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SOUTH–SOUTH PEACEBUILDING: LESSONS AND INSIGHTS FROM TURKEY AND SOUTH AFRICA'S SUPPORT TO FRAGILE STATES

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African perspectives. Global insights.

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ABSTRACT

Emerging actors, such as providers of South–South cooperation (SSC), are increasingly playing a role in peacebuilding, particularly in fragile states and conflict-affected areas. While there is much discussion on the role of emerging donors in sustainable development, there is little empirical evidence on their contribution to peacebuilding and state building. Joint research by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Center for International Cooperation (CIC) analysed the features of South African and Turkish assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia respectively, to unpack what sets these emerging economies apart from Western powers operating in similar environments. This paper compares the peacebuilding approaches of South Africa and Turkey and attempts to assess their effectiveness in relation to the approaches of traditional donors. Evidence from the two case studies shows that, while operating under different paradigms, principles and drivers, Southern providers not only bring substantive support to fragile states but also get different types of results and responses from host countries. While it is still difficult to discern a clear 'Southern peacebuilding model', emerging economies play an important role in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies and accountable institutions, in their region and internationally.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
G77	Group of 77
GDP	gross domestic product
MONUSCO	UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
NeST	Network of Southern Think Tanks
NGO	non-governmental organisation
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPP	purchasing power parity
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SSC	South–South cooperation
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

INTRODUCTION

The increasing relevance and potential of South–South cooperation (SSC) has been subject to growing debate on the international agenda. All the key SSC conferences – in Bandung (1955), Buenos Aires (1978), Nairobi (2009), Bogota (2010) and Delhi (2013) – have echoed the understanding that Southern providers of development assistance, by promoting partnerships among equals for mutual benefit relying on their own experiences, might be uniquely equipped to foster sustainable development in developing countries.

The growing importance of SSC has gone hand-in-hand with shifts in the global economy. Traditional sources of development finance such as official development assistance (ODA) and other 'donations' from the world's developed countries are plateauing and in many cases decreasing. As a result, the rise of economies such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey has contributed to the importance of SSC efforts on the global stage.[1] Most recently, the Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in 2015 has acknowledged that SSC 'is an important element of international cooperation for development',[2] and the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognises SSC as necessary to achieve the 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the impact that emerging donors have on addressing political instability and conflict. The inclusion of Sustainable Development Goal 16 in the 2030 Agenda, calling for peaceful, inclusive and just societies, as well as several other goals and targets that lie at the intersection of peace and development, highlights the importance of building and sustaining peace as a harbinger of development. The agenda addresses factors that foment violence, insecurity and injustice, with a special focus on inequality, corruption, poor governance, and illicit financial and arms flows.[3]

Global recognition that peace and sustainable development are interlinked and mutually reinforcing has led to the awareness that development efforts in the context of SSC also encompass peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected situations. Since the 1990s Southern providers have become increasingly involved in addressing the challenges faced by fragile states, bringing new approaches, principles and paradigms to the discussion. These modes of engagement have spread, in conjunction with broader acceptance in peacebuilding circles of demand-driven and context-specific approaches, which emphasise national leadership and ownership.[4] Yet despite these developments, relatively little has been done

Global recognition that peace and sustainable development are interlinked and mutually reinforcing has led to the awareness that development efforts in the context of SSC also encompass peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected situations

1 While politically and economically diverse, emerging donors are countries that have transformed from being aid recipients to donor countries. See Mawdsley E, *From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape*. Chicago: Zed Books, 2012.

2 UNDESA (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs), *Addis Ababa Action Agenda*, 2015, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf, accessed 8 February 2017.

3 Steven D, *SDG Targets for Fostering Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies*. New York: CIC (Center on International Cooperation), 2016.

4 For instance, see UN, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the UN Peacebuilding Architecture*. New York: UN, 2015.

to systematically translate the interests, influences and approaches of Southern providers into a coherent policy framework.[5]

This research aims to help narrow this gap by adding to the body of empirical evidence on SSC actors. The first objective is to explore the ways in which emerging donors' approaches to peacebuilding differ from those of traditional donors, highlighting their potential, their strengths and their weaknesses. Secondly, we look at how South Africa and Turkey have engaged in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia respectively, in order to draw insights and lessons for Southern providers engaged in support to fragile states.

SOUTH AFRICA AND TURKEY: EMERGING ACTORS IN A SHIFTING TERRAIN

South Africa and Turkey as SSC providers

Turkey and South Africa are industrialised to different degrees, but they share similar internal challenges of political and socio-economic vulnerability and instability.[6] They are situated in different geographical and historical contexts, and have different capacities, institutional structures and approaches to development cooperation.

These two countries were chosen because of these differences: Turkey is a member of NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at the upper end of developing countries. It is also the successor to the Ottoman Empire, whose territory extended into Asia, Europe and Africa in its heyday. Turkey's interest in sub-Saharan Africa, and Somalia in particular, has spiked in the last decade; and fostering peace, security and development in Africa is often cited as one of its foreign policy priorities.[7]

Turkey, with some fluctuations, has enjoyed steady economic development and GDP growth for over a decade, and is moving from aid recipient to donor with heightened international visibility. While it is a member of several multilateral organisations, it has increasingly preferred to deliver development assistance through bilateral channels. This shift has been accompanied by a growing focus on principles such as solidarity, mutual benefit, non-conditionality and adaptation to local context.[8] Despite this commitment

5 Mathur A, *Emerging Powers in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2013.

6 Eurasia Group, 'Welcome to the geopolitical recession', 2017, https://www.eurasiagroup.net/issues/top-risks-2017, accessed 6 February 2017.

7 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Turkey–Africa relations', 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa, accessed 12 February 2017; Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 'Somalia', 2015, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/exclusive/africa/somalia/, accessed 12 February 2017.

8 Sucuoglu G & J Stearns, *Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid*. New York: CIC, 2016.

to SSC principles, Turkey is not a typical Southern provider owing to its decades-long assistance programmes, past engagements in multilateral efforts, and its engagement in traditional donor mechanisms with the West (such as the OECD).[9]

South Africa shares Turkey's interest in promoting peace and stability in Africa. Both are growing economies of increasing importance on the continent and beyond; their economic interests in Africa are very much connected to its security and stability. A strong regional power, South Africa is a member of the BRICS, the Non-Aligned Movement, SADC, the AU and the Group of 77 (G77). Its world view has been deeply marked by its historical struggle against apartheid. In the last two decades South Africa has been able to engage with the rest of Africa on equal terms, but this has had to be balanced against its emergence as a leader in the economic sphere with the potential to contribute to the socio-economic progress of the continent.[10] Its relations with the rest of Africa since 1994 have been shaped by its commitment to continue the struggle against colonialism, oppression and injustice.

