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OXFAM

NETWORK OF SOUTHERN THINK TANKS (NEST)

Multi-stakeholder Policy Dialogue
EMERGING PARTNERS IN AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT:
Measuring the Impact of South–South Co-operation
Midrand, 3 March 2015

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

Oxfam and South African Institute of International Relations

Summary Report by:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive summary

The Network of Southern Think Tank (NeST) was established on the periphery of the first High Level Meeting (HLM) of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) in Mexico in April 2014, and in follow-up to the Conference of Southern Providers held in Delhi in March 2013. The network has committed itself to 'generating, systematising, consolidating and sharing knowledge on South–South Co-operation (SSC) approaches to international development'. A collaborative initiative for the South by the South, NeST is primarily a think tank and academic forum which provides policy inputs into the arena of SSC. Nonetheless, NeST welcomes inputs from a diversity of Southern stakeholders, through the open engagement of government, civil society, private sector, and various Southern practitioners to contribute towards creating a unified understanding and framework for debates around SSC.

Following the successful launches of the NeST Chapters in South Africa and Brazil, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in collaboration with Oxfam South Africa hosted a multi-stakeholder policy dialogue titled 'Emerging Partners in Africa's Development' on 3 March 2015 in Midrand, South Africa. The meeting, attended by over 100 participants, brought together a wide range of stakeholders from Africa and the global South including academics, think tanks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector, philanthropies and government departments from South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, India, Turkey, China, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Kenya, among others, to debate the latest trends and features of South–South Co-operation.

The discussions were centred on two broad topics, 'Emerging Development Partners in Africa' and 'Monitoring and Accountability of South–South Co-operation'. The meeting also served as an open session to collect inputs for the NeST Technical Workshop, held in the subsequent days to develop a conceptual and methodological framework for SSC. The topics were broken down into key questions, introduced by the panel of experts, and subsequently discussed in the open forum.

Opening session

The first session of the Multi-stakeholder Policy Dialogue constituted a welcome address by co-hosts SAIIA and Oxfam, and the key-note address by the Chief Executive Officer of the African Union (AU) New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Agency, Dr. Ibrahim Mayaki.

Hosts and key-note speakers

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive - SAIIA

Africa has become the subject of accelerated interest as the narrative of an 'Africa rising' has become an accepted term to describe the economic development on the continent over the last decade. Having undergone institutional re-building of its continental structures since the early 2000s, Africa has grown into a more dynamic and active player in its own development. In addition, new players such as Brazil, China, India, Korea, and Turkey are engaging with African countries politically and developmentally and are helping to shape a new narrative different from the one Africa had previously. These newer engagements are viewed against the background of South–South Co-operation which is considered fundamentally different from Africa's developmental relations with the North. At the same time South–South Co-operation, emanating historically from the need for Southern solidarity, requires constant empirical assessment and interrogation.

The Busan High Level Forum (2011) places South–South Co-operation in a different category from North–South Co-operation (NSC) and affirms that this category is 'differential' and 'voluntary', though sharing common goals with NSC. What does this mean and how does it impact key development issues in a continent which still has the highest number of low-income countries in the world, where numerous countries are plagued by endemic conflict and extremism threatens to further weaken the fibre of society?

The Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST) was established on the periphery of the Mexico High Level Meeting in April 2014. This network has committed itself to generate, systematise, consolidate and share knowledge on South–South Co-operation approaches in international development. The South African Chapter of the NeST was established on 28 January 2015 and brought together a wide range of local stakeholders such as academics, think tanks, NGOs, philanthropies and relevant government departments engaged in a South Africa's development assistance to the continent.

This Multi-stakeholder Policy Dialogue now intends to bring together officials, intergovernmental actors, civil society, academics and researchers to explore the topic of measuring the impact of South–South Co-operation. As an African think tank, SAIIA is particularly interested in providing a platform for African views on the issue of emerging partners in Africa's development. SAIIA's partnership with Oxfam intends to put at the centre of the discussions in the NeST the views and perspectives of African countries, some of which are Southern providers of development assistance while others still remain primarily recipients and beneficiary countries.

Sipho Mthathi, Executive Director - Oxfam South Africa

The present is an exciting time for the global South, as more and more Southern nations are beginning to contest the non-democratic nature of global governance. Given the immensity of the combined population of the global South the question that needs to be asked is how the South can use its numbers to influence the international development regime and introduce a new development trajectory. While the topic of South–South Co-operation is dominated by technical discussions like what indicators to use, how it is measured and how it is defined, at the heart of South–South Co-operation is a concern for people. Two questions arise in this regard. First, what have the countries of the South learned from decades of development efforts led by the North and; second, what roles do emerging powers and Southern coalitions like BRICS play in addressing the development challenges of their people? The next two days are about exploring these issues.

It is the hope of SAIIA and Oxfam that the NeST initiative grows in the coming years as an effective platform for dialogue on South–South Co-operation that goes beyond mere rhetoric. The last decade has seen the introduction of new actors in the global development arena and a concomitant increase in South–South Co-operation. At present however, although it is agreed that South–South Co-operation is different from North–South Co-operation, a common definition of South–South Co-operation does not yet exist. Furthermore, the knowledge gaps in South–South Co-operation, exacerbated by weak information systems and limited evaluation practices among Southern partners, highlighted at Southern meetings such as the Delhi conference of Southern Providers (2013), the Nairobi (2009) and Bogota (2010) conferences and several UN Development Co-operation Forums, necessitates for follow up discussions such as this one. It is hoped that in the next few days the NeST meeting produces a framework for monitoring and evaluation; and principles that will guide South–South Co-operation. Such a framework can assist in ensuring a positive impact of development co-operation policies and practices on communities in need, those suffering from decades of conflict and trauma and those riddled by diseases.

As recipients of development assistance the countries of the global South have first-hand experience of the potential for aid policies and practices to have a detrimental effect on communities in need. This therefore is an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the past. The involvement of people and civil society organisations from across the continent therefore is important in this regard. For Africa to attain its ambitious goals – reducing poverty, building vibrant economies, acquiring the necessary resources that will enable infrastructure development – a new approach to development and development assistance is necessary.

Mr Ibrahim Mayaki - Chief Executive Officer, AU NEPAD Agency

The key-note address by Mr. Mayaki is attached as annexure 1 of this report

Summary of Q&As and moderated discussion

Criticism was voiced and accepted towards the NEPAD Agency that, although it does already engage with a number of international NGOs, it still needs to improve greatly in the way it engages African civil society in African development policy and planning. There is great significance in civil society engagement, especially with public policy becoming more and more of a combination of 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches. The NEPAD Agency has committed itself to improving its engagement with civil society as it is a key actor in the implementation of strategies and needs to be part of the public policy design process.

Concerns were raised that in many African countries leaders have remained in office far beyond their legitimate term, thus with time rendering themselves more distant from the people and ineffective in addressing the nation's development challenges. These major governance issues of Africa need to be addressed head on within the African Union.

