

**Policy
Insights**

141

February 2023



BRICS XV: Expectations for South Africa's 2023 chair

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African perspectives
Global insights

Executive summary

How do the BRICS member countries measure success? Much of this is left to the member who chairs the respective year. In 2018, South Africa committed itself to a new but interlinked list. While it was able to register progress on several items, it is worth noting that most agenda items overlap various rotational chairs and BRICS leaders tend to register collective gains.

South Africa risks being drawn into the geopolitics of the larger members, especially in the context where BRICS members China and Russia have received censure for various reasons. In view of South Africa's own domestic exigencies, there is concern that South Africa is unable to pursue its growth agenda with the necessary pragmatism when its membership of BRICS might put this agenda at risk.

However, that said, redeeming features include the centres of excellence created by the BRICS, which find degrees of synergy within the multitrack diplomacy system. Looking to the XV Summit, to be hosted by South Africa in 2023, the most pressing question will be whether South Africa is able to domesticate the agenda and summit declarations in a manner that sees all South Africans better able to understand how to relate to the behemoth that is BRICS.

Introduction

The success of BRICS is dependent on the ability of its member countries to make strides and find synergies in their bi-lateral relationships which can be further extrapolated on at the multilateral level. Between each rotating cycle of the presidencies, each of the five members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – has the opportunity to set the agenda for a common vision that embodies their national and regional perspective. In this, the usefulness of BRICS for each member can be determined by whether what has been set out in its agenda is achieved. In 2018, the theme of South Africa's presidency 'BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution' committed to establishing a [BRICS Energy Research and Cooperation Platform](#); security cooperation on ICTs and chemical and biological weapons; a New Development Bank (NDB) regional office in Sao Paulo; closer cooperation on customs and trade, and on tourism; and establishment of a vaccine research and development centre.

Other priorities included strengthening cooperation around disaster management, collaboration on the Oceans Economy, making progress on the BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund, further operationalizing the BRICS Economic Partnership through the Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues, and regional aviation (see Annex 2 for a more detailed

overview).¹ With each passing year, the BRICS partnership and networks are able to expand on their relationships and establish institutional formats, however, their success rests on the extent to which these initiatives can develop beyond track 1 dialogues,² or government-to-government relations.

Entering 2023, South Africa faces similar challenges to those it did in 2018, specifically in service delivery in vital sectors like energy, security, health and education. Each summit broadly speaks to the work the BRICS are committed to, which is in line with national objectives. But how agendas are nationalized and implemented speaks to the value that each BRICS member can bring to the partnership. In understanding BRICS, there is a broader academic lens that focuses on the collective impetus of BRICS as a global governance reformer; however, the operational components deserve more attention because BRICS agendas are ongoing and agenda items may only be realized in years to come and be considered collective gains. In anticipating South Africa's 2023 chair, this paper tracks the progress on the commitments listed above and engages on the expectations of South Africa.³

Challenges to the BRICS vision of global and economic governance

The world in 2023 is vastly different to when South Africa chaired BRICS in 2018. A pandemic triggering a global health emergency and disrupted value chains, unprecedented levels of global inflation, and the war erupting in Ukraine are major events impacting on the BRICS. The BRICS outlook has been to shape a fair multilateral order free from coercion that upholds principles in the UN Charter. Although the BRICS have taken several multilateral positions on climate, and development and trade toward that end, what stands out are the events that have unfolded in Ukraine since February 2022. South Africa's position of pragmatic non-alignment with either Russia or Ukraine and calls for dialogue and negotiation have been communicated in a clumsy manner. South Africa's values and propositions, for all its outward communication of respect for human rights and democracy, have been critiqued as an instance of 'talk left, walk right'.⁴ However, South Africa can also be argued to be taking a pragmatic stance in its understanding of the changing global environment, as to whether it agrees with choices and competing

1 Government of South Africa, *10th BRICS Summit: Johannesburg declaration*, (Johannesburg, South Africa, July 27, 2018).

2 Tracks of diplomacy include: track 1, inter-governmental cooperation, track 2, cooperation in think tanks, academia, business, and track 3, debates undertaken by civil society respective to their home countries and inter-BRICS cooperation.

