in July 2006. Recommendations for amending the APRM NPoA were made by the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons following the mission. The South African Country Review Report (CRR) was discussed at heads of state level in Accra, Ghana in July 2007, and was published in September 2007.

In spite of the praise it received, if one looks beyond the glossy cover of the *First Report on the Implementation of South African's African Peer Review Programme of Action* (hereafter referred to as the Implementation Report), it is easy to see that much of the progress and achievements discussed inside have little to do with the APRM, and rather refer to the accomplishments achieved since the country's democratic transition in 1994. Overall, the Implementation Report does a poor job of discussing and analysing progress on the commitments made in the APRM NPoA and fails to provide evidence that South Africa is serious in its efforts to implement it.

Two years after the official publication of the CRR, to what extent has the South African government been able to implement the recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons and its NPoA? To answer this question, this paper summarises and analyses the Implementation Report, places it in the South African political context, and makes constructive recommendations for improved APRM implementation and reporting in future.

Throughout the analysis of South Africa's first annual APRM Implementation Report, the following three questions are considered:

- Firstly, is the Implementation Report a reflection of the relatively low importance given to the APRM domestically in South Africa?
- Secondly, to what extent does the Implementation Report fulfil the purpose for which it was intended, which is to follow up on South Africa's progress since the inception of its APRM NPoA?
- Thirdly, is the Implementation Report well-written? Does it cover the issues in detail, provide statistics where necessary and elaborate on important topics?

To provide a broader context, this paper also draws on additional information, including personal interviews with government officials, diplomats and academics conducted in October and November 2009, as well as the South African government's Programme of Action (GPoA), which arises out of the annual cabinet *lekgotla* (strategic planning session).

It is a useful exercise to compare the GPoA and its achievements to those discussed in the Implementation Report.[2]

An important consideration running through this paper is whether improvements to governance are being made because of the APRM or whether they are due to other national plans and processes, including the key planning tool of the GPoA. Because the APRM has both internal and external dimensions, it is important to try to distinguish the value that it adds. But, at the end of the day, citizens want the situation to improve and are less concerned about which mechanism is being used.

While it is necessary to be critical, it is also important to bear in mind the novelty of the APRM process, both on the continent and in South Africa. It is an iterative, learning process, and it is therefore simply too early to pass definitive judgements. This paper thus attempts to provide a balanced analysis of the Implementation Report and suggest recommendations that could help to improve both future reporting and the APRM implementation in South Africa. It is also important to note that the author is aware of the fact that some of the material is repeated in different sections of the paper. The reason for this is a methodological decision, which was taken to follow the structure, sections and sub-sections of the Implementation Report itself. The APRM Questionnaire, the APRM CRRs and South Africa's Implementation Report all follow four thematic areas: Democracy and Political Governance, Economic Governance and Management, Corporate Governance, and Socio-Economic Development. Certain issues, e.g. corruption, are cross cutting and appear in more than one area. This paper makes an effort to duplicate as little as possible and cross-references sections that discuss the same issues. The author expresses the hope that following the structure of the Implementation Report will enable policymakers to use the paper in a more constructive way.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT: POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC FLUX

Analysis and critique of South Africa's APRM process has been well documented and will not be repeated at length in this paper,[3] other than to say that a common complaint from civil society stakeholders reflected perceptions of a rushed process, lack of transparency, government dominance, poor consultation, a weak research methodology, excessive sanitisation and revision of the publicly validated draft, and a non-consultative NPoA that would be difficult to implement or monitor.

Since the publication of the CRR in September 2007 there has been very little media coverage of the APRM in South Africa. When politicians have mentioned the APRM, it has usually been in the context of South Africa's foreign policy rather than its application at home. Even when reforms recommended in the report — such as abolishing floor crossing in Parliament or regulating private funding to political parties — have been implemented (to varying degrees), no link has publicly been made to the APRM, and the changes have not been 'branded' as APRM inspired.

Several political and bureaucratic factors explain the significant drop-off in energy in driving the APRM in South Africa and its local profile. Firstly, research suggests that the primary orientation of the South African government towards the APRM was externally focused. Many argue that South Africa itself did not really need the APRM, as it already

had good policies and good governance, but that if it expected other countries (who needed it more) to submit to review, it would have to be prepared to do so itself. The process in South Africa seemed initially designed to get through the self-assessment as quickly as possible, and the government expected (mostly) glowing praise. There also seems to be ambivalence in government circles, if not resistance, to taking advice 'from Africa', a feeling that 'government knows best' and that South Africa had little to learn from the local APRM exercise.[4] The South African NPoA was never intended to be central to the national policymaking process and did not seek to attract vast donor funding (in contrast to most other countries). It largely covers ongoing work already being done by national stakeholders and government departments.[5] The rules of the APRM require substantial civil society input — government cannot simply present its existing national development plan, as this might exclude the views of key groups. Therefore, while the GPoA should be the basis of the NPoA, it cannot substitute for it.

Secondly, there have been significant changes in government over the last two years. Rivalries within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and its alliance partners (the South African Communist Party and Congress of South African Trade Unions) led to the defeat of incumbent Thabo Mbeki for the post of party president at the ANC congress in Polokwane in December 2007 and his recall by the party from the presidency of the country in September 2008. Kgalema Motlanthe became president until May 2009, when he was replaced by Jacob Zuma. The minister of public service and administration, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, political head of the lead department driving the APRM in South Africa, resigned in September 2008 when Mbeki was recalled and was replaced by Minister Richard Baloyi, who was reappointed in the Zuma administration. He has had a lower public profile on the APRM and arguably wields less political clout than his predecessor.

Thirdly, the National Governing Council (NGC), which is meant to drive the process, was moribund since 2007, although it has been revived recently. This might be due to the new minister beginning to focus more on the APRM and the need to produce South Africa's second Implementation Report by the end of January 2010. Many of its original members have moved on, both in government and civil society. The lead government department on the APRM — the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) — has also had a significant turnover of staff who have worked on the APRM and has therefore suffered institutional memory loss. The current department appears to lack the capacity to implement the NPoA or marshal others to do so.

Together, these political and bureaucratic changes appear to have had an effect on APRM implementation in South Africa, although it is impossible to estimate what progress would have been made in the absence of such changes, given the rather marginal role of the APRM in local politics and policymaking.

COMPILING THE IMPLEMENTATION REPORT

South Africa's Implementation Report is 67 pages long. Its structure corresponds to the thematic structure of the APRM CRR itself, as it is divided into four thematic areas: Democracy and Political Governance, Economic Governance and Management, Corporate Governance, and Socio-Economic Development, plus a section on the 11 cross-cutting

issues. Within these thematic areas, the report addresses issues raised by the CRR. For consistency, this paper will follow the same structure. It is also important to note that the Implementation Report covers the period from November 2007 to December 2008, which will be referred to as the 'reporting period' throughout this paper.

DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE

Following the APRM review, South Africa's NPoA listed the following challenges under the Democracy and Political Governance section, which the government intended to address:[6]

• Civil society structures seek increased opportunities to contribute to and participate in the delivery and monitoring of public services.
• Racism, sexism, marginalisation, crime, lack of awareness and poor access to information impair the full enjoyment of human rights.
• Racism prevents many citizens from realising their human potential and contributes to unequal access to essential goods and services and reproduces acute social inequities.
• Corruption undermines national integrity.
• Violence and crime in general, and against women and children in particular, are widespread, and there is the need for active engagement of all communities in the fight against crime and violence.
• Marginalised and vulnerable groups experience difficulties in making use of the institutions of justice.

Below is a summary of how the Implementation Report commented on progress in addressing these issues.

Increased civil society participation

Civil society in South Africa is complex and diverse, with many different expectations in respect of what consultation and participation mean. The CRR states that civil society needs to be provided with more opportunities for contribution to, participation in and monitoring of public services. In response to this, the Implementation Report lists a number of currently available mechanisms and processes that it says allow for continuous community and public engagement:

• mandatory community consultations in formulating municipal integrated development planning (IDP);
• *izimbizos*, where the executive meets communities to discuss issues of service delivery and development;
• Thusong service centres for communities;[7] and
• the APRM NGC.

The report also notes that in spite of the existence of these channels, certain groups choose to engage in protests and demonstrations, some of which turn violent.[8] The mushrooming of these protests over the past five years suggests that there are many frustrated citizens

who do not feel that their needs are addressed through these existing formal channels, forums and institutions.

The mid-2009 protest by taxi operators and drivers against the implementation of the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) System serves as a good example. Although the South African government said that it had conducted extensive consultations with some taxi associations, others called a strike in Gauteng, blocking main roads, breaking shop windows in central Johannesburg and clashing with the police. The protesting drivers claimed that they were not consulted on the creation of the BRT System, which, according to them, will lead to job losses in the taxi industry.[9]

The Implementation Report fails to specify whether more (or new) community-based consultation channels were established in response to the CRR. An exception to this is the mention (in the matrix at the end of the Implementation Report) that no progress has been made on strengthening community and African radio stations.