South Africa fits more snugly in the category of Southern providers. The country's focus on peace and security, institution building, infrastructure development and regional integration is in line with the AU's Agenda 2063 – the 50-year vision for the continent's development.[11] South Africa's political narrative frames its relations with other African states as an 'equal partnership' rather than a 'donor–recipient relationship', and its diplomats frequently use a language of solidarity, horizontality[12] and 'ubuntu' (an African concept often translated as 'humanity towards others').[13] Much like Ankara, Pretoria defines its development cooperation quite broadly, including private and public projects that can be financial or technical in nature to address peace, governance and development challenges. These projects are designed and implemented by a range of actors, from government ministries to parastatals, civil society and businesses.[14]

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9 *Ibid.*

10 Pfister R, 'South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards Africa', *Electronic Journal of Africana Bibliography*, 6, 2000, http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=ejab, accessed 10 February 2017.

11 South Africa, DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation), 'Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu', 2011, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf, accessed 13 April 2016.

12 Core SSC principle based on the understanding that development cooperation must be mutually beneficial to both parties.

13 DIRCO, *op. cit.*

14 The two definitions of SSC offered by DIRCO are examples of such narratives: 'co-operation amongst countries and/or groupings in the global South aimed at addressing and developing a common stance on political, economic, social and human rights issues (all of which are often termed developmental issues, or issues which must be addressed in order to overcome the historical legacy of marginalization faced by these countries)' and 'co-operation between countries in the field of aid, trade, security and politics to promote economic and social well-being in developing countries'. See more in Besharati N & C Rawhani, 'South Africa and the DRC: Evaluating a South–South Partnership for Peace, Governance and Development', SAIIA (South African Institute of International Affairs) Occasional Paper, 235, April 2016.

The OECD recognises that numerous countries, such as Turkey and South Africa, are playing an active role in providing development despite their not being members of its Development Assistance Committee (DAC).[15] Due to the heterogeneity of these 'Southern providers' it has been difficult to label them, but there are some similarities that allow them to be categorised into sub-groupings. Turkey, for example, is considered an emerging donor, and is grouped with countries such as Israel and Russia whose aid programmes are either new or recently revived, relative to the longstanding ODA in which DAC members have been engaged. South Africa, on the other hand, is labelled as a provider of SSC, a category of developing middle-income and emerging economies such as Brazil and Egypt, many of which still receive ODA while sharing expertise and financial support with other countries. One of the characteristic features of these countries is their disillusionment with terms such as 'donor' and 'aid', preferring 'partner' and 'cooperation' instead.[16]

For the purposes of this study, SSC is understood as the exchange of resources, personnel, technology and knowledge between countries of the Global South, connected to a vision of solidarity and mutual benefit, and the understanding that developing countries should find their own solutions for sustainable development.[17] Turkey and South Africa are both viewed as emerging development partners, distinctive from traditional donors. It is acknowledged, however, that the case of Turkey is not a clear-cut one: while sharing many characteristics and a history of cooperation with OECD-DAC donors, its approach to development assistance is more closely aligned with that of SSC providers.[18]

South African assistance to the DRC: Trends and figures

South Africa's post-apartheid engagement in the DRC can be dated back to 1997, when the DRC was admitted into SADC.[19] In addition to playing a crucial role in political mediation efforts in the country, South Africa was among the first African states to deploy peacekeepers there in 1999, and remains the largest African contributor to the

15 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the aid coordination forum of 30 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries that are some of the largest donors. See OECD, 'Development Assistance Committee (DAC)', http://www.oecd.org/development/developmentassistancecommitteedac.htm, accessed 10 February 2017.

16 Smith K, Yamashiro Fordelone T & F Zimmerman, 'Beyond the DAC: The Welcome Role of Other Providers of Development Co-operation', OECD DCD (Development Co-operation Directorate) Issues Brief, May 2010, https://www.oecd.org/dac/45361474.pdf, accessed 6 February 2017.

17 UNDP (UN Development Programme), Special Unit for South–South Cooperation, 'What is South–South cooperation?', http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html, accessed 12 February 2017.

18 Sucuoglu G & J Stearns, *op. cit*.

19 Potts D & T Bowyer-Bower, *Eastern and Southern Africa: Development Challenges in a Volatile Region*. New York: Routledge, 2014.

UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).[20] At the time of its deployment there was an ongoing war, sparked by the fall of former president Mobutu Sese Seko. Under the leadership of president Thabo Mbeki, South Africa played a decisive role in negotiating the Sun City peace agreement of 2002, and helped the country to draft its new constitution. It has since provided crucial security, technical and logistical support to the organisation of the 2006 and 2011 Congolese elections, and has engaged in security sector reform, strengthening state institutions, governance reform, and economic development in the DRC. The DRC is currently the biggest recipient of South Africa's development assistance.[21] South Africa engages the DRC via a multi-stakeholder approach: in addition to the efforts of the government through ministries, agencies and parastatals, a number of South African non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private sector entities are also active. The sheer number of South African departments and state agencies implementing cooperation activities in Africa, as well as the lack of a centralised agency to coordinate development efforts, has meant that its engagement can appear disjointed.[22] The South African government hopes to address this through the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), an institution that has now been under discussion for nearly a decade.[23]

South Africa's assistance to the DRC seems to have fluctuated over the years. This is difficult to determine definitively, in great part owing to the limited availability of reliable and consistent information from the diverse South African institutions involved in the DRC (See Figure 1).

In terms of aid as a proportion of gross national income, South Africa surpassed most OECD-DAC donors in the DRC in peak years.[24] In absolute terms, while the comparison is not a perfect one owing to incomplete data, differences between aid definitions and reporting systems, South Africa remains a significant provider of development cooperation to the DRC, almost always ranking in the top 10 (see Figure 2). When these figures are adjusted to reflect purchasing power parity (PPP) it ranks even more favourably (see Figure 3).[25]

20 Lotze W & C de Coning, 'Peacekeeping contributor profile: South Africa', Providing for Peacekeeping, http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-south-africa/, accessed 6 February 2017.

21 Besharati N & C Rawhani, *op. cit*.

22 Besharati N, 'SADPA: Strategic Aid or Development Packages for Africa?', SAIIA Research Report, 12, 2013.

23 *Ibid*.

24 Besharati N & C Rawhani, *op. cit*.

25 Reflecting currency in conversions based on PPP rather than standard exchange rates allows one to compare economic data between countries that is originally expressed in units of national currency. It addresses the flaw of exchange rate-based comparisons, as they reflect many more influences than the direct comparisons necessary to allow one to compare volume. Schreyer P & F Koechlin, 'Purchasing Power Parities: Measurement and Uses', OECD, 2002, http://www.oecd.org/std/prices-ppp/2078177.pdf, accessed 17 August 2016.