3 Note on the methodology: A desk top study was used to analyse the BRICS Joint Communiqué/declaration from 2018, as well as other recent literature on key themes. In addition, a number of interviews were undertaken with experts from BRICS countries. See addendum for list of interviewees and base questions.

4 Peter Fabricius (Journalist, Daily Maverick), interviewed by Arina Muresan, April 2022; Sanusha Naidu (Senior Associate, Institute for Global Dialogue) & Philani Mthembu (Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue), interviewed by Arina Muresan, April 2022; Prof. Bhaso Ndzenzhe (Head of Department, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg), interviewed by Arina Muresan, April 2022.

interests vis-à-vis its values. Critics, meanwhile, claim that South Africa has swapped out its humanist values in order to pursue a path that ultimately does not support democratic values. A challenge is that, while South Africa has a position on this matter, as others do, it stands the risk of getting swept up in the geopolitics of bigger regional players.⁵

There is a resurgence of non-alignment in the global South, signaling a possible rising trend in how the BRICS interpret global matters

The global humanitarian crisis is worsened by the continued economic disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, inflation and food and medicine shortages. There is a resurgence of non-alignment in the global South, signaling a possible rising trend in how the BRICS interpret global matters.⁶ Allied to the major questions around the Russia-Ukraine war, questions emerge as to what extent this will impact on BRICS and their cooperation on multilateral fora and how this will impact the image of BRICS. There is anticipation that this may catalyse the official expansion of the BRICS beyond the regional invitation to annual observers and partners. While some feel this may breathe new life into BRICS, practically, BRICS members would face a new kind of competition, in working out how new members would be strategic geopolitical partners and how they would fit into existing institutional arrangements. Regardless, in the context of changing global dynamics, there is also a call to revitalize the India, Brazil, South Africa – or IBSA – grouping as a coalition to recalibrate how BRICS as a bloc interprets emerging issues and shift focus away from the strongest partners, China and Russia.⁷ South Africa may face increased expectations around the impact of BRICS on the global order, as well as the order within the BRICS partnership, and where BRICS are considered outliers, this is where IBSA leadership within the BRICS bloc may be of benefit.

South Africa may face increased expectations around the impact of BRICS on the global order, as well as the order within the BRICS partnership

5 Fabricius, interview; Naidu & Mthembu, interview.

6 Sachin Chaturvedi (Director General, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS)) and Sabaysachi Saha (Assistant Professor, RIS), interviewed by Arina Muresan, April 2022; Valeriia Gorbacheva (National Committee for BRICS Research), interviewed by Arina Muresan, April 2022; Karen Costa Vazquez (Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Center for China and Globalization, Fudan Scholar at Fudan University | Executive Director, Assistant Dean, Associate Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University), interviewed by Arina Muresan, April 2022.

7 Chaturvedi & Saha, interview.

South Africa's non-alignment on various issues that are perceived to be politically sensitive also has an impact on how South Africa can implement its humanistic and democratic value orientations in its international relations. Moreover, it seems that when South Africa attempts to take a more pragmatic perspective it clashes with the abovementioned values.

In this context, calls for a pragmatic South Africa have a direct impact on national objectives and economic recovery from the pandemic. Some of this is highlighted in Operation Vulindlela and the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan, where uptake has been slow because of domestic exigencies like ruling political party infighting, the July 2021 riots, flood damage to the port and supporting infrastructure in Durban in 2022, bureaucratic inefficiencies, general strife within the ruling hierarchy and security nexus, and continuous uncertainty around electricity generation and provision.⁸ While government acknowledges and supports the urgent need to make climate-sensitive changes through a Just Energy Transition (2020),⁹ which is supported by partners in the West, the outdated Integrated Resource Plan (2019)¹⁰ continues to drive the bigger debates on how South African business and citizens access energy. In this context, moreover, global economic growth has slowed which sets emerging and developing economies back further as inequality widens and inflation increases. Russia's war in Ukraine has at the same time had disastrous effects on South African consumers: 1) the cost of fuel has sky-rocketed, further impacting the supply of energy, 2) the price of food increased significantly due to import and internal transport costs, 3) global trade channels have been impacted, with South African agricultural imports and exports suffering most.¹¹ Across Africa, meanwhile, the impact on food security is expected to be severe, similarly impacted by fuel and agricultural product inflation, specifically fertilizer, which creates greater vulnerability to shocks, barriers to addressing the impacts of climate change and other energy costs.¹²