In contrast, the GPoA provides more details with regard to public participation, stating that the framework for the facilitation of public participation was approved by cabinet in February 2009 and that two additional Thusong centres were operational at the end of 2008, bringing the total number countrywide to 130. In total, 62 are equipped with a local area network and 41 have a fixed-line telephone installed. Apart from that, the GPoA reports, the implementation and monitoring of an IDP framework has been completed.[10]

Racism, sexism and marginalisation

The Implementation Report states that 'South Africans continue to enjoy full human rights in a country that has suffered from racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination'.[11] However, it also states that there are isolated cases of racism and mentions the following: the incident in Skierlik where a young white man shot and killed three members of the black community in a racially motivated attack, and the case at the University of the Free State, where four white students abused black staff members and published a video recording of their wrongdoings.[12]

Yet the report does not also discuss many other incidents or manifestations of discrimination, including, for example, the racial or class dimension of many violent crimes. Analysts Jack Fine and William Bird of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation write that 'in a country already experiencing high rates of crime and violence, a high proportion of these criminal and violent events are racially motivated'.[13] Racism and discrimination remain very complex, real, ongoing issues in contemporary South Africa and are often highly politicised (with race being labelled as the underlying motive for decisions, known as 'playing the race card' in local parlance). Highlighting two isolated, but extreme examples suggests that insufficient research was done to determine the scale and trajectory of racism in South Africa for the Implementation Report.[14]

Furthermore, the statement that South Africans continue to enjoy full human rights is generalised and misleading. Rights to dignity, life and equality are not equally enjoyed. Although progress has been made, the socio-economic rights in South Africa's Bill of Rights still have to be extended to most people, e.g. social security recipients and unemployed poor people of working age. While unquestionable progress has been made in establishing human rights since 1994, problems remain that need to be addressed. For example, as is evident from the APRM report, South Africa has significant deficiencies when it comes

to women's and children's rights, as both groups continually suffer from violence.[15] Taking the view that everyone enjoys human rights, but there are isolated cases of non-compliance, is dangerous, as it can prevent the government from focusing on improving the overall situation.

With regard to women's rights, the Implementation Report mentions that the ruling ANC has passed a resolution targeting a minimum of 50% representation of women in all structures of government. This raises questions about the separation between the ruling party and the government, with an action of the former being reported on. The Implementation Report also makes no link as to whether the ANC resolution was as a result of the CRR or not.

Corruption

The Implementation Report notes that all municipalities were given support to develop fraud prevention plans and anti-corruption strategies, specifically dealing with the following: employment practices, procurement procedures, financial controls and the allocation of subsidised houses. The matrix also adds the following progress: 'roll-out of communication campaigns regarding anti-corruption was undertaken in February and March 2008 involving radio stations and adverts on buses', 'the Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy was rolled-out to 150 municipalities', the 3rd national Anti-Corruption Summit was convened in August 2008' and 'research on the effectiveness of the national anti-corruption framework was carried out'.[16] Once again mentioning party policies (see the sub-section above), it notes that the ANC has 'adopted as a priority the need to intensify the fight against corruption'.[17] Given that the APRM's recommendations are made to government, it is submitted, the Implementation Report should rather be concerned with the government's response to corruption-related problems, rather than those of the ruling party.

However, this thin section completely avoids discussion of specific high-profile corruption incidents reported in the media, some of which include or have included high-level government and political leaders, and makes no attempt to address criticisms of government for inconsistency in fighting corruption, protecting the politically connected and abusing the organs of state.

The lack of specifics reported on in this highly contentious area highlights one of the difficulties with government writing a progress report on itself. It is not in the interests of the officials charged with compiling the report to make government 'look bad' or delve into sensitive subjects that might upset superiors and limit such officials' career advancement.

Violence and crime, in particular against women and children

According to the Implementation Report, the South African government has adopted a three-pronged approach to fighting trafficking in women. Firstly, it has strengthened international relations, particularly with its neighbouring states, with a view to fighting organised and other forms of trafficking in women and children.[18] However, the Implementation Report does not specify what this entails or whether any agreements have been signed with regard to exchange of information, joint operations, monitoring or similar collaboration.

Secondly, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act No. 121 of 1998 is mentioned, which enables the government to prosecute human traffickers and seize the proceeds of their crimes.[19] It is not clear how this law has improved the situation, as the NPoA was supposed to establish new and improve on old ways of fighting violence against women and children, and given that this law has been in existence for a decade, it clearly has deficiencies.

Thirdly, the report states that a law reform process aimed at 'creating an integrated and holistic legal framework that facilitates the fight against human trafficking'[20] has been started. This does represent tangible and positive progress. The matrix also provides some numbers, saying that 3 662 crime prevention operations, which included roadblocks and stop-and-search operations, were conducted nationally. Furthermore, 4 621 arrests in terms of crimes against women have been made. Apart from that, 713 sector policing initiatives were undertaken, together with 125 awareness campaigns relating to domestic violence, sexual offences, and crimes against women and children, and 63 specialised sexual offences courts were established across the country. At one point, the matrix states that 657 members of the South African Police Service Domestic Violence Programme were trained and at another it says that 476 police members were trained in terms of the Domestic Violence Learning Programme. It is unclear if these are different programmes or whether the report simply reports two different statistics in different sections.

Finally, the matrix at the end of the Implementation Report states that the Child Justice Bill was tabled in Parliament.[21] However, no more details are provided about the latter. This bill was tabled in Parliament in 2002 and became an Act in 2008, although experts point to the lack of resources to successfully implement its provisions. The Implementation Report does not mention whether the passing of the Bill happened because of the APRM or not.

The APRM CRR emphasises that women are often the victims of rape and domestic physical abuse in South Africa, while children suffer from physical abuse, child trafficking, child prostitution and economic exploitation. These were highlighted in the CRR as two of the 11 'cross-cutting issues' requiring special attention, with crime as a third such issue.[22] The Implementation Report does not make an attempt to respond to this and only discusses progress made with regard to fighting trafficking and omits any discussion of the broader issues of violence against women and children mentioned in the CRR.

Marginalised and vulnerable groups

The Implementation Report discusses the establishment of branch courts and family court centres across South Africa that are supposed to improve access to courts and ease congestion at main courts (although no numbers are specified). Another achievement is the enactment of the Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act No. 31 of 2008, which confers civil jurisdiction on regional courts. With regard to this, 'processes are underway to replace 116 of the 227 periodical courts located in private farms, police stations, [and] prisons with accessible courts within the community settlements'. Furthermore, 28 additional small claims courts have been established during the reporting period, resulting in an increase from 156 in 2007 to 184 in 2008.[23]

Adoption of APRM codes and standards

During the period under review, South Africa ratified and acceded to the following:[24]
- International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ratified 30 November 2007);
- Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ratified 30 November 2007); and
- Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons (Southern African Development Community — SADC) (ratified on 4 February 2008).

The report fails to mention that South Africa has not ratified three conventions and protocols, as recommended by the APRM CRR, or give reasons for not doing so. These are:[25]

- International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
- Covenant on the Protection of Migrant Workers; and
- Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment.

The fact that this important information was omitted suggests at least two possibilities: either South Africa is not planning to ratify these agreements, or the authors of the Implementation Report simply did not include them.

Summary of the Implementation Report section on Democracy and Political Governance:

• Discussion of human rights in South Africa is limited to two isolated cases of extreme racism and it does not provide sufficient elaboration on what is being done to eradicate violence against women and children.

• On two occasions, the distinction between the ruling party and the state is blurred, as the Implementation Report lists policies and achievements of the former.

• The Implementation Report does not define how it views civil society, beyond an apparent assumption that 'civil society' is synonymous with 'community', and poor communities at that. The necessary role for a dynamic civil society in a successful participative democracy is never referred to or even problematised.

• The most concrete achievement mentioned is the establishment of numerous new courts — which arguably would have happened anyway, even if there were no APRM in South Africa

• The Implementation Report fails to provide significant detail on the progress achieved as a result of the NPoA, which suggests that little has been done since the 2007 review to improve democracy and political governance in South Africa in ways proposed by the APRM.

> • The matrix at the end of the Implementation Report also does not address all the objectives listed in the original NPoA. '*Objective 6: Fight corruption in the political sphere*' is omitted without any explanation. While all the other objectives are addressed, this is done with a lack of detail, and overall the matrix does not add much additional information on progress.
> • The Democracy and Political Governance section of the Implementation Report appears rather superficial and fails to identify real progress on the issues mentioned by the APRM. When achievements are mentioned, it is not clear whether they have taken place due to the APRM or not.
> • The Implementation Report does not list areas that need further improvement. Such self-reflection is crucial for a process like the APRM, and yet it is conspicuously absent from the report.

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT

South Africa's NPoA listed the following challenges under the Economic Governance and Management section as being areas that the government intended to address:[26]

- blockages to service delivery;
- unemployment;
- inadequate public consultation, education and feedback in policymaking;
- underdeveloped capacity and skills in public expenditure management and monitoring; and
- lack of deeper economic integration within SADC.

The way that each of these five aims is reported on is discussed and analysed below.

Blockages to service delivery

The Implementation Report lists and explains the following initiatives as evidence of the government's commitment to improving service delivery:

- provision of free basic services;
- Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP);
- provision of municipal infrastructure grants; and
- emphasis on local economic development.

The Implementation Report mentions other government efforts to improve the integration and co-ordination of the abovementioned initiatives, especially in the poorest-performing local municipalities, through Project Consolidate, an intervention launched in 2004 to mobilise service delivery (and heavily criticised since). However, all of these long-standing existing endeavours pre-dated the APRM CRR and NPoA, and none is evidence of a direct response to the review process.

A number of newer, post-CRR initiatives are also listed. Specifically, the National Capacity Building Framework was launched in 2008 and currently the Capacity Building Implementation Plan is under way. Apart from that, skill and competency assessments of municipal managers are under way as a means to ensure that these public servants have the necessary skills to conduct their jobs. The Implementation Report states that up to December 2008, a total of 1 283 technical experts were assigned to 268 municipalities to assist in the areas of engineering, town planning, finance, project management, human resource management and development.[27] It also notes the launch of a five-year anti-corruption capacity-building programme and a 'Know Your Rights Campaign' specifically aimed at educating citizens about their rights with regard to government services by the DPSA. The matrix at the end of the Implementation Report adds some further details, stating that[28]

> a Constitutional Educational Programme focusing on the Bill of Rights was rolled out to seven of the nine provinces. The Programme includes ongoing seminars on constitutional and human rights matters, publication of articles and simplified booklets on human rights.