FIGURE 1 SOUTH AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE DRC, 2001–2015 ($ MILLION)



Note: ZAR*/$ exchange rates were based on the annual average for each year

* Currency code for the South African rand

Source: Authors' compilation; data drawn from financial reports of SA government departments and agencies. See also Besharati N & C Rawhani, 'South Africa and the DRC: Evaluating a South–South Partnership for Peace, Governance and Development', SAIIA Occasional Paper, 235, April 2016

Pretoria conducts its development cooperation through a number of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral channels. The most obvious source of bilateral aid is the grants awarded by the African Renaissance Fund, a special funding instrument jointly managed by the National Treasury and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).[26] Various line ministries and other public institutions also provide direct bilateral support to the DRC. DIRCO and the National Treasury also manage assistance through multilateral financing mechanisms, including the India, Brazil and South Africa Trust Fund, the UN, multilateral development banks and regional institutions. In addition, third-party donor funding plays an important role in South African development efforts; many of the South Africa–DRC development projects are actually trilateral cooperation initiatives.[27]

26 Besharati N, *op. cit.*

27 For instance, the UK's Department for International Development has financed the South African Police Service's security sector reform projects, while Sweden and Germany complemented the African Renaissance Fund's funding for the public service census implemented by the South African Department of Public Service and Administration.

FIGURE 2 TOP 10 DONORS TO THE DRC IN 2014 IN ABSOLUTE TERMS



Source: Authors' compilation; data drawn from SA government financial reports and OECD creditor reporting system. See also Besharati N & C Rawhani, *op. cit.*

FIGURE 3 TOP 10 DONORS TO THE DRC IN 2014 ($, PPP-ADJUSTED)



Source: Authors' compilation; World Bank, 'World development indicators', http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=PA.NUS.PPP&country=, accessed 22 March 2017

Turkey in Somalia: Shifting paradigms and trends of aid

Despite hosting an embassy in Mogadishu from 1979–1991, participating in the UN Operation in Somalia (I and II) in the early 1990s, and engaging in peace efforts from 2008,[28] Turkey was a relatively marginal actor in Somalia until 2011. Its involvement and visibility in Somalia spiked after then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's heavily publicised 2011 visit to Somalia during a famine that claimed over 250 000 lives. Replicating a template of engagement begun elsewhere in Africa, Turkey opened an embassy and a Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) office in Mogadishu, followed by a general consulate in Hargeisa.[29] Turkish Airlines started regular flights, humanitarian and developmental assistance programmes were launched, and Turkish diplomats encouraged mediation efforts, particularly between Somalia and Somaliland.[30] Business activities flourished; Turkish companies gained contracts for the management of the Mogadishu airport and for the reconstruction and maintenance of the Mogadishu seaport. Erdoğan returned to Mogadishu twice, signing several bilateral agreements and inaugurating new projects during his visit in 2015 and opening Turkey's largest embassy in the world in Mogadishu in 2016.[31]

According to TIKA, Somalia is among the top five recipients of Turkish development assistance, the largest recipient of Turkish aid in sub-Saharan Africa, and the largest least developed country recipient of Turkey's development assistance worldwide.[32] Like South Africa's involvement in the DRC, Turkish engagement in Somalia has involved a multi-pronged approach.[33] Beginning with famine relief in 2011, Turkey's efforts in Somalia rapidly expanded into development and statebuilding, with a particular focus on

28 Turkey participated in the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I); Turkish Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir served as the force commander of UNOSOM II in 1993. Turkey was involved in the Djibouti peace talks in 2008, and organised two Istanbul conferences on Somalia in 2010 and 2012, together with the UN. They hosted a pledging conference of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 2011 and joined the informal Somalia Contact Group alongside the EU, the US and Ethiopia. See Ozkan M & S Orakci, 'Turkey as a political actor in Africa', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9,2, 2015, pp. 343–352.

29 TIKA is the Turkish state-run development coordination agency that has been in operation since 1992 and is active on five continents, prioritising those countries with which it has a shared culture and geography.

30 The Somaliland conflict has taken the form of a civil war that began in 1991 out of clashes between the Somali Armed Forces and armed clan-based opposition to the Siad Barre regime. Although the regime was overthrown in 1991 the subsequent power vacuum caused the conflict to continue.

31 Sucuoglu G & J Stearns, *op. cit*.

32 TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Turkish Development Assistance 2013, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/publication/list/turkish_development_assistance_reports-24, accessed 12 February 2017.

33 For further information, see ICG (International Crisis Group), 'Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia'. Brussels: ICG, 2012; Kadayifci-Orellana A, 'Turkish mediation in Somalia for peace and stability', in Eralp DU (ed.), *Turkey as a Mediator: Stories of Success and Failure*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016.

health, education, infrastructure and capacity building. Various Turkish ministries and government agencies engage in development efforts under the umbrella of TIKA while Turkish NGOs continue to treat the humanitarian fallout, run refugee camps and operate a variety of assistance projects on the ground. Meanwhile, Turkish municipalities build local government capacities, Turkish diplomats support reconciliation and mediation efforts, and Turkish private investors contribute to the Somali economy.

Turkey has been among the top 10 donors to Somalia since 2011, in terms of both humanitarian assistance and ODA (see Figures 4 and 5).[34]

FIGURE 4 TURKISH AID TO SOMALIA 2011–2014 ($ MILLION)



Source: TIKA, 'TIKA Annual Report 2011', http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/FAAL%C4%B0YET%20RAPORLARI/PDFLER/2011%20Annual%20Report.compressed.pdf, accessed 1 March 2017; TIKA, 'TIKA Annual Report 2012', http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/tika2012AnnRep.pdf, accessed 1 March 2017; TIKA, 'TIKA Annual Report 2013', http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf, accessed 1 March 2017; TIKA, 'TIKA Annual Report 2014', http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/FAAL%C4%B0YET%20RAPORLARI/PDFLER/FR2014_ENG.pdf, accessed 1 March 2017

34 See Global Humanitarian Assistance, 'Somalia', www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/somalia/#tab-donors, accessed 22 April 2017, for further information. Also see TIKA, *op. cit*.

FIGURE 5 TOP 10 PROVIDERS OF ODA TO SOMALIA IN 2013 (IN ABSOLUTE TERMS)



Source: Authors' compilation, TIKA, 'TIKA Annual Report 2013', http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf, accessed 1 March 2017; TIKA & OECD, 'Creditor Reporting System', https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1, accessed 1 March, 2017

FIGURE 6 TOP 10 DONORS TO SOMALIA IN 2013 (PPP BASED)



Source: Authors' compilation; PPP conversions drawn from World Bank statistics

While Turkey's efforts in Somalia prior to 2011 were mostly delivered through multilateral channels, it quickly evolved into a mostly bilateral exercise. This pivot in Turkish assistance towards bilateralism is not unique to Somalia: multilateral ODA accounted for 2% of Turkey's total ODA in 2014, as opposed to 60% in 2003 and 44% in 2004.[35]

This initial snapshot suggests that both providers have employed multi-actor and multi-track policies in these countries. The amount of assistance provided by Turkey in Somalia and South Africa in the DRC matches and sometimes exceeds those of OECD–DAC donors in many peak years. In the Turkish case, there has been a pivot towards bilateral aid in recent years, while South Africa conducts activities in the DRC through bilateral projects, multilateral mechanisms (MONUSCO, AU, SADC) or trilateral cooperation initiatives involving funding from traditional donors.

