With footage of the public execution of civilians in Nigeria by Islamic State-West Africa Province (IS-WAP) circulating in the media yet again, severe security concerns emerge as Islamic State’s (IS) most active affiliate in sub-Saharan Africa overruns military bases and terrorises local populations. This article explores how IS-WAP reshapes battlefield dynamics with advanced weaponry and assesses its positioning in the broader landscape of jihadi expansion in West Africa.
The landscape of the wider Sahel comprises a variety of militant Islamist and armed groups, with the most operationally active ones being IS-WAP, Islamic State-Sahel Province (IS-SP) and al-Qa’ida affiliate JNIM. In 2024 alone, IS-WAP executed at least 400 attacks across Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, targeting military bases, infrastructure and garrison towns. Despite Abuja’s efforts, IS-WAP sustained a high operational tempo in the north-east, conducting at least 233 attacks in Nigeria and neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon in the first half of 2025.
Simultaneously, IS-WAP’s closest splinter group, IS-SP, aims for regional expansion, consolidating its foothold in the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. IS-WAP reportedly facilitates supply networks with IS-SP, transferring weapons, fighters, supplies and machinery. With militant Islamist activity in both the north-east and the north-west, Abuja finds itself positioned in an increasingly complicated domestic and regional security environment.
Once part of Boko Haram, IS-WAP has had a presence in the region since 2016, with between 7 000 and 12 000 fighters, according to the latest estimates. IS-WAP first showed the extent of its capabilities between 2018 and 2019, launching multiple offensives against military bases and seizing weapons and ammunition to boost its arsenal. Unlike Boko Haram, IS-WAP initially employed a ‘Winning hearts and minds’ campaign – a strategy under which the military and security forces constitute primary targets while attacks against Muslim civilians are held off, with the aim of gaining influence over the local population. Presenting itself as an alternative to the state in under-controlled areas allows IS-WAP to compensate for its lack of permanent territorial control, focus on entrenchment into the local economy and penetrate the society.
With operational guidance from the IS core leadership in Iraq and Syria, in 2021 IS-WAP advanced militarily and absorbed a major part of Boko Haram. The same year, IS-WAP underwent major restructuring, potentially explaining the group’s resilience amid pressure from Abuja and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). IS-WAP’s command-and-control structure was reorganised from the Shura Council to four branches: Lake Chad, Timbuktu, Sambiosa Forest and Tunbuna.
As early as 2022, IS-WAP started using surveillance drones to gather intelligence and plan its operations, moving to weaponising drones. The 24 December 2024 attack on the military base in Wajiroko, Borno state, marked the first use of drones in direct combat in the region. Not long before, IS-WAP’s Lake Chad Basin branch had undergone a leadership change. The new leadership was tasked with executing at least four large-scale attacks on military targets in one month, which in retrospect explains the ongoing campaign targeting military bases.
Shortly after IS instructors from the Middle East were reportedly deployed to support IS-WAP tactically in the Lake Chad Basin, IS-WAP demonstrated an ability to launch near-simultaneous attacks on military bases in Borno state in January 2025. These developments show both the IS-WAP’s strong connection to the core organisation in the Middle East and project an element of operational learning. The rate of attacks in IS-WAP’s ‘Burning of the camps’ campaign, launched in February 2025, indicates that the group gained enough experience to employ sophisticated military tactics, experiment with delivery methods, execute large-scale coordinated attacks on hard military targets and, most importantly, adapt their warfare. With at least 26 military bases overrun since the start of the campaign, IS-WAP is currently enjoying the most operational success in its history.
In Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad Basin, IS-WAP is expected to continue launching mid- to large-scale attacks targeting under-staffed military bases and garrison towns. As Abuja’s resources remain stretched, the expanding security vacuum along the Nigeria–Niger border risks attracting more fighters to the region. The 2023 coup d’etat in Niger prompted a fall-out/exacerbated already-tense relations between Abuja and Niamey and the consequent exit of Niger from the MNJTF in April 2025. As a result, the logistic routes connecting IS-WAP and IS-SP face comparatively less military pressure, which simplifies cross-border mobility.
Although there is a low possibility that IS-WAP and IS-SP are aiming to connect their areas of operation, the transfer of weapons – drones in particular – between the two constitutes a major security concern. As history shows, IS and its affiliates have developed a high degree of operational learning and adaptability. If one affiliate has advanced weaponry, the one geographically closest to it might shortly obtain it or at least receive training to operate it. Given the close ties between IS-WAP and IS-SP, there is a high chance that the tri-border area will soon see an upsurge in drone attacks. IS-SP’s biggest rival – JNIM – started using drones in 2023 in Mali and Burkina Faso. Hence, it would be logical to assume that, in competition for influence in the area, IS-SP will seek to expand its arsenal with the logistic assistance of IS-WAP.
As JNIM and IS-SP entrench in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and expand southwards towards Benin, Togo and Ghana, regional security continues to deteriorate. IS-WAP’s resurgence therefore constitutes a wider trend of jihadi group expansion in West Africa exacerbated by the withdrawal of French and other foreign troops after the series of coups d’etat in the Sahel. The poorly functioning regional security architecture prompts local populations to join jihadi groups in search of safety and stability. To prevent a further transnational spillover of the threat, efforts should be made to revitalise regional security and intelligence cooperation both in the Lake Chad Basin and in the Sahel.