It is also stated that '131 police were trained in human rights'.[29] One must point out that this number is extremely small, given that as of June 2008 the South African Police Service had over 172 000 police officers in its ranks. Furthermore, 11 162 public servants were inducted by the end of November 2008, while 251 out of 283 municipal manager posts were filled and the vacancy rate had dropped to 11%.[30] This section of the Implementation Report is commendable, as it provides specific data from programmes that took place after South Africa's APRM review, meaning that they could be attributed to the NPoA.

Unemployment

The Implementation Report quotes figures from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) that between April and September 2008, employment in the informal sector fell by 7.1%, while employment in the formal sector rose by 0.3%.[31] While statistics on the levels of unemployment remain contested in South Africa, given the decision by StatsSA not to report on the portion of unemployed people referred to as 'discouraged workers'. These are people who have not actively looked for a job in the four weeks prior to the survey. They are not employed, they are of working age, but they are not included as 'unemployed'. Many people argue that to exclude discouraged work seekers in a country whose unemployment is long-term and structural in nature could lead to an under-appreciation by policymakers of the true extent and nature of the unemployment crisis in South Africa.

The Implementation Report also notes that the EPWP reached its target of providing one million 'work opportunities', understood as short-term, mostly manual jobs. It nevertheless does not mention during which period this was achieved or relate it to the statistics provided in the previous paragraph, which do not correspond to this statement. It also states that although further job losses are expected due to the 2008–09 global financial crisis, the government is optimistic about meeting its target of halving unemployment by 2014 through 'fast tracking the implementation of all initiatives at creating jobs'.[32] Many observers remain skeptical — some economists had predicted that, with the global downturn, between 207 000 and 304 000 jobs would be lost in 2009.[33] President Jacob Zuma himself has stated that

'we may still lose more jobs before we turn the corner on job creation. Nearly a million people have been cut loose by the crisis and many of them have families that depend on them', but also added that in the second quarter of 2009, the EPWP had created 223 568 verified work opportunities.[34]

Yet there is a big distinction between jobs and working opportunities, although it is not made in the Implementation Report. The former refer to medium- to long-term skills-based employment, while the latter are typically short-term work on once-off projects that require unskilled labour, with minimal pay and little useful skills training. Furthermore, according to the South African Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, '[t]here is the challenge that these [work programmes] are of short duration and the training that is meant to take place is not taking place at the optimum level'.[35]

Overall, this section is mostly concerned with providing statistics rather than listing the South African government's response to the issue. Furthermore, the Implementation Report fails to define terms such as 'work opportunities', which would provide more insight into the information it gives.

Public consultations, education and feedback in policymaking

With regard to public consultations, the Implementation Report lists some of the same initiatives covered in the Democracy and Political Governance sub-section on 'Increased Civil Society Participation — Community Consultations, *Izimbizo*, and Thusong Service Centres'. The matrix at the end of the Implementation Report also lists the exact same achievements for both sections.

This relates to an overall criticism of the APRM questionnaire that all countries follow — the fact that there is much repetition of issues across different sections. Thus, the Implementation Report should not be criticised for a flaw in the APRM's design.

In the period under review, it states that 597 mayoral and 23 premiers' *izimbizos* were held, where 791 issues were raised, of which 359 (45%) were successfully resolved.[36] The Implementation Report also states that 127 Thusong centres have been established, over 3 000 community development workers trained and deployed, and ward committees have been established in 96% of the wards. However, no dates are provided, making it impossible to link the achievements with the APRM; and again these initiatives all pre-dated the APRM. It is also not specified whether the increased workforce has resulted in increased productivity.

Finally, the report posits a remarkable improvement in the adoption of integrated development plans from 52% in 2005 to 100% for 2008/09. No elaboration, explanation, evidence or detail is provided as proof of the accuracy of this data. This is a major shortcoming of the Implementation Report, as it is often difficult to understand statistics without knowing their context, which the report does not provide.

Capacity and skills in public expenditure management

Under this section, the Implementation Report states that 'during the period under review, the auditor-general presented the outcomes of the financial management of 34 national departments; 201 national related entities; 9 constitutional institutions; 120 provincial

departments and 122 provincial entities'. In total, 463 (95%) national and provincial entities were covered. The outcomes of the audit 'highlighted an improvement over the previous years'.[37] The Implementation Report does not provide further details on the different areas in which or the extent to which improvement was shown. This is a crucial shortcoming, as it does not allow for comparison of progress between different years. Also, it fails to comment on the well-known weaknesses in financial management at the local government level.

Economic integration in SADC

According to the Implementation Report, SADC 'requires collective commitment to deepen and achieve regional economic integration'.[38] In this regard, the South African government has identified the need to deepen integration through the development of a framework for building productive supply capacity in the region. South Africa, as part of the Southern African Customs Union, has also removed duties on over 95% of imports from other SADC countries. It is surprising that the Implementation Report does not provide more information on such an important issue. However, this once again suggests that the report was rushed.

Summary of the Economic Governance and Management section of the Implementation Report:

• High levels of unemployment and blockages to service delivery are the main issues. However, the Implementation Report fails to produce convincing evidence of the South African government addressing these during the reporting period or taking new measures inspired by the APRM. All the initiatives listed as responses are long-standing and existed prior to the APRM CRR.

• In most cases, this section does not provide data and statistics to demonstrate progress; where it does, the numbers are seldom explained, analysed or elaborated upon.

• Curiously, the Implementation Report does not mention either the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) or the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), although ASGISA is mentioned in the Corporate Governance section. These were policies developed under President Mbeki with a view to obtaining skilled workers, and, more importantly, closing the gap between the so-called 'first' and 'second' economies (the formal and the informal economies).

• While the Economic Governance and Management section of the Implementation Report provides more concrete numbers and statistics than the Democracy and Political Governance section, it still suffers from a lack of self-criticism.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

This section describes how the Implementation Report presents the progress on the NPoA's key issues related to corporate governance:[39]

• Companies legislation is not transformative and needs to be reviewed.
• Key institutions and certain social groups are underdeveloped and need to become more effective.
• Consumers and shareholders fail to assert their rights, and are ill-informed and inactive.
• Governance in civil society needs development.

The Implementation Report lists another issue, not mentioned in the NPoA:

• The national development imperatives need to inform the planning and conduct of companies in the private sector.

It is unclear why this issue is discussed in the Implementation Report, other than because it is an important tenet of government (and ruling party) thinking.

Companies legislation

The Implementation Report states that two pieces of legislation, the Companies Amendment Bill and the Competition Amendment Bill, were adopted by Parliament in 2008 and were awaiting signature by the president. The latter became an Act in August 2009.[40] Both of these bills were in development long before the CRR and NPoA, which makes their mention redundant for the purposes of the Implementation Report. It is also noted that the business sector was involved in the development of these pieces of legislation, without providing further detail. However, consulting other sources shows that in recent years hefty penalties have been imposed for price fixing by industry, such as the 2007 bread scandal, when an investigation of four companies by the Competition Commission resulted in significant fines for Tiger Brands (South African rand (ZAR) 98 million) and Foodcorp (ZAR 45 million).[41] It is surprising that this was not referred to in the Implementation Report. This once again relates to the points made earlier about poor and rushed reporting. It also fails to mention the structure of the South African economy with its barriers to new entrants in the production and manufacturing sectors, which potentially stifle growth, job creation and poverty alleviation.

The planning and conduct of companies in the private sector

In this section, the Implementation Report asserts that 'a number of jobs have been created as part of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa'[42] without providing any numbers or statistics. In fact, the only two figures provided in this section refer to the creation of 9 000 jobs and ZAR 500 million in investments in the business process outsourcing sector through government support. Thus, while the focus of the Implementation Report is on listing priorities and strategies in this section, it provides

little concrete data or evidence of achievements. To find out the current situation, other sources had to be consulted. These sources indicate that between 2004 and 2007 South Africa managed to achieve economic growth averaging just over 5%, surpassing the initial ASGISA targets. This growth, however, created far fewer jobs than anticipated and the nature of the growth must be considered as the country moves out of the current recession.

However, the situation changed at the end of 2008 due to the global economic recession, and South Africa's economic growth rate dropped to 3.1%. After the first three-quarters of 2009, economic growth contracted to –1.83%.[43] Economists predict that 2010 will once again see modest positive growth (at 2%), which is not enough to significantly eat into the unemployment backlog. According to economist Mike Schussler, 2011 or 2012 could see economic growth of 4%.[44] The fact that the Implementation Report does not mention the possible impact of the global economic downturn on ASGISA shows a lack of vision and an unwillingness to insert negatives views in a generally positive report.

Effectiveness of key institutions and social groups

The Implementation Report lists as an achievement the September 2006 adoption of a resolution establishing an ad hoc committee to review state institutions supporting constitutional democracy (headed by a former minister, Kader Asmal), which took place prior to the release of the CRR. No other progress on this issue is mentioned, despite the fact that the Asmal Committee completed its report, and recommended combining several of these institutions. However, little debate appears to have followed the release of this report, at least in the public domain.