In 2018, South Africa's BRICS chairship saw it echo the need for development solutions for the African continent through initiatives like the UN's Sustainable Development Goals, the African Union's Agenda 2063, and its New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) infrastructure campaign, cloaked in the promise of effective inter-African trade integration supporting value and supply chains, and eventually establishing a monetary union through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA Agreement is based on World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines but does not cater for additional membership external to the African continent and so the agreement is exclusively African. However, external parties are still able to trade with African countries and still negotiate bilateral trade agreements. The Rules of Origin will also tighten access to African markets to ensure that the continent is strengthened across all dimensions. Therefore, third parties may be part of

8 Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Presidency, *Summary Booklet of the Operation Vulindlela*, (March 20, 2021); Government of the Republic of South Africa, *the South African Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan*, (October, 2020).

9 Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Presidency, *South Africa's Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP)*, (November, 2022).

10 Government of the Republic of South Africa, Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, *Integrated Resource Plan*, (October 2019).

11 Jan Gerber, '3 ways Russia's invasion of Ukraine affects SA's economy', News 24, (March 16, 2022).


12 Ben Farmer, 'Soaring Fertilizer prices 'causing more global hunger than Russia's grain blockade', *Telegraph*, (January 9, 2023).

the AfCFTA by investing in African infrastructure, industries and bureaucratic systems that streamline the trade process. South Africa may play a role for BRICS as a literal ‘gateway’, or an enhanced logistics hub, with the potential to dovetail into NEPAD’s infrastructure campaign and the Southern African Development Community’s infrastructure master plan. However, expectations around the practical implications of the AfCFTA are still vague.

South Africa may play a role for BRICS as a literal ‘gateway’, or an enhanced logistics hub, with the potential to dovetail into NEPAD’s infrastructure campaign and the Southern African Development Community’s infrastructure master plan

Over the years, trade with BRICS partners has grown. However, perhaps the larger challenge is diversifying South Africa’s product offerings and finding new markets in general as well as improving the trade deficit.¹³

Figure 1 BRICS trade 2015-2020 during the first Trade Strategy as conceptualised by Russia in 2015 (\$ Billions)



Source: Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, <http://www.thedtic.gov.za/>

¹³ Cyril Prinsloo, ‘Boosting South Africa’s Economic Relations with the BRICS,’ *Institute for Global Dialogue*, Issue 131, (June 2017); Government of the Republic of South Africa, Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, *BRICS trade data*, (2022).

The BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues, held at government-to-government level, seeks avenues for cooperation in the multilateral system, as well as on tariff and non-tariff barriers between countries.¹⁴ While this mechanism is envisioned to fast-track BRICS trade, it is unclear how the working group expands South Africa's access to BRICS markets as South African exports to BRICS partners stand at a substantial deficit. A meeting held in India in 2021 focused on the TRIPS waiver,¹⁵ consumer protection in e-commerce, resolutions on non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, mechanisms on sanitary and phytosanitary mechanisms, protecting traditional knowledge and related genetic materials, and creating a clear mechanism on co-operation in professional services.¹⁶ In addition, tourism has taken a back seat due to the Covid pandemic, with annual ministerial meetings having agreed to a new strategy, Green Tourism, to resuscitate this sector. Tourism makes a consistent appearance on the BRICS annual declarations and may be closely linked to South Africa's 2018 recommendations emphasizing the place of conservation and sustainable tourism. Another recommendation made in the 2018 Johannesburg declaration was the BRICS Customs Training Centre, which was created in India, with the first meeting for customs experts held in 2021. The gains in the work done by government-to-government entities, or track 1 diplomacy, are easier to conclude and track. While they speak to an innovative list of cooperation topics, the more substantial gains that speak to the maturity of the BRICS partnership may be located in the other tracks of diplomacy.