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A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH AND SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING

Since the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Buenos Aires Conference in 1978 and the Nairobi Conference in 2009, meetings on SSC have promoted the idea that developing countries can provide assistance to each other in more horizontal, equitable, mutually beneficial, context-specific and demand-driven ways. Do experiences in Somalia and DRC bear this out? Here the two case studies are evaluated against the values of SSC shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 NEST FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING THE QUALITY OF SSC

Dimensions	Inclusive National Ownership	Horizontality	Self-Reliance & Sustainability	Accountability & Transparency	Development Efficiency
Indicators	Multi-stakeholder partnerships	Mutual benefit	Capacity building	Data management & reporting	Flexibility & adaptation
	People-centred inclusivity	Shared decisions & resources	Knowledge & technology transfer	Monitoring & evaluation systems	Time & cost efficiency
	Demand-driven	Trust & solidarity	Use of country systems & human resources	Transparency & access to information	Internal & external coordination
	Non-conditionality	Global political coalitions	Domestic revenue generation	Mutual accountability & joint reviews	Policy coherence for development

35 For 2003 and 2004 data, see OECD, *Development Cooperation Report 2005*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006. For 2014 data, see OECD, 'Turkey's official development assistance', http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm, accessed 12 February 2017.

The results are categorised below in five dimensions, and are summed up again later in a comparative fashion in Table 2, which contains case-specific examples. It is important to note that the two case studies on the peacebuilding efforts of Turkey and South Africa used the analytical framework developed by the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST) to assess the effectiveness of SSC.[36]

Inclusive national ownership

National ownership and respect for sovereignty have been at the heart of SSC since its inception.[37] Recent documents such as the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, and the 2015 Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the UN Peacebuilding Architecture underscore the imperative of ensuring the leadership, ownership and participation of the recipient country in the peace and development processes.[38] These conversations have evolved to accept the importance of implementing people-centred, inclusive solutions that leave no one behind and address needs on the ground.

Both Turkey's and South Africa's narratives align with the SSC principles of non-conditionality, non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Their relationships with the host countries have been more demand-driven and flexible than those of traditional donors

Both Turkey's and South Africa's narratives align with the SSC principles of non-conditionality, non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Their relationships with the host countries have been more demand-driven and flexible than those of traditional donors. Most humanitarian and development projects and other cooperation activities have been launched during or immediately after high-level visits or meetings, mostly based on requests from the recipient government.

People-centred inclusivity, however, is a relative point of weakness for both Southern providers. While many Turkish projects are community-oriented, and South African efforts have focused on a peace process that is intended to benefit Congolese citizens, it is often unclear to what degree their projects are politically inclusive. In addition, the private sector actors engaged in Somalia and the DRC are usually either Turkish and

36 For more information see SAIIA, 'Welcome to NeST Africa!', 16 March 2015, http://www.saiia.org.za/nest, accessed 1 February 2017.

37 African-Asian Conference of Bandung, 'Final Communique of the African Asian Conference', http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf, accessed 22 march 2017; UN Special Unit for Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries, 'The Buenos Aires Plan of Action', http://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/documents/Key%20Policy%20Documents/Buenos%20Aires%20Plan%20of%20Action.pdf, accessed 22 March 2017.

38 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 'A New Deal for Engaging in Fragile States', https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf, accessed 10 February 2017; UN, 'Report of the AGE on the 2015 Peacebuilding Review FINAL', 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/150630%20Report%20of%20the%20AGE%20on%20the%202015%20Peacebuilding%20Review%20FINAL.pdf, accessed 10 February 2017; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development', https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld, accessed 10 February 2017.

South African state-owned enterprises or businesses that have links to senior ruling party officials in South Africa's ANC or Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP).

On geographic reach, South Africa has been present beyond the capital city to the frontlines of rebel fighting in the east of the DRC.[39] While Turkey's efforts have been criticised for being Mogadishu-centric, there have been recent efforts to extend cooperation to other parts of the country.[40] Both countries have been praised for operating in areas that traditional donors avoid for security reasons. As such, direct engagement, delivery and access emerge as a promising dimension of how Turkey and South Africa engage with their partner countries.

Horizontality

Horizontality is a core principle for SSC, based on the understanding that SSC must be mutually beneficial to both parties. This is why Southern actors prefer to function as 'partners' rather than 'donors'; a narrative of solidarity and trust echoes through statements on development cooperation coming from both Turkey and South Africa. Yet, despite this language of 'partnership among equals' and 'demand-driven cooperation', pure altruism and solidarity are not the driving forces for engagement for either country. For instance, while South Africa was initially involved in the peace process in the interests of solidarity and regional stability, the main recent strategic driver of Pretoria's engagement in the DRC has been the energy potential of the Inga Dam, and the increase in trade and investment between the two countries.[41] Turkey's desire to become more visible on the global scene, gain an entry point into sub-Saharan Africa, find a space in which its businesses and civil society can expand, and present itself as a model emerging donor are the key motivations for its engagement in Somalia.

Horizontality is based more on mutual benefit than on altruism, and the degree to which both sides actually benefit is often a matter of perception. Development assistance is an inherently unequal relationship. The providers, by definition, have more financial resources than the recipient countries and, given the explicit economic interests of emerging donors in partner countries – the two cases examined here are no exception – development cooperation can be perceived as a foothold for the expansion of business opportunities.

In terms of political solidarity and global alliances, the relationship between the South African and Congolese governments goes back many years and has contributed to a strong executive-level friendship, allowing the two countries to cooperate closely in multilateral forums such as the UN, the G77, the AU, the International Conference on the Great Lakes

39 Booysen S, *Dominance and Decline: The ANC in the Time of Zuma*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2015.

40 The opening of a general consulate and a TIKA office in Hargeisa and embassy visits to both Somaliland and Puntland in 2015 indicate the expansion of Turkish involvement in Somalia beyond Mogadishu. See Sucuoglu G & J Stearns, *op. cit*.

41 Besharati N & C Rawhani, *op. cit*.

Region and SADC. In the Turkish case, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was one of the first world leaders to condemn the coup attempt of 15 July 2016. Of course, while all these incidents show solidarity at a state-to-state level, they are not necessarily indicative of broader feelings of solidarity between grassroots communities more generally.

Self-reliance and sustainability

Ending dependency and ensuring sustained peace and development is an oft-repeated core objective of international assistance efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states. SSC platforms endorse this objective; the 2016 Delhi conference stresses that SSC has contributed to the transformation of development partnerships through capacity building, and infrastructure and institution building.[42] Using national and local systems in delivery, knowledge and technology transfers, and untying aid are central to reducing the dependency of the recipient country, and thus contribute to long-term and sustainable development.