Rights of consumers and shareholders

The Consumer Protection Bill of 2008 is listed as an achievement by the Implementation Report. This bill 'seeks to promote the rights of consumers when interacting with suppliers, and recognises the role of civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in preventing consumer harm and promoting consumer rights'.[45] The bill became an act on 29 April 2009.[46] The Implementation Report further notes that consumer education campaigns were scheduled to be launched throughout 2009 in order to create awareness of consumer rights contained in the Consumer Protection Bill before it is implemented. Finally, it is noted that South Africa needs to improve in transforming the second economy, promoting economic employment in rural areas, and promoting transparency and accountability in the civil society sector. It lists ASGISA and the EPWP as important steps to address the first two challenges. The existence of a second economy and the need to merge the two economies has been a prominent issue in South Africa in the recent decade and the Implementation Report should have made a stronger effort to explain the situation, provide the context and give more details on what steps apart from ASGISA and the EPWP are being taken by the South African government to rectify the problem.

Governance in civil society

The Implementation Report does not address this issue, in spite of listing it. This is critical in South Africa, where civil society has the potential to unite people in different social groups around combined movements for progressive change. The apparent fragmentation of the apex civil society structures and umbrella bodies also means that the state has no real institution for consultation with the sector. Future development plans highlight the need for civil society to play an instructive role in respect of development. The failure of the report to address these issues is unfortunate.

Summary of the Corporate Governance section of the Implementation Report:

• This is the weakest of the four thematic areas, which suggests that the authors did not have sufficient knowledge of corporate governance.
• In terms of progress, only bills that existed prior to the APRM are listed as achievements. Unlike the Economic Governance and Management section, the Corporate Governance section of the report does mention ASGISA, albeit very briefly.
• Much like the two sections before it, the Corporate Governance section fails to provide a clear assessment of progress made on the APRM NPoA, as the majority of achievements it lists had already existed prior to the APRM review in South Africa.
• This section occasionally uses technical jargon, such as 'collusive tendering', that is not explained to the reader.

SOCIO–ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

South Africa's NPoA lists the following nine challenges in the Socio-Economic Development section as those that the government intends to address, and these are repeated in the CRR:[47]

• There is no consensus among stakeholders on definitions and measurement of poverty.
• There is a need for more effective land use that contributes to sustainable livelihoods, especially for the rural poor.
• There is a need to build capacity to implement the programmes of the developmental state.
• Strategies for ensuring children's nutrition, health and development need improvement.
• There are challenges of crime and violence, particularly against women and children.
• An integrated and holistic approach to combating HIV and Aids needs to be appropriately resourced.

- An integrated and holistic approach to combating tuberculosis (TB), malaria and other communicable diseases needs strengthening and deepening.
- Without universal access to basic rights and services, citizens cannot participate in and benefit from socio-economic development.
- Weaknesses in civil society reduce its participation in and impact on socio-economic development processes and outcomes, and there is a need to ensure its increased contribution to South Africa's national development imperatives.

The NPoA goals given in the Implementation Report are slightly different to those in the CRR, and they are discussed here as they appear in the Implementation Report.

Definitions and measurements of poverty and strategies to deal with it

The Implementation Report hails the Social Security Assistance Programme, which, according to the report, is a key driver for reducing poverty, as the most successful anti-poverty strategy. However, once again, no statistics are provided, and the only details given are that this programme manifests in the form of old age pensions, disability support, child support, foster care grants and grant in aid. Other sources (such as the *Towards a 15 Year Review* report) state that over 12 million people were receiving social grants in 2007, the majority of which (7.8 million) was given in the form of child support grants. The current figures for those receiving social grants are likely to rise — according to estimates, 15 million people will be receiving grants by 2011–12.[48]

However, Isobel Frye, director of the Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute, noted:[49]

> Social assistance [i.e. grants] is a universal right for those who need it under the Constitution. The current grant system fails to address the needs of working age, unemployed poor people. There is an ambivalence in government and the ruling party towards grants — whilst they work best in addressing some of the worst destitution in the country, there is a reluctance to extend the coverage of them as is indeed required by the Constitution, for fear that it will remove people's incentives to make their own income, which bears no relevance to what the empirical evidence about labour market needs and unemployment to date suggests.

With regard to a definition of poverty, which South Africa does not yet have, the Implementation Report claims that progress has been made in tackling this issue through a national consultative process that included the government, civil society and research intuitions, without stating which institutions. A Policy Dialogue on the Poverty Line was held in November 2007, which the report said 'contributed to the evolving policy debate on the definition and measurement of poverty'.[50] According to Kefiloe Masiteng, the deputy-director general of StatsSA, her organisation is currently working on a pilot poverty line for South Africa, as at the moment 'we do have one, but people are not happy with it'.[51] In actual fact, a National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) task team was established to work on the development and adoption of acceptable national poverty measures in 2007, but has to date failed to agree on terms of reference and has not met in the last 12 months. Some people have therefore questioned how StatsSA can proceed without the consensus required by the Nedlac Act.

In addition, the Implementation Report mentions that the War on Poverty Campaign was launched by government in August 2008 within the broader poverty strategy.[52] This campaign recognises the work in eradicating poverty done through various programmes, but aims to raise their profiles and ensure that those eligible are receiving the relevant grants. Its approach is therefore aimed at determining which households qualify for which grants and helping them apply for these grants. The Implementation Report, however, does not list any achievements of this campaign or provide any more detail.

Poverty alleviation through anti-poverty strategies in South Africa is a contentious issue. Currently, according to the Public Service Commission, there are 40 programmes and almost 30 000 projects that deal with poverty reduction in the country,[53] and the South African Human Rights Commission noted that the country 'could do with a comprehensive national anti-poverty strategy, as opposed to relying on disparate sets of policy programmes and initiatives to address the problems and challenges'.[54] According to Isobel Frye,[55]

> we used to claim everything we're doing is anti-poverty. But two years ago the then-president, [Thabo] Mbeki voiced that South Africa needs to co-ordinate the existing strategies and subsequently a draft document 'Towards a National Ant-Poverty Strategy' was launched on 22 October 2008. In July 2009, civil society was asked to endorse it, but they suggested further research and work was required.

The need for more effective land use that contributes to sustainable livelihoods, especially for the rural poor

The Implementation Report does not address this issue, despite the detailed National Spatial Development Perspective policies.

Improving the efficiency and efficacy of the education system

The Implementation Report mentions the Kha Ri Gude campaign launched by the Ministry of Education in 2008, which intends to help 4.7 million adults become literate by 2012. The campaign boasts 20 000 literacy classes in all 11 official languages, and currently has 360 000 learners. An important issue is raised with regard to the participation of black learners and women in mathematics, science and technology. The Implementation Report states that 'barriers range from lack of resources, inadequate infrastructure, inadequate learning and teaching materials and a shortage of trained mathematics, science and technology teachers'. It is also states that 'South Africa has been training far fewer teachers than it needs over the past decade'.[56]

It is notes that an occupation-specific dispensation agreement was signed with all teachers' unions in 2008. This agreement is aimed at ensuring the 'improvement of remuneration packages for educators ... increas[ing] recruitment, and ... retain[ing] the services [of] competent educators within the learning environment'.[57] Furthermore, expenditure in education has risen from ZAR 30 billion in 1994/95 to ZAR 101 billion in the 2007/08 financial year. Among the achievements, the report notes that South Africa has attained the goal of universal primary education (StatsSA says that over 98% of seven-to-

13-year-old children attended education institutions in 2006)[58] and that 60% of children remain in school for the full 12 years.

Although these are all considerable accomplishments, they represent overall progress attained since the country's democratic transition and are not a specific response to the 2007 NPoA. Furthermore, South Africa is suffering from serious challenges in the area of education, in spite of the increased funding, including the poor literacy and skills rates of many school leavers, and declining matriculation pass rates. The Implementation Report does not lists these as areas that need to be improved on, which echoes the point made in other sections that the Implementation Report needs to be more self-critical.

Strategies and programme to improve children's nutrition

The Implementation Report provides the following statistics: ZAR 1.152 billion was allocated for the National School Nutrition Programme in 2008, over 6 million primary school pupils are fed in schools on a daily basis in 17 899 schools across the country and 6 226 operational vegetable gardens have been established at schools.[59] It says that all schools were encouraged to maintain a vegetable garden, although the policy tends to concentrate on primary schools. This sub-section is commendable as it lists achievements that were made after the APRM review and could thus be attributed to progress in the NPoA. However, more elaboration on progress achieved would be welcome, as the sub-section is rather short.

Combating HIV and Aids, and other communicable diseases

The Implementation Report lists the following as progress in respect of combating HIV/Aids:

- development of the Framework on Health and Wellness for all levels of the education system;
- development of organised health campaigns to assist learners and communities affected and infected by HIV/Aids;
  provision of support to child-headed households;
- provision of voluntary HIV/Aids counseling; and
- provision of HIV/Aids testing.

The matrix also states that so far 1 145 270 people infected with HIV/Aids have received care and support services. With regard to other diseases, 'the country remains committed to establishing an effective monitoring, evaluation and learning system for public health and TB, malaria and communicable diseases'.[60] Thus far, 72 TB tracing teams have been established, covering all of South Africa's provinces. The magnitude of the HIV/Aids pandemic in South Africa is well known (there are approximately 5.5 million infected adults, which represents 18.8% of the total population), as are the skeptical attitudes towards the disease and its treatment adopted by the Mbeki regime.[61] Interestingly, no

mention is made in the APRM NPoA of the ZAR 7.5 billion allocated to 'an integrated and holistic approach to combating HIV/Aids, TB, malaria and other communicable diseases'.[62] This large figure represented over half of the total NPoA costs.

