Every February in Cape Town, mining executives, investors, government officials, civil society representatives and others gather for the Investing in Africa Mining Indaba. It is the largest gathering of mining sector stakeholders on the continent, drawing stakeholders not only from Africa but also from those regions with strategic interests here. It is, first and foremost, an investment conference – governments and companies are here to market themselves and make deals. While the drive for investment and profit is clearly at the fore, governance and sustainability questions, even geopolitics, weave themselves into almost every conversation.
SAIIA has been supporting enhanced governance of Africa’s mineral resources for several years. We are proud to serve as the technical partner for the AU’s African Green Mineral Observatory, a platform seeking to support knowledge and engagement on Africa’s green (or critical) minerals. The guiding objective of our work is to support the realisation of the African Mining Vision and the African Green Mineral Strategy. These continental frameworks speak to Africa’s desire to link its mineral wealth to growth and industrialisation on the continent in a way that benefits local economies, while protecting communities directly affected by the social and environmental consequences of mining.
Here are five issues that we will be watching closely at this year’s Mining Indaba.
1. Bringing Out the (hopefully metaphorical) Gig Guns: How Is Geopolitics Shaping Africa’s Critical Minerals?
The US National Security Strategy, published just a few months ago, makes it clear that critical minerals are central to its engagement with Africa. Just days ago, the Trump administration launched ‘Project Vault,’ an effort to build a strategic stockpile of critical minerals, promote domestic minerals processing and ensure secure mineral supply agreements. Europe has its Critical Raw Materials Act and the recently launched RESourceEU Action Plan. India, Saudi Arabia there is a growing list of countries eager to reduce their dependence on Chinese-dominated mineral supply chains. They are all eyeing Africa’s abundant critical minerals. Africa can use this newfound leverage to secure deals that speak to its own priorities but, of course, there’s also the risk that the continent becomes the trampled grass under the feet of fighting geopolitical elephants. On this point, research by SAIIA on the geopolitics of critical minerals has shown that, despite the minerals-focused development plans designed by African policymakers, the critical minerals debate is frequently dominated by the needs and priorities of external actors.
- Beyond their obvious self-interest in securing critical mineral supplies, what will the US, the EU and other major geopolitical players concretely bring to the table in order to secure win–win mineral deals in Africa?
- To what extent can African governments negotiate astutely to ensure a good deal for the continent, or will opaque deals leave a few African elites wealthier at the expense of their citizens?
- How will China respond to other geopolitical players actively trying to court its partners in Africa? Will they be pushed towards partnerships that will see more mineral processing and industrial linkages taking place in Africa?
2. Beyond the Easy Excuses: Are Efforts to Bring More of the Mineral Value Chain to Africa Showing Concrete Results?
Africa has long been clear that it is not satisfied with simply being a source of minerals that are shipped out and processed elsewhere. Despite its vision of tying its mineral wealth more directly to industrialisation and development on the continent, results have been less than impressive. For example, research by the World Bank shows that the legacy of Africa’s previous commodity boom was largely one of missed opportunity, where significant revenues were not converted into sustainable and diversified prosperity. Mining executives say that they are in the business of getting minerals out of the ground; they are the wrong people to speak to about downstream value addition. Foreign governments claim they would love to help but can’t do much to promote investment until critical skills, infrastructure and an adequate and reliable energy supply are in place. Then there’s the question of Africa being a ‘high-risk’ place to do business. There is growing recognition that credit ratings agencies have not been treating Africa fairly – all risk on the continent is, of course, not simply a perception problem, but there are real challenges with how risk is assessed in Africa, which has direct impacts on access to finance and investment. Now, concrete steps are being taken to address this, from the Africa Credit Rating Agency, set to launch later this year, to the Africa Investment Guarantee Agency, set up by the African Development Bank and the Financing Africa Forward Initiative. Energy has been a particularly difficult barrier to minerals processing on the continent (the Mozal aluminium smelter in Mozambique may shut down this year over energy pricing issues and many South African smelters are at risk of closing down due to energy constraints). Yet in some instances those excuses are not accepted. In Zimbabwe, when energy supplies for mineral processing were not available to Chinese mining firms, they simply built the needed power plants themselves.
- To what extent will we see concrete steps being taken to overcome the barriers to investment in African minerals-based industrialisation, including addressing Africa’s risk premium?
- How will companies and foreign powers collaborate with Africa to address the energy constraints holding back domestic minerals processing? How will social equity dimensions be navigated (for example, new energy investments to power mines and smelters while 600 million Africans lack access to electricity)?