This philosophy is apparent in both Turkey's and South Africa's assistance. However, neither Turkey nor South Africa seems to employ a structured peacebuilding model or substantive theory of change aimed at realising durable peace.[43]

The Turkish vision of capacity building seems to be more structured, with well-defined short- and long-term goals. In the short term, organisations such as Turkish Red Crescent recruit and train local personnel so it can work jointly with them on the ground.[44] Turkish organisations train and use Somali personnel and decision-makers and aim to fully transfer management to locals once they are ready.[45] Private companies also regularly train and employ Somali personnel to build capacity and leadership skills – one example is the health centres run by Turkish organisations, which are then handed over to Somali counterparts.[46] Capacity building and knowledge transfer are also elements of a long-term development strategy, exemplified by both governmental and nongovernmental actors providing scholarships, education programmes and training in various sectors, such as security services, science, engineering, health, agriculture and urban policy.[47] Many of the bilateral agreements and related projects include long-term visions, sometimes spanning as many as 20 years.[48]

42 See RIS (Research and Information System for Developing Countries), 'Media Briefing on International Conference on South-South Cooperation', http://www.ris.org.in/node/996/, accessed 12 February 2017.

43 Richmond O & I Tellidis, 'Emerging actors in international peacebuilding and statebuilding: Status quo or critical states?', *Global Governance*, 20, 2014, pp. 563–584.

44 Interview, Turkish Red Crescent official, Ankara, May 2016.

45 *Ibid*.

46 Interview, Somali businessman, Mogadishu, April 2016.

47 Interview, Abdirahman Bayidow, Mogadishu University, Mogadishu, March 2016.

48 Interview, Somali member of Parliament, Mogadishu, April 2016.

South Africa invested over $1 billion in the DRC from 2001–2015 in various capacity-development and institution-building initiatives, including training local police, the diplomatic corps and many other Congolese civil servants. It has engaged in knowledge and technology transfer, particularly in the area of governance and public service, and provided training and technical assistance to various entities, including the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the *Police Nationale Congolaise*, the DRC Central Bank, and customs and immigration officials. Yet the positive impact of these initiatives has been diminished by South Africa's failure to put pressure on the government to crack down on patronage networks and corruption within the security forces and public administration. Political instability and the continuous turnover of personnel have also undermined efforts to ensure sustainability.[49]

The lasting impact of all development initiatives, however, will be largely determined by the durability of the peace process.

In this context it is much less clear whether Turkey and South Africa have been able to leverage their considerable political and economic heft to promote an inclusive and well-structured peace process in Somalia and the DRC, respectively. In conversations with officials of both providers it is clear that they lack a coherent theory of change that could inform an overarching peacebuilding strategy. In general, both countries appear to privilege strong relations with their hosts over a more inclusive approach that would necessarily also be more critical of government policy.

Accountability and transparency

Accountability, monitoring and evaluation are major challenges for all SSC actors, as was made clear at the Delhi conferences in 2014 and 2016.[50]

Approaches to accountability and transparency are among the areas where Turkish and South African assistance differ substantially. Due to delays in the establishment of SADPA,[51] retrieving information on humanitarian and development financing in South Africa has been an arduous task that requires addressing each government agency and ministry separately.

Turkey, on the other hand, reports its ODA volumes to the DAC annually and voluntarily, and more sporadically to the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs'

49 Muthayan S, 'Capacity Development through SSC and Triangular Cooperation in Africa: Lessons Learned', NeST, 2015, http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_download/714-2015-03-05-nest-technical-wshop-pres-muthayan, accessed 15 April 2016.

50 RIS, 'Conference of Southern Providers of Development Cooperation South–South Cooperation: Issues and Emerging Challenges', 2013, http://www.ris.org.in/conference-southern-providers-development-cooperation-south-south-cooperation-issues-and-emerging, accessed 6 December 2016; RIS, 'Conference on South–South Cooperation', 2016, http://ris.org.in/press_release/PressRelease8March16.pdf, accessed 6 December 2016.

51 Besharati N, *op. cit.*

Financial Tracking Services. Several Turkish NGOs and companies report data on the nature, scope, personnel and budget of their projects to TIKA and the Ministry of Interior's Department of Associations, and often publish project data on their websites.[52] However, reporting is not always broken down geographically and by sector, and is less regular and consistent than that of traditional donors.

On the recipient side, governance challenges and technical capacity limitations make gathering data from Congolese and Somalis extremely difficult. A lack of reliable evidence and proper monitoring and evaluation systems on both sides also seriously hampers the effectiveness of the few mutual accountability and review mechanisms that are in place. Developing indicators and quantifiable targets to measure progress is not common for either South Africa or Turkey. Ultimately, a reliable and common monitoring and evaluation framework for SSC is lacking, which in turn leads to failure to promote accountability, transparency, learning and improvement of development cooperation efforts by emerging donors.

Development efficiency

An often-praised characteristic of SSC providers is their geographical and geopolitical proximity to and familiarity with the recipients, and their ability to respond more rapidly, appropriately and often in a more cost-effective manner due to less stringent security regulations and less detailed needs assessments compared to traditional donors. These have been highlighted as comparative advantages of SSC.

In Somalia the presence of Turkish actors on the ground, 'side by side with their Somali counterparts' and local communities, has allowed these actors to be more adaptable to local conditions, needs and wishes.[53] Partially due to the absence of an institutionalised aid provision system, South Africa is also fairly flexible and adaptable to the specific conditions that it faces in the DRC.

As suggested above, achieving coordination and coherence of efforts has proven to be a considerable challenge for both Turkey and South Africa. In the Turkish case, the coordination efforts of the centralised development agency and the Turkish embassy have not always prevented overlapping or duplication of efforts on the ground, or an imbalance of responsibilities among different Turkish institutions.[54] South Africa also suffers from a lack of internal coordination among its various departments and agencies, making its development interventions fragmented, ad hoc and limited in their effectiveness.[55]

Both countries only sporadically attend coordination meetings with other international donors. Turkish and South African cooperation with other development actors seems

52 Interviews, Doctors Worldwide and Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), Istanbul, April 2016.

53 Interviews, Turkish civil society representatives, Istanbul, April 2016.

54 Interview, Doctors Worldwide representative, Istanbul, April 2016.

55 Besharati N, *op. cit*.

to be personality driven, as some project managers are more capable and willing to coordinate with other players active in the sector. Nonetheless, both countries are often seen to play an important role between Northern and Southern providers due to their proximity to the West. South Africa, for instance, has been defined as 'a bridge between Kinshasa, Northern donors and the other emerging economies'.[56]