It is well known that many African countries are plagued with problems of governance and development. In dealing with African countries, emerging partners need to be cognisant of the different realities and experiences in the continent. Four major country blocks can be identified in relation to Africa's development:

1) Countries with no mineral resources, where structural transformation has succeeded in diversifying the economies and in triggering the process of industrialisation;
2) Resource-rich countries that are still facing challenges regarding structural transformation and which experience some growth but with major inequalities;
3) Least developed countries which are still highly dependent on foreign aid;
4) Conflict ridden countries relying on the weight of Regional Economic Communities and other regional bodies to maintain peace and stability.

Development co-operation with countries in Africa cannot therefore be viewed in a homogenised and generalised manner. Moreover, changes regarding the issues of governance do not occur through rational processes and decisions taken at the level of the African Union. Change occurs when power relationships change.

NSC–SSC relations need to be governed by a code of conduct in order to ensure mutual accountability. There is no preferential liking by Africa of either NSC or SSC. What lies at the heart of Africa's development co-operation is pragmatism and African interests. Thus it is fundamentally crucial for African states to clearly articulate their priorities, strategies and drive the execution of their development plans.

Panel discussion 1: Emerging development partners in Africa

Chair*: Mandeep Tiwana, Head of Policy & Research, CIVICUS*

Panellists*:*
Xiaojing Mao, Deputy-Director, CAITEC, Ministry of Commerce, China
Peter Simbani, Director Aid and Debt, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Malawi
Andre de Mello e Souza, Senior Researcher, IPEA, Brazil
Paulo Esteves, Director-General of the BRICS Policy Canter, Brazil
Richard Ssewakiryanga, CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness, Uganda

China's development co-operation

Xiaojing Mao, CAITEC, Ministry of Commerce, China

In an effort to improve the transparency of Chinese foreign policy, the first White Paper on China's foreign aid was released in April, 2011. The White Paper identifies China's foreign aid resources in the forms of grants, concessional loans and interest-free loans. China's development assistance is provided in the forms of:

1) Complete projects;
2) Technical co-operation;
3) Goods and materials;
4) Human resources development;
5) Medical teams sent abroad;
6) Emergency humanitarian aid;

7) Volunteer programmes and;
8) Debt relief

Chinese development finance to Africa is transferred through the China–Africa Development Fund, and also through preferential export buyer's credit, loans from the China Development Bank and special loans for the development of Small and Medium Enterprises in Africa. The Chinese foreign aid that flows through official channels has more preferential terms; it is characterised by mutual benefit and focuses on socio-economic development.

On the other hand, development finance to Africa that flows through commercial channels has less preferential terms than official Chinese foreign aid, is mainly motivated by economic profits and focuses mainly on economic sectors.

More broadly, the Forum of China–Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) facilitates co-operation between China and Africa in the fields of politics, international affairs, peace and security, economic development, culture and education.

From the Chinese perspective, South–South Co-operation is much broader than South–South Development Co-operation. South–South Co-operation includes South–South development aid; economic co-operation and trade, monetary co-operation and cultural and educational exchanges. South–South Co-operation is animated by principles such as respect for national sovereignty; non-interference and non-conditionalities; equality; mutual benefit; ownership, and is demand driven. China believes that it focuses more on knowledge sharing, technical co-operation and economic infrastructure and maintains that SSC does not replaces but rather plays a complementary role to North–South Co-operation.

Brazil's development co-operation:

Andre e Mello de Souza, Senior Researcher, IPEA, Brazil
Paulo Esteves, Director, BRICS Policy Centre, PUC-Rio, Brazil

Brazil does not refer to itself as an 'emerging donor'; it is merely a participant in South–South Development Co-operation. The first development co-operation initiatives from Brazil date back to the early 1970s. During the Lula administration, these initiatives increased significantly in resources and geographical reach. The volume of resources increased more than four times during the Lula administration, from US$ 158.1 million in 2005 to US$ 923 million in 2010. At the same time, the number of beneficiary countries grew from 21 to 56 from 2003 to 2007, 35 of which are located in Africa. Overall Brazil's development co-operation expenditure has grown exponentially between 2005 and 2010, with a sharp increase in 2010 due to Brazil's development co-operation to Haiti as a response to the natural disaster there.

The Lula government has also promoted a very significant increase in a Brazilian economic and political presence in Africa, which has manifested through a number of indicators. The main countries for co-operation in Africa for Brazil are Angola, Mozambique, Libya and South Africa and the main sectors are construction, oil and mining. Brazilian increase in development co-operation has been visible through:

- The number of Brazilian embassies in the region, which doubled since 2003, from 18 to 37, surpassing the UK diplomatic presence in Africa;
- The number of African embassies in Brasília also more than doubled (from 16 to 34) and is now higher than in any other capital in the Western Hemisphere except for Washington DC;
- President Lula's 12 trips to Africa, visiting 21 countries;
- Brazil's Foreign Minister (2003-2010) Celso Amorim's 67 official visits to African countries;
- Since 2003, Brazil received 47 visits of African leaders from 27 nations;
- Trade has increased to US$ 20 billion, climbing back to 6% of overall trade;
- Brazilian companies currently invest in 19 African countries and the Brazilian Development Bank's (BNDES) financing for these companies increased from R$ 477 million (2008) to R$ 649 million in 2009.

In 2010, Brazil's development co-operation in Africa amounted to approximately US$ 36.76 million, constituting 23% of total Brazilian international development co-operation, second only to Latin America. While this is still considerably inferior to Chinese and Indian development co-operation in the region, Brazil has maintained some comparative advantages in its historical links and cultural affinity, in terms of climate, environmental, urban and social conditions which favour Brazilian development projects.

How different is Brazil's development approach in Africa to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) model and that of other emerging donors? This is difficult to answer for many reasons. First, there is a challenge when judging the quality of intangible assets (such as knowledge) which constitute the great part of Brazil's co-operation. Second, Brazil provides its assistance often through trilateral (i.e., Germany, Japan, ILO) and multilateral channels. Third, the focus is more on social sectors such as food and agriculture, health, and education. There have been notable attempts to replicate in Africa Brazil's experiences and 'best practices' in the areas of agricultural research (Embrapa, Cotton-4 and ProSavana); pharmaceutical manufacturers (Fundação Oswaldo Cruz and the Antiretroviral Pharmaceutical Plant built in Mozambique); Vocational Training Centers (SENAI) and conditional cash transfer programmes such as Bolsa Família.

The challenges to Brazilian development co-operation in Africa include considerable institutional fragmentation and lack of central planning and coordination between the central agencies and executing agents; the sustainability of Brazil's projects is brought into question as there is no participation form civil society or the private sector; the fact that Brazilian legislation prevents the financing of activities and the hiring of personnel abroad (thus making it difficult to untie aid); and the transferability of Brazil's policies given the difference in social environments.