Universal access to constitutionally mandated basic rights and services

To demonstrate improvement regarding access to basic services, the report notes the following:

- Percentage of households with access to water increased from 59% in 1994 to 88.6% in 2007.
- Percentage of households with access to sanitation increased from 48% in 1994 to 73% in 2007.
- In 1994, 30% of households in South Africa had access to electricity and in 2007 this percentage increased to 80% for lighting, 67% for cooking and 59% for heating.[63]

As pointed out earlier, such statistics, although impressive, represent the overall progress of the country in the post-apartheid era, but not a response to the CRR NPoA specifically. The most recent statistics provided by the Implementation Report concern sanitation improvement through the eradication of the bucket system. By December 2007, 81% of the 252 254 buckets identified in February 2005 were replaced with functional flush toilets, and it is claimed that the bucket system was eradicated in formal settlements by March 2008. This is disputed by township residents.[64] Apart from that, the matrix at the end of the Implementation Report contradicts this claim, stating that 'three provinces have eradicated their backlogs bucket system [sic]. Six provinces still have buckets outstanding'.[65] Another part of the matrix states that 81% of the bucket system was eradicated.[66] These contradictions and poorly written passages suggest that the Implementation Report was hastily assembled and not properly checked. It is also important to define 'access'. This could either mean that people are indeed enjoying these services, or it might mean that the state has provided the infrastructure, but people who cannot afford to pay user fees are unable to pay for, and hence access, the service.

The Constitution refers to the 'progressive realisation' of many of these services, which means that over time, all people should have direct access. It would be useful from a monitoring perspective if a matrix for the spread of access could be developed both in terms of expanded cover and an increase in the value of the right.[67]

Social capital is built at the local level

The report mentions the completion of a funding model for ward committees, intended to improve the facilitation of public participation in local government, and the finalisation of a fund to support women entrepreneurs. It provides no further explanation of these achievements and no discussion of their impact. The term 'social capital' itself requires better definition.

Summary of the Socio-Economic Development section of the Implementation Report:

• Most of the progress is set against a longer timeframe than just 2008. It is therefore difficult to discern what value the APRM has added, given that almost all of these policies, programmes and projects existed before the APRM process in South Africa.

• This section also highlights the ongoing contested nature of statistics in South Africa, with official statistics being questioned by civil society and citizens, and government being skeptical of international measures and comparisons.

• The lack of quantifiable data on specific NPoA pledges raises questions about the government's commitment to implementing the NPoA, notwithstanding the magnitude of developmental backlogs in the country.

• Worryingly, there are also inconsistencies between the information provided in the main body of the Implementation Report and the matrix at the end of it, as seen in the example of the bucket system mentioned above.

• The matrix itself is also vague, when it should actually provide specifics and the details that the main body of the report does not. Instead, many of the remarks related to timeframes found in the matrix for the Socio-Economic Development section say 'Ongoing', perhaps indicating that sufficient progress has not been achieved.

• There is a significant imbalance in the issues covered. While 'improving the efficiency and efficacy of the education system' is covered over almost three pages, 'combating HIV and Aids, and other communicable diseases' — an issue that is just as important — barely receives one-third of a page of discussion.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Apart from identifying issues under the four thematic areas, the APRM CRRs also acknowledge important recurrent and interrelated themes. These are known as cross-cutting issues, and the South African CRR states that 'they necessitate a holistic approach because of the wider impact they have on the quality of governance in all areas'.[68] The South African CRR identifies the following 11 cross-cutting issues: unemployment; capacity constraints and poor service delivery; poverty and inequality; land reform; violence against women; violence against children; the HIV and Aids pandemic; corruption; crime; racism and xenophobia; and managing diversity. Below is a summary of how the Implementation Report addresses each of them (except for unemployment, which the Implementation Report does not address as a cross-cutting issue).

Poverty and inequality

The Implementation Report refers back to the NPoA, which recommended that the country needs a 'poverty barometer'. The explanation starts off by outlining the government's

multi-level, multi-dimensional approach to dealing with poverty, which includes basic income security, which works as a safety net for the most vulnerable; free basic municipal services like water, electricity, education and healthcare for the poor; addressing of asset poverty through land reform and the provision of houses; human development, which focuses on skill development; and second-economy initiatives such as the EPWP and ASGISA. No evidence of their impact is provided to detail the achievements of the government's strategies. From this material (and the discussion of poverty in the Socio-Economic Development section), it is evident that such a measurement instrument was not developed. It is not clear whether any attempts were made to develop it, apart from the Poverty Dialogue mentioned above.

The Implementation Report notes a widening gap between the rich and poor. According to the provided statistics, 20% of the poorest households allocate a much higher proportion of their expenditure to food, non-alcoholic beverages, clothing and footwear than the richest 20%. It is also stated that 'indications are that *per capita* real incomes of the poorest have grown substantially since 2002',[69] but no evidence is provided in support of this claim. Given the huge inequalities in terms of income allocation in South Africa, a per capita measurement does not provide sufficient description of the levels of poverty experienced by the majority of South Africans.

Finally, the work of the South African Non-governmental Organisations Coalition is mentioned, which was aimed at deepening the understanding of poverty, its root causes and enabling citizens to share their stories. In order to achieve this, public meetings were held in all nine provinces in 2008. According to the Implementation Report, citizens complained about 'persistent poverty, extreme hunger, unemployment and [their] inability to access resources for self-help initiatives'.[70] Nevertheless, it is not stated what lessons were drawn from these hearings or what initiatives were taken to address those grievances.

Capacity constraints and poor service delivery

The Implementation Report divides its response into two sections dealing with national/provincial government and local government.

National/provincial government

According to a 2005 Governance and Administration capacity assessment cited in the Implementation Report (which pre-dated the APRM NPoA and was done by the government and covered the health, education, justice and economic departments), the following weaknesses were identified: inadequate remuneration in departments, the inadequacy of human resources with regard to recruitment and selection processes, bureaucratic red tape, and weaknesses in co-ordination between departments. The Implementation Report states that the recommendations (unspecified, so presumably from the CRR) currently implemented include the following:

- development of monitoring and evaluation systems;
- improving planning capacity;
- developing policy on a revolving door with the private sector;
- providing performance-based security of tenure for Senior Management Service (SMS) members;

- carrying out a public service skills audit;
- ecruitment of retirees;
- reinvigoration of Batho Pele (according to the matrix, 1 437 officials from 268 municipalities have been trained in an effort to improve the quality of service delivery);[71] and
- tilting the balance towards career progression and away from lateral entry.

Additionally, reform initiatives are in place to improve human resource functions in governmental departments, as well as a draft bill to create a single public service.

A more concrete achievement is the establishment of the Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy in August 2008 to boost public service training. The establishment of the National Planning Commission in the Presidency will also, it is hoped, drive structural improvements in the co-ordination of planning and development.

Local government

This section states that local government has been plagued by 'capacity constraints stemming from a general scarcity of technical skills in the country and inability to recruit and retain the requisite staff, especially in small and rural based municipalities'.[72] According to the Implementation Report, the result was many staff vacancies across technical, professional, senior management and leadership positions. In June 2008 an average 22% vacancy rate was reported for municipal managers and those reporting directly to them. The GPoA provides more recent statistics, which show an improvement, with 251 out of 283 municipal manager posts being filled. Among the achievements, the Implementation Report lists the following: the launch of Project Consolidate in 2004 (a hands-on intervention in 136 municipalities), which later incorporated the Five-Year Local Government Strategic Agenda, the outcome of which thus far is the deployment of 1 283 experts in 268 municipalities by December 2008. However, the matrix lists slightly lower figures: 1 134 experts deployed by August 2008. The GPoA also provides more detail about this agenda, stating that the implementation of institutional and operational systems to monitor, evaluate and report on the performance of local government service delivery through consultative processes has been conducted on the proposed set of indicators for local government. The overall implementation of the Performance Management System has improved, and quarterly review meetings have increased from 6% to 43% since the last reporting cycle (February 2007–February 2008). A new Institution of Traditional Leaders was established in April 2009 under the new Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. The Implementation Report also lists some challenges, including low compliance with corporate governance basics and a lack of improvement in financial management. While the Implementation Report merely states that Batho Pele was reinvigorated, the GPoA goes further by clarifying that municipalities experiencing problems in implementing Batho Pele (this includes all municipalities in Gauteng and Mpumalanga) are receiving assistance. It is also stated that the implementation of service delivery improvement plans and service standards (not mentioned in the Implementation Report) was completed (but the date of completion was not specified).[73]

Land reform

The Implementation Report claims that the redistribution of land is central to South Africa's anti-poverty strategy. Of 79 696 lodged restitution land claims, the Restitution Commission has settled 75 010 (a total of 95%) thus far. From the start of this programme, 5.2 million hectares of land were redistributed to various beneficiaries. Apart from that, there are currently 521 settled restitution projects, which have thus far resulted in the creation of 1 699 permanent jobs and 3 047 temporary jobs.[74] The government of South Africa has also delivered 165 773 hectares of land to farm dwellers and workers. Currently, the plans are to assist 38 000 land tenure beneficiaries in the next three years to gain access to land through land acquisition programmes. Finally, the president assented to the Provision of Land and Assistance Amendment Act of 2008, which, according to the Implementation Report, will ensure the sustainable use of land and allow the government to buy land and movable property.

Despite these statistics, land reform remains problematic in South Africa. In 1994, 87% of South Africa's arable land was white owned. The government planned to redistribute 30% of it to black or mixed race farmers by 2015. However, currently only 5% has been redistributed. Critics of South Africa's land reform claim that it has hurt investment in the commercial farming sector and reduced land available for commercial agriculture.[75] According to researcher Michael Aliber, about half of the resettlement projects have collapsed. Theo de Jager, vice-president of AgriSA, adds that often the collapse is not the fault of the new farmers, but rather because of the administrative red tape in the Department of Agriculture.[76] The ANC treasurer-general, Matthews Phosa, recently admitted that 'land reform policy had often failed to achieve its aims, notably in the Limpopo province, because beneficiaries were not given the help they needed to cultivate land'.[77]

Violence against women and children

The Implementation Report combines the two cross-cutting issues of violence against women and children into one when addressing them. According to the report, South Africa is in the process of implementing a law reform programme to strengthen and ensure an integrated response to violence against women and children, specifically focused on issues of trafficking, child pornography, sex tourism and labour exploitation. Other achievements listed include the extension of the Domestic Violence Act to those who live in relationships similar to marriage and the establishment of specialised courts dedicated to sexual offences. (See also the discussion of the problem of violence against women and children in the Democracy and Political Governance section.)