TABLE 2 TURKISH, SOUTH AFRICAN AND TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING IN FRAGILE STATES

	Traditional DAC approach	Turkish approach	South African approach
1 Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations	Mostly managed from capitals or regional 'safe hubs' (eg, Nairobi), with delivery through other partners **Outcome** Fewer security risks; potential for better coordination with other international agencies	Direct aid delivery through presence on the ground in Mogadishu **Outcome** Efficient, cost-effective, rapid, direct contact with local populations; needs based; more visibility	Strong military presence on the ground (eastern DRC), aid delivery direct to beneficiaries. **Outcome** Programming that is appropriate, sensitive and adaptable to the local context
2 Coherence and coordination of aid strategy	Seasoned national technical/ development agencies present on the ground with close links to their embassies' foreign policy **Outcome** Coherence of donor's development cooperation policy	Humanitarian and development assistance provided through multiple national and sub-national government agencies, NGOs and businesses **Outcome** Limited coordination of Turkish stakeholders and difficulty in adhering to a broader conflict transformation strategy	Peace, governance, social and economic support provided by a variety of government departments, national agencies, NGOs, private sector and state-owned enterprises **Outcome** Very poor coordination and weak overall coherence of South African international development strategy
3 Alignment with host government priorities	Country assessments and programming done with limited consultation with fragile-state government, which is often seen as illegitimate, incapable or corrupt; aid is supply-driven **Outcome** More upward accountability; weak national ownership, capacity development and sustainability; more empowerment of civil society organisations and opposition groups	Joint assessment and planning with national government and local counterparts **Outcome** Increased ownership and leadership of national government	Strong bilateral joint planning and reviews with recipient government and state leadership **Outcome** Respect of sovereignty; strengthening of 'fraternity' between countries;[a] support is demand-driven, but beyond the executive level there is little inclusivity of other stakeholders

56 Comments made by a number of diplomats and political affairs officials interviewed in Kinshasa in October 2016.

4 **Interventionism and conditionality**	Sanctions, political and economic conditionality linked to peace and development interventions **Outcome** Promotion of normative agenda – human rights, good governance, inclusive participation, accountability – often interpreted by recipients as interventionist/neo-colonialist	Non-interference and respect for sovereignty; no direct or indirect policy conditionalities **Outcome** Empowering the central state and ruling elites; little accountability, inclusivity and action on human rights	Non-interference and respect for sovereignty; no direct or indirect policy conditionalities **Outcome** Empowering the central state and ruling elites; little accountability, inclusivity and actions on human rights
5 **Drivers of engagement**	Addressing immediate conflict and humanitarian crisis; preventing instability and/or violent extremism; containing migration and refugee outbreaks **Outcome** The cooperation is short term and defined by a donor–recipient aid dependency relationship; funding fluctuates depending on other international crises and priorities arising	Humanitarianism and solidarity, regional influence, soft power, increase of trade and foreign investment **Outcome** The relationship is more long term, business oriented, equitable and focused on mutual benefits	African solidarity, peace and stability of the region, economic growth and regional integration through multilateralism **Outcome** The relationship is more horizontal, pragmatic, long term and focused on mutual benefits
6 **Focus of cooperation**	Humanitarian support, contributions to health, education and social sectors through parallel provision	Humanitarian support, political engagement, trade deals, infrastructure and institution building, business investments	Peacekeeping and political mediation, state building and capacity building, economic development, trade and investment
7 **Coordination with other development partners**	Multilateralism and strong coordination; country assessments and programming done with other development partners **Outcome** Less duplication, more harmonisation, better collective accountability, unity of strategy with recipient country	Strong bilateralism and little coordination with other development partners **Outcome** Better promotion of Turkish visibility and interests; closer relationship with host government; some duplication of efforts by other donors	Strong bilateralism and partial multilateralism through AU/SADC; limited coordination with Northern donors **Outcome** Closer relationship with recipient government; less impact compared to broader efforts of the international community

8 **Modalities of financing and support**	Peacekeeping, technical cooperation, grants, parallel support to NGOs **Outcome** Better advances of donor objectives and better accountability of funds	In-kind goods, public–private partnerships, direct budget support, loans, grants, technical cooperation, support via NGOs **Outcome** Support mobilised from a variety of public and private sources; increased potential for sustained and innovative financing	Peacekeeping, technical cooperation, grants, non-concessional loans, public–private partnerships, in-kind goods and services **Outcome** Support mobilised from a variety of public and private sources; increased potential for sustained and innovative financing
9 **Monitoring and evaluation**	Structured monitoring, evaluation, and reporting systems, harmonised to OECD systems **Outcome** Better analysis and evaluation of the impact and value for money of development programmes; more evidence, transparency, accountability to tax payers, beneficiaries and broader stakeholders	Absence of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism, ad-hoc reporting and limited data availability **Outcome** More general qualitative evaluations of the general Turkish engagement, but increased difficulties in evaluating the impact of specific projects and programmes	Very weak information management and accountability due to the absence of an institutionalised reporting, monitoring and evaluation system **Outcome** Poor accountability, uncoordinated development cooperation that the government is rarely able to leverage due to a lack of knowledge of its true extent

a The Presidency, 'Toast Remarks by His Excellency President Jacob Zuma on the Occasion of the State Banquet Hosted by His Excellency President Joseph Kabila Kabange of the DRC', 2013, http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=16365, accessed 13 October 2016.

Source: Compiled by authors

SSC AND THE POLITICS OF ENGAGEMENT

While quantitative and qualitative analysis on the engagement of Southern providers in fragile states reveals valuable lessons that could contribute to the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts, such an analysis will not be complete without exploring the political dimensions of aid, on both the provider and the recipient side. After all, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are essentially political, and sustainable development is connected to peace and stability in the region. Just as with traditional donors, domestic politics and geopolitical interests play a role in shaping aid policies and their outcomes. Thus, the effectiveness of SSC will remain contingent on a conducive security, governance and economic environment in the region and in both partner countries.

Political, economic and strategic motivations of Southern providers

SSC providers are different from traditional donors, not just because of their cultural practices and their past but also because of their particular political interests. All donors are influenced by such interests. Development cooperation can help project soft power, address domestic concerns and be a vehicle for strategic or economic interests. While these factors will vary based on the particular countries and context, there are some generalities that can be proposed based on the nature of emerging donors.

Emerging donors occupy a particular political, economic, and ideological space that influences their engagement with host countries. With their rising power, there can be the need to expand their visibility and power as regional and sometimes global actors, as well as the quest for new markets for their growing economies. At the same time, their past as aid recipients themselves and as members of the Global South can inspire their support for ways of working beyond the traditional rules and dynamics of donor and recipient countries.

Research on both Turkey and South Africa has indicated that the reasons for engagement, as well as the expectations and interests of Southern providers in developing and fragile countries often go beyond the sole intent to bring sustainable peace and development.