Emerging donors in Africa: recipient country perspective

Peter Simbani, Director Aid and Debt, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Malawi

It has been argued that in the 1970s a lot of aid, foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade taking place between Africa and the West followed much of the colonial ties. At the same time, there was a lot of movement of resources from Africa to the West through debt repayments, with profits and interest being gained by donors on the loans. Through this process of colonisation Africa developed distinct government institutions, infrastructure and commercial specialisation where Africa became the main producers of raw material.

The last two decades also saw the emergence of new players in the international development arena: China, India and Brazil who experienced high levels of sustained economic growth and began to intensify their development co-operation with Africa. This presented the continent with many new development opportunities.

The **first** major benefit for Africa is that the emergence of these new players helped improve the terms of trade and reduce the prices of the finished products.

A **second** benefit has been increased aid to Africa from the emerging partners. As a result there has also been an improvement in the continent's infrastructure. However with aid from emerging partners the issue of tied aid also arises. Loans from export-import (EXIM) banks of emerging countries usually include the condition that a certain percentage of the resources given should be used on products that come from the donor country. Often this aid is not concessional, and therefore recipient countries are left with a debt to pay back with additional interest. The support that recipient countries receive from emerging partners does not have a fiscal impact on the budget of the recipient country. The money from the EXIM Bank of India, for instance, never leaves Bombay, as it goes from the caucuses of the government bank to those of the local Indian companies. The risk of this type of aid for emerging partners is that Africa's debt levels may reach unsustainable levels.

The **third** benefit comes in the form of increased FDI from emerging partners. There is however a dark side to this FDI: often with private investment from emerging countries issues of good governance and good practice are relegated. There is also the issue of exploitation of Africa's natural resources and substandard labour practices being adopted by these companies.

The answer to all of this is that Africa needs to come up with a strategy on how to engage emerging powers. Emerging donors have a strategy for Africa, but Africa does not have a strategy for emerging donors. It is important for African nations to collaborate with the regional bodies and with civil society to develop an appropriate African strategy for these emerging development partners.

Emerging donors in Africa- Civil society perspective

Richard Ssewakiryanga, Executive Director, Uganda NGO Forum, Uganda

Some schools of thought point to a long history of South–South Co-operation (SSC) including the Bandung conference in the 1950s and the non-aligned movement during the cold war times. At the same time we are also confronted with the idea of SSC as a recent occurrence that began when previously poor countries such as China and India started becoming more affluent. We therefore need to understand relations between countries in the South as an evolving relationship and not a new occurrence.

The distinction between SSC and South–South Development Co-operation (SSDC) is not helpful in advancing the conversation. The challenge with this is that SSDC is being generated from a term (SSC) that is not yet clearly defined. We know that SSC includes economic integration, negotiating blocks, alliances in cultural, military, and humanitarian aid, technical co-operation and development financing. We need to accept SSC as a broader, deeper and multi-faceted concept.

The two tenets of SSC are non-conditionality and democratic ownership. However from case studies we have learned that sometimes these two tenets are not upheld in development co-operation. Another principle of SSC is that it is built on the notions of solidarity. This can be difficult to deal with when the parties involved have different privileges, lifestyles and abilities. Furthermore the relationships between civil society organisations in the South need to be strengthened and deepened.

Today we have providers that describe themselves as 'BRICS' (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa). The South needs to tread carefully around naming and forming identities, as these can create exclusivity. It generates an 'us' and 'them' mentality with those who are not part of such groups being viewed as being lesser partners. The South needs to pay attention to power relations that are created through this exclusive **naming** and identity politics and make sure it does not influence the ways in which countries relate to each other.

A clear challenge for Africa is that there are over 50 countries with different priorities. While there may be a common African position on certain matters, this position is difficult to get to in the context of SSC. Moreover there are also several governance-related challenges, such as long-standing autocratic regimes and presidents and widespread corruption, which compromise the development of a single African position on the issue.

Going forward Africa will need to reform its governance system so that the principles of democratic ownership of development co-operation can be achieved through rule of law, the elimination of rampant corruption and building strong institutions. In addition to this, Africa needs to ensure that citizens are central in all development co-operation processes by putting in place mechanisms that allow for their participation. Building strong regional economies – where countries can cede some power to the Regional Economic Communities so that the negotiation with providers from the South or the North is carried out at a level that takes into consideration the economies of scale and brings about the creation of viable markets that allow for meaningful trade.

Summary of Q&As and moderated discussion

The experience of traditional donors is relevant to South–South Co-operation in that Southern donors have much to learn from them, even though South–South Co-operation is different from North–South Co-operation. Southern providers often experience the same kinds of challenges as traditional donors and can learn from the successes and failures of North–South Co-operation.

Brazil only engages in trilateral co-operation with traditional donors when the arrangements follow the principles of South–South Co-operation. These arrangements have their origins in projects that were implemented by traditional donors in Brazil and are now being replicated elsewhere. The traditional donor provides the financial resources and Brazil provides the technical expertise.

As the foundation of the global supply chain, African countries need to articulate clearly what their strategic interests are in connection with traditional partners and emerging partners, in light of dwindling aid from the North.

One challenge to South–South Co-operation is endemic corruption in African countries. The example of the recent corruption scandals serves as a reminder of how deeply rooted this problem is. Furthermore discussions on South–South Co-operation need to take into consideration social justice and the upholding of human rights, environmental sustainability and labour standards, especially where the private sector is involved.

Panel discussion 2: Monitoring and accountability of South–South Co-operation

Chair: *Vitalice Meja, Africa Coordinator, Reality of Aid, Kenya*

Panellists:
Bernadette Vega, Director of Monitoring & Evaluation, AMEXCID, Mexico
Sachin Chaturvedi, Director-General, Regional Information Systems (RIS), India
Mmakgoshi Phetla-Lekhethe, Deputy-Director General, National Treasury, SA

Introduction by the chair

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) within SSC remains a contentious debate. By virtue of modality, SSC is unique in its approaches and in the instruments it uses. Nevertheless SSC is indeed a part and parcel of development co-operation; therefore it needs to establish its own frameworks and mechanisms for accountability. In beginning to create such a framework one needs to firstly take into consideration the global context in which SSC operates. In Busan the SSC partners participated in and acknowledged the framework of global governance and agreed on shared principles, but at the same time went on to enforce their standpoint of 'common goals but differential commitments'. However, the question of what it entails to have differential commitments remains unclear. Consequent to the agreements made in Busan, should SSC partners also adhere to the principles that inform the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) by virtue of attending and participating in the global negotiations, or should we have something unique for SSC?

Challenges of monitoring and evaluation of SSC

Bernadette Vega, Director of M&E, AMEXCID, Mexico

When Mexico began implementing its 2011 law for international development co-operation, integrating some of the principles and frameworks of the GPEDC into its national systems for the monitoring and evaluation of their SSC, the challenges were overwhelming. These included:

- The difficulty in defining a monitoring framework without adequate available data to define baselines and targets;
- Operating with weak information systems and weak methodologies to quantify co-operation.

