Mozambicans went to the polls on 9 October to elect a new national government. Provincial elections took place at the same time with results expected to be announced on 24 October. International observers have noted several irregularities around the poll and days before results are expected to be announced, the killing of a representative of and lawyer associated with the Podemos party has put a stain on the upcoming announcement of results.
Key issues for voters included poverty and economic inequalities but one of the largest looming concerns has been the continued Islamist insurgency in the northern Cabo Delgado province compounded by the repercussions of the recent withdrawal of regional response forces from the area. Armed forces from several countries in the region have assisted the government of Mozambique with combating violent extremism in the province since 2021. Little tangible progress has been made and the violence continues. A review of the consequences of this withdrawal seems particularly pertinent.
More than a million people have been displaced due to the extremist violence although around 600 000 have returned to their communities finding critical infrastructure in a terrible state of disrepair. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) formally concluded its operations in Cabo Delgado on 15 July after three extensions since its launch in July 2021. The withdrawal of the mission was both inevitable and lamentable due to financial constraints and ineffective coordination, leaving behind a series of controversial legacies.
Comprising troops from eight SADC countries, SAMIM worked alongside and complemented the efforts of the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) and troops from Rwanda. SAMIM aimed to combat extremism and stabilise the region, which has been plagued by extremist Islamic Jihad insurgencies since 2017, particularly by the Ahlu Sunnah Waljama’a Islamist militant group. The complexities of the local situation defy a simple two-part categorisation, which tends to simplify the matter either as popular discontent with the squeezing of abundant local natural resources by elites and transnational corporations or as religious extremism that echoes the global wave of Islamic jihad.
Various studies debating the conflict’s socio-economic origins have pointed to the diversity of the factors involved. While religious factors indeed played a role in the making of extremist mindsets, especially for those in leadership positions, Feijó highlighted the lure of secular rewards for ordinary rebels such as immediate financial gains and revenge for state violence. Further, Forquilha and Pereira detailed more specific prerequisites underlying the Al Shabaab group’s (separate from the group by the same name in Somalia) appeal to local youths, including poverty and unemployment, race-based identity issues and the ‘porous nature’ of cross-border jihadist networks, especially with Tanzania whose territory has been used by such networks for recruitment and illicit trade.
The transnational nature of terrorism became increasingly worrisome after ISIS claimed responsibility for several incidents of violence in Cabo Delgado in 2019. The extremist organisation is driven to manipulate and protract the local armed conflicts and to resume control of the largely illegal lucrative trade routes that arise out of locally mined gas and minerals. This reality generates anxiety within SADC and it was against this backdrop that SAMIM was deployed to counter the potential spillover effects of terrorism.
As a coordinated regional response to terrorism, SAMIM set out ambitious goals for its short mandate, which can be roughly summarised as three-fold: 1) support the FADM to neutralise violent extremism and restore regional security; 2) cut off the link between the insurgents in Cabo Delgado and those in other ISIS establishments to avoid knock-on implications for regional security; 3) provide humanitarian assistance to the local population, including internally displaced persons.
As appealing as these commitments may sound, practical constraints weighed heavily on the operations on the ground, particularly in financial and political terms. The chronic lack of financial and equipment support faced by SAMIM is a result of overdependence on South Africa whose already modest defence spending has been on the decline in recent years. SAMIM was also caught up in a series of tensions between SADC and the Mozambican government since its inception, primarily due to the Filipe Nyusi Administration’s concerns over SADC’s lack of preparedness and ineffective coordination. This lack of trust impeded effective information sharing and the coordination of joint operations.
These constraints ultimately led to the phasing out of SAMIM, which was completed in mid-July. Here it was notable the way SADC pre-determined the date of the withdrawal, announcing it during the SADC Troika in July 2023 rather than assessing the de facto security and governance situation in the theatre of operations. In fact, the number of attacks recorded this year so far has surpassed the total for the previous year and the number of internally displaced persons in many parts of Cabo Delgado, such as Chiure, Mecufi and Ancuabe has risen since December 2023. Given the surge in armed conflicts and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Cabo Delgado over the last two years, the timing of the withdrawal has not been ideal and potentially left behind a security void in the already unstable region. Though local troops and the Rwandan Security Forces are expected to step in, it is also likely that insurgents will cast a covetous eye and aim to extend their reach to fill the gap. South Africa, Angola and Botswana have withdrawn their forces deployed in Cabo Delgado while Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania have maintained a presence.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to point out that, however complex the tug-of-war may be, it fundamentally relates to the most superficial aspect of the Cabo Delgado turmoil, namely the armed conflict itself. Insufficient attention has been geared towards analysing why the youths were enticed to join the jihad and how to address more socially rooted causes of the insurgencies. Moreover, while blame-shifting seems to be a convenient strategy when there are so many parties involved, it has also caused the Mozambican government to shy away from the governance roles that it was supposed to assume regardless of foreign military presence.
It is a well-known fact that governments’ responsiveness to the needs of their citizens is key in combating jihadist extremism. Mozambique is among the poorest countries in the world and its people are in desperate need of governance that leads to development, poverty alleviation and improved economic prospects. For this to be realised, the country needs peace. Its government will no-doubt have to ramp up efforts to put an end to the insurgency.