Turkey's engagement in Somalia has catered to its ambition to increase its international and regional visibility and power, and emerge as a lead actor in conflict prevention and resolution efforts on the global stage. For Turkish officials, these engagements are part of a strategy to define the AKP's 'New Turkey' and the new ways it does business, and have often highlighted the normative and operational underpinnings of Turkish involvement in Somalia.[57] Turkey's engagement in Somalia has also opened up space for its businesses to operate, most of which are seen as close to the government, leading causing Turkish exports to Somalia to skyrocket.[58] A similar story can be told for civil society organisations, although non-profits that were engaged in Somalia were close to the Gülen movement and have been deeply affected by the fallout between Erdoğan and

57 Erdoğan's speech at a 2015 election rally is a good example: 'We went to Somalia without any fear. We opened a modern hospital, a nursing school, and a mosque … Turkey embraced Somalia, who everyone had left alone. Today, there is a Turkey that determines the global agenda.' See Sucuoglu G & J Stearns, *op. cit*., p. 45.

58 This includes the biggest contracts, notably for construction and management at the strategically important Mogadishu airport and seaport, which were awarded to three companies: Favori, Kozuva and Albayrak. Interview with MP, Mogadishu, April 2016. Albayrak Group, for instance, is the owner of the *Yeni Şafak newspaper*, which is known to be close to AKP. See Günes Koç G & H Aksu (eds), *Another Brick in the Barricade: The Gezi Resistance and Its Aftermath*. Bremen: Wiener Verlag für Sozialforschung, 2015; Eroglü A & İ Toprak, 'Somali'ye hayirli olsun', *Yeni Şafak*, 26 January 2015, http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/somaliye-hayirli-olsun-2069261, accessed 12 February 2017.

Fethullah Gülen in 2013.[59] Turkey's engagement has also appealed to the expectations and sensitivities of the AKP's conservative base, while injecting new energy and dynamism into a country whose ego has been bruised by decades of endless negotiations with the EU, and boosting the image of both the party and its leader.

Post-1994, South Africa has endeavoured to change its image in Africa from being the last bastion of European colonialism on the continent to the new 'rainbow nation' and democracy providing leadership in addressing the challenges of the continent. Once seen as a hegemonic Western actor in its region, South Africa has shifted to an African-centred foreign policy that favours multilateral engagements when it comes to peace and security concerns, while preferring bilateral mechanisms in its development cooperation.[60]

South Africa's motivations for becoming involved in the DRC have evolved under successive presidencies. Throughout these shifts, however, its commitment to promoting peace and security as well as regional integration has remained. Under Nelson Mandela the motivations were shaped by South Africa's commitment to be a 'friend to the world', coupled with its economic reliance on growth across the continent.[61] Under Mbeki South Africa's foreign policy appeared to be particularly strategic, and to pursue the goal of establishing itself as a seasoned mediator implementing 'African solutions to African problems'. As part of Mbeki's 'African Renaissance', the country took a leading role in peacekeeping operations and establishing collective governance mechanisms and development frameworks for the entire continent.[62] Under Jacob Zuma there has been a decline in strategic thinking and a general decrease in interest in foreign policy. For the DRC, there has been an increased focus on economic cooperation, trade and investment,

59 The Gülen movement is a well-organised network consisting of the followers of the US-based Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen. Although not a political party, the Gülen movement successfully infiltrated the highest levels of the Turkish state machinery and has been blamed by Erdoğan for the attempted military coup in 2016, an accusation which Gülen denies. The Gülen movement is best known for its many community service-based efforts such as setting up schools around the world, expanding into business later as its ranks grew. Many organisations connected to the Gülen movement entered Somalia after 2011. After a fallout between Erdoğan and Gülen in 2013, schools and organisations linked to Gülen in sub-Saharan Africa, including Somalia, found that their operations were under increased pressure from the AKP government, they had their bank accounts frozen, and were being investigated as forming part of a terrorist network.

60 Landsberg C, 'The Jacob Zuma government's foreign policy: Association or dissociation?', *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, 1, 1, 2012, http://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10210/9561/LandsbergAUSTRAL_2012.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 20 June 2016.

61 Mandela N, 'South Africa's future foreign policy', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 5, 1993, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1993-12-01/south-africas-future-foreign-policy, accessed 20 June 2016.

62 Mbeki T, 'The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World', DIRCO, 9 April 1998, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0409.htm, accessed 20 June 2016.

with the energy potential of the Inga Dam as a major motivator.[63] However, South Africa has struggled to reconcile its bilateral economic interests with its role in peacebuilding and stability more broadly. For example, as mentioned before, Pretoria has contributed significantly to MONUSCO's peacekeeping efforts in the country, yet has remained silent throughout the recent political impasse related to Kabila's succession. The president appeared to be manoeuvring for a third term in office despite widespread public protest against this. With the country's elections postponed due to a need to update the voter register, political parties have struggled to come to an agreement on the way forward for the country, with violence breaking out periodically.

Effects of domestic political and economic changes on aid and assistance

It is widely accepted that both peace and development are long-term processes, and require sustained engagement to successfully build self-reliance and address the root causes of conflict.[64] The ability of emerging donors to bring about long-term development and peace relies on the sustainability, continuity and consistency of their efforts and engagement over time. SSC providers are, however, undergoing rapid economic growth and political changes, which can affect their foreign policy. The weakness of aid bureaucracies, as well as fluctuations in domestic and foreign policy priorities, can also undermine the effectiveness of their development cooperation and international peacebuilding efforts.

At the domestic level, rapid economic growth can foster uncertainty and a lack of predictability. Instability inside and outside of Turkey's borders – including large refugee flows from Iraq and Syria – continues to raise questions about the sustainability of Turkish efforts in Somalia (See Figure 4), and what level of priority these efforts will receive in the future.[65] Somalia remains the third-largest recipient of ODA from Turkey, and the ODA amounts have remained relatively constant – $93.39 million in 2011 versus $95 million in 2014.[66] However, like many other middle-income countries, Turkey will probably not have the institutional capacity to engage in multiple international cooperation projects at once: if Somalia loses its place among Turkey's top foreign policy priorities, the sustainability of its ODA might be affected. Additionally, a changing

63 The Presidency, 'President Zuma strengthens economic cooperation with DRC', 2015, http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=20810, accessed 12 October 2016.

64 See, for example, UN Security Council, 'Long-term institution-building, national ownership critical to peacebuilding in Africa, speakers stress at Security Council debate', 28 July 2016, http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12465.doc.htm, accessed 12 February 2017.