SSC is not understood and agreed upon at the national level, let alone in the international space. Without adequate data collection of standardised quality, SSC cannot begin to quantify nor conduct impact evaluation. To also aggregate and incorporate the data is incredibly complex. With that said, there are various methods to tackle measurement of SSC or co-operation in general. You can measure the quality, quantity and impact through evaluating performance, or even analysing the process.

An M&E framework for SSC would have to engage with a reality check. Begin with asking what are the challenges and the inefficiencies of these co-operation projects. On the other hand, relying on just basic information project information won't allow institutions to cover the entire learning cycle and the different variants of SSC.

Measuring capacity development is also an interesting exercise. SSC often consists of capacity development through knowledge sharing and best practices. However, it is difficult to directly correlate capacity development initiatives with institutional development in partner countries. We therefore need to be careful when measuring capacity development actions. Such results cannot easily be claimed and attributed to a particular intervention or agency.

To make a note on 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (CBDR) discussions mentioned earlier, CBDR highlights the capacity differences in the way that co-operation is managed. Some of the capacity limitations experienced by the South can be nurtured by the experiences of the North. The differential part is due to the capacity limitations: for example, the limited available resources to collect data in a timely manner for systematic and quality information systems.

The GPEDC presents a space to get together and exchange valuable experiences and ideas on effective and sophisticated monitoring and evaluation systems. It should not matter whether this is coming from a Northern or Southern perspective. The advantage of the Global Partnership is that it brings together a diversity of stakeholders – traditional and non-traditional donors, civil society organisations, and private sector – to discuss development co-operation and learn from one another.

Is Monitoring and evaluation really necessary for SSC?

Sachin Chaturvedi, Director-General, RIS, Ministry of External Affairs, India

In light of the previous speakers, I would like to highlight that civil society often borrows arguments from Northern continents were the funding comes from. The ongoing deliberations and discussions from OECD-DAC donors overpower the historical context of SSC and lose sight of the manner in which to address the Southern issues. Similar patterns are seen in the M&E debates for SSC.

Countries from the South are historically similar entities but at varying levels of development. China may not be considered a developed country because of its internal challenges; similarly Brazil may not call itself a donor because of its own internal contradictions. Therefore the 'Global South' may be homogenous in historical context but not in developing patterns.

There are Southern countries who are lining up to join the OECD and DAC yet who are now also trying to include themselves as champions of SSC. This is not consistent or acceptable. The issues that need to be addressed in SSC need to also be clearly defined. M&E is important, but should be discussed under a different lens. It is difficult to suggest that SSC, which has a deep rooted legacy in its historical and cultural affinity, suddenly requires an M&E framework. It should be noted that M&E is an OECD Development Assistance Committee-led agenda for SSC. There is an ongoing effort from the OECD to have SSC at par with NSC for supplementing the resources for global development and thus following the same rules and accountability frameworks.

The premise of NSC rests on the conditionality framework. The conditionality framework approach tells recipient countries to correct their macro-economic policies according to the standards of Northern countries. Only once the macro-economic policies are corrected would a loan be granted. Nevertheless you do not find conditionality imposed by the South.

Malawi has been provided an example where concerns of the Indian lines of credit have been raised. The three lines of credit given to Malawi by the Indian government were between 1.62% to 1.95% in terms of interest rates. Is this more than commercial or lower than commercial charges? These are the types of questions that need to be asked when defining conventionality and conditionality from SSC providers. The credit lines rates rest on EXIM banks which give both commercial and concessional loans.

Lastly, the distinction between SSC and South–South Development Co-operation (SSDC) is an unnecessary distinction. SSC is SSDC; there is not extra dimensions because SSC is intended to be development-oriented. SSC brings in different elements known as the development compact:

- Trade
- Investment
- Development Finance
- Technology

A prime example of SSC was during the Cancun HLF when all developing countries demanded duty-free, quota-free access to least developed countries. Only India and China came forward to provide such access.

The creation of SSC started with training programs; even before Indian independence, in 1946 India had training programs for scientists from Indonesia and China. The issuing of loans only began much later in the following boom of the late 90s where you start to see lines of credit emerging as an instrument of assistance within the South.

The problem the North now faces is the dislocation of excessive financial supply from within the South itself. Southern partners have made considerable progress amongst themselves, already passing the 50% mark of trading amongst themselves. Investments have increased from an initial 16% to 52% in the period 2000-2012.

When it comes to the issue of accountability, the question is accountability for whom and for what? SSC is demand-driven; therefore there is no compulsion by partner countries to give assistance or hold each other to account. The national governments are sovereign enough to take responsibility. This serves as the basis of non-interference policies and what makes SSC distinctive from the NSC framework. Particularly in light of the Ingredients framework, there is no reason for any Southern partner to interfere with any recipient country on the premise of giving assistance and demanding accountability by recipient countries. That is the sovereign responsibility of the recipient country's government, who are tasked with taking care of their own people. If they require support, then support may be extended.

With the rise of the influence of civil society organisations (CSOs), it is extremely important for emerging economies to engage more with CSOs to ensure democratic practices are upheld in SSC, raising the importance of accountability to people and citizens.

Regarding CBDR, the reality was that it was a compromise which came about in Busan. CBDR is expected to bring Southern donors on a par with Northern donors. This should not be the correct approach for the South. It is not about the quantity of SSC against NSC. SSC continues to be about solidarity, mutual benefit and focuses on domestic responsibilities of governments.

Lastly, to conclude, the GPEDC is not the platform for the South. The Busan negotiations concluded that all partners need to commit to the Busan principles and come together under the GPEDC platform. Busan placed a lot of emphasis on the new emerging donors and the role of the South to step up efforts to address the current global challenges. This is why most of the new donors agreed and signed up to the GPEDC. However, shortly after the signing of Busan, a set of indicators were released that served to measure both NSC and SSC. This was not the correct approach for the South to take. This approach continued later in the Mexico High Level Forum where the Northern framework of development assistance and the monitoring and evaluation process was continuously pushed on to the South against its will.

South African positioning globally, regionally and nationally

Mmakgoshi Phetla-Lekhethe, Deputy Director-General, National Treasury, South Africa

South Africa is very much a two-state nation, with some characteristics of first world and other characteristics of the third world. It is important to anchor everything within national development planning with regards to how South Africa presents its objectives.

I was previously attending this morning a forum with health and finance experts from sub-Saharan countries. The critical concern raised was how to resolve the issue of health financing in the African continent in a world where social services are no longer the 'sexy things to finance'. Yet Africans are well aware of poor health indicators. Within this forum, the various experts acknowledged the lack of African state capacity and adequate resources to meet the development goals with respect to health to the extent expected. Moreover, the internal use of the funding that is being received is already predetermined by the donor, thus raising the concerns of conditionality.

