Ongoing unrest across Mozambique since October’s general elections has occupied news reports and international relations desks. Called fraudulent by Mozambican civil society, with observer missions noting irregularities, the elections have been positioned in analyses at the centre of what has been driving ongoing public demonstrations, now in their fourth month.
The reality is not that simple. The elections may have sparked higher-than-average levels of protest action, but they are not the key driver. The public outcry is, in fact, rooted in a deeper dissatisfaction with ruling party Frelimo’s extended governance – in power since independence from Portugal in 1975 – amid declining standards of living.
Roughly two-thirds of Mozambique’s population are under the age of 25, but prospects for youth in the country are bleak. In an Afrobarometer survey, respondents aged 18-35 years ranked rising unemployment and access to water and electricity as the country’s three most important problems. Limited health services and a lack of infrastructure development were also singled out.
Reliant on Aid
Underlining these challenges, Mozambique ranked 177th out of 183 on the 2023 Global Youth Development Index on “youth education, employment, health and wellbeing, equality and inclusion, peace and security, and political and civic participation” – the worst of all SADC states.
The country also ranks among the lowest on the 2024 Human Development Index (183rd out of 193) and, despite its abundant natural resources, primarily coal and minerals, remains one of the world’s poorest nations, reliant on foreign aid.
Poverty levels have risen from 46% to 65% over the past decade, according to the government in its National Development Strategy 2025-2044. The plan attributes this rise to “lower than expected economic growth [having] resulted in lower investment, higher unemployment, and a reduction in the government’s capacity to finance social programmes and essential infrastructure” between 2015 and 2023.
This lack of capacity has been exacerbated by government corruption, most notably the hidden debt scandal. International media in 2016 revealed that between 2013 and 2014, a clique of government officials created three state-owned enterprises that took on $2.2 billion of debt, ostensibly for a project involving tuna fishing and maritime security.
The loans were backed by undisclosed state guarantees, and a large part of the money went missing. The discovery triggered a collapse in the local currency, a sovereign default, and the suspension of budgetary support from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. While budgetary support resumed from 2021, delays in developing Mozambique’s liquefied natural gas fields, a downturn in the tourism sector amid the Covid-19 pandemic, limited investment in the agricultural sector, and high debt repayments have meant that the economy has struggled to recover.
Private sector corruption has also undermined growth in Mozambique. Tax avoidance on the part of extractive companies is a longstanding issue noted by civil society, compounded by political patronage networks that permeate the business sector.
These dynamics have significantly eroded support for Frelimo, particularly among young voters, who regard its liberation credentials as much less important than those of older generations. Opposition politician and 2024 presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane effectively capitalised on this discontent to mobilise citizens against electoral fraud.
Allegations of Fraud
It is not the first time that Mondlane has stood up to Frelimo or rallied voters to his side. In the 2023 local elections, Mondlane – then part of the other opposition party, Renamo – lost the race for the mayorship of Maputo to Frelimo’s candidate, with a parallel vote count suggesting vote tampering.
Mondlane organised street demonstrations, voicing discontent at the alleged fraud with backing from young voters.
Mozambique’s post-colonial history is littered with allegations of fraud and electoral misconduct. Recorded incidents date back to the country’s first multiparty elections in 1994, with the most publicised incident in the 1999 general elections when Renamo uncovered flaws in the voter registration process.
In a study of 25 years of elections in Mozambique, the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) concluded that the ruling party has been “protected by a total secrecy not acceptable in normal electoral democracies”. In its assessment, Frelimo has effectively been employing “the electoral system to maintain power, while convincing Mozambicans and the international community that voting could bring change”.
Frelimo also has a history of mobilising security forces to crackdown on protests and stifle media freedom, including the assassination of journalists.
This high level of frustration at the most recent electoral irregularities can therefore be understood as the spark that ignited wider, ongoing unrest related to longstanding grievances around socioeconomic woes and distrust of Frelimo. The violent response from the police towards protesters, which resulted in over 300 deaths and the assassination on 18 October 2024 of Mondlane’s lawyer and a candidate belonging to political party Podemos (which supported Mondlane’s bid for the presidency), further inflamed the unrest.
The December 2024 decision by the Constitutional Court to uphold Frelimo’s victory and pave the way for its presidential candidate Daniel Chapo to become the next head of state has kept tensions high. Renewed protests since January 2025 against the tolling system on the N4, the main access road into Maputo, underline this ongoing frustration towards Frelimo and the state, which are regarded as one and the same by many citizens.
Protests have also been directed towards private sector companies in recent months, indicating that it has inspired citizens to advocate for their rights outside of the elections – and not wait for the state to stand up for them.
Not Business as Usual
In December, in Nampula province, workers protested against Irish company Kenmare at its mining site over the lack of construction of a promised bridge. That same month, in Cabo Delgado province, citizens gathered near French hydrocarbons major TotalEnergies’ Afungi site to protest over a violation of land rights.
In both instances, the companies yielded. More recently, in January, residents of Chongoene district in Gaza province forced the stoppage of construction work on the local port terminal, citing Chinese company Desheng Port’s failure to electrify part of the district.
It is clear then that it cannot be business as usual for Chapo’s government. Mozambicans want to see real change. Ideally, Chapo should invite Mondlane to the dialogue he has opened with other opposition politicians. He is unlikely to do so, however, probably because Chapo wants to delegitimise Mondlane as a political opponent. But without Mondlane, the ongoing dialogue will be unproductive and highly restricted. South Africa and SADC should promote this dialogue because without it, Mozambique’s future will be marked by instability and, therefore, uncertainty.
Putting Out Fires
Mondlane is a threat to Frelimo’s dominance of the political and economic environment, and Frelimo, like most former liberation movement-turned-ruling parties, closes ranks when it is threatened, rather than opening up debate. Its sister liberation movements within the SADC region typically do the same, meaning they may turn a blind eye to their neighbour for now.
South Africa may eventually be forced to exert pressure on Mozambique if protests block the border post between the two countries again, disrupting critical flows to Maputo Port.
Congestion at South Africa’s ports means that Maputo Port has become a crucial trade link in the region – even for Transnet, which encourages use of the port to ease pressure on it at home. For now, though, it seems like Chapo will focus on putting out fires as they spark, while citizens will continue to take a tougher stance towards the state and business.
This piece draws on the discussion from a webinar hosted by SAIIA on the situation in Mozambique, 29 January 2025.