65 Sucuoglu G & J Stearns, *op. cit.*

66 TIKA, 'TIKA Annual Report 2011', http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/FAAL%C4%B0YET%20RAPORLARI/PDFLER/2011%20Annual%20Report.compressed.pdf, accessed 1 March 2017; TIKA, 'TIKA Annual Report 2014', http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/FAAL%C4%B0YET%20RAPORLARI/PDFLER/FR2014_ENG.pdf, accessed 1 March 2017.

domestic policy terrain might also affect Turkey's ability to prioritise conflict prevention and peacebuilding in fragile countries.[67]

Similarly, South Africa is a relatively young and inexperienced aid provider, and lacks an institutionalised aid provision system and a coherent, coordinated and unified approach to its development cooperation.[68] Its economics-oriented focus has yielded little fruit vis-à-vis the time and resources invested.[69] Furthermore, the South African government has recently failed to react appropriately to the deteriorating political situation in the DRC, further calling into question the sustainability of its decade-long peacebuilding and institution-building efforts. Should the president be ousted during the next few years, South Africa will likely lose favour with the incoming government. And should the current president remain in power while instability spreads, South Africa's investments and hard work may be lost.[70]

A more effective model for peacebuilding: Defining theories of change and effective response

Southern providers have not seen peacebuilding as a primary focus area for SSC until recently. At the same time, key SSC conferences rarely mention peacebuilding and conflict prevention as an area of interest for SSC, as these often run counter to SSC principles such as respect for national sovereignty, independence and non-interference. The increasing linkages drawn between development and peace, and the G77-supported mantra that 'there can be no development without peace, and no peace without development', have resulted in Southern providers' growing interest in and engagement with peacebuilding efforts. The expansion of the global development agenda to also include security, governance and justice concerns through Sustainable Development Goal 16 has also encouraged this convergence.

However, while several Southern providers rhetorically define their engagement in conflict-affected countries as peacebuilding, this definition is often not connected to a distinctive theory of change to address conflict dynamics, or a broad strategy aimed at dealing with the root causes of conflict, based on Southern principles. It is not clear whether emerging powers such as South Africa and Turkey offer an alternative paradigm and approach to peacebuilding that is unique and more effective than traditional approaches.

67 Developments after the failed coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016 might also signal a changed strategic direction for the foreign policy of the country.

68 Besharati N, *op. cit*.

69 Interview, peacekeeping expert with a special interest in the Great Lakes and the DRC, Durban, 23 June 2016; World Bank, 'World Bank Group Suspends Financing to the Inga-3 Basse Chute Technical Assistance Project', 25 July 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/07/25/world-bank-group-suspends-financing-to-the-inga-3-basse-chute-technical-assistance-project, accessed 10 August 2016.

70 Interview, peacekeeping expert with a special interest in the Great Lakes and the DRC, Durban, 23 June 2016.

Building on its progressive constitution and its history of reconciliation, peaceful transition and democracy, South Africa has tried to play a key role in addressing justice, governance and rule of law in the DRC. Prompted by the outbreak of violence in the DRC in the late 1990s, South Africa hosted truly multi-stakeholder peace talks in 2002 and assisted in the drafting of a new constitution.[71] In pursuing these ideals, South Africa has followed a mediated, inclusive peacemaking doctrine modelled on its own negotiated transition. This has emphasised that the process of resolving conflicts should seek first and foremost to create stability. Such stability would provide the space to begin building institutions and advancing values such as democracy, good governance, human rights and sustainable development. The South African government and civil society groups have also made a concerted effort to ensure that the Congolese public sphere is diverse and representative, working to address gender parity and advancement of women. But none of these efforts has been connected to a broader and holistic policy of building and sustaining peace in the DRC. They have rather taken the form of demand-driven assistance and somewhat sporadic efforts in a fragile country, not necessarily attached to conflict analysis, a mapping of other peacebuilding efforts in the country, or an understanding of what might work on the ground.

On the Turkish side, the tendency has been to portray traditional conflict prevention efforts such as mediation and dialogues as attempts at peacebuilding. What has been lacking is deeper analysis on how development efforts might feed into structural conflict prevention aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict, or broader strategic analysis and political knowledge connecting various Turkish and international efforts to a peacebuilding theory.

CONCLUSION

South–South partnerships are characterised by a state-to-state solidarity that tends to favour ruling elites and sideline the political opposition, civil society, minorities and other marginalised groups

In the last decade SSC providers have become increasingly visible in the global development landscape. Recently these emerging powers have also started to play a more prominent role in peacebuilding and state-building efforts in fragile and conflict-affected areas – an important priority for the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This report suggests that in countries such as Somalia and the DRC, emerging donors such as Turkey and South Africa have in some years provided more resources for peace, governance and development efforts than traditional donors operating in the same space.

Emerging powers distinguish themselves from Northern donors by their fresh approaches to state building in line with the principles of SSC, such as demand-driven assistance, horizontality, solidarity, national ownership and self-reliance. When engaging with other developing countries they often bring more locally-appropriate knowledge and experiences, consonant with their shared history, culture, religion, and geographic and developmental context. Compared to Northern donors they tend to be more flexible and

71 Interview, peacekeeping expert with a special interest in the Great Lakes and the DRC, Durban, 23 June 2016; USIO (US Institute of Peace), 'Truth Commission: Democratic Republic of Congo', 2003, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-democratic-republic-of-congo, accessed 17 October 2016.

able to respond more rapidly to challenging security environments, by engaging on the front lines of conflicts such as the ones in Somalia and the eastern DRC.

However, SSC in peacebuilding is not without its problems. The application of Southern values such as respect for sovereignty and non-conditionality often contrasts with the normative Western agenda of inclusive governance, democracy and human rights promotion. South–South partnerships are characterised by a state-to-state solidarity that tends to favour ruling elites and sideline the political opposition, civil society, minorities and other marginalised groups. This was highlighted both in South Africa's engagements with the DRC and in Turkey's support to Somalia. Furthermore, both countries showed strong commitment towards local empowerment and institution building, but capacity-building efforts were often not sustained due to high staff turnover and the volatile political and security situation.

From a technical point of view, South Africa and Turkey's monitoring and evaluation practices and availability of data on development programming are extremely weak, hampering accountability efforts around SSC. Both countries engage in peace, governance and development efforts through multilateral and bilateral channels and operate in recipient countries through a multiplicity of agencies, state and non-state actors. However, the challenge of SSC remains that of internal coordination, which has an impact on the effectiveness of providers' development cooperation strategies. This is more acute in the case of South Africa, which still does not have a centralised foreign aid agency like TIKA. The two case studies have also highlighted that aid from SSC providers fluctuates and is susceptible to political and economic shocks domestically, as well as changing international priorities and crises in their respective regions of interest.

Notwithstanding principles of solidarity and altruism, peacebuilding by emerging donors is driven by realpolitik considerations such enhancing their strategic, economic and geo-political interests, projecting soft power in international relations and stabilising a neighbouring region. This is expressed through the rhetoric of 'mutual benefit', where ODA is often linked to increased trade and investment and fostering long-term business relations between the two countries.

The two case studies presented here offered interesting insights and lessons from emerging economies' engagement with fragile states. It is not yet clear if there is a defined and distinctive peacebuilding paradigm offered by Southern providers that differs from the models presented by traditional donors. With a mixed bag of strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures, there is still no conclusive evidence whether the approaches of Southern providers are more effective than those of Western donors when dealing with conflict-affected areas. Further research is required on SSC and peacebuilding, potentially looking at the approaches of other emerging economies such as India, Brazil, Indonesia and China.

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