Multi-track diplomacy, a driver for BRICS centres of excellence

The more tangible examples of BRICS initiatives are cases where multiple tracks of diplomacy can build synergistically, such as a vaccine centre and the NDB. The [BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre](#), launched in March 2022, is one of the goals noted in the 2018 Johannesburg Declaration and encourages cooperation on track 1 and track 2. This centre has a virtual infrastructure and is a joint venture between national centres: Brazil's Immunobiological Technology Institute (Biomanguinhos), Russia's Smorodintsev Research Institute of Influenza, the Indian Council of Medical Research, China's Sinovac Life Sciences, and the South African Medical Research Council pivoting off of the South African Network for Genomic Surveillance. For now, the BRICS vaccine centre will contribute to basic research, preclinical and clinical vaccine studies, and strengthen BRICS countries' laboratory capacities to develop and standardise assays for testing vaccine candidates¹⁷ with the goal of one day including diagnostics and therapeutics.

14 BRICS, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, India, '[Meeting of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade issues](#)', press release, July 20, 2021.

15 A TRIPS waiver removes protections on imports and exports of intellectual property, which provides partners an opportunity to produce products themselves.

16 BRICS, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, India, '[1st meeting of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues](#)', press release no. 24, March, 2021.

17 Government of the Republic of South African, Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Innovation, Minister Blade Nzimande, '[Launch of BRICS Vaccine R&D Centre initiative](#)' (March 22, 2022).

The NDB is another example of a successful BRICS institution, one that has a physical presence in Shanghai, Johannesburg, Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Moscow. It was up and running as soon as it was established and managed to create a joint corporate identity that aligned with BRICS government guidelines. The NDB model manages to experiment in a structured manner and draw from engagements in finance among the BRICS to create a practical solution with political implications for alternative understandings of how development finance should be approached and what a complementary socio-economic model could look like.¹⁸ This model itself is not perfect, and the BRICS can learn that ‘non-interference or respecting sovereignty’ may have financial implications for the BRICS. However, it is one of the avenues of the BRICS partnership with the most potential to experiment with alternative development finance interpretations and take on new membership. As a commercial bank, expansion of the bank was always part of the vision. Before opening up membership in 2021 and welcoming Bangladesh, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay, the BRICS were circumspect in how geopolitics impacted on their political leverage within the bank. For example, India was concerned about increased competition for available funds and only once it had received enough project funding was it open to additional membership. Russia may have been wary of welcoming members that could implement sanctions against it for the situation in Crimea.¹⁹ A bigger success, linked to the three tracks of diplomacy, has been the ability to integrate into the NDB. For example, track 1 initially set policy and staffed the NDB at executive level, track 2 incorporated suppliers for the bank at business level, and academics frequently comment on its activities. Track 3 pushes for more inclusion and accountability from the bank in terms of the projects that it undertakes. However, it is vital to further strengthen the civil society window of engagement.²⁰

Another element that was not necessarily given a particular benchmark, but receives frequent acknowledgment is academic diplomacy and migration within BRICS countries. All BRICS members offer academic mobility through various scholarships and grants, encouraging undergraduate study for short- or long-term periods, as well as research. Academic migration holds unique potential because of the value of communication and dissemination, as well as for research and development, and increasing gross domestic product, among the BRICS and their respective regions. However, this needs effective monitoring and evaluation whereby member countries agree on the respective categories and record figures within the annual statistical BRICS report.

18 Marina Larionova, “The rise of new institutions”, in *BRICS and Global Governance*, eds. Marina Larionova and John Kirton (London: Routledge, 2018); Alexandra Morozkina, “The New Development Bank in the global financial and economic architecture”, in *BRICS and Global Governance*, eds. Marina Larionova and John Kirton (London: Routledge, 2018).

19 Before the Russia-Ukraine war, which broke out in 2022, Russia’s invasion and annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in south Ukraine in 2014 was met with immense consternation by the international community. This had triggered three rounds of sanctions against Russia from 2014-2021 and featured on the foreign policy agendas of NATO members. There may have been a concern from Russia that the potential new members would be used as leverage by sanctioning countries to implement further sanctions.