- If, indeed, we do see heightened investment in African energy infrastructure driven by mining and mineral processing, to what extent will this be driven by wind, solar and hydro, as opposed to investment in coal-based power plants or other fossil fuel-based power?
3. The Great Race in the Great Lakes: Will Infrastructure Serve Africa’s Interests?
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a minerals powerhouse in Africa. It is also the centre of one of Africa’s longest-standing and devastating conflicts. We will have to see whether the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity – signed in December 2025 between the DRC and Rwanda and mediated by the Trump administration – will bear fruit. Meanwhile, the US and EU are touting their support for the Lobito Corridor, a rail project running from the DRC and Zambia to the Angolan port of Lobito, as a sign of their commitment to revitalising Africa’s infrastructure. China, for its part, is supporting the upgrading of the TAZARA railway line that runs from the same region to Dar es Salaam on Africa’s east coast. Meanwhile, West Africa has several significant transport infrastructure projects, including the Kano–Maradi Railway and the TransGuinean Railway Corridor. Getting minerals out of Africa as cheaply and efficiently as possible is a big part of the rationale for these investments, but what of the continent’s hopes to process these minerals domestically? Research shows that the outcomes of these types of projects have historically been mixed.
- What progress will be announced on existing transport infrastructure projects and what new projects may be announced? To what extent are these projects structured to bring broader benefits to Africa, beyond serving as funnels for mineral exports?
- To what extent are infrastructure investments coupled with requirements or incentives to reorient mineral exports towards those countries supporting these investments? Will mineral exports simply continue to go to the most efficient producer (China), even when they are transported via EU- and US-backed infrastructure projects like the Lobito Corridor?
4. Regional Value Chains: Can a Longer View Overcome Short-term National Interests?
The challenge is not simply producing a widget – it is the ability to produce that widget competitively, at a price at which it can be sold. Here, China has massive advantages related to economies of scale and abundant, cheap energy. It has long been recognised that Africa’s only hope of competing is by working collaboratively, developing regional value chains. In the past few years there has been much excitement around the Zambia–DRC agreement to develop a regional battery value chain, yet this initiative seems to have lost momentum recently. Signing an agreement is one thing, but when the difficult questions come up – where will the smelter or factory be built, who will be employed there, how will the energy be supplied and at what price – short-term national interests can easily scupper these regional initiatives. Research has shown that, while regional cooperation can enhance prospects for mineral value addition in Africa, national governments often face domestic pressures to retain control over resources and jobs locally, even if domestic projects are not always feasible or would not generate as many benefits as regional projects.
- Will substantive progress on the DRC–Zambia battery minerals agreement be shared at the Indaba?
- What new initiatives or agreements are emerging as the basis for potential regional value chain development?
- What concrete support are international institutions and foreign partners (particularly the US, EU and China) offering to support regional mineral value chains in Africa?
- What specific roles do actors such as governments, regional bodies and private sector actors need to play if they are to overcome the political economy barriers to greater regional cooperation?
5. Parallel universes: Will there be a crossover between the Mining Indaba and the Alternative Mining Indaba?
While business suites dominate at the Mining Indaba, across town another set of stakeholders convene each year for the Alternative Mining Indaba, a civil society-led initiative that focuses on the costs, both social and environmental, that come with the exploitation (some would say plundering) of Africa’s mineral wealth. Over the years, there’s been relatively little crossover between these discussions. Civil society has largely been excluded from the Mining Indaba due to the high registration costs, while mining executives have been leery of facing often angry civil society organisations in the less stage-managed atmosphere of the Alternative Mining Indaba. In recent years, some government officials and members of larger international organisations have spent time at the Alternative Mining Indaba – there were even a few World Bank representatives who waded through a fairly hostile reception to speak to the bank’s efforts to support more responsible mining on the continent. Generally, however, crossover has been limited. Last year, the Mining Indaba made an effort to bring communities and traditional leaders more directly into the discussion with the launch of the Communities Interactive Workshop. It is also noticeable that registration for this year’s Indaba includes a category for communities, indicating that participation is free (although who decides which civil society applications are approved remains opaque).
- To what extent will community participation at the main Indaba be curated and stage-managed?
- Which government and private sector stakeholders will engage civil society organisations in the more unstructured environment of the Alternative Mining Indaba?
- What are civil society organisations, including think tanks and policy researchers, doing to deliberately involve private sector actors in their discussions, so as to bridge the gap between these separate discussions?
Learn more about SAIIA’s work on extractive industries here.