African states aspire to reach the new sustainable development goals, however remain sceptical that the outcomes that will emerge from the September United Nations General Assembly meeting will reflect the realties and challenges developing countries face.

In light of the current global economy, all countries – with the exception of India, China and the United States – are struggling with their growth margins. With that said, it is expected that the discussions in July on financing for development will be very difficult. The basic outcome from the finance meetings should be to ensure the development path is still on par for every developing country, and that we develop the kind of capacity required to achieve these new objectives. Therefore before engaging in discussions of CBDR or M&E, the discussion should begin with the importance of the institutions and instruments to support international development co-operation. The views and goals of developing countries are less often reflected in M&E process. Regardless of who the donor is, the true successes of development assistance need to be visible and accounted for.

The African position has placed emphasis on domestic resource mobilisation as a critical priority for Africans. This is not a replacement for aid but rather a strengthening of the ability of African countries to raise resources locally. This helps national governments to determine the allocation of resources. This is an instrumental tool for accountability, whereby the population can begin to see how the state prioritises development objectives. This national political will and capacity development should be complimented by support by international intuitions to support developing countries in their efforts.

The BRICS Development Bank represents a new way of doing things in the South. It is redefining the role of institutions, with its own frameworks of governance influenced by frameworks of the South.

Summary of Q&As and moderated discussion

South Africa's position is torn between, on the one hand, the continental responsibilities for Africa and the shared support for the accountability and M&E systems of the GPEDC, and on the other hand the contrary views of the BRICS, who have opposed participation in the GPEDC. So what is South Africa's true position in the sphere of international development co-operation? The answer lies in the fact that South African foreign policy rests on the policy of multilateralism. Inclusive partnerships allow for participation and engagement on policies that will directly affect every country. Therefore South Africa takes on that role to be a part of such policy discussions to support the outcome of development partnerships that benefit developing countries. For this reason, South Africa engages actively in the GPEDC. With that said, South Africa still adheres to and advocates for the principles of SSC.

With regards to alternatives to the GPEDC, the South has to create a platform for its own SSC discussions and institutional developments. The South is perfectly capable of doing so as demonstrated by the establishment of institutions such as the BRICS Bank and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Trust Fund which has implemented projects worth US$ 80mil. The issue at hand is how to develop evaluation methodologies for the South; hence the establishment of and need for a forum such as NeST, a forum in which the South can identify alternative methodologies and borrow some of the useful tools from their Northern counterparts.

How to apply principles of SSC for impact evaluations of Southern projects remains an issue to be explored. The South still suffers from a lack of descriptive data. Without the data, the issue of M&E becomes premature for SSC. Though we should not be paralysed by this challenge, we need to take into consideration the costs of evaluation. Perhaps we should refrain from evaluation until we have better capacity and better data. Indeed, sophisticated impact evaluations would be premature at this stage. What is being suggested is project surveys, which is not entirely an evaluation mechanism but a monitoring tool in order to start gathering the basic data about SSC initiatives, then to gradually build up to more rigorous and sophisticated evaluation system.

In response to comments by the representative from India, the representative of Malawian Ministry of Finance clarified that while the interest rates of Indian credit lines are indeed low, they still are not 'concessional' based on the IMF calculator for loan concessionality, which takes into account many other factors (i.e. grace period, re-payment terms, discount rate, etc.).

Conclusions

Neissan Besharati, SAIIA/WSG, NeST Africa focal Point, South Africa
Kevin May, Oxfam, China

The policy dialogue proved to be a very rich multi-stakeholder discussion around measuring the impact SSC. The discussions were filled with constant reminders that debates around SSC should not be only about technicalities of M&E, but we need to always keep in mind that the final objective of SSC is development. Regardless of the focus of the discussions, the objective should be making progress in developing countries, especially for the poorest people.

Nevertheless, there is a need for clarity on the workings of SSC. Dr Mayaki spoke of a code of conduct for emerging donors. There is a need for an African strategy for new and old development partners. There is therefore a need for a framework of SSC that does not necessarily duplicate the NSC monitoring and accountability frameworks.

Following the multi-stakeholder policy dialogue, the Network of Southern Think Tanks will host a technical workshop over the next two days to delve deeper and address an identified demand to develop the instruments, the methods, the definition, the indicators, the technical framework, and the information systems appropriate for SSC. The degree of complexities of the methods and evaluation systems can be debatable, including the readiness of SSC to start conducting impact evaluations. Despite contestations, the South has begun to have these discussions.

The purpose of this multi-stakeholder policy dialogue was to open the discussion to the broader stakeholders and not develop a framework for SSC from a purely technocratic and academic standpoint. Therefore all the inputs received today will feed into the work of the NeST technical working group who will be developing and elaborating further the potential SSC conceptual and M&E framework.

Thank you to all the participants presents, the respective representatives of governments of Malawi, South Africa and Mexico. It was wonderful to have the contributions of esteemed academics and think tanks from Brazil, China, and India. We heard voices from Uganda, Zimbabwe, Kenya and a wonderful keynote address from Dr Mayaki, the CEO of NEPAD agency.

It was remarkable to also have accounts of civil societies be articulated in the debates, particularly African civil society. Today was a testament to the vibrant citizenry alive in Africa which is ready to be critical and hold governments to account. Linked to that, civil society was the funder for today's workshop. In contrast of having government funding, civil society does not carry a political agenda but rather represents the interest of the poor and marginalised. Receiving funding from an NGO has been refreshing for the organisers of the event.

On a reflective note, today's conversations were very enlightening and inspiring. With the largest part of global aid coming to the continent, it is important that Africa be a significant driver in aid and development effectiveness debates and the development of SSC policy frameworks. Today was important in identifying the crucial principles in SSC; quality is more important than quantity but most importantly, people should be at the core of the development co-operation processes.

Annex 1: Key Note address Ibrahim Mayaki, CEO, African Union NEPAD Agency

Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST) Multi-stakeholder Policy Dialogue
3rd March 2015, Protean Hotel Midrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

Emerging partners in Africa's development
Measuring the impact of South–South Co-operation

Distinguished guests, Members of the academic community, ladies, and gentleman, it is a privilege to be afforded the opportunity to engage with you this morning on the pertinent topic on 'Emerging partners in Africa's development'

1) BACKGROUND

The new political and economics architecture of the international affairs

The global financial crisis has spurred leading emerging states to take an increasingly commanding role in global economic affairs while the Western industrialised states still struggling economics problems.

Nowhere is this trend more evident than in Africa, a continent traditionally regarded as sitting on the margins of the international political economy by the industrialised North. Over the last fifteen years, emerging powers have made significant inroads into Western political and economic dominance in Africa. The result is a diversification of external actors involved across a range of sectors of the African economy with much of this interaction being framed in terms of new forms of multilateral and bilateral arrangements.

In June 2014, the 23rd General Assembly of the African Union approved the Malabo declaration relating to the South–South Co-operation on Africa's Development priorities. In this regard the African Heads of State recognised that enhancing South–South relationship is a new opportunity for the Continent to build a new partnership framework which takes into account the present challenges faced by the people of the African Continent, including the lessons learnt from past experiences.

As we enter a new dimension of global economic and political architecture it is imperative for Africa to analysis this new opportunity towards effective implementation of its priorities.

Indeed, from 1960-1990 the main African partnerships have being important for both exports and imports however since the raise of the new emerging countries in the 1990s to 2000 the main partners of Africa in terms of imports and exports have changed considerably. This is indicative of the need to strengthen the new partnering.

This situation, urges us to orient this new dimension of African partnership to inclusive development actions and how can we engage with partnerships of emerging countries by elevating from the lessons learnt and from the mistakes made in the past.

The purpose of my presentation is to highlight key elements to enable South–South co-operation more beneficial for African countries. To this effect, I will focus on the following three points:

- What are the characteristics of the South–South partnerships
- What are the current impacts of the South–South corporations on African developments
- NEPAD Agency as a privileged African actor

2) WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTH–SOUTH PARTNERSHIPS?

The main characteristics of African partnerships with emerging countries can be identified as follows:

The rise of powerful economic partners: a new pole of dependence

Since the turn of the Millennium, Africa's trade volumes with emerging partners have doubled in nominal value and now amount to 50% of Africa's total trade, the volume of trade with individual countries like China even surpassing that with traditional partners. China overtook the United States to become Africa's single biggest trading partner in 2009. By 2020, on current trends, Africa's share of trade with emerging markets could be as much as 70%.

Foreign direct investment from the five BRICS countries reached 25 per cent of total foreign direct investment in Africa in 2010 and continued to increase since then.

But at the same time, figures show that Africa is a minor player in China's overall trade. China's trade with Africa reached nearly $200-billion in 2012 whereas it was quite six fold higher than with the US or the EU alone.

Emerging countries development paths are not simply transferable

It is clear that the partnership with emerging countries also benefits from the discredit which struck on traditional donors who were considered the main promoters of economic models that led to the lost decades at the end of the last century. The search for an alternative for development of Africa is justified, given the partial failure of the partnership with Europe and the United States since the 1980s.

Conversely, lessons from the emergence trajectory of Asia directly contradict the economic recommendations made through the IMF. The structural adjustment programs and its conditionality for financial assistance destroyed the economic planning capacity of African states. The application of the Washington consensus has discredited the neoliberal combination of orthodox macroeconomic and microeconomic policies as a viable economic path for Africa.

But this attractiveness for economic take-off models that emerging countries may be proud of and are advocating, may maintain the illusion that these paths are simply reproducible. The initial conditions in Africa are in fact probably very different in particular where human capital level is concerned.

Therefore, considering emerging countries as the model to follow in contrast to old developed countries has to be considered cautiously. Especially as emerging countries in the present time are now part of the globalization movement and don't fundamentally differ in their business practices of that of developed countries.

Partnering with Emerging countries

The Doha Round process showed the difficulty of multilateralism in the area of free trade in the context of economic emergence at global level. Competition between nations increased and developed countries make it much more difficult to find a common interest to liberalize multilaterally. States shifted their attitude towards regulating unilaterally in an already highly liberalized environment, and build free trade agreements for additional needs on a bilateral basis. This is a general trend for trade for goods, services and capital and even human migration.

A new difference however is that their new diplomatic capacities of emerging countries provide leverage to mobilize their African counterparts. The Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) is a regular event and the Brazil for instance has opened 19 Embassy on the continent since 2003. At the same time they also have developed a 'diplomacy of club' such as the BRICS. Again in that sense they are close to the process that led traditional partners to create the G7.

Not imposing conditionality gives way to more subtle dependency ties

Given, Chinese aid is less conditional to policies; African Governments are more attracted by this approach. Emerging countries may have a clear strategy on preferring to negotiate bilaterally with a single country for the benefit of negotiations between unequal parties.

Direct award deals and the lack of conditionality for giving grants facilitate political patronage.

For lack of previously clear established rules, all arrangements are possible on an individual basis, even those that are less transparent regarding the law.

3) WHAT ARE THE CURRENT IMPACTS OF THE SOUTH–SOUTH CORPORATIONS ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS?

South–South corporation impacts are political, economic and social

From a political perspective creating groups of G77 allows emerging and African countries to have a powerful voice to engage in global issues. The Group of 77 developing countries and China was formed in June 1964 contributes directly towards deepening collaboration amongst developing countries in international affairs. There were 32 African states which signed the founding Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries which established the G77 Plus China, the vast majority of these emerging from colonial rule. At the time of its formation, this grouping served as a platform for the global South to collaborate within the United Nations institutions in order to have a collective voice on major international matters, particularly in the realm of economic justice and diplomacy.

As the technical arm of the African Union the NEPAD Agency has the privilege to address the United Nations general assembly on an annual basis, reporting on our African priorities and partnerships, in order to invite the global community to support the Agency's interventions.

In relation to the economic dimension

Trade between China and Africa may still be modest, but it has grown significantly. In 2003 the total value of the transactions between the two was US$18.5 billion, as opposed to US$12.39 billion the previous year. Currently China is one of the major trading partners with many African countries (Gabon's second largest client after the United States, second largest supplier of goods to Benin, fifth largest to South Africa, sixth largest to Algeria, etc.)

Nowadays China is the primary recipient of direct overseas investments, amounting to US$53 billion in 2003, but is actually also now one of the major sources of such investments. In 2003 China was fifth in the world, after the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. Its overseas investments totalled US$2.087 billion, which represented an increase of 112% over the amount for 2002, and made it an active presence in 160 countries. China is investing massively in raw material deposits overseas, and is multiplying its trading partnerships in order to secure regular supplies. China's presence has undergone rapid expansion in both Latin America and Africa. In 2002 its total overseas investments (leaving aside Hong Kong and Macao) amounted to US$5.083 billion, of which 25% were in North America, 9.5% in Latin America, 8.7% in Africa, and 8% in Australia. The main recipients of Chinese investment in Africa are Zambia, South Africa, Mali, and Egypt.

Brazil-Africa trade has expanded nearly seven fold over the past 12 years, having surged from $4.3 billion to $26.5 billion from 2000 to 2012. Although Africa still accounts for only a small part of Brazil imports (6.8 percent in 2011) and exports (4.8 percent in 2011),8 Africa's stake in Brazil's foreign trade overall increased steadily from 3.9 percent to 5.7 percent between 2000 and 2012. Bilateral trade has the potential to expand further in the near future, particularly when taking into account the complementarities. A closer look at bilateral trade flows highlights a number of distinctive features. Since the late 1990s, trade balance has presented a persistent healthy surplus for Africa as a whole. In 2012, bilateral trade registered a deficit of -$2.05 billion for Brasilia. This is largely explained by BrazilNigeria trade flows, its largest trade partner in the continent, with which it has a trade deficit of -$6.95 billion, a result of heavy of oil imports. Brazil has a surplus with most other countries. Another telling feature is that Brazil-Africa trade is very concentrated in a handful of countries. In 2012, four countries alone accounted for nearly 60 percent of Brazil-Africa trade: Nigeria ($9.1 billion), Egypt ($3 billion), South Africa ($2.6 billion) and Angola ($1.2 billion).10 Brazil's exports to the continent are relatively balanced by aggregated value: 42 percent manufactured, 27 percent semi-manufactured, 31 percent basic. As for imports, there is a high concentration on natural resources: 66 percent fuels (oil, natural gas and liquefied natural gas — mostly originating from Nigeria) and 34 percent raw materials.