20 Costa Vazquez, Interview.

Bottlenecks to people-to-people exchange

The BRICS declarations often reflect upon how countries are able to relate through sport, culture and film, and access to socio-economic welfare nets. However, the opportunities to reflect upon the mechanisms that are in place for this exchange are lacking. BRICS is moving towards more formalized, institutionalized methods of engagement. As much as BRICS networks have expanded, bottlenecks to streamlined track 2 and track 3 contributions to the agenda are vested in the people-to-people connection. It was envisaged that track 2 and track 3 would have a greater impact on driving the BRICS agenda from the bottom up.

However, track 2 does not have much impact on BRICS decision-making processes and, as such, closer cooperation between the national coordinators and the Sherpas/Sous-Sherpas of the BRICS countries is vital.

Track 3 needs a more sustainable common platform for information exchange and better coordination of projects and initiatives with a particular agenda. In addition, there is a desire to catalogue NGOs and civil society organizations as well as existing projects and programs. However, there still needs to be a common framework on the modalities of what institutionalization means for civil society. These tracks are still experiencing teething issues; there is a desire to innovate as well as prove its utility and so the multitude of additional fora and meetings (both official and unofficial) make the people-to-people exchanges somewhat less effective. If there was more evidence of influence from track 2 and track 3, the BRICS process might gain more legitimacy and prove the assertion that BRICS is supported by a strong people-to-people component.

At present, the BRICS grouping experiences language barriers. The people-to-people pillar of cooperation is concentrated among elite circles or those who engage in the various tracks of diplomacy, so BRICS' vision of all citizens being able to benefit from the partnership is vested in the BRICS countries' abilities to localize the outcomes of the partnership. Strong meta narratives of civilization, especially for China, India and Russia, are one common people-to-people unifying factor. While this may not impact relations between BRICS members, the use of a narrative that provides an all-encompassing account explaining history, experiences and phenomena as particular truths, or values of countries, may pose a danger of legitimizing or romanticizing countries' actions. South Africa's referral to the spirit of Ubuntu, rainbow nationalism and pan-Africanism²¹ is an attempt to link to a meta narrative. However, in this context the current exigencies would mean that the process is somewhat disingenuous to the current challenges that South Africans and Africans experience.

21 Ubuntu is an African word found across several African cultures and language groups meaning 'humanity to others, it calls collectively to the common humanity in others by expressing that "I am what I am because of who we all are". The Rainbow Nation is a phrase coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu as a call to unity among South Africans of all races in the newly democratized South Africa. Pan-Africanism found its origins in calls to unite all Africans in Africa and around the world against imperial and colonial oppression.

Conclusion

How successful has South Africa been in achieving progress on its 2018 Johannesburg Declaration agenda? Although countries gain credit for achieving specific agenda items during their presidencies, or notoriety for failing to, the leaders of the BRICS claim this as a collective gain.²² Therefore, to measure the potential gains of BRICS countries during their respective presidencies, it is more practical to consider the ease with which they may catalyse the BRICS relationship for domestic priorities.

There is a critical tone already among public intellectuals and political parties in South Africa as to what value the BRICS relationship brings when South Africa risks being drawn into the geopolitics of larger member countries, especially in the context where BRICS members China and Russia have been rebuked for human rights violations and attempting to circumvent international law.²³ It was a milestone for South Africa to be included in the BRICS club and have the opportunity to contribute to and set the agenda amongst some of the most illustrious emerging and established powers. However, it has also been widely alleged that it did not succeed in igniting the South African economy due to its structural shortcomings, and further entrenched existing extractive industries and elites. Membership did not cement South Africa's leadership role as a middle power or emerging middle power with regional leadership aspirations.²⁴

In the next decade of BRICS it may be harder to reach common agendas, however, because of the geopolitical context, and this is where the value of synergies with multi-track diplomacy lie

How will what successes the 2018 chairship did deliver feed into South Africa's imminent BRICS presidency in 2023? South Africa is not likely to fix its internal exigencies that act as bottlenecks to mobilizing South Africa's political and economic potential, though the growth of institutionalization within BRICS will be steady. The government-to-government agenda may add certain elements and contribute to sectoral meetings because of the ministerial network that has been established. In the next decade of BRICS it may be harder to reach common agendas,²⁵ however, because of the geopolitical context, and this is where the value of synergies with multi-track diplomacy lie.