HIV and Aids pandemic

The Implementation Report claims that the fight against HIV and Aids remains a key priority. In order to back this claim, the following statistics are provided:

- The funds spent by the public sector to combat HIV/Aids increased from ZAR 5.317 billion in 2006 to ZAR 5.768 billion in 2007.

- The Department of Education increased its expenditure on HIV/Aids from ZAR 157 million in 2006 to ZAR 167 million in 2007.
- The Department of Social Development increased its expenditure on HIV/Aids from ZAR 339 million in 2006 to ZAR 452 million in 2007.[78]

It is also stated that significant resources have been allocated to the treatment, care and support of those infected with HIV/Aids since the launch of the National Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and Aids Management, Treatment, Care and Support. There is also a concern about a lack of a 'chronic illness' grant. Anecdotal evidence suggests that HIV-positive people who receive a temporary disability grant, which provides for the means to source the necessary food required for taking anti-retroviral treatment, often have to face the fact that improvement with regard to the CD4 count might in fact disqualify them from an extension of their disability grant. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that increased spending does not always automatically guarantee improved outcomes, and more practical statistics and evidence are needed to judge its impact. However, the Implementation Report does not provide much more detail, only stating that significant increases in expenditure were used for laboratory testing, anti-retrovirals, nutrition and the health system during the reporting period. (See also the discussion of HIV/Aids in the Socio-Economic Development section.)

Corruption

The Implementation Report mentions the National Anti-Corruption Forum, through which 150 municipalities will be assisted with the development of anti-corruption strategies. Furthermore, it states that government has initiated an appraisal of the national anti-corruption framework within South Africa. The GPoA adds that as of February 2009, 135 (90%) of 150 municipalities identified were supported to develop fraud prevention plans. It also states that information educating communities about the process of reporting corruption has been placed in the print media. The GPoA further states that the Conflict of Interest Framework was developed to manage conflict of interest affecting public officials, although it has not yet been implemented.[79] It is surprising that the Implementation Report provides such scant details with regard to such an important issue and that no concrete achievements are listed, especially taking into account the political battles that raged to abolish the corruption-fighting Department of Special Operations, popularly known as the Scorpions, and other high-profile corruption cases. The matrix adds a little more detail, stating that a ZAR 20 million five-year programme aimed at enhancing the capacity of the public sector to fight corruption was launched (although a launch date is not provided). Furthermore, the matrix mentions the 'launch of [a] massive communication campaign in March and April 2008 aimed at raising awareness of corruption and anti-corruption measures'.[80] (See also the discussion of corruption in the Democracy and Political Governance section.)

Crime

The APRM CRR states that 'crime is a major problem in South Africa'.[81] According to uncited data it uses, South Africa ranks second in the world for murders per capita and first

for assaults and rape. The APRM CRR further notes concerns about the level of violence as a distinctive feature in South Africa. The South African government responded to it by saying that 'although it is true that crime poses a serious challenge in South Africa, an impression should not be created that the Government is not taking steps to curb it'.[82]

According to the Implementation Report, South Africa 'remains resolute in its fight against crime'.[83] It asserts that government expenditure on the prevention of crime has been steadily increasing and efforts to fight crime by the government and civil society are starting to yield results and states that crime statistics from 2007 indicate a marked decrease in murder, attempted murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances and common robbery. However, no other data or achievements are listed to back this claim, nor are these results spelled out.

Racism and xenophobia

One of the key recommendations by the Panel of Eminent Persons that government ignored was that it should deal with growing xenophobia. The APRM CRR states that 'xenophobia against other Africans is on the rise and should be nipped in the bud'.[84] Although in response to this the South African government said that it 'shares the view that more needs to be done to fight xenophobia',[85] the necessary measures were not taken, and the country erupted in a wave of xenophobic attacks in May 2008 that left 62 dead and a further 670 injured.[86]

This section begins with the two examples of racism used earlier in the Implementation Report (see the Democracy and Political Governance section, above). The report also discusses the outbreaks of xenophobic violence in May 2008. It states that since these incidents occurred in the poorest communities, there is an undeniable class dimension to the attacks. In order to address the matter of xenophobic violence, the South African Parliament established a task team to investigate, discover the root cause of the attacks and subsequently make recommendations on how to prevent similar incidents in the future. The team found that attacks occurred in places affected by poverty, and that 'socio-economic inequalities, competition for scarce resources, poor living conditions and a high rate of unemployment may have exacerbated an already tense situation'.[87] The matrix provides some more information, however insufficient. It is states that 'a National Action Plan to combat racism, xenophobia and related intolerances was developed', without providing any details of what this plan entails. Other progress includes the following: 'a national study on Racism and Racial Discrimination is underway', 'a Conference on the "Challenges and Opportunities of International Migration" was convened in partnership with Government and civil society organizations', 'a Social Indaba on Xenophobia was held in Pretoria in August 2008' and 'matters pertaining to violence against foreign nationals were expedited with 1 521 accused in 435 cases brought to court. A total of 46 accused in 30 cases were convicted'.[88] No recommendations or any steps (if any) taken to prevent further tension or a possible repeat of the attacks are listed in the Implementation Report.

This section of the Implementation Report was also criticised by Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti, a research fellow at the Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP), who made the following points.

Firstly, the Implementation Report presents gross inaccuracies, in spite of the fact that relevant data was available at the time of its release. For example, xenophobic violence

started in May and not in June, as the Implementation Report claims. It also claims that in the Western Cape, violence occurred between foreign nationals. The FMSP denies this, claiming that it has documented that the violence was perpetrated by South Africans against foreign nationals.[89] Secondly, the Implementation Report tries to tone down the knowledge of the situation the South African government had prior to attacks by using words such as 'spontaneous' attacks 'with little or no warning'.[90] However, the South African government was adequately warned about the existing tensions by the APRM CRR and by others, according to the FMSP.[91] Thirdly, the Implementation Report does not assess the response of the South African government to the attacks, which, according to the FMSP, showed major co-ordination and capacity gaps in its Disaster Management System.[92] Fourthly, the matrix does not give sufficient details about the charges and sentencing brought against the guilty parties. Finally, there is a very unclear assessment of actions taken to prevent similar scenarios from occurring in the future.[93]

It is also important to note that according to the Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South Africa, a year after the attacks, 'foreigners in South Africa face continued threats of xenophobic violence' and 'little has been done by authorities to address the root causes of the violence'.[94] Furthermore, in November 2009, a year and a half after the original attacks, xenophobia was once again on the rise in South Africa's Western Cape Province, where local workers in the town of De Doorns drove 3 000 foreigners from their shacks, accusing them of stealing their jobs by accepting lower wages.[95]

Managing diversity

The Implementation Report claims that huge strides have been made by South Africa in managing diversity over the past 15 years. The Government Communication and Information Systems commissioned a perception survey (which is undertaken on a half-yearly basis) called the Government Performance Barometer to assess government's performance. The Implementation Report provides data from the survey taken in 2008. With regard to gender equality, 71% of respondents felt that the government is managing gender equality well, while 45% felt that the government is doing a good job in managing affirmative action. However, the Implementation Report notes that the employment of women and persons with disabilities remains below set targets; for example, the level of employment of women within the SMS is 33%, which is below the target of 50%. More up-to-date statistics are provided in the GPoA, which states that the figure for women in the SMS was 34.3% in February 2009. Although no statistics are provided for the employment of people with disabilities, it is noted that the Job Access Strategic Framework on the Recruitment, Employment and Retention of Persons with Disabilities in the Public Service was launched in March 2009. The Implementation Report further notes that young people often have difficulty in finding employment. In 2007, 22% of young males and 35% of young females could not find jobs. There is also an increase in black people and women at the top and senior management levels. However, statistics show a slight decrease of employment of so-called Coloured people in these positions. With regard to professionally qualified people and the middle-management level, statistics show a decrease in blacks' and women's representation and an increase in whites' representation. Finally, according to the Government Performance Barometer, 62% of the respondents felt that the government is doing well in term of the delivery of basic services. It is surprising that this particular

data is provided under the Managing Diversity section and not under the Poor Service Delivery section (see the Socio-Economic Development section, above). Although the data provided gives an indication of public perceptions and some employment statistics, the Implementation Report fails to list concrete ways in which the government of South Africa is planning to improve its performance in managing diversity and the many divisions inherited from the apartheid era.

EMERGING ISSUES

The Implementation Report also lists two issues that have emerged since the completion of the CRR. The first of these is the challenge in electricity supplies, which resulted in blackouts and load shedding, especially in early 2008. The second issue identified is climate change, which, according to the Implementation Report has led to 'vicious storms and fires that have damaged homes and crops'.[96] It is also noted that South Africa is ready for the 2010 FIFA World Cup (referred to in the Implementation Report as the '2010 World Cup Show'), as the necessary infrastructures and stadiums have been built, and a massive investment in infrastructure has taken place.