Brazil only became a significant source of overseas foreign direct investment (OFDI) in the 2000s. Its FDI stock expanded from $50 billion in 2001 to $181 billion in 2010. Even though the number of Brazilian MNCs investing overseas has steadily increased over the past decade, OFDI stock remains highly concentrated in a small number of companies. The top four companies (Itau-Unibanco, banking; Vale, mining; Odebrecht, construction; Petrobras, hydrocarbons) account for 78 percent of Brazil's OFDI stock. Brazilian OFDI stock in the primary sector rose substantially in recent years, from two percent in 2008 to three percent in 2010, totaling nearly $57 billion. The lion's share is mining and quarrying ($49.6 billion), mainly driven by Vale's foreign assets, followed by hydrocarbons ($6.8 billion) mostly under Petrobras. Not surprisingly, a significant share of these investments target Latin America and Africa.

While India's economic interests in Africa have been focused on Eastern and Southern Africa, in 2007 these primarily private commercial concerns received a significant boost from state support. A government-launched multilateral forum, the India Africa Summit involving 15 African countries and Delhi, committed itself to raising its credit line for Indian businesses to US$5.4 billion, to providing US$500 million in grants for development co-operation, improved market access to African exports, training for over 1500 Africans in Indian universities and improvements in defence co-operation. The IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) forum launched in 2003 builds on long-standing close ties with South Africa and in recent years Delhi has hoped to enlist African support for its positions in the WTO and in the reform of the United Nations Security Council. The presence of the Indian communities scattered on the African littoral once caused Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to remark that they were 'India's ambassadors' to Africa; this attitude dominated traditional official thinking in Delhi.

The social element involves capacity development and cultural co-operation

Through youth exchange program Chinese and Indian universities welcome hundreds of African student every year. This assures also a transfer of technology and skills to the continent. Moreover, the emerging countries interact with Africa in peace and security issues, given that stability is a condition to attract investment.

4) NEPAD AGENCY AS A PRIVILEGED AFRICAN ACTOR

South- South Co-operation and Aid Effectiveness

At the Second High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2005) it was recognised that aid could be producing better impacts.

In 2008 at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness an even greater number and wider diversity of stakeholders endorsed the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA).

The AAA both reaffirms commitment to the Paris Declaration and calls for greater partnership between different parties working on aid and development.

Designed to strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA, 2008) takes stock of progress and sets the agenda for accelerated advancement towards the Paris targets. It proposes the following three main areas for improvement:

Ownership: Countries have more say over their development processes through wider participation in development policy formulation, stronger leadership on aid co-ordination and more use of country systems for aid delivery.

Inclusive partnerships: All partners - including donors in the OECD Development Assistance Committee and developing countries, as well as other donors, foundations and civil society - participate fully.

Delivering results: Aid is focused on real and measurable impact on development.

Capacity development - to build the ability of countries to manage their own future - also lies at the heart of the AAA.

5) CONCLUSION

Key recommendations for a better, more improved South–South corporation for the Continent
African countries should negotiate better terms for aid delivery to promote partnership between emerging country companies and their domestic counterparts, increase local sourcing of inputs and enhance outsourcing arrangements including subcontracting with local entrepreneurs. And when local capacity does not exist, co-operation should be encouraged to incorporate capacity building as part of the aid package. The opportunity presented by multiple sources and rising volumes of aid should be used as leverage to negotiate better terms and ensure that development assistance is driven by the needs of the national development agendas.

This calls for a three-pronged strategy for institutions like ours, with targeted actions on both the public and private sector spheres.

First, to acquire a critical mass of partners for negotiations, leverage complementarities and make the most of the competition amongst them in line with regional priorities; the more partners we have the more leeway we will get;

Second, to develop our own code of conduct in order to change the sequence in imposing conditions, we should assume that by imposing rules ourselves we would have a leveraging effect by creating confidence and then better involvement of partners in the long run. In the short term the conditions should focus on the management of the rent harnessed from natural resources in particular extractive industries. Governance rules and accountability are necessary.

Third, to actively target and mobilize emerging economies, and companies in support of development goals in particular, to fill productive gaps that are useful to trigger the rise of industries where Africa might have comparative advantages.

We must further increase our ability to be selective based on objective and transparent criteria.

This is clearly an agenda for increased leadership, applicable to partnership with emerging countries as well with traditional ones.

I wish you all successful deliberations.

Dr I. A. Mayaki

Annex 2: Bios of the speakers, panelists and chairs of the Policy Dialogue

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

Ms Sidiropoulos is the chief executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), an independent foreign policy think tank based in Johannesburg. She holds an MA in International Relations (cum laude) from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

She is a member of the International Advisory Board of the *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, the journal of the Graduate Institute of International Development in Geneva and the International Journal *China Quarterly of Strategic Studies* under the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. She is the editor-in-chief of the *South African Journal of International Affairs*.

Her research focus is South Africa's foreign policy, global governance and the role of emerging powers in Africa. Her most recent work is a co-edited volume on *Development co-operation and emerging powers: New Partners or Old Patterns* (Zed Books, May 2012). Her current research focus is Russia's renewed presence in Africa, against the background of SA's membership of the BRICS grouping.

Sipho Mthathi

Ms Mthathi is the founding Executive Director of Oxfam South Africa, with two decades of experience in the human rights and social justice movement in Southern Africa. She was General Secretary of the Treatment Action Campaign, the South Africa Director of Human Rights Watch, the regional advisor at the Coalition of African Lesbians, and most recently Manager for South Africa and Southern Africa programs at Norwegian People's Aid.

In her last position, Ms. Mthahi worked in support of people and organizations advocating for just distribution of power and resources particularly in the extractives industry. She is also a trustee of the boards of Open Society Institute for Southern Africa, the One in Nine Campaign, and the Women on Farms project.

Ibrahim Assane Mayaki

Dr Mayaki was professor of Public Administration and Management in Niger and Venezuela where he served during the periods 1978-1982 and 1985-1987. He also worked for ten years in the mining sector in Niger. From the period 2000 to 2004, Dr Mayaki was Visiting Professor at the University of Parix XI where he taught international affairs and international organisations. He also led researches at the Centre for Research on Europe and the Contemporary World in the same university. In January 1997, under the presidency of Ibrahim Bare Ma'inassara, Dr Mayaki joined the cabinet as Minister in charge for African Integration and Co-operation, before holding the position of Foreign Minister. He was appointed Prime Minister of the country in November 1997. He remained in charge until January 2000. As Prime Minister of Niger, Dr Mayaki played a catalyst role in enhancing the social dialogue in the country. He initiated the creation of relevant technical committees in charge of the negotiations with social partner. Since 2009, Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, is the CEO of the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

Mandeep Tiwana

Mandeep Tiwana is the Head of Policy and Research at the global civil society alliance, CIVICUS. He specialises in legislation affecting the core civil society freedoms of expression, association and assembly. Prior to joining CIVICUS in 2008, he worked on a range of human rights and social justice issues in India. Mandeep has a keen interest in issues related to civil society space, development and international relations.

On joining CIVICUS in May 2008, he was engaged in advocacy to protect and expand civil society space globally, including through the completion of a comprehensive compendium of legal instruments and other intergovernmental commitments concerning core civil society rights. Previously, Mandeep advised the New Delhi Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross on due process guarantees for persons detained in Jammu and Kashmir.

Xiaojing MAO

Ms Xiaojing Mao has been working since 2002 in the Chinese Academy of International trade and Economic Co-operation (CAITEC), the think tank affiliated to the Ministry of Commerce of China. She is currently the Division Chief of International Co-operation of the Institute of International Development Co-operation. She is involved in initiatives related to international development co-operation and China's foreign aid policies. Furthermore, she has participated in many important aid policy studies entrusted by the Ministry of Commerce, including the first and the second White Paper on China's Foreign Aid.

André de Mello e Souza

André de Mello e Souza is a researcher at the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a Brazilian governmental think tank. He earned a PhD in Political Science from Stanford University, United States. He has previously worked for five years as Professor of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Brazil. His main areas of research include the global governance of intellectual property rights and its impact on health and biotechnology and international private and South–South development co-operation and foreign aid, with a country focus on the BRICS. He is one of the authors of 'The Politics of Private Aid', published in *International Organization*, and several articles and book contributions on these topics.

Paulo Esteves

Paulo Esteves holds a PhD in Political Science from Rio de Janeiro University Research Institute (IUPERJ). He is the Director of the International Relations Institute of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and the General Supervisor of the BRICS Policy Center. He was a Post-doctoral Fellow at Copenhagen University in 2008. Recent publications include articles and books on development co-operation and the nexus between international security and development. Currently, Professor Esteves is the President of the Brazilian International Relations Association (ABRI).

Richard Ssewakiryanga

From 1998 Mr Ssewakiryanga was the National Team Leader for Participatory Poverty Assessments in Uganda and also spent a year as the in-charge coordinating the secretariat for the revision of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan/Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for Uganda for 2007-8. He is a Policy Anthropologist and his work has spanned several fields including qualitative and participatory poverty research that informed Uganda's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers from 2000-2008. Currently he is the Co-Chair of a Global Civil Society Group – Civil Society Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) which works with the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC). At the Uganda National NGO Forum, Mr Ssewakiryanga formed and co-ordinates the Uganda CSO Aid and Development Effectiveness Platform. Before joining the Ministry of Finance in 1998, he worked for OXFAM Great Britain in Uganda as a Policy and Advocacy Officer.

Peter Kelvin Simbani

Mr Peter Simbani joined the Ministry of Finance in 1989 after graduating from Chancellor College of the University of Malawi with a Bachelor of Social Sciences Degree. All his working life, he has been dealing with aid co-ordination and resource mobilisation issues in the Ministry. He has specifically managed the following aid portfolios, UNDP and all UN agencies, Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, and the EU. Over the years, he has acquired additional professional qualifications to manage EU, World Bank, African Development Bank and UNDP projects. He is married to Vutiwe and has four children.

Vitalice Meja

Vitalice Meja is a development policy analysis specialist in the areas of development co-operation, economic development, poverty reduction policies and microfinance as it relates to NGOs, government and intergovernmental organisations. He co-ordinates the Reality of Aid Africa Network – a pan-African network working on poverty eradication through effective development co-operation

Bernadette Vega-Sánchez

Bernadette Vega-Sánchez is Director of Monitoring and Evaluation at the Mexican Agency of International Co-operation for Development (AMEXCID) and a member of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI in Spanish). Previously, she worked in the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Deputy Director of International Co-operation Policy Planning. Her experience in development co-operation include collaborations with German Co-operation Agency (GIZ), the international organisation Global March Against Child Labor in New Delhi, India; the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Rwanda and different research projects at the Center for Research on North America at the National Autonomous University of Mexico.

Sachin Chaturvedi



Dr Sachin Chaturvedi is Director General at the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), a New Delhi-based autonomous think tank. He was also a Global Justice Fellow at the MacMillan Center for International Affairs at Yale University. He works on issues related to development co-operation policies and South–South co-operation. He has also worked on trade and innovation linkages with special focus on WTO. Dr Chaturvedi has served as a Visiting Professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and has also worked as consultant to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, World Bank, UN-ESCAP, UNESCO, OECD, the Commonwealth Secretariat, IUCN, and to the Government of India's Department of Biotechnology and the Ministry of Environment and Forests, among other organizations. He has been a Developing Country Fellow at the University of Amsterdam (1996), Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla (2003), and Visiting Scholar at the German Development Institute (2007). His experience includes working at the University of Amsterdam on a project on International Development Co-operation and Biotechnology for Developing Countries supported by the Dutch Ministry of External Affairs. Dr. Chaturvedi has also been a member of the IGSAC Committee of Experts for evolving a framework for co-operation on conservation of biodiversity in the SAARC region, as well as a member of the Editorial Board of Biotechnology Development Monitor (the Netherlands); Editor of *South Asia Economic Journal* and *Asian Biotechnology Development Review* (New Delhi). He has authored two books and edited four books apart from publishing several research articles in various prestigious journals.

Mmakgoshi Phetla-Lekhethe



Ms Phetla-Lekhethe is the Deputy Director-General: International and Regional Economic Policy at the National Treasury of South Africa. An economist by training, Ms Phetla-Lekhethe spent 3.5 years at the World Bank as South Africa's representative on the Board of the World Bank Group. Her current role is that of overseeing Government's engagement and relationship with multilateral and regional development finance institutions such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, as well as institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the OECD. She is also responsible for government's participation in the G-20 and was part of the team of negotiators to the November 2010 G-20 Leaders Summit in Seoul, Korea. Ms Phetla-Lekhethe has over 12 years experience in debt capital markets globally and possesses a deep understanding and knowledge of the South African and international financial market operations. Most of her experience in economics and finance was gained at the National Treasury, the South African Government department tasked with the formulation of the country's macroeconomic policy and strategy, the preparation of the annual government budget and the management of its assets and liabilities.