22 Gorbacheva, Interview.

23 Naidu & Mthembu, Interview.

24 Phillip Nel, "South Africa, BRICS, and Global Governance How SA Tried to Change the World and Succeeded in Changing Itself", (Working Paper, 2017).

25 Costa Vazquez, Interview.

Recommendations

- The BRICS have established an extensive network that contributes to multiple tracks of diplomacy. It is of paramount importance to encourage synergies between the tracks of diplomacy. A challenge remains in that engagement among BRICS countries is still event-driven and a deeper synergy would require deepening bilateral relationships, while encouraging common 'golden threads' between the three tracks of diplomacy. BRICS experts recommend that coordinators at government-to-government level need more efficient delegation to prevent duplication, as well as better management of track expectations to ensure inclusiveness and performance in the overall dialogue.
- The BRICS grouping stresses the importance of alternative visions for global governance, especially where individual countries tend to engage according to their unique perspectives. Examples of this potential are seen in the formation and functioning of the NDB. As norm entrepreneurship is an important part of South Africa's foreign policy, it should set a particular tone for how a country system should be upheld in a multilateral context and how it is also internally accountable to its citizens. However, inhibiting this are domestic or internal exigencies, and respective government ministries such as the National Treasury should be more supportive in sharing information in the public interest.
- South African policy makers are actively engaged in crafting relevant agendas. However, more communication is needed for South Africans to comprehend what BRICS strategy exists and how the South African bureaucratic machinery will be utilized to achieve its national interest.
- While cooperation exists at government-to-government level, there is an opportunity to strengthen how the BRICS countries relate to each other on multilateral fora. The continued repetition of the mantra that BRICS does not replace Bretton Woods institutions but attempts to find more inclusive ways of engagement, is vital to understanding the need for better coordination at the level of the WTO, the World Health Organisation and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change through respective countries' ministries.

Annex 1

Stakeholder consultations

Interviews (April 2022)

- 1 Sanusha Naidu and Philani Mthembu
- 2 Peter Fabricius
- 3 Bhaso Nzendze
- 4 Karen Costa Vazquez
- 5 Sachin Chaturvedi and Sabaysachi Saha
- 6 Valeriia Gorbacheva

Guiding Questions: Please feel free to take an analytical perspective or a country-specific perspective.

- How do changing global dynamics impact on BRICS and their cooperation on multilateral fora? In the next decade are we seeing a trend where neutrality is still an option?
- What centres of excellence (ie. the NDB, vaccine centres, women's business fora) stand out and why?
- What is the usefulness of BRICS? Where are the bottlenecks to achieving closer cooperation?
- Where are the bottlenecks in track 2 and 3 diplomacy?
- What are the more significant contributions of each country?
- Are country systems effective?

Annex 2

Overview of Johannesburg Declaration (2018) priorities and successes

The 2018 Johannesburg Declaration highlighted a list of gains and commitments:

- Creating a BRICS Energy Research and Cooperation Platform inclusive of Terms of Reference.
- Launching multilateral negotiations on the suppression of chemical and biological terrorism.
- Creating a framework on security for the use of information and communication technologies.
- Engaging in partnerships on the New Industrial Revolution inclusive of Terms of Reference and Work Plan aligned to the 4th Industrial Revolution priorities of BRICS.
- Launching a New Development Bank regional office in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
- Launching the BRICS Customs Training Centres within the Strategic Framework of BRICS Customs Administration [and Cooperation].
- Creating a BRICS Working Group on Tourism.
- Strengthening cooperation around disaster management and collaboration on the Oceans Economy.
- Making progress with the BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund.
- Operationalizing the BRICS Economic Partnership through the Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues.
- Strengthening cooperation in regional aviation.

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Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Sanusha Naidu, Dr. Philani Mthembu, Peter Fabricius, Prof. Bhaso Nzendze, Prof. Karen Costa Vazquez, Prof. Sachin Chaturvedi, Dr. Sabaysachi Saha and Valeriia Gorbacheva for sharing their expert insights.

SAIIA gratefully acknowledges the support of the South African BRICS Think Tank and the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences for this publication.

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