IMPLEMENTATION REPORT SHORTCOMINGS

The Implementation Report begins with introductory remarks by Kgalema Motlanthe, the president at the time, and Minister for Public Service and Administration Richard Baloyi, who both speak of it in glowing and proud terms. The fact that these two very senior government officials are proud of the report is concerning, considering its quality.

The Implementation Report states that it is a 'product of wider consultation with stakeholders',[97] citing that it uses data obtained from research commissioned by independent bodies, NGOs and annual reports for Cabinet Committee clusters (the key groupings of government ministries). Yet interviews conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) researchers with members of civil society and senior government officials could not identify exactly which stakeholders were consulted. In fact, many of the interviewees admitted to not having seen the Implementation Report previously. According to Grant Masterson from the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, to his knowledge a meeting convened to gather input for the Implementation Report in January 2009 'consisted largely of civil servants', and the Implementation Report appears to have been written entirely by DPSA staff. Overall, it suffers from three significant problems.

Firstly, the most important issue is that the Implementation Report often discusses South Africa's overall progress since its first democratic elections in 1994 and not specific progress achieved in response to the APRM NPoA during the reporting period (November 2007–December 2008). More often than not, the Implementation Report reads more like review of the country since its democratic transition until the present day, rather than a follow-up from the APRM process and its NPoA. This creates a sense that much of the Implementation Report was actually a 'cut-and-paste' job from other reports, such as the 10- and 15-year reviews of South Africa commissioned by the Presidency following the

country's first democratic election in 1994. The fact that much of the progress listed in the Implementation Report dates back prior to the commencement of the APRM processes in the country suggests that not much has been done with regard to putting the NPoA, specifically, into practice.

Secondly, while the Implementation Report emphasises the implementation of existing policies, it makes no effort whatsoever to analyse their effectiveness and suffers from a lack of self-reflection and criticism. Details are often scant, meaning that these policies cannot be utilised as 'best practices' by other states that are signatories to the 'peer review' process. Mentioning achievements without elaborating on them or providing statistics or relevant data to demonstrate their impact makes it hard to discern the added value of the APRM and its NPoA in South Africa. It is also not always clear in which timeframe the listed achievements took place, and thus one does not know whether they can be attributed to the APRM's review of South Africa or not.

Thirdly, it appears that the Implementation Report was written in haste. There are numerous technical errors in it, ranging from grammatical errors to not addressing identified NPoA issues. The GPoA, at least in some cases, provides a little more insight and detail into the achievements and provides more concrete data. Those writing the Implementation Report appear not to have drawn on the GPoA data in many instances. Although some of this data falls outside the reporting period, it is nevertheless surprising that more effort was not put into providing concrete numbers to demonstrate the achievements in the Implementation Report.

In short, it represents 'reporting for the sake of compliance', a point emphasised in several interviews with government officials.[98] This is a dangerous trap that many government departments often seem to fall into — not doing much on an issue and only remembering it a few months or weeks before the report is due. Since this leaves only a short time to act, all energy goes into preparing a report to make it appear as though some progress has been achieved. The Implementation Report certainly lists real progress, but the majority of it is non-APRM related and does not correlate to the NPoA. It thus tries to cover up a lack of any real achievement on the APRM to-do list and instead draws the reader's attention to the strides the country has made in the last 15 years, categorising it under the APRM thematic areas to make it appear as though the two are directly related. According to a number of senior government officials interviewed for this paper, the reporting culture inherent in the South African government can often be described as 'malicious compliance'. One interviewee stated:

> It was a compliance review; we did it because we had to. You read it and then you say, so what? Would you be able to summarise it in one sentence, could you say that we progressed by 20%? So in that sense we have complied with the reporting process, but we have not mapped what we have to do. This is the reporting culture — malicious compliance.

Given the problems surrounding the APRM process in South Africa from its onset, judging from the vagueness and quality of the Implementation Report, it is not a convincing demonstration on the part of the South African government that the country is taking the process, its recommendations and the NPoA seriously. But if both the former president and the current minister responsible for the APRM are proud of such a poor effort, is there any hope for the overall APRM process in South Africa? Although South Africa aspired

to provide an example for other, less democratic states on how to conduct the exercise, in many ways its choices provide a cautionary tale for others on what not to do, i.e. it is a largely negative rather than positive example.

From this report and interviews conducted by SAIIA researchers with senior government officials and members of civil society, it is also evident that the APRM NPoA does not feature in government policies, programmes and plans. Rather, it is an initiative that is only remembered when reporting time draws near.

There also seems to be broad agreement among stakeholders that South Africa underwent the APRM process for external, rather than domestic, reasons. Since the APRM was a part of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), which itself was masterminded by South Africa's then-president, Thabo Mbeki, the country had to demonstrate good faith and undergo the review if it expected other African states to do so. There was also an expectation that the country would get an excellent review, especially when compared to other countries on the continent. However, instead, South Africa received a balanced, but critical, review that highlighted both achievements and serious governance and developmental problems.

The vagueness of the NPoA itself suggests that it would have been difficult to implement and measure. Nevertheless, South Africa had to continue with the APRM at least for the sake of its image on the continent. Therefore, the Implementation Report was published, which, in spite of its lack of content, was highly praised at the APRM Heads of State Forum in January 2009.

The Implementation Report presents South Africa in glowing terms and describes the country's progress since the end of apartheid. When looked at from this angle, it does do South Africa proud, as it shows how dramatically the country has improved since the establishment of democratic rule. But the Implementation Report is not a 15-year review of South Africa's political, economic, corporate and social review since 1994. It is a document that was supposed to reflect on the 2007 APRM report and its NPoA and therefore needs to be judged in those terms. To praise a report that does not answer the questions it was supposed to and instead points to achievements and progress in other areas is at best erroneous or else disingenuous.

One hopes that South Africa does not repeat the mistakes identified in this analysis when compiling its Second APRM Implementation Report, due for the APRM Forum Meeting on 31 January 2010 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. According to one of the senior officials at the DPSA, there is awareness at the department that the first APRM Implementation Report was a poor effort.[99]

CONCLUSION

South Africa underwent an APRM process that was widely criticised by some of its own civil society organisations. It started out expecting a very positive review, considering that it is one of the most advanced and better-governed countries on the continent. An attitude of arrogance was also perceived, and of undergoing the review for external reasons rather than internal ones. President Thabo Mbeki was one of the creators behind Nepad and the APRM, and thus South Africa had to be one of the pioneering countries to be reviewed in order to encourage others to do so as well. However, the government of

South Africa forgot that those who set higher standards are judged by higher standards as well. It simply would not make sense to judge South Africa by the same standards as a country like, for example, Rwanda. The APRM CRR attempted to find out what problems and challenges exist in contemporary South Africa and to provide advice in order to try and help the country eradicate them. However, this was met with resistance by the South African government, which tried to dominate and tightly control the process and was very reluctant to listen to criticism of its performance. Thus, South Africa gave itself a negative image during the APRM process, which has not been remedied by the first APRM Implementation Report. If South Africa wants to remain at the forefront of the governance agenda in Africa and exemplify democracy, it needs to put effort into implementing its APRM NPoA and reporting more accurately and sincerely.

Implementing the NPoA, following up on its objectives and reporting on their achievement are great ways to show that South Africa is committed to the APRM process and the overall goal of improving governance in Africa. However, the first APRM Implementation Report does not succeed in demonstrating this, which raises an important question: does South Africa actually need the APRM? Namibia and Botswana, which, like South Africa, enjoy higher levels of democratisation and 'good governance' on the continent, have so far rejected the APRM by saying that they would not benefit from it. Judging from interviews with government officials, South Africa is already addressing most of the issues in the NPoA through its GPoA. Thus, some see the APRM as mere duplication of already existing policies and programmes. However, if South Africa is only participating in the process in order to encourage other African states, it needs to do this properly, by demonstrating the necessary commitment and political will to the APRM processes.

THE APRM'S FUTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA: RECOMMENDATIONS

The APRM was a time-consuming and costly exercise in South Africa, but research suggests that it currently has little discernible direct effect on South African policy. Yet it produced a solid diagnosis of governance in the country and identified its major problems. Can it still play a role and become useful in improving governance matters in South Africa? Yes, it certainly can, but in order for that to happen, there are several essential conditions for the APRM to be successful in South Africa. Many of the following recommendations stem from research and interviews by SAIIA for a project examining the implementation of the APRM in South Africa for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.[100]

• Create a champion for the APRM. In the considerable political and bureaucratic changes over the past four years, there is no recognisable driver of the APRM. The champion needs to be tough, credible and able to get things done. The new minister in the DPSA as Focal Point and NGC chairperson has the potential to play this role, but hitherto has not demonstrated leadership in this regard.
• Mainstream the APRM. At present, the APRM has a low profile in government and is seen as the purview of the DPSA within South Africa, and the Department of International Relations and Co-operation outside it. For the APRM to be taken more seriously, its findings and recommendations need to be mainstreamed into policy debates and documents.

- Create permanent capacity. If South Africa is to take the APRM seriously in the future, much greater institutional capacity needs to be created. Several interviewees recommended that a dedicated, semi-autonomous APRM unit be developed, at arms length from government to give it the necessary credibility and independence, but still maintaining strong links with government, and especially the new National Planning Commission. One of the factors that has led to the APRM being weakened is the loss of institutional memory within the DPSA, as those who worked on the process have moved on. Ghana's model of an independent NGC and Secretariat should be strongly considered.

- Reconstitute and revive the NGC. As in many countries, the NGC tends to become dormant when the CRR is finalised, and this pattern has been followed in South Africa. Given the controversy over the composition, chairmanship and method of selection of NGC members in 2005, South Africa should strongly consider a more open and participatory process to select a credible NGC that can then bring the perspectives of different sectors to the implementation process.

- Get Nedlac, Parliament and the auditor-general more involved. As Ghana demonstrates, the APRM works best when as many stakeholders as possible feel they have a genuine stake in it. South Africa has a regular forum where government, organised business and organised labour meet to discuss key policy issues, Nedlac. It was not involved in the APRM much, but it potentially could be a strong partner in driving the process forward, as it brings the perspectives of different sectors together. Parliament created ad hoc committees in the four APRM thematic areas, although this interest and momentum has not been sustained, but could be revived. Similarly, the auditor-general's office could potentially examine NPoA implementation as part of its performance auditing functions.

- Prepare stakeholders for future reviews. The APRM is not meant to be a once-off event, and all countries should expect and plan for future reviews. There is the opportunity for the country to begin sensitising stakeholders now for these future reviews. A more informed and involved civil society — especially academics, activists, researchers and think tanks, but also grassroots organisations — can only strengthen the process. These groups should also be brought in to assist with implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.

- Improve communication. Many felt that the APRM report and NPoA are not sufficiently well known in South Africa, both within government circles and beyond. The APRM will struggle to penetrate the policy environment if only limited copies of the report are produced, distributed, read and commented upon. The national APRM website, <http://www.aprm.org.za>, has not been updated since mid-2006, and does not have the Implementation Report uploaded. This makes it difficult for government to be held accountable for its commitments and to track progress on implementation.

- Engage the media. While limited media attention was focused on the APRM in 2005–06, this has decreased dramatically since that time. The media tend to concentrate on the big set-piece events or on scandal and controversy — particularly if it thinks government is hiding something. The new Focal Point and NGC should consider strategies to raise the public profile of the APRM through the media. This has been done successfully in countries such as Ghana and Uganda, where the APRM is mentioned weekly in the major newspapers and thereby becomes a 'living document'.

- Improve the quality of planning, indicators and reporting. Stakeholders repeatedly emphasised that the quality of planning, indicators and reporting must improve. It is extremely difficult to produce a credible and honest report based on poor design and data. Reporting should also not be a substitute for carrying out action items.

- Involve civil society organisations in monitoring and evaluation. Many civil society groups in South Africa do (or could) take an interest in NPoA implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. A framework to gather their input should be developed in order to strengthen the implementation and reporting processes and make them more inclusive.

- Create a category on the GPoA for the APRM. The Presidency has an electronic system for capturing progress on the GPoA that is flagged under different policies and programmes. The system could be adapted to flag items as relevant to the APRM. The system already does this for UN Millennium Development Goals. This would assist in monitoring progress on APRM NPoA implementation, as the system is updated on a quarterly basis. Reports can also be extracted from this system.

- Begin to brand reforms. Where reforms occur on issues raised in the APRM CRR and NPoA, there should be a conscious effort to link them to the APRM in speeches and reports. This provides both support for the reforms from the APRM and evidence that the APRM is taken seriously and has a genuine, measurable impact. For example, this opportunity has been missed on scrapping floor-crossing legislation, initiating a process to examine private funding of political parties and dealing with xenophobia — three issues strongly identified in the CRR.

- Demonstrate political will to integrate policy. Before genuine and meaningful policy integration is possible, government needs to demonstrate the will to do this. The National Planning Commission offers potential in this regard, but the omission of any focus on the APRM in official references to it shows that the APRM is not currently prioritised in South Africa.

ENDNOTES

1   Johwa W, 'African peer review report commends SA on changes', *Business Day*, 23 February 2009.

2   For the purposes of this paper, only the Governance and Administration cluster of the GPoA will be discussed, as it is the only one that correlates with the APRM NPoA.

3   Herbert R & S Gruzd, *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2008, especially pp. 255–313.

4   Personal interviews conducted with government officials and civil society organisations during SAIIA's study commissioned by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on 'Mainstreaming the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) National Programme of Action (NPoA) into National Development Strategies/Plans: Towards a Common, Unifying Framework for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), and the APRM NPoA: South African Case Study', October–November 2009.

5   *Ibid.*

6   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *APRM Country Review Report No. 5: Republic of South Africa.* Midrand, September 2007, p. 292.

7   The Thusong Service Centre (formerly Multi-purpose Community Centre) Programme of government was initiated in 1999 as a primary vehicle for the implementation of development communication and information in order to integrate government services into primarily rural communities. This was done to address historical, social and economic factors that limited access to information, services and participation by citizens, as they had to travel long distances to access these services.

8   APRM Focal Point, *First Report on the Implementation of South Africa's African Peer Review Mechanism Programme of Action*. Pretoria: APRM Focal Point, Ministry of Public Service and Administration, January 2009, p. 2.

9   SABC News, 'Gauteng taxi strike turns violent', 24 March 2009, <http://www.sabcnews.com/portal/site/SABCNews/menuitem.5c4f8fe7ee929f602ea12ea1674daeb9/?vgnextoid=e2d84555c0730210VgnVCM10000077d4ea9bRCRD&vgnextfmt=default>.

10   South Africa, *Government's Programme of Action*, 2008, <http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/poa/report/index.html>.

11   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit*., p. 3.

12   *Ibid.*

13   Fine J & W Bird, 'Shades of prejudice: An investigation into the South African media's coverage of racial violence and xenophobia', 2006, <http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/foreigners/shades.pdf>.

14   During a recent scandal around the gender of the women's 800 metres world champion runner Caster Semenya, the then-head of Athletics South Africa, Leonard Chuene, tried to use allegations of racism to cover up his lies regarding his knowledge of previous gender tests that the athlete was subjected to. Chuene claimed that racist South Africans wrote letters to the International Athletics Associations Federation (IAAF) that, according to him, caused the athletics body to test Semenya. He said: 'These rumours come from South Africa. Why did these people write to the IAAF? These are the same people who don't want the 2010 World Cup, the same people who bring black people down and the same people who refuse to believe that Africans can make it on the world stage.' While Chuene later admitted lying about his prior knowledge of Semenya's gender situation, he never apologised for unnecessarily creating racial tensions or for shifting the blame for his own mistakes.

15   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit*., pp. 277–79.

16   *Ibid.*, p. 37.

17   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit*., p. 4.

18   *Ibid.*

19   *Ibid.*

20   *Ibid.*

21   *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40.

22   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit*., pp. 277–81; 284–86.

23   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit*., pp. 4–5.

24   *Ibid.*, p. 6.

25   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit*., p. 73.

26   *Ibid.*, p. 292.

27   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit*., p. 7.

28   *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.

29   *Ibid.*, p. 35.

30   *Ibid.*, p. 58.

31   *Ibid.*, p. 8.

32   *Ibid.*, p. 9.

33   *Mail & Guardian*, 'Economic crisis could lead to 300,000 job losses', 5 May 2009, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-05-05-economic-crisis-could-lead-to-300nbsp000-job-losses>.

34   *Business Report*, 'SA may still lose more jobs, Zuma says', 3 December 2009, <http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=5272413>.

35   Appel M, 'Poverty in South Africa is "Declining"', 2 October 2008, <http://www.southafrica.info>.

36   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

37   *Ibid.*, p. 10.

38   *Ibid.*

39   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

40   *Government Gazette*, 32533, 28 August 2009, <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=106306>.

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42   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

43   *Trading and Economics*, 'South Africa GDP rate', <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/GDP-Growth.aspx?Symbol=ZAR>.

44   *Mail & Guardian Online*, 5 May 2009, *op. cit.*

45   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

46   Lake R, 'The Consumer Protection Act', 29 May 2009, <http://www.deneysreitz.co.za/index.php/news/the_consumer_protection_act/RosalindLakeConsumerProtectionAct>.

47   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

48   StatsSA (Statistics South Africa), *Social Grants: In-depth Analysis of the General Household Survey Data, 2003–2007*, GHS Series, 1, p. 48, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?PPN=P0318.1&SCH=4436>.

49   Personal interview, Isobel Frye, director of the Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute, Johannesburg, 19 October 2009.

50   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

51   Personal interview, Kefiloe Masiteng, deputy-director general of StatsSA, Pretoria, 15 October 2009.

52   This must be distinguished from a previous 'War on Poverty' declared by then-President Nelson Mandela in 1998, which was linked to the National Poverty Hearings. That process appears to have been buried before any victories were achieved against poverty in South Africa.

53   Public Service Commission, *Report on the Evaluation of Government's Poverty Reduction Programme*, October 2007, p. 2, <http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/poa/report/index.html>.

54   Public Service Commission, *op. cit.*

55   Personal interview, Isobel Frye, director of the Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute, Johannesburg, 19 October 2009.

56   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

57   *Ibid.*

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60   *Ibid.*

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62   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

63   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

64   *Mail & Guardian*, 'Too little, too late', 9–16 April 2009.

65   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

66   *Ibid.*

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68   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

69   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

70   *Ibid.*, p. 22.

71   *Ibid.*, p. 51.

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73   South Africa, *op. cit.*

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79   Public Service Commission, *op. cit.*

80   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

81   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

82   *Ibid.*, p. 357.

83   APRM Focal Point, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

84   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

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    National Programme of Action (NPoA) into National Development Strategies/Plans: Towards a
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OTHER PUBLICATIONS

The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers is the first in-depth study of the APRM, examining its practical, theoretical and diplomatic challenges. Case studies of Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Mauritius and South Africa illustrate difficulties faced by civil society in making their voices heard. It offers 80 recommendations to strengthen the APRM.

The APRM Toolkit DVD-ROM is an electronic library of resources for academics, diplomats and activists. In English and French, it includes video interviews, guides to participatory accountability mechanisms and surveys, a complete set of the official APRM documents, governance standards and many papers and conference reports. It is included with the **Pioneers** book